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ABSTRACT
Although much has been written about the general relationship between 
democracy and development since the end of the Second World War, a common 
consensus has not emerged to explain the various facets of this relationship. Originally 
defined in purely economic terms, only recently has the concept of development been 
broadened to include the most vital non-economic components under the umbrella of 
‘human development’. Indeed, the UNDP’s first Human Development Report (1990) 
proposed that human development should serve as the yardstick with which to measure 
the progress of nations. Influenced by the post-Cold War euphoria, the accompanying 
political argument, propagated by many international bodies (including the World Bank 
and the UNDP), Western policy-makers and development planners, held that democracy 
and human development are mutually complementary phenomena. To date, however, the 
empirical basis for this view has not been established.
Using data from 123 countries for the 1970-90 period, this thesis represents an 
extensive cross-national, time-series investigation into the nature of the relationship 
between democracy and human development. It will be argued that there are in fact two 
relationships to be established, one between democracy and levels of human development 
and one between democracy and human development performance. This leads to the 
fundamental question: Is democracy typically the by-product of development, the catalyst 
for development, or neither? To answer this, the records of democratic and non- 
democratic states will be evaluated and compared using many different analytical 
techniques, sample groups and controlling variables.
This thesis will also examine other important related concerns, including the 
triangular relationship between democracy, human development and economic growth, 
and the political basis of the best-performing case studies, or ‘developmental states’. 
Several new empirical measures have been constructed specifically for the purposes of 
this research, including a new measure of democracy, the Level of Democracy index 
(LoD), and a new and more comprehensive measure of human development, the 
Integrated Human Development Index (I-HDI).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
“What is a conducive external environment for human development? ”
-1990 Human Development Report
According to the World Bank, the UNDP and many Western academics and 
policy-makers, the short political answer to the above question is ‘democracy’. Indeed, the 
proposition that democracy and human development are mutually complementary 
phenomena is seldom challenged. And yet, crucially, the empirical basis for this conclusion 
has not been sufficiently examined. This thesis will seek to fill this void.
The principal question to be addressed is deceptively straightforward: What is the 
relationship between democracy and human development? Is democracy typically the by­
product of development, the catalyst for development, or neither? In reality, then, there are 
two relationships to be established: between democracy and levels of human development 
and between democracy and human development performance. It is commonly held, in the 
former case, that countries become more democratic as they become more developed, an 
argument which stems back to Upset’s influential hypothesis (1959). In the latter case, the 
prevailing post-Cold War view argues that democracy is also the form of government most 
capable of improving overall living conditions in any given society.
Using data from 123 countries for the 1970-90 period, this thesis will critically 
analyze the various facets of the democracy-human development equation. In doing so, an 
attempt is made to address the problem that “development studies have for too long been 
excluded from mainstream political science” (Leftwich 1993b: 70). To the best of my 
knowledge, this thesis represents the first extensive cross-national, time-series study 
comparing variations in human development levels and performance across political 
systems.
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1.1 Points of Departure: The Emergence of Human Development
There is a broad similarity in the patterns by which human development emerged as 
a central concept in both political science and development studies.1 The beginning of its 
popularity in each discipline may be traced back to the same period, from the mid-1960s to 
the early 1970s, when the concept was embraced by its supporters (political humanists and 
basic needs advocates) as the only morally-justifiable alternative to the perceived ‘value- 
free’, dominant approaches of the day (the political development school and the growth , 
later to be called neo-liberal, paradigm). Over the course of the next two decades, basic 
needs advocates were more successful than political humanists in making an imprint, 
arguably because they backed their arguments with concrete, empirical evidence, while 
political humanists continued to focus on theoretical propositions. Nonetheless, the 
publication of the UNDP’s first Human Development Report in 1990 effectively placed the 
seal of approval on the concept of human development as a tool of analysis in both 
disciplines.
Human Development and Comparative Politics
The idea of placing human development at the forefront of comparative politics is 
certainly not new. Aristotle himself had claimed that one should assess “the ‘difference 
between a good political arrangement and a bad one’ in terms of its success and failure in 
facilitating people’s ability to lead‘flourishing lives’” (quoted in UNDP 1990: 9). This 
argument was taken up in the 1960s by a normative political tradition which postulated that 
“all politics exists for the purpose of progressively removing the most stultifying obstacles 
to a free human development” (Bay 1965: 50). Since it serves as the theoretical inspiration 
behind this thesis, the ‘humanist’ approach will be considered in detail in Chapter 2. Suffice 
it to note here that, in a direct challenge to theorists of political development, who focused 
almost exclusively on the issues of democratization and institutionalization, a new 
perspective was offered based on the precepts outlined in Christian Bay’s celebrated 
passage:
ifvfy own specific interpretation of human development will be outlined during the construction of the 
indices in Chapter3. However, conventional definitions are plentiful. One study suggests that: “it is about 
whetherpeople live and die, whether people eat well, are malnourished or starve...whether their conditions 
of work are tough and unpleasant, whether people have access to work at all, whether people control their 
political lives, whether they have the education to be full members of society with some control over their 
destiny” (Griffin and Knight 1990: 10). Along a similar vein, the UNDP (1990: 1) argues that ‘human 
development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are 
to live a long and healthy life, to be educatedand to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard 
of living”.
11
...the only acceptable justification of government, which also determines the limit to its 
legitimate authority, is its task of serving human needs - serving them better than would 
be done without any government The only justification of a particular form of 
government which again also determines the limits on its legitimate demands on the 
individual’s obedience and loyalty, is that it serves to meet human needs better than other 
forms of government (Bay 1968: 241).
By the late 1970s this perspective had gained considerable currency among 
disaffected academic groups such as the Caucus for a New Political Science, which argued 
quite simply that “We need a different set of standards for judging regimes” (Fitzgerald 
1977a: xiv). But only recently, however, has a broader consensus evolved around the value 
of the concept of human development for political analysis. Why this apparent delay of 
some two decades?
One reason is ideological impasse: all too often, any talk of ‘human needs’ and 
‘improving the human condition’ was dismissed by writers on the Right as concealing a call 
for socialist revolution, whereas notions of ‘individual responsibility’ and ‘capability’ were 
derided by writers on the Left as euphemisms for market forces (Fitzgerald 1977a; Doyal 
and Gough 1984). Instead of evaluating political performance on the basis of actual living 
conditions, which requires an empirical investigation, many writers simply engaged in a 
purely theoretical debate over the desirability of different institutional structures and 
mechanisms (democraticor socialist):
Among the social sciences, political science has...been relatively slow to develop 
empirical knowledge applicable to problems of ends andmeans....(Writers) have for many 
centuries been concerned principally with thought about how a society ought to be 
governed and have neglected the empirical study of how existing societies actually ere 
governed (Bay 1970: 4-5).
A second reason for this past neglect had to do with the fact that, even had the desire 
been there to undertake empirical investigations on any significant scale, researchers were 
hampered by wholly inadequate and insufficient data. While economic indicators - namely 
GDP/GNP per capita - were largely available in cross-national, time-series formats, only a 
few basic social indicators (life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, etc) were available and 
reliable. Although Morris introduced his Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) in the late 
1970s, its limitations (Chapter 3) ensured that no composite measure of well-being 
succeeded in truly capturing the attention of the academic world until the appearance of the 
UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) in 1990.
The publication of the first Human Development Report had a profound and 
immediate impact on virtually every discipline in the social sciences. The seminal role of 
politics was highlighted in particular by the UNDP: “the lack of political commitment, not 
financial resources, is often the real cause of human neglect” (UNDP 1991: 1). From this 
basic premise there followed several pertinent questions requiring further research: Does
12
democracy suggest that “influence does not require affluence... for it is a valuable ally to 
all” (UNDP 1991: 8)?; or is it true that “the right to vote...is of less value to someone who 
is starving or illiterate...(so that) political democracy will be fragile until basic economic 
(and social) rights are guaranteed” (UNDP 1992: 29)?
The introduction of the HDI coincided with a renewed interest in adopting human 
development as a normative standard of evaluation and comparison (Andrain 1994; Blondel 
1995; Diamond 1992; Goulet 1995; Lane and Ersson 1993, 1994; Leftwich 1990; Mayer 
1989; Monshipouri 1995; Schmitz and Gilles 1992; Smith 1996; Sorensen 1993b; Weede 
1993). Mayer (1989: 22), for one, claims that it is time for political scientists to “prescribe 
what should be (in terms of) humanistic values”. Blondel (1995: 60) asks rhetorically 
whether one could not “consider as ‘inalienable’ and universally ‘valuable’ the right to 
strive, the right to achieve, a view which is perhaps not too far from the right to 
‘happiness’”? And Leftwich(1990: 100) urges us to contribute to:
...the great tradition of enquiry into the fundamental issue of all politics in its 
inextractible and interdisciplinary involvement in the economic and social affairs of 
society: how, as human beings, do we live together and how might we do so, while 
seeking simultaneously to promote the collective welfare of all and the individual 
fulfillment and potential of each?
The case for making human development the cornerstone of a new comparative 
politics is self-evident Meaningful cross-national comparisons can only be made if 
performance is evaluated against normative criteria which are, above all, morally compelling 
and universal. As Doyal and Gough (1984: 9) correctly point out “unless there is some 
yardstick - some common denominator which all people share - which can be employed to 
assess the success of particular social practices, then any notion of social progress is itself 
thrown into question”. The only such universally-accepted yardstick is human development 
(Goulet 1968; Park 1984; McGranahan et al 1985). And as a universal goal, human 
development satisfies the essential conditions of being ideologically- and culturally- 
objective (Wiarda 1985a: 8). Every ideology explicitly or implicitly accepts the UNDP’s 
argument for the need to “create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy 
and creative lives” (UNDP 1990:7). Nor is the concept of human development confined to 
one particular cultural tradition, for despite “the diversity of goals across cultures, people 
require certain physical and mental capacities in common to pursue any goals at all” (Miles 
1985: 164).
If human development is the ‘end’, politics is the ‘means’. This argument, the 
essence of the humanist message, implies that democracy, like all forms of government, has 
an instrumental role to fulfil which is quite independent of whatever intrinsic value it may 
have for societies at different stages of development (Chapter 2). In a passage that reflects 
the extent to which contemporary political science has borrowed some of the very 
terminology used by the UNDP, Schmitz and Gilles (1992: xiv) argue that
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Democracy...is judged in the final analysis by how it gets things done and how well it is 
able to serve the common good...The developmental potential of democracy lies in its 
capacity to expand the range of human possibilities and choices, to benefit people as 
persons and as members of communities - in general, to improve the human condition.
Unlike the earlier political humanists, whose lack of any empirical dimension largely 
sidelined their theoretical efforts, contemporary researchers now have the means to bridge 
the gap between theory and practice. Although the HDI is (essentially) a credible tool of 
comparison, this paper will show that it is, upon close inspection, insufficient for the task at 
hand (Chapter 3).
Human Development as the Key Developmental Objective
At roughly the same time that political humanists were stating their case, 
disillusioned writers in the interdisciplinary field of development studies started to ask: 
“What are the necessary conditions for a universally acceptable aim, the realization of the 
human personality” (Seers 1972: 22)? A new approach subsequently emerged arguing that 
“human beings themselves should be the end to which economic development, political 
development and social changes are the means” (Miles 1985: 152). What matters is not 
necessarily how quickly GNP is growing, but to what extent people’s lives are improving:
The goals of development are the goals of existence itself: to provide an opportunity for 
(individuals) to live fully human lives. In other words, development is good if it helps 
individuals live the good life and accelerates the advent of the ‘good society’ (Goulet 
1968: 308).
There has always been an underlying tension between the developmental goals of 
economic growth and human development Indeed, up until a decade ago a debate raged 
within development circles over the priority to be assigned to each. What should come first, 
economic growth or human development? In an ideal world, proponents of each position 
would argue, both could be achieved. But since the attainment of each goal appeared to 
require the adoption of altogether different strategies and policies (growth-oriented or basic 
needs-oriented), initial efforts and resources would have to be channeled towards the 
promotion of one or the other. Two distinctive schools of thought therefore emerged.2
2Some focus on more than two general approaches. Goulet (1995: 85-89) describes four “pathways to 
development”: (1) growth; (2) redistribution with growth; (3) basic human needs; ami (4) development from 
tradition. Approaches (1) and (3) will be looked at specifically. Approach (2) is to some extent a mixture of 
(1) and (3), in that part of the wealth accumulated from growth is invested back into ‘human capital’ via 
expenditures on health and education (although the poor are not specifically targeted). Approach (4) is found 
more on the fringes of academic discourse. This paradigm holds that “the goals of a form of development 
suited to a particular society should be sought from within the latent dynamism of that society’s value 
system - its traditional beliefs, (and)its meaning system...” (ibid: 89).
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The growth (or neo-liberal) paradigm is quite familiar and straightforward. Counting 
the IMF and World Bank as its chief proponents, it holds that the creation of conditions 
required for sustained economic growth should be the immediate developmental objective, 
for as a society enriches itself materially, the benefits of the new-found prosperity will 
eventually trickle down to wider segments of the population. The following passage from 
the 1987 World Development Report summarizes this position:
A fundamental goal of long-term economic development is to improve the welfare of the 
poor. The evidence suggests that in the long term, in most cases, the benefits of 
economic growth are dispersed throughout society and reach its poorest members...Such 
improvements for the poor would not be instantaneous (WorldBank 1987a: 59, Box 4.1).
The central message that ‘everyone benefits, but not right away’ implies a trade-off: “ the 
conventional wisdom among industrial countries as well as policy-makers in developing 
countries has been that things ought to be done ‘one at a time’: first, economic growth; 
second, social equity; third, civil and political liberties” (World Bank 1991a: 137).
In contrast, the ‘basic needs approach’ (BNA),3 with its emphasis on non-economic 
measures of development, foreshadowed contemporary interest in the concept of human 
development (Desai 1991: 352). In his Report to the World Employment Conference of 
1976, an event credited with giving the BNA its initial impetus (Weigel 1989),4 the 
Director-General of the ILO lamented that
Contrary to earlier expectations, the experience of the past two decades has shown that 
rapid growth of aggregate output does not by itself reduce poverty and inequality or 
provide sufficient productive employment within acceptable periods of time...(I)t is no 
longer acceptable in human terms or responsible in political terms to wait several 
generations for the benefits of development to trickle down until they finally reach the 
poorest groups (ILO 1976:4).
3For greater clarity, the term ‘basic needs approach’ has at various times been referred to as the ‘basic needs 
regime’, the ‘basic human needs approach’, the ‘human-centereddevelopmentapproach’, the ‘poverty focus’, 
etc. Regardless of precise terminology, basic needs largely refer to the most fundamental requirements for 
physical survival - food and nutrition, drinking water, basic health, shelter, and basic education (ILO 1976; 
Hopkins and Van DerHoeven 1983; Moon 1991). That these fit into Abraham Maslow’s famous hierarchy 
at the level of ‘physiological needs’ (Chapter 2) is a point not lost on most scholars (Seers 1972: 24; 
Streeten 1981a: 353; Hopkins and Van DerHoeven 1983: 7).
^Though it achievedintemational credibility and acceptance at the Conference, the concept of ‘basic needs’ 
was not of course introduced here. Indeed, writers on poverty in India spoke of ‘minimum levels’ and 
‘poverty levels’ decades beforehand (Cutler 1984). Furthermore, some scholars had been calling for new, 
BNA-related development perspectives since the early 1970s. Seers, for one, argued that: “a ‘plan’ which 
conveys no targets for reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality can hardly be considered a 
‘development plan’” (1972: 24). Inspiration was also derived from an ambitious effort undertaken in the 
mid-1970s by the Bariloche Foundation (Herrera 1976), which formulated a mathematical model using 
eleven indicators to predict the time period necessary for states to “satisfy basic needs to required levels’’. 
Though certainly not immune from criticism, this theoretical project had an impact on the unfolding ‘basic 
needs’ debate.
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The Conference conceded that a radical rethinking of development approaches would have 
to occur, and adopted a resolution specifying that “Strategies and national development 
plans and policies should include explicitly as a priority objective the promotion of 
employment and the satisfaction of the basic needs of each country’s population” (Emmerij 
and Ghai 1977: 13).
The BNA thus confronts the premise that the poor must be patient for the fruits of 
economic growth to be realized (Croswell 1981, Lewis 1981). Outlining the problem in 
terms of human development priorities, the GNP/GDP per capita variable is rejected as the 
standard measure of development (Streeten and Burki 1978; Ram 1982b). Instead, the BNA 
defines poverty:
...not in terms of income, poverty lines, and deciles of income distribution, but as the 
inability to meet certain basic human needs on the part of identifiable groups of human 
beings. Poverty is characterized by hunger and malnutrition, by ill-health, by lack of 
education, of safe water, of sanitation, of decent shelter (Streeten quoted in Leipziger 
1981: xi-xii).
Contrary to the worries of neo-liberal theorists, fearful of potentially disruptive 
consequences arising from the state’s tampering with the market, most (sensible) BNA 
supporters do not advocate a trade-off between growth and basic needs (Streeten 1981b). In 
fact, one of the perceived advantages of BNA programs is the selective targeting of the poor, 
which “makes it possible to satisfy the basic human needs of the whole population at levels 
of income per head substantially below those that would be required by a less 
discriminating strategy of all-round income growth, and therefore sooner” (Streeten 1981a: 
337).5 Although universally-applicableBNA strategies are not proposed for governments to 
adopt, since selectively targeting the poor involves country-specific prescriptions,6 the 
typical features of a BNA strategy often include: (1) a redistribution of assets; (2) some 
transfers to the very poor; (3) an expansion and enhancement of public services; (4) 
employment training and creation programs; and (5) an emphasis on ‘human capital 
investment’ (Leipziger 1981: 114).
Interestingly, there is considerable convergence here between the two paradigms. 
The World Bank acknowledges the importance of these five BNA features but makes a 
careful distinction between what is desirable and what is ultimately possible:
^The idea of selectively targeting the poor is reflected in the very focused nature of BNA studies. Needs- 
deprivationis calculatedin terms of the ‘shortfalls’ in the satisfaction of certain needs. Strategies are then 
devised for addressing them. For instance, in their influential work Streeten and Burki (1978: 417-418) 
calculated the ‘shortfall populations’ for three basic needs and the subsequent investment cost of a ‘global 
basic needs program’. For a more detailedlook at the specifics behind BNA strategies, see Hopkins and Van 
DerHoeven(1983: 7-8).
6dause 1.5 in the Programme of Action adoptedby the World Employment Conference of 1976 states that: 
“It is important that the concept of basic needs is a country-specific and dynamic concept...(and it therefore) 
should be placed within a context of a nation’s overall economic and social development” (Emmerij and 
Ghai 1977: 24).
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Governments that seek to increase the assets of the poor have pursued two approaches - 
redistribution of existing assets (such as land) and increased public investment in human 
capital of the poor. Both policies are beneficial to the poor...(The first policy) is resisted 
strongly (by entrenched elites)...The second approach, therefore is likely to be more 
feasible (World Bank 1990a: 52-53).
Its own advice to governments on how to help the poor is summed up in a two-part strategy, 
best described as ‘growth with redistribution’: (1) efficient labour intensive growth together 
with (2) investment in human capital (World Bank 1990a: 55). This focus on ‘human 
capital’ must be complemented by structural adjustment policies (where required) and other 
measures designed to ensure the efficient functioning of the market In effect, the World 
Bank argues that
Governments have a central role...of providing for a desirable distribution of income and 
the alleviation of poverty, ill-health, and literacy. By providing a safety net, governments 
can fulfill their humanitarian duties and at the same time reinforce a social consensus in 
favour o f economic growth (World Bank 1987a: 58; emphasis added).
This somewhat minimalist view of the role of the state,7 though not overtly advocating a 
particular regime-type,8 suggests that only market-friendly governments may successfully 
pursue its development prescriptions, thereby ruling out other political economies 
altogether.
In contrast, the BNA’s prescriptions span “the ideological spectrum...(thus making) 
cross-country interpersonal comparisons of welfare comprehensible” (Weigel 1989: 9).9 
Far from being minimalist, the BNA’s emphasis on “supply management (ensures a) 
substantial role for government” (Streeten and Burki 1978: 413-414). The size of 
government, however, is not the issue: “what matters for human development is what 
functions the state performs, and how well it performs them, not how large it is” (Griffin
7The Worid Bank’ s view on the role of the state in development will be considered in Chapter 7.
8The World Bank’s advocacy of democratic structures and practices is often tied to the question of ‘good 
governance’; the two are not synonymous (Leftwich 1994: 366). Moreover, this concept also has a narrow 
administrative meaning which is somewhat problematic: “while it can hardly be doubted that this is an 
essential feature of any successful development process... the current preoccupation with good governance is 
naive and simplistic. It is part of the technicist illusion,.. .which holds that there is always an administrative 
or managerial ‘fix’ in the normally difficult affairs of human societies and organizations, and that this also 
applies to the field of development” (ibid: 364).
^To illustrate this point, Streeten (1981b: 116-122) distinguishes between three types of polities—socialist 
planned economies, market-oriented economies, and mixed welfare-oriented economies—and examines how 
each type has spawned its share of basic needs success stories: Cuba and China (socialist); Taiwan and 
South Korea (market); and Sri Lanka (mixed welfare). He concludes: “each type followed a different 
development strategy, yet was successful in meeting basic needs. This suggests that there is no single basic 
needs strategy, but lessons can be learned from the different approaches”. (Fra: another, more random survey 
of ‘basic needs’ case studies see Hopkins and Van Der Hoeven, 1983: 24-31.) These examples disprove and 
counter the ill-founded criticism that the BNA somehow concealed a call for a world-wide socialist 
revolution (Streeten 1979: 142); although, it should be added,the popularity of the Bariloche model (Herrera 
1976) - which rested on the fictional premise that a socialist production system was operating globally - dd 
not help matters.
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and McKinley 1993: 10). This central role for government reflects the belief that markets 
alone are not enough. Indeed, on the basis of the findings in his excellent study, Moon 
(1991: 109-111) concludes that
Markets - if left unbridled- tend to allocate resources in ways that yield sub-optimal basic 
needs fulfillment..(Hence) for those who possess nothing to offer in exchange for the 
resources that would increase their life chances, only an authority system - the political 
instrument of the state - offers aid. ^
How the ‘aid’ is to be determined and distributed is open to divergent opinions. 
One view suggests that only through grass-roots political mobilization and representative 
democracy can people themselves determine “the scope, content and priority of their own 
basic needs...(since other alternatives) must seem authoritarian, or at best paternalistic” 
(Ghai and Alfthan 1977: 20). In one of the few surveys of its kind, Morrison and Waxier 
(1986) examined the variation of basic needs fulfillment across local districts in Sri Lanka 
over the 1971-73 period and found that “when locally accountable leadership gains 
authority to lead the economic, social and political development of their districts the levels of 
health, education and employment also improve”. The need for local, grass-roots 
participation has been a constant theme in the UNDP’s Human Development Reports.
Others agree with the view that local people should participate in the decisions which 
may affect their lives but argue that, if any progress is to be made at all, ‘experts’ must 
formulate and execute development plans. Such expert-guided action may be described as 
“discriminating or selective or educational” (Streeten 1981b: 26). Referring to one of its 
own specific initiatives, the World Bank (1983a: 15) argues that
Local participation, though an extremely important objective, is not a simple solution: it 
all depends on who participates and how...To ensure that the poor benefit, it may be 
necessary to mix participation with instruction, as in the effective Training and Visit 
System of agricultural extension in Rajasthan, India; or perhaps with some measure of 
outside organization and paternalism, as exemplified by the successful Bank-supported 
Indian dairy cooperative based in Anand. (emphasis added)
On a more general level, few BNA advocates consider democratic governance alone 
to be sufficient for the task of alleviating basic needs deprivation. Indeed, Carr-Hill provides 
a familiar explanation for why it is ‘utopian’ and ‘naive’ to accept this assumption:
l^This contravenes the (more extreme) neo-liberal belief that individuals should rely on their purchasing 
power to ‘buy’ the basic goods and services they require. Even if, for the sake of argument, this premise 
were accepted, and people somehow could afford such goods and services, one may question the rationality 
of the consumer (the ‘secondary poverty thesis’), since various studies have shown that “many people, in 
spite of adequate incomes to buy the products that would keep them well nourished and healthy, do in fact 
spend their money on other things and therefore suffer...’’ (Streeten 1984: 973). Stated differently: “what 
people do depends as much upon market forces (eg. advertising, shortages, prices, fashion) as it does upon 
their real needs’’(Hopkins and Van Der Hoeven 1983: 8).
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there has been considerable experience - and disillusionment - let alone literature, with the 
end result of popular referenda or representative democracy. For the former to reflect 
properly people’s views, we require that everyone has perfect information and equal 
influence; and for the latter that representatives actually do represent. Both of these are 
very Utopian assumptions so that, although the emphasis on popular power is welcome, 
it can be dangerously naive... (quotedin Hopkins and Van DerHoeven 1983: 5).
Streeten (1981a: 366) forwards another interpretation of the dilemma between democracy 
and basic needs:
If society were organized benevolently, like a zoo, or less benevolently, like a well-run 
prison, physical needs would be met at a high level, but human rights would be denied.
On the other hand, the civil rights principle of one man, one vote might easily conflict 
with the satisfaction of basic needs. In a democracy in which everyone votes in his 
narrow, material self-interest, and there are no cross-percentile alliances, the poor will 
never have enough votes to get redistribution to them enacted and...(therefore) will not 
have their needs met...Thus basic needs can be met in ways which deny human rights, 
andhuman rights can be practicedin ways which reject basic needs, (emphasis added)
By the end of the 1980s, a consensus had emerged between the two paradigms over 
the need to consider economic growth and human development as co-realizable priorities 
(Griffin and Knight 1990). Why this change of outlook? Simply stated, the search for a 
new moral dimension to development issues assumed paramount importance as the 
inadequacies of each approach became clear. The dilemma was highlighted in the 1990 
World Development Report “it is possible to have economic growth without much social 
progress. The converse is also true: social indicators can be improved even in the absence of 
rapid economic growth” (World Bank 1990a: 51).11 Although this proposition was not 
new, it reflected the considerable attention that greeted the UNDP’s first Human 
Development Report in 1990. The opening paragraph of this landmark publication boldly 
proclaims:
This Report is about people - and about how development enlarges their choices. It is 
about more than GNP growth, more than income and wealth and more than producing 
commodities and accumulating capital. A person’s access to income may be one of the 
choices, but it is not the sum total of human endeavor(UNDP 1990: 1).
^This dilemma has been confirmed in a number of different studies. After examining six country cases, 
King (1981: 499) concludes: “even though most non-communist LDCs in Asia have experienced rapid and 
sustained economic growth over the last decade, this remarkable progress has been accompanied by 
persistent poverty, growing numbers of poor people, and widening inequality in many of them”. Looking 
specifically at South Korea, a country with a very high GNP per capita growth rate of 7.3% for 1965-80 
(UNDP 1994), Shin and Snyder (1983: 204) find that “the rate of GNP growth itself appears to have little 
effect on the rate of improvements in the overall quality of life”. Similarly, in his study of African regimes 
Berg-Schlosser (1984: 135) found that: “stable authoritarian systems have the highest per capita growth rate 
for the period under consideration, but the actual improvement of living conditions for a large part of the 
population...is the lowest of all types! Thus...the economic performance of these systems can be called, to 
a large extent, ‘growth without development’ ”.
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The World Bank has since followed the UNDP’s lead in proposing a broader 
definition of development, to the extent of even embracing indicators of human development 
- consumption per capita, life expectancy, and educational attainment (World Bank 1990a; 
39) - similar to those which comprise the UNDP’s Human Development Index. In short, a 
universal agreement now exists that “(socio-economic) success needs to be evaluated 
according to the various dimensions of development, not just economic growth” (World 
Bank 1991a: 49).
1.2 Democracy and Development: An Overview of Existing Empirical Research
Given its relatively recent appearance on the scene, the concept of human 
development has not enjoyed the analytical coverage granted to its more traditional 
counterpart, economic development (typically measured using the GDP/GNP per capita 
variable). Before reviewing the results produced by the few such efforts to date, it is prudent 
to first examine the extensive findings regarding democracy and economic development
The Findings Regarding Democracy and Economic Development
Investigations into the relationship between democracy and levels of economic 
development have been more conclusive than those examining the relationship between 
democracy and economic growth. Studies of the wealth-equals-democracy hypothesis are 
plentiful and, according to Diamond (1992: 453), conclusive: “all of them have strongly 
supported Lipset’s thesis”. Although there have been partially dissenting voices (Shannon 
1957; Laband 1984; Cammack 1994b; Roemer 1995), there is a fairly widespread view that 
national income levels have a significant influence on the likelihood that democratic forms 
of government will emerge (Pourgerami 1988; Pourgerami 1991; Huntington 1987; 
Huntington and Nelson 1976; Hadenius 1992; Liu 1993; Diamond 1992; Jackman 1973; 
Moore 1995). “The weight of evidence,” Moore argues (1995: 1), “points fairly clearly in 
one direction: that there is a distinct correlation, at any moment in time, between national 
wealth and the degree of democracy”.
The relationship between democracy and economic growth is mired in considerably 
more doubt and confusion. Most studies begin by posing the same question: Does 
democracy promote, hinder or have no observable effect on economic growth? Three 
distinct perspectives emerge - Compatibility, Conflict, and Skeptical - whose underlying 
arguments are familiar enough to require but a brief synopsis here (Huntington and Nelson 
1976; Huntington 1987; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990; Sorensen 1993b; Przeworski and 
Limongi 1995).
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With its thoroughly liberal roots, the Compatibility Perspective may be argued from 
several slightly different angles. In its more extreme manifestation, it considers democracy 
to be a prerequisite for economic growth. Despite enjoying virtually no empirical support, 
this view has recently come into vogue as part of the post-Cold War euphoria. As Leftwich 
(1993a: 605) observes:
what is new is the proposition that democracy is a necessary prior or parallel condition erf* 
development, not an outcome of it...Contrary to the best analytical work on development 
by political scientists of different persuasions, the new orthodoxy assumes that there are 
no inherent tensions, conflicts or difficult trade-offs over time between the various goals 
of development - such as growth, democracy, stability, equity and autonomy.
Some proponents of this perspective forward the more cautious claim that, although 
democracies may not perform as well as some authoritarian regimes in terms of economic 
growth, their performance rates may still be regarded as ‘satisfactory* (Kohli 1986: 156). 
Yet others claim that democracy and economic growth are mutually reinforcing since, to use 
Huntington’s (1987: 10) analogy, economic growth is the ‘locomotive’ which pulls the 
other four general development goals - equity, democracy, social harmony / stability, 
autonomy - along in its wake.12 On the whole, the problem of determining causation is just 
one of the many criticisms levied against this perspective: “the liberal model of development 
has been shown to be methodologically weak, empirically questionable, and historically 
irrelevant,except under specialized circumstances” (Huntington and Nelson 1976: 20).
The Conflict Perspective argues that democracy and economic growth cannot be 
achieved simultaneously. Consequently, trade-offs must be made once the three key 
developmental objectives - rapid economic growth, democracy, and socio-political stability - 
are placed in order of desired priority. Given the preoccupation of political development 
theorists with issues of stability and institutionalization in the developing world, it is not 
surprising that “overall, the political science literature tends to urge the temporal priority of 
order over democracy” (Huntington 1987: 19). Most development policy-makers have also 
accepted this notion of a trade-off, but with economic growth as the first priority (World 
Bank 1991a: 137). The inability of democratic states to match the relatively high economic 
growth rates produced by some authoritarian states (the East Asian NICs in particular) has 
led some to conclude that adopting and sustaining a strategy of rapid growth necessitates 
the sacrifice of democratic liberties, for “as the costs of rapid development mount sharply, 
so does the impetus towards control and repression” (Lamb 1981: 106).
Several reasons have been forwarded to support the view that democracies are 
somehow inherently incapable of rapid growth. In their comprehensive survey of the
12One may wonder, however, whether this particular argument really does suggest ‘compatibility’ since 
democracy is seen as the by-product of economic growth, not its catalyst. If the direction of cassation is 
from economic growth to democracy, then this line of reasoning has more in common with the Conflict 
Perspective.
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literature, Sirowy and Inkeles (1990: 129-130) list three possible explanations: (1) 
democracies in poorer states are constantly preoccupied with maintaining order and 
stability; (2) democracies have greater difficulty ‘forging a consensus’ among disparate 
social and ethnic groups and then mobilizing these groups for ‘rapid national development’; 
and (3) the nature of democratic politics may “well act to distort the economy...as 
government officials shift their allegiances among policies based on short-run political 
expediency, rather than focusing exclusively on policies oriented toward national 
development in the long run”. In another such survey, Przeworski and Limongi (1995: 7) 
note the importance to economic performance of ‘state autonomy’, defined as “ a 
combination of the ‘capacity’ of the state to pursue developmentalist policies with 
‘insulation’ from particularistic pressures, particularly those originating from large firms or 
unions”. Weede (1983: 23) is fairly explicit “While authoritarian governments are 
certainly capable of (macro-economic) policy mistakes, in democracies they seem to be the 
natural outcome of a political process in which politicians respond to articulated interests, 
and more strongly to the more articulated and better organized ones”. Hence, “whenever 
governments assumed extraordinary powers to curb individualistic, sectarian and extra­
territorial interests, economic conditions improved sharply” (Rao 1984: 78). In short, “the 
implications of this position are clear political democracy is a luxury that can be ill-afforded 
by Third World countries” (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990: 128).
Unlike the two aforementioned positions, the Skeptical Perspective assumes that 
there is no direct relationship between democracy and economic growth, since there are 
good and bad performers of every regime-type. Relatively democratic Botswana grew at an 
exceptionally high GNP/C rate of 6.1% between 1980 and 1992, compared to a dismal 
growth rate of -1.0% for Venezuela over the same period (World Bank 1994a). By the same 
token, not all authoritarian regimes have performed as well as the East Asian ‘tigers’. 
Looking at African and Latin American variants it becomes evident that: “any attempt to 
make a general claim on the basis of the East Asian experience that authoritarianism will 
invariably help create (a strong performer) must be rejected” (Sorensen 1993a: 27).
Proponents of the Skeptical Perspective also argue that comparisons of regime-type 
performance are often based on different points of reference. A typical tendency is noted by 
Przeworski and Limongi (1995: 11): “The critics argue that dictatorships are better at 
mobilizing savings; the defenders that democracy are better at allocating investment”. 
Therefore, both sides may claim victory using different criteria. Moreover, when the 
definition of economic development is broadened, it may be argued that, whereas 
authoritarian regimes may, on the whole, perform better in terms of GNP/C rates, 
democracies tend to perform better using other economic criteria. Kohli’s (1986: 153,159- 
160) elaborate overview is worth quoting at length:
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the developmental performance of Third World democratic regimes must be judged 
satisfactory...there is enough evidence to suggest that democratic regimes tend to promote 
a broadly similar pattern of development. Countries as diverse as India, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, Venezuela and Costa Rica have achieved relatively impressive records. For the 
most part, their economies have grown at moderate but steady rates. Income inequalities 
within most of them have either remained stable or even narrowed, and their foreign debts 
have been kept within manageable limits. These countries contrast with a number of 
prominent cases steered by bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. In the latter, growth rates 
may have been somewhat higher, but income inequalities widened, and foreign debts rose 
to staggering proportions....(However) most cases of very high growth rates have 
involved authoritarian regimes...Specific types of authoritarian regimes are capable of 
installing hyper-growth development strategies, whereas democracies tend to muddle 
through.
Which perspective does existing empirical evidence support? Given the highly 
inconclusive findings, one would have to say the Skeptical Perspective. Whereas 
Pourgerami (1988, 1991) claims to have produced “conclusive evidence” in favour of the 
Compatibility Perspective, Park (1984), Huntington (1987), and Sloan and Tedin (1987) 
disagree in favour of the Conflict Perspective. McKinlay and Cohan (1975), Weede (1983, 
1990,1991), Munslow and Ekoko (1995), and Roemer (1995) have produced results which 
are weak and inconclusive.
Three major cross-national surveys of the literature have also produced mixed 
results. Of the thirteen studies reviewed by Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), three support the 
Conflict Perspective, six support the Skeptical Perspective, and four report “qualified or 
conditional” support for the Compatibility Perspective. Brunetti and Weder (1995) looked 
at twenty empirical studies and observed that “two find a negative, ten no, five a conditional, 
and three a positive correlation” between democracy and economic growth. Furthermore, of 
the 21 separate findings examined by Przeworski and Limongi (1995), “eight found in 
favour of democracy, eight in favour of authoritarianism, and five discovered no 
difference”.
To some extent, the inconsistent results produced by these studies simply reflect 
differences in samples, methodologies, and chosen variables. As suggested by the Skeptical 
Perspective, however, one should be wary of extrapolating generalizations (e.g the inherent 
superiority of all authoritarian states) from the performance of the few (e.g Thailand, South 
Korea, Indonesia, China). But since these few superior performers have not been 
particularly democratic, one key tenet in the Conflict Perspective has not been falsified by 
the above evidence: a non-democratic regime may be a necessary though insufficient 
condition for rapid economic growth.
The Findings Regarding Democracy and Human Development
Since economic development is strongly (but not perfectly) correlated with human 
development, as subsequent chapters will show, one may suspect that the preceding account 
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sheds some light on the relationship between democracy and human development To date, 
this relationship has not been examined in any comprehensive manner, even if the HDI and 
PQLI are accepted, however reluctantly, as suitable measures of human development13
To be sure, some have used the HDI to determine correlations at specific points in 
time (Diamond 1992; Liu 1993; Lane and Ersson 1994, 1996), but these efforts provide a 
very basic overview only. Yet others have employed the HDI primarily for the purpose of 
illustrating differences between individual or regional cases (Haynes 1996; Monshipouri 
1995; Smith 1996). Crucially, these investigations do not make any reference to changes in 
human development indicators over time (i.e., they do not measure performance), thereby 
neglecting to record if living conditions have either improved or deteriorated, and by how 
much. Studies using the PQLI have been just as unsatisfactory, with some partial exceptions 
(Moon and Dixon 1985; Moon 1991).
Virtually all of the studies employing either the HDI or PQLI in cross-national 
samples have found the relationship between democracy (or political liberties) and the level 
of human development to be positive and strong, but not strictly linear (Diamond 1992; 
Haynes 1996; Lane and Ersson 1994, 1996; Liu 1993; Moon and Dixon 1985; Moon 
1991; Moore 1995; Pourgerami 1988, 1991, 1992).14 This overwhelming consensus has 
prompted one observer to reformulate Lipset’s thesis as follows: “The more well-to-do the 
people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favor, achieve, and maintain a 
democratic system for their country” (Diamond 1992: 468). The reason behind this 
proposition is familiar “A certain minimum quality of life is needed to make democracy 
possible, because no state can be stable in a situation of extreme poverty” (Lane and Ersson 
1994: 215).
The relationship between democracy and human development performance has not 
been explored to any significant extent. Although Monshipouri (1995) does not undertake
13Despite some slight methodological differences between the HDI and PQLI, both essentially “measure 
similar phenomenon” (Lane and Ersson 1996: 57). The HDF s three components are life expectancy, 
educational attainment (literacy and school enrolment) and real GDP per capita ($PPP), whereas the PQLTs 
three components are life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy. Although the basis for a broader 
conceptual model will be outlined in Chapter 3, suffice it to note here that these two measures do not 
capture all of the various dimensions of human development which collectively give this concept its fullest 
meaning. Technically, therefore, comparative studies using either the HDI or the PQLI measure not ‘human 
development’ but ‘basicneeds’.
l^This conclusion has usually been confirmed by cross-national studies employing several social indicators 
instead of one composite measure. The World Bank (1991a) has found a moderately strong and positive 
relationship between ‘political liberties’ and indicators such as women’s education, overall education and 
infant mortality. Hadenius (1992) finds a particularly strong relationship between democracy and indicators 
such as literacy, infant mortality and the percentage of people not employed in the agricultural sector. In a 
dissenting capacity, Vorhies and Glahie (1988) find only a weak relationship between democracy and die 
overall level of ‘social development’ as definedby six indicators: GNP per capita, life expectancy, literacy, 
infant survival, income equality and the percentage of non-agricultural GDP. In an earlier study, McKinlay 
and Cohan (1975) found no relationship between regime-types and socio-economic variables such as the 
cost of living, the food index and primary education.
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extensive analysis (focusing on just four case studies), he is one of the very few to even 
consider human development performance as the change in HDI levels between two points 
in time (1970 and 1990). Weede’s failure to adopt a similar technique calls into question 
the conclusion produced by his more ambitious effort: “neither democracy nor its opposite, 
regime repressiveness, make much difference for...human development indices (such as the 
HDI)” (Weede 1993: 185).15 Methodological difficulties also undermine the very different 
conclusion arrived at by Pourgerami (1992: 373) using the PQLI: “democratic institutions 
are more likely to accelerate (PQLI) growth”.16
Other studies have produced equally inconclusive findings with smaller cross- 
national samples. Berg-Schlosser (1984) examined how 45 sub-Saharan African countries 
performed in terms of PQLI disparity rates over the 1960-75 period and found that socialist 
countries achieved the best results. Sloan and Tedin (1987) looked at the changes (1960-80) 
in the levels of four key social indicators (life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy and 
school enrolment) among 20 Latin American countries and found no differences between 
the regime-types. Using almost identical indicators (life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy 
and GDP per capita) in their survey of the 51 poorest countries, Dasgupta and Weale 
(1992) found positive and significant correlations between political/civil liberties and 
indicator changes (1970-80).
Finally, some observers have sought to evaluate regime-types based on the aggregate 
investments made in social welfare programs. While this approach emphasizes inputs 
(expenditures) rather than outcomes (actual rates of change), and thus holds little value for 
this thesis,17 it is interesting to note that even here the results are mixed. Pluta (1979) 
examined the South American context during the 1960s and observed that civilian 
governments devoted greater expenditures on social programs than their military 
counterparts. Finding strong positive correlations for a broader sample at various points in 
time, Lane and Ersson (1990) confirmed this tendency with respect to expenditures on
^Though selecting a wide sample (129 countries), Weede has HDI data for only one date (1987). He thus 
chooses to estimate human development changes over the course of roughly one decade by using regression 
analysis: the HDI (1987) is regressedon life expectancy (1975) and on GNP per capita (1975). Weede (ibid: 
182) himself acknowledges some obvious shortcomings with this method.
16Pourgerami’s sample is substantial (104 developing countries) but his methods are not particularly clear. 
Nowhere does he specify the dates which correspond to the PQLI values and Disparity Reduction Rates 
(DRRs). In an endnote he makes a reference to Morris (1979), which suggests that the PQLI values might 
be drawn from the early 1970s; no clues are offered for the DDRs. And while he makes a reference to the 
source for his measure of civil liberties (Gastil 1985), Pourgerami does not indicate whether he is using data 
for one point in time or an average over a given period. Since he relies on “estimation results”, it may 
perhaps be inferred that his political data (for Gastil’s civil liberties index) do not exactly correspond to the 
dates for his PQLI and DDR values. Because of this confusion, which also surrounds some of his earlier 
efforts (1988, 1991), it may be said that Pourgerami has not sufficiently validated his ‘development- 
democraey-growth hypothesi s ’.
17To borrow Ingham’s (1993: 1814) succinct distinction: ‘The question should be, ‘What are people 
capable of doing or being?’. For example: ‘Can people read and write?’ not ‘How much is being spent on 
primary education?’ ;not ‘What is the output of foodstuffs?’ but ‘How many people are malnourished?’; not 
‘What is the expenditure on health?’ but ‘Are people living longer?”’.
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welfare, health, and education. However, in a survey of 32 developing and 26 industrial 
nations for the period 1965-75, two scholars concluded that:
(the level of democracy) has a substantial effect on changes in Social Security Efforts for 
industrial nations, but that there is relatively little effect for developing nations. This 
outcome is consistent with the theories of those who argue that democracy will have a 
greater effect on the distribution of societal resources in those nations with a greater 
economic surplus (Williamson and Pampel 1986: 24).
1.3 Synopsis of Research Design
Using data from 123 countries (Appendix A), this thesis will provide a detailed 
empirical account of the relationship between democracy and human development over the 
1970-90 period.18 To substantiate any conclusions arising from the evidence, indicator 
levels are assessed at three points in time (1970, 1980 and 1990) and indicator changes are 
recorded for three periods (1970-80, 1980-90, and 1970-90). To shed further light on the 
relationships under investigation, controlling variables are employed throughout (levels of 
economic development, regional categories, etc). The sources for the data are given in the 
Technical Notes and various appendices found at the end of the paper.
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the 
traditional perspectives on democracy and development, examining the literature on political 
development and democratic preconditions. Attention will then be given to the arguments 
forwarded in the ‘humanist* literature which has inspired this thesis and which, it is argued, 
should underpin efforts to reinvigorate comparative politics with a normative dimension.
Chapter 3 argues the need for new measures of democracy and human development, 
and then demonstrates how such measures were constructed for the purposes of this 
research. These include: a new measure of democracy, the Level of Democracy (LoD) 
index; a new and more comprehensive measure of human development, the Integrated 
Human Development Index (I-HDI); and several other new measures which capture the 
various component dimensions of human development (peace/conflict, gender equity, 
security, liberty, social mobility).
Chapter 4 provides a detailed examination of the relationship between democracy 
and levels of human development After first establishing the general relationship, I proceed
18The year 1970 marks roughly one decade after many developing countries had achieved their 
independence;their political orientation and structures had, therefore, become more or less apparent by this 
date. Social indicators research was still in its infancy prior to 1970, so that data remained largely 
unavailable/unreliable for any sizeable cross-national samples. The year 1990 marks the approximate point 
after which many developing states (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) embarked on transitions to democratic 
rule. Sufficient time has not passed for the consolidation of these experiments, so that proper assessments 
cannot as yet be made (although some preliminary comments are offered in the concluding chapter).
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to examine whether the conclusions hold when levels of economic development are 
controlled for, and whether regional variations influence the findings.
Chapter 5 considers the relationship between democracy and human development 
performance. Two questions are of particular relevance: (1) Is there a direct linkage between 
improvements in human development conditions and the level of democracy?; and (2) On 
average, do democratic states perform better, worse, or no different than non-democratic 
states? The chapter opens with a look at the general relationship between the variables, 
proceeds to evaluate this relationship after controlling for levels of human development and 
economic development, and then examines how performance rates vary across the different 
regions.
Chapter 6 delves beyond the findings of the composite indices to analyze how levels 
of democracy correspond to selected basic indicators (literacy, life expectancy, gender 
equity, etc) specifically in the developing world. Mirroring the approaches taken in the two 
preceding chapters, the first part of the chapter considers the relationship between 
democracy and indicator levels, while the second part examines the relationship between 
democracy and indicator performance rates.
Chapter 7 focuses on the political requirements for establishing what has been called 
the virtuous cycle o f development: strong human development performance combined with 
strong economic growth. After first demonstrating the importance of economic growth to 
human development performance, the relationship between economic growth and democracy 
will be considered. I then examine which level of democracy, if any, appears most likely to 
translate economic growth into human development gains. The final part of the chapter 
identifies the ‘developmental states’ for the 1970-90 period and assesses the implications 
for democratic governance.
Chapter 8 is divided into three parts. The first part summarizes the main findings of 
this thesis, the second part assesses these findings in the context of the post-1990 
transitions to democracy, and the third part provides some final thoughts on the implications 
arising from the empirical evidence.
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CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON 
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
This chapter provides an overview of the key arguments relating to democracy and 
development. The first part considers some of the more traditional interpretations of this 
relationship, including the literature on political development and democratic preconditions. 
The second part looks at the humanist approach which emerged from earlier attempts to 
integrate the concept of human development into political analysis. It will become apparent
that, although the two approaches begin from altogethe remises, the conclusions they draw
are remarkably similar.
2.1 Traditional Approaches
PoliticalDevelopment
The relationship between democracy and development has been a central 
preoccupation of political scientists since the end of the Second World War, especially for 
those interested in the area of ‘political development*. From the 1950s to the early 1970s, 
this particular school enjoyed a preeminent place within the discipline. The resulting 
literature, both vast and controversial, was characterized by the attempt to reconcile the 
theoretical attractiveness of the democratic political model with the practical realities found 
in the newly-independent countries of the Third World.
Whereas economists have traditionally worked with a commonly accepted measure 
of economic development (GNP/GDP per capita), political scientists have not agreed upon a 
measure of political development This dilemma was exposed by C.L Taylor (1972: 105):
...there is no political goal to produce. Nothing is quite the analogy of wealth. Political 
development is not the creation of more and more power or authority or 
sovereignty...These may be redistributed, refashioned, revolutionized, but their aggregate 
increase is not development
Given this conceptual ambiguity and the value-laden nature of the term (Blondel 1995: 49), 
it is hardly surprising that many different interpretations were forwarded.1 Judging by the
^^ Pye (1966: 33-44) records ten definitions of political development, as: (1) the Political Prerequisite of 
Economic Development; (2) the Politics Typical of Industrial Societies; (3) Political Modernization; (4) the 
Operation of a Nation-State; (5) Administrative and Legal Development; (6) Mass Mobilization and 
Participation; (7) the Building of Democracy; (8) Stability and Orderly Change; (9) Mobilization aid 
Power; (10) One Aspect of a Multi-Dimensional Process Social Change. Jaguaribe (1973: 198) lists five 
interpretations: (1) as political modernization; (2) as political institutionalization; (3) as the development of 
the capability of the political system; (4) as the development of the contribution of the political system to 
the overall development of society; and (5) as political modernization plus political institutionalization. 
Blondel (1995: 50) relates the term to: (1) social and economic development; (2) the organization of die 
political system; and (3) political values (mass mobilization, the movement towards democracy).
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sheer volume of the literature, two interpretations were particularly influential: political 
development as the movement towards democracy; and political development as the 
institutionalization and organization of the political system.
The first interpretation caused considerable commotion in its relatively short lifespan 
(roughly from the 1950s to the early 1960s). Unabashedly calling for “the dissemination of 
Western democracy throughout the ‘new states’ of the developing world” (Cammack 
1994a: 353), the early writers on political development were, predictably, accused of serving 
specific ideological and political ends.2 Political development was equated with 
democratization, so that formally democratic institutions and practices were accepted as 
evidence of development.3 Merely having a democratic form of government was enough to 
warrant accolades, irrespective of a country* s socio-economic conditions. By implication, 
democratic governance could be introduced into a given society without reference to its 
stage of development
The subsequent failure of democracy to make significant inroads in the developing 
world forced a gradual shift in emphasis. Some began to argue that developing societies 
could not be expected to embrace democracy ‘prematurely’ (Cantril 1961: 49; Cutright and 
Wiley 1969: 35). By Upset’s admission (1970: 35):
...with the emergence of military and one-party regimes in many of these (developing) 
nations, an almost total pessimism concerning the democraticpotendal of these countries 
has replaced earlier hopes. Scholars, journalists and politicians from stable democracies 
now conclude that they erred in anticipating democratic institutions in nations whose 
economy and culture were not yet ready to sustain tensions of party conflict.
A country’s stage of development could no longer be ignored. Recalling Lipset’s 
famous hypothesis - ‘The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will 
sustain democracy” (Upset 1981: 37) - it was proposed that democracy must be seen as a 
by-product of development The irony that liberal writers would eventually embrace Marx’ s 
determinism was not lost on some observers: “(this) can only be described as a neo- 
Marxist premise: that the causal flow would be from economics to politics rather than in the
2Gendzier(1985: 4) points out that: “Interpretations of politics and society that were codified in Political 
Development theories were the product of a particular vision of American society....(This) vision was 
expressed in debates provoked by national and international developments, from McCarthyism to the cdd 
war”. Likewise, Needler(1991: 39) argues that: “that era, the 1950s and 1960s, was characterized by a 
particular configuration in international politics and by a particular stage in U.S academic evolution, with 
some curious relations between the two dimensions”. Cammack (1994a: 356) is more direct ‘Xthese 
writers) aspired not only to understand but also to influence the politics of (developing) states by direct 
academicintervention on behalf of foreign elites and U.S interests abroad”
^This idea certainly inspired the very few empirical measures of political development. The ‘Political 
Representation Index’ (PRI) devised by Cutright and Wiley (1969) employed a series of measures - 
Parliament Scoring, Chief Executive Scoring and Effective Franchise Scoring - which suggested that the 
end-objective of any and every state is the establishment and maintenance of democratic rights and 
institutions. The PRI was essentially a modification of Cutright’s earlier Index of Political Development, 
which rewardednations “for achieving or maintaining more complex (democratic) forms of organization” 
(Cutright 1963: 256).
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reverse direction” (Huntington and Nelson 1976: 20). Indeed, Marx’s dictum - “the 
country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its 
own future” (Marx quoted in Somjee 1986: 4) - influenced attempts to reconcile democracy 
with development
Implicit (here was) the acceptance of an image of the Good Society: wealthy, just, 
democratic,orderly and in full control of its own affairs; a society, in short, very much 
like those found in (the West). A backward society was poor, inequitable, repressive, 
violent and dependent Development was the process of moving from the latter to the 
former (Huntington 1987: 6).
Emphasizing the structural/institutional aspect of political development, writers also 
began to focus more intently on the inherently destabilizing nature of the process of 
development, or ‘modernization’. It was argued that modernization produces increased 
levels of social mobilization, where “uprooted, impoverished and disoriented masses” are 
the product of a “process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological 
commitments are eroded or broken own and people become available for new patterns of 
socialization and behaviour” (Deutsch 1961: 494, 498).4 Dramatic increases in political 
participation necessarily follow, almost invariably leading to “ instability and violence” 
(Huntington 1970: 323). This turbulent environment, in turn, serves as fertile soil for the 
growth of extremist political movements (Lipset 1981: 54). Taken together, these 
consequences of rapid socio-economic change suggest not only the impossibility of 
democratic governance, but also the probability, if the consequences were left unchecked, of 
complete “political decay” (Huntington 1965: 386; Nordlinger 1970: 340).
For these early proponents of the Conflict Perspective (recall Chapter 1), the 
prescription was to be found in strong institutional structures. These were necessary, Pye 
(1965: 7) argued, to “maintain certain kinds of public order, (and) to mobilize resources for 
a specific range of collective enterprises...”. Apter (1971: 15,66) took this argument one 
step further “the task of government..(is) to maximize development and order”, which is 
best achieved “through some variant of a bureaucratic system”. This heavy reliance on state 
“coercion and persuasion” (Vorys 1965: 18) reflected an unpleasant reality:
In many non-Westem areas of the world where individuals have had no chance to achieve 
political maturity, where social change is spotty, sporadic, and uneven, the leaders who 
emerge, if they are to remain leaders, must wield their power and guide their people in 
wide-ranging activities, including under the cloak of political development many aspects 
of personal and social behaviour which in a more mature, democratic West would regard 
as an infringement of personal rights (Cantril 1961: 60).
4Deutsch (1961: 503) constructed a “quantitative model of the social mobilization process” consisting erf 
eleven indicators: “...demonstrations of machinery or merchandise; shift into mass media audience; increase 
in voting participation; increase in literacy; change of locality of residence; population growth; occupational 
shift out of agriculture; change from rural to urban residence; linguistic, cultural or political assimilation; 
income growth; and income growth per capita”.
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Political stability and state effectiveness took precedence under this interpretation of political 
development, so that “the discussion of the developing countries was disconnected from the 
question of democracy” (Cammack 1994a: 367).
Overall, the literature on political development has been criticized for “its 
ethnocentric, ahistorical and conservative bias, (and) its failure to make sense of what 
transpired in the Third World...” (Gendzier 1985: 8). Others dispute what they see as a 
proposed unilinear path of development which all societies are meant to follow (Taylor 
1972: 108; Bauzon 1992b: 38). Cammack (1994a: 358), on the other hand, dismisses these 
claims:
...none of the protagonists of political development theory adopted a unilinear theory of 
development They saw the process as problematic from the start; they were all concerned 
with the dislocations it produced, and directly concerned with public policy in the 
developing world as a result precisely because the dissemination of Western democratic 
institutions was always viewed with apprehension.
History has in fact supported the premise that the process of rapid development is 
‘problematic*, producing those very ‘dislocations’ which political development theorists 
had correctly identified (Agpalo 1992: 86).
In tenns of their specific focus, however, criticism can be levied against the tendency 
to evaluate societies as being more or less developed on the basis of either the nature 
(democratic or not) or the strength (institutional capacity) of their political structures. As 
Eckstein (1971: 9) remarks: “the crucial limit of all this work is that it does not itself 
attempt to posit imperative criteria of political performance...(in other words) the criteria 
themselves are never regarded as ‘compelling’”. This is directly attributable to the 
conscious attempts to “disassociate morality from any linkages to development” (Bauzon 
1992b: 39).5
Consider, for example, Huntington’s (1965: 409) treatment of Argentina and India 
in the mid- 1960s:
So long as Argentina retains a politics of coup and countercoup and a feeble state 
surrounded by massive social forces, it cannot be considered politically developed, no 
matter how urbane and prosperous and educated its citizens ere... In reverse fashion, a 
country may be politically highly developed, while still very backward in terms of 
modernization...So long as (the Congress Party and the Indian Civil Service) maintain 
their institutional strength, it is ridiculous to think of India as politically undeveloped, no 
matter how low herpercapitaincome or how high her illiteracy rate (emphasis added).
^To be fair, some writers did attach explicitly moral ends to the instrumental means of stability. Cantril 
(1961: 59), for instance, argued that: ‘The primary criterion by means of which a political system is tested 
is that it provide sufficient political stability for the realization of individual needs and for directed, 
purposeful change to achieve even greater human satisfactions”.
......................................................................3 1 ......................................................................
Had he applied ‘compelling criteria’ such as basic needs provision (or broader still, human 
development), Huntington would have concluded, of course, that Argentina was 
considerably more developed than India (as he clearly infers is the case in terms of 
‘modernization’). Thus the root of the difficulty: “there is a higher degree of agreement on 
socio-economic norms than on political norms. Few believe... that society should not educate 
its members or take care of the health of its citizens” (Blondel 1995: 59). As consistently 
espoused in the humanist literature (section 2.2):
comparing ‘life situations’ ought to be done in terms of human situations rather than 
material or institutional situations...One would not evaluate the institutional set-up of a 
university as a way of determining the state of ‘development’ of the educational system. It 
is what die institution does, not what it consists of, that accounts for ‘development’ or 
‘underdevelopment’ (Park 1984: 35, 47).
Democratic Preconditions
Despite these criticisms, much of the contemporary writing on democratization 
derived its initial impetus and inspiration from the propositions outlined above. Attention, 
however, has since shifted more direcdy to the general question: What are the observable 
causes or preconditions for the establishment and maintenance of democracy? Broadly 
speaking, the ‘preconditions’ literature may be separated into the four levels of analysis 
identified by Sorensen (1993b: 26-27): (1) modernization and wealth (level of socio­
economic development); (2) political culture; (3) social structure of society; and (4) external 
factors.6
The first approach draws its inspiration from Lipset’s hypothesis, from which all 
modernization theories are derived, that the road from backwardness to modernity brings 
forth those socioeconomic conditions which characterize the democratic experience 
(Bauzon 1992: 36; Hadenius 1992: 77). Implicit in this view is that ‘all good things go 
together’. Since “the average wealth, degree of industrialization, and level of education is 
much higher for the more democratic countries...” (Lipset 1959: 75), it follows logically 
that, as countries become more socio-economically developed, they too would become 
democratic (Cutright 1963: 253). In brief: “in poor countries democratization is unlikely; in 
rich countries it has already occurred” (Huntington quoted in Diamond 1992: 455).
While most analysts accept that democracy certainly does correspond to higher 
levels of economic development, few believe that the relationship is linear (recall the findings
6There are certainly other such classifications. Zarate (1994) divides the literature into three areas: (1) socio- 
economic-factors, (2) cultural factors, and (3) socio-political factors. Pennock’s three categories are: (1) 
history, (2) socio-economic order, and (3) political culture (cited in Vanhanen 1990: 42). Liu (1993) looks 
at four theories of democratic transition: (1) modernization approach, (2) civil society approach, (3) 
institutional approach, and (4) the strategic (political elites) approach.
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in Chapter 1). Neubauer (1967: 1007) in particular adds an important qualifier by 
proposing the notion of a democratic ‘threshold’:
Certain levels of ‘basic’ socio-economic development appear to be necessary to elevate 
countries to a level at which they can begin to support complex, nation-wide patterns of 
political interaction, one of which may be democracy. Once above this threshold, 
however, the degree to which a country will ‘maximize’ certain forms of democratic 
practice is no longer a function of continued socio-economic development
Dahl expands on this assumption by attributing specific figures to the upper and lower 
income thresholds (circa 1970):
Proposition 1: There exists an upper threshold, perhaps in the range of about $700-800 
GNP per capita (1957 U.S dollars), above which the chances of polyarchy...are so high 
that any further increases in per capita GNP (and associated variables) cannot affect the 
outcomes in any significant way.
Proposition 2: There exists a lower threshold, perhaps in the range of about $100-200 
GNP per capita, below which chances for polyarchy...are so slight that differences in per 
capita GNP or variables associated with it do not really matter (Dahl quoted in Diamond 
1992: 454).
Others have also followed in this tradition of selecting a point in time and then 
examining where democracies fell along the developmental continuum (Jackman 1973; 
Hadenius 1992; Liu 1993). Of course, such exercises run into the problem of shifting 
income thresholds over time. Nonetheless, of the two interpretations: “the data are much 
more consistent with Neubauer’s argument for curvilinear effects than they are with the 
linear developmental hypothesis suggested by Lipsetand Cutright” (Jackman 1973: 621).
This approach certainly contains enough obvious exceptions (poor, democratic 
India; wealthy, autocratic Saudi Arabia) to confirm that the level of development alone 
cannot determine whether or not democracy takes root in a given country. Other mitigating 
factors must also be taken into account:
(T)he development hypothesis that posits a fairly straightforward linear relationship 
between levels of socio-economic development and levels of political participation needs 
to be modified in two ways... (With) respect to the promotion of political participation, 
the impact of a society’s external environment may compensate, in part, for a lower level 
of socio-economic development, and the impact of its traditional culture and behaviour 
patterns may counterbalance, in part, the effects of higher levels of socio-economic 
development (Huntington and Nelson 1976: 53).
Diamond et al (1995: 24) pick up on this theme in their wide-ranging study:
Development enhances the prospects for democracy because - and to the extent that - it 
enhances several crucial intervening variables: democratic values and beliefs, capacities for 
independentorganization and action in civil society, a more equitable class structure (with 
reduction of absolute poverty), and a less corrupt, interventionist, rent-seeking state.
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At most, therefore, the consensus suggests that: “socio-economic conditions do affect the 
quality of political democracy but they do not prevent the development of a democratic 
system” (Sorensen 1993b: 19).
The second approach examines the impact of political culture, described as “that 
intangible nexus which serves as a gauge of the social and cultural resonance and legitimacy 
of the state” (Kamrava 1996: 47). Though a highly enigmatic concept for researchers,7 with 
obvious shortcomings for meaningful cross-national analysis,8 its explanatory value should 
not be underestimated. Some even suggest that political culture “may well comprise a 
sufficient condition for democracy” (Pennock quoted in Vanhanen 1990: 42). At least one 
empirical investigation has confirmed this assumption: “a substantial proportion of any 
observed association between economic well-being and democracy is cultural in origin” 
(Laband 1984: 35).
Since “democracy itself is rooted in a set of cultural values” (Ingham 1993: 1809), 
it is generally believed to be a concept alien to most developing nations (Kohli 1986: 167).9 
The ‘democratic potential’ of developing nations therefore varies. ‘The Third World 
countries with the best chances of establishing sustained democratic rule,” Kohli (1986: 
175) argues, “are those with historically inherited institutions that facilitate elite unity”. The 
significance of colonial rule is highlighted in the statistical analysis carried out by Hadenius 
(1992: 130): “a British background has a positive association with democracy and a French 
negative. At the same time the fact that states have not been colonies during this century has 
a much weaker impact”.
The rigid application of the democratic model to developing nations, as some writers 
on political development had originally urged, could therefore be expected to produce 
distorting consequences. Lipset(1970: 42) himself came to the conclusion that: “exporting 
models of political systems and ideologies which ‘work’ in advanced industrialized areas to 
less advantaged ones is not only bad social science, but much worse, may result in
7As Huntington (1987: 22-23) observes: ‘The concept of culture is a tricky one in social science because it 
is both easy and unsatisfying to use. It is easy (and also dangerous) to use because it is, in some sense, a 
residual category. If no other causes can possibly explain significant differences between societies, it is 
inviting to attribute them to culture”.
8Pye (1965: 16) makes the general observation that: ‘The conditions of research and the availability of 
information in different countries set quite different limits upon possibilities for studying one or the other 
culture”. Even if we could somehow propose a widely-accepted definition for the term, the basic problem is 
that we cannot quantify or otherwise operationalize political culture. Researchers are therefore forced to rely 
on purely subjective measures. The end result in such cases is always open to dispute. One only has to look 
at die charges of subjective bias and methodological incoherence levied against Almond and Verba’s The 
Civic Culture (Somjee 1986: 16-18; Gendzier 1985: 119-124; Zarate 1994: 14).
'The very ‘Westernized’ notion of democracy as merely consisting of formal structural and procedural 
trappings leaves itself open to many criticisms, aside from the inevitable charges of ideological and cultural 
bias. If we are to equate democratization with development, Bagchi argues, surely we should in fact be 
distinguishing between a democratic society and a democratic polity: “At the very least, we can conceive of 
a society as being more democratic than others if the life chances of the members of that society are more 
similar than others, even though procedural democracy...doesnot yet obtain” (Bagchi 1995: xviii).
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disastrous politics”. The process by which foreign influences are either accepted or rejected 
by societies is in fact quite subliminal:
(What writers on political development overlooked) was the essential permeability of 
(developing) societies - and for that matter of any society. Instead of acting as hard shells, 
which, as modernization theorists assumed, had to be broken, these societies tended to act 
as sponges, absorbing whatever they wanted. In such a process, some things were 
absorbed more due to contact and exposure rather than through conscious choice (Somjee 
1986: 4).10
Thus, where they are to be found at all, developing democracies necessarily deviate 
to some degree from the ‘Western model’ (an elusive term in its own right). Lane and 
Ersson (1990: 159) observe that “even in countries where there has been democracy for a 
number of years, such as Costa Rica, Columbia and Venezuela, this has been more of an 
elitist and conservative type rather than true competitive party government”. This argument, 
of course, also suggests that cultural traits invariably shape the nature of authoritarian 
regimes. The developmental success enjoyed by the East Asian NICs is often attributed to 
the “paternalistic patron-client style of personal power” (Ingham 1993: 1809), which is 
described as “a rare species” (Sorensen 1993b: 29).
The third approach considers the socio-political cleavages in developing societies 
which may affect possible transitions toward democracy. At the heart of this literature is the 
proposition that “in all polities there is a fundamental distinction between the culture of the 
rulers or power holders and that of the masses, whether they are merely parochial subjects 
or participating citizens” (Pye 1965: 15). Whereas the ‘masses’ are often portrayed as 
mere pawns to be manipulated (Kohli 1986: 169), the attitude of elites is believed to be a 
major factor in influencing whether or not democracy takes root (Huntington and Nelson 
1976: 171).11
It may be assumed that the central motivation for either supporting or thwarting 
democratic advances is common from one elite group to another the fundamental desire to 
preserve or enhance their socio-economic privileges (Huntington and Nelson 1976: 2). But 
setting aside the simplistic (though valid) notion of self-interest, elite attitudes are also 
influenced by the corresponding gulf, derived from this disparity in socio-economic 
privileges, between what they perceive is their own self-worth and abilities on the one hand,
l®It should also be noted that some social groups in developing societies are more influenced by this 
“contact and exposure” to Western ideas and practices. Indeed,it is often argued that: “the Third World upper 
stratum is more attuned to Western business, military, bureaucratic, and technical values than the traditional 
values of its own populace” (Goulet 1995: 188).
^This simple dichotomy between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’, drawn for purposes of illustration, assumes 
that (1) both are monolithic groups, and (2) that the political contest is actually waged between them. The 
reality is much different In most developing societies the real political contest is often between two or 
more groups of elites. In these cases, the significance of elite attitudes lies in the possible selection of 
democracy as the medium of competition: “...before democracy can be bom, elites must come to ‘agree to 
disagree’and be willing to put ‘rules above personal power’” (Kohli 1986: 167).
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and the inherent inferiority and incompetence of the masses on the other.12 Lipset (1981: 
52) describes this perception vividly:
The poorer the country and the lower the standard of living of the lower classes, the 
greater the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower as vulgar, innately inferior, a 
lower caste beyond the pale of human society...Consequently, the upper strata in such a 
situation tend to regard political rights for the lower strata, particularly the right to share 
power, as essentially absurd and immoral. The upper strata not only resist democracy 
themselves, their often arrogant political behaviour serves to intensify extremist reactions 
on the part of the lower classes.
A related argument thus centers upon De Tocqueville’s proposition that democracy 
is more easily established and maintained in societies where there is a greater ‘equality of 
conditions’ among the populace. Empirical evidence suggests that the emphasis should not 
be on income inequality alone,13 but on the widespread enjoyment of basic health, 
education, economic security, etc (Barsh 1992: 133; Schmitz and Gillies 1992: 24-25). In 
other words, “the greater the equality of resources and power distribution, or of access to 
them, the better are the opportunities for fuller participation, and the more of it there is in 
practice”(Leftwich 1983: 265).14 Quite clearly, one may readily substitute the term ‘human 
development* into the above formulations.
The fourth basic approach, examining the role of external factors in creating a 
climate favourable for democratization, is too unwieldy for any substantive conclusions 
applicable to all developing states. “Foreign agencies do have a role to play in helping 
democracies form,” Zarate argues (1994: 28), “yet the power to do so is constrained by the 
sets of conditions hindering or helping democratization within a country”. One policy that
12This argument is necessarily constructed largely on anecdotal evidence, since any attempt to conduct a 
study of such attitudes, regardless of the nature and size of the sample, must inevitably confront the 
problem of trying to find elites willing to go on record as questioning the rationality and wisdom of the 
average elector, whatever their private views. One such survey, however, was conducted by Moskos and Bell 
in the mid-1960s among political, economic and social elites in four emergent countries in the British 
Caribbean. The objective was to uncover elite attitudes towards democracy through a range of different 
questions. When asked to judge the competence of the average West Indian voter, 72% of the elites found 
the voter to be ‘incompetent’. When asked whether the democratic form of government is best suited for the 
West Indies, the reviews were mixed: 50% said ‘very suitable’, 10% said ‘partially suitable’, and 40% said 
‘not suitable’. The authors concluded that: “the overall level of democratic - as opposed to authoritarian - 
beliefs and attitudes was not very high” (Moskos and Bell, 1965: 227).
13When the income inequality measure alone is used, it has been found that it “has no systematic effect on 
the level of democracy within countries...(However) if a democratic regime is inaugurated in a country with 
an extremely inegalitarian distribution of income, high inequality is likely to undermine the legitimacy of 
the regime and cause democraticinstitutions to be replacedby authoritarian rule” (Muller 1988: 50, 57).
14Vanhanen has undertaken to examine this argument empirically by employing a composite measure, 
which he calls the Index of Power Resources (IPR), to test a two-fold hypothesis: “(1) The relative 
distribution of economic, intellectual, and other power resources among various sections of the population 
is the fundamental factor that accounts for the variation of democratization; and (2) Democratization will 
take place under conditions in which power resources have become so widely distributed that no group is 
any longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain its hegemony” (Vanhanen 1990: 50). Though 
not without its faults, which Vanhanen himself is quick to point out (1990: 192; 1992: 24-25), the IPR 
“was able to explain, statistically, about 70 percent of the variation in the (Index of Democratization)” 
(1990:193). Following in the footsteps of Neubauer et a], Vanhanen then uses a modified version of the 
IPR (the IPR-ISI) to establish a ‘thresholdof democracy’.
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has received much attention and criticism involves the linking of development aid to 
progress on human rights, democracy and, recently, ‘good governance’ (Munslow and 
Ekoko 1995: 159). Often referred to as ‘political conditionality’, its consequences are 
enormous:
Behind such seemingly innocent measures is a potentially dramatic change of basic 
principles of the inter-national system: putting human rights first means that respect for 
individuals and individual rights acquires priority over respect for the sovereignty of states 
(Sorensen 1993a: 1).
Looking beyond such theoretical considerations, the main problem with this tendency is that 
it differentiates by ideology, and not by actual performance. The pressure to democratize is, 
therefore, sometimes misdirected.15 Predictably, this policy is open to the same charges of 
cultural and ideological bias which accompanied those theories equating political 
development with democratization.
Though perhaps highlighting one approach in particular (level of socio-economic 
development, political culture, etc), most writers on democratic preconditions have tended to 
adopt an overall interpretation which incorporates elements of each approach. Setting aside 
some of the more deterministic attempts - those claiming to be able to predict the emergence 
of democracy using data for certain variables16 - one may wonder how accurately these 
approaches, individually and collectively, reflect the actual conditions required for 
democracy to take root in developing societies. “For every factor seen as conducive to 
democracy,” Sorensen (1993b: 27) argues, “counterexamples can be forwarded”. Edwards 
(1994: 101) certainly adds his skepticism:
General questions about democratization are unanswerable. The infinite variety of 
conditions, actually present or counterfactually posed, which might facilitate or impede 
such a process can only produce bewilderment
^U g an d a is  an excellent case in point In the aftermath of the brutal and corrupt regimes of Idi Amin and 
Milton Obote, Yoweri Museveni assumed the reins of power in 1986. Under his direction, Uganda has 
experienced an economic boom (annual growth of 6% since 1987, making it the envy of the IMF) and 
much-neededsocio-political stability. Despite initial pressure from the West Musevini has resisted holding 
multi-party elections, arguing that the West does not understand the 'subtleties’ of African politics (ie. the 
vertical division along tribal lines). Owing to his successes, the West now appears to be acquiescing: 'The 
bottom line,” says one Western ambassador, 'Is that he is one of the few leaders on this continent who 
appears to care about his people and we therefore trust him to do the right thing”. In return, Musevini is to 
hold elections for the constituent assembly where candidates must stand as individuals, thereby creating a 
‘no-party state’. Regardless, there is ample evidence to suggest that “so long as there’s food on the table”, 
Ugandans will allow Musevini to lead. (From “No Democracy Here, Please”, The Economist, 29 May 
1993; and “Musevini Takes MeasuredRoute To Democracy”, The Independent, 10 June 1993.)
16There are always inconsistencies with deterministic models, as Vanhanen (1992: 30) has found using his 
own variable (the IPR1-ISI): “According to the IPR-1SI, Kuwait, Bahrain, Thailand, Qatar, Iraq, and Guyana 
should (be) democracies. According to the IPR-ISI, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania.. .Papua New 
Guinea, Madagascar and Haiti were not expected to be democracies...(The IPR-ISI) now predicts 
democratizationfor several Arab states in the Middle East”.
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Proponents of what may be called the ‘strategic school’ (Liu 1993) reject systematic 
preconditions outright Using the metaphor of a complex ‘chess game’, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986: 66) bring political actors into their analysis of possible transitions from 
authoritarianism to democracy: ‘Political democracy, then, usually emerges from a 
nonlinear, highly uncertain, and imminently reversible process involving the cautious 
definition of certain spaces and moves on a multi-layered board”. Di Palma concurs: “New 
democracies are thus less the result of cumulative, necessary, predictable, and systematic 
development than of historical busts and booms, global opinion climates, shifting 
opportunities, and contingent preferences” (quoted in Zarate, 1994: 21). The debate over 
which sets of factors - ‘structural/systematic’ or ‘conscious strategies’ - most influence the 
process of democratization has not yet been fully resolved, despite some notable recent 
empirical attempts to discover the answer.17
2.2 The Humanist Approach
From Human Needs To Human Development: The Theoretical Backdrop
A normative political movement, hereinafter referred to as the humanist approach, 18 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Seeking to place human developmental the forefront of 
their discipline, its proponents, political humanists, chastised their colleagues for losing 
perspective: ‘The increasingly fashionable concept of ‘political development* has been left 
hanging in the air within authoritative political science literature, because the pluralist value- 
vacuum has barred any connection to human development” (Bay 1971a: 172).
Political humanists were strongly influenced by Abraham Maslow’s landmark 
paper, A Theory of Human Motivation (1943), which proposed a hierarchy of human needs 
designed to take “account of the relative unity behind the superficial differences in specific 
desires from one culture to another” (Maslow 1946: 41).19 Led by Christian Bay and J.C.
17 Vanhanen, for one, concludes that “64 to 70 percent of the variation in the degree of democratization is 
explained by systematic structural factors. This means that conscious strategies would account for a mere 30 
to 40 percent variation at most” (1992: 5). He further assumes that once a certain level of development has 
been reached, “the significance of conscious strategies of democratization is highest” (ibid: 6). Looking at 
purely structural factors, Liu (1993: 97-98) finds that “economic development is the single most important 
factor which pushes a state to start a democratic transition...(but) after a transition is started, education and 
communication....are the most significant factors affecting the results of a democratic transition”. 
l^This broad heading includes ‘needs theorists’, ‘developmental ethicists’, and any other individuals who 
contributed to the general tenets of the literature, as described in the following outline. The ‘humanist 
approach’, therefore, is a classification of convenience which embraces many different labels. Bay, for 
instance, sometimes referred to himself as a ‘rational humanist’: “humanism here will refer to the 
orientation that is committed to a human rights order based on basic needs priorities, and rational means 
being ready to question all related assumptions, possibly excepting the com m itm ent to the supreme 
inherent value of every human” (Bay 1990: 241).
*9Although Maslow provided the necessary conceptual framework, one could trace the spirit of this 
literature at least as far back as the early writings of Marx and Engels, who wrote in 1846: ‘life involves, 
before everything else, eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things (and) that as soon 
as a need is satisfied..., new needs are made” (quoted in Davies 1977a: 159).
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Davies, a generation of theorists embraced Maslow’s resulting model of human 
development as a new standard of comparison.
Much of the humanist literature is devoted to establishing the moral case for human 
development, which involves, in the first instance, resolving the highly abstract ‘needs versus 
wants’ debate in favour of the former. Whereas a want refers to “any demonstrable 
predisposition to desire or prefer something, whether expressed in words or nonverbal 
behaviour”(Bay 1977: 2), a. need refers to “any behaviour tendency whose continued denial 
or frustration leads to pathological responses” (Bay 1968: 242).20 We may all want 
different things, but we all “share our most basic needs categories” (Bay 1990: 246). 
Generally speaking, therefore:
The attempt to mark off needs from wants is one version of the ancient distinction 
between Nature and Convention. The securing of needs is held to be natural, proper 
human activity whereas the securing of wants is merely conventional, artificial or 
‘socially determined’ activity (Mclnnes 1977: 229).
The corresponding assumption, which itself carries profound implications, is that 
“needs are objective and in principle quantitative, while wants are subjective and ephemeral, 
liable to ebb and flow in rhythm with satisfactions” (Bay 1965: 48).21 If only ‘needs’ can 
be objectively quantified, it is both meaningless and methodologically unsound for political 
scientists to try and measure ‘wants’:
the bulk of political behaviour research has dealt directly with want priorities...Simple 
accounting or scale-measurement studies of opinions, attitudes, beliefs and voting 
behaviour will not help much toward understanding basic needs (Bay 1977: 13-14).
Making “no reference to the public good”, such efforts may be dismissed as being 
“pseudopolitical” (Bay 1965: 40). As Doyal and Gough (1984: 11) correctly argue:
when goals are described as ‘wants’, it is precisely because they are not regarded as 
universalisable...(thatis), they are not linked direcdy to the achievement or maintenance 
of some aspect of the human condition which is accepted as normal and necessary for 
everyone... (Furthermore,) unlike needs, wants are always thought of as perceived goals 
which are justified by reasons that have little to do with more general beliefs about the 
human condition.
2^ McInnes (1977: 235) counters that it is often difficult to draw political conclusions from this distinction: 
“...the suppression of nefarious wants can encounter more political opposition than the denial of ‘basic 
needs’. Napoleon I had more trouble curbing illicit distilling, or Khruschev the abuse of vodka, than either 
had in denying their subjects ‘basic needs’, whether for personal integrity or food”.
21The objective/subjective divide is a common theme. Mclnnes (1977: 231) remarks: ‘Needs are at one and 
the same time objective facts and the criteria or norms of mental health, and therefore the norms of a 
healthy society, one where policy is addressedto their satisfaction”. Moreover, Fromm argues that the ‘sane 
society’ is that which: “corresponds to the needs of man, not necessarily to what he feels to be his needs - 
because even the most pathological aims can be felt subjectively as that which the person wants most - but 
to what his needs areobjectively, as they can be ascertained by the study of man” (in Fitzgerald 1977a: ix).
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Accordingly, the concept of ‘wants’ does not have any value for cross-national research; a 
point well illustrated by the inherent deficiencies of Quality of Life studies.22 An objective 
assessment of the human condition across nations can only be made by measuring levels of 
needs satisfaction, or human development
But what exactly are the ‘needs’ which humanists believe we all share? Speculation 
about human nature is as old as the study of politics itself; indeed, one cannot understand 
the latter without some reference to the former. While many theorists have, in the process of 
trying to describe human nature, compiled their own classifications of human needs, none 
have been more influential than Abraham Maslow. Described as “the most elaborate and 
currently most popular model of man”, Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs is predicated 
on the conviction that “man is neither a behavioural sponge (as behaviourists would have it) 
nor a tormented neurotic (as the Freudians hold), but a natural innocent (shades of 
Rousseau) who is endowed with an array of biologically based needs that ascend 
hierarchically...” (Coming 1977: 47). In ascending order of priority, these are: (1) the 
physiological needs (water, food, shelter, etc); (2) the safety needs (predictability of 
environment,sense of security); (3) the belongingness needs (affection, identity,etc); (4) the 
self-esteem needs (sense of personal worth, equality); and (5) the self-actualization needs 
(self-realization).23
Unlike the more ad hoc lists produced by other theorists, Maslow’s model contains 
a sense of sequence and priority:
Human needs arrange themselves in hierarchies of prepotency. That is to say, the 
appearanceof one need usually rests on the prior satisfaction of another, more prepotent 
need Man is a perpetually (needing) animal. Also no need or drive can be treated as if it 
were isolated or discrete; every drive is related to the state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
of other drives (Maslow 1946: 22-23).
22By using attitude surveys and questionnaires, Quality of Life (QoL) studies simply record people’s degree 
of satisfaction with various aspects of their lives. Aside from the technical difficulties with such approaches 
in general (UNESCO 1983: 20-22), there are methodological inconsistencies with QoL studies which 
cannot be overcome for cross-national studies: “(1) the stability of meaning across the groups being 
compared; (2) the possibility that the amounts and patterns of errors in one’s data may vary systematically 
from group to group, or from time to time; and (3) the impact of using different methods in the various 
groups to collect the data” (Andrews 1980: 278-279). Moreover, one inevitably encounters the conceptual 
problem that “rich nations do not necessarily show higher levels of subjective well-being than relatively 
poorer ones” (Inglehart and Rabier 1986: 2). This phenomenon has been confirmed by Gallup (1976: 467) 
and Cantril (in Hankiss 1980: 51). Cantril’s findings in particular show that, despite having only 25% of 
Japan’s ‘developmentalindex’ score, Egypt ranked higher on a ‘mean self-ratings on ladder scale’. Finally, 
although some writers have attempted cross-national samples of basically ‘similar’ groups of countries 
(Andrews and Inglehart 1979), it is acknowledgedthat people in different societies do not think about ‘well- 
being’ in similar ways, thus undermining any common basis of comparison.
23Even the most diverse classifications of needs may be either traced to, or placed within, Maslow’s 
framework. In a famous study which served as the basis for his surveys of ‘welfare’ and ‘levels of living’ in 
Scandinavia (Miles 1985: 159), Allardt(1973) proposes “three basic welfare values” common to everyone: 
Having (Maslow’s Physiological and Security needs). Loving (Maslow’s Belongingness needs), and Being 
(Maslow’s Self-Esteem and Self-Actualization needs). Whereas Doyal and Gough (1984) choose to divide 
their “Abstract Universal Needs” into Individual Needs (Survival/Health, Autonomy/Learning) and Societal 
Needs (Production, Reproduction, Culture/Communication, Political Authority), Weigel (1986) focuses on 
three “Core Attributes of Human Life” - Existence, Intelligence and Sociality. With some creative 
tampering, both classifications could be reworked into Maslow’s hierarchy.
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Not wishing to be misunderstood, Maslow makes two important clarifications. To begin 
with:
(the hierarchy) is not nearly as rigid as we may have impliecL..(T)here have been a number 
of exceptions....(Some) people who have been satisfied in their basic needs throughout 
their lives, particularly in their early years, seem to develop exceptional power to 
withstand present or future thwarting of these needs simply because they have strong, 
healthy character structure as a result of basic satisfaction (Maslow 1946: 37-39).
Furthermore, one should not be under the false impression that
a need must be satisfied 100 per cent before the next need emerges. In actual fact, most 
members of (Western) society who are normal are partially satisfied in all their basic 
needs and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the same time...If I may assign 
arbitrary figures for the sake of illustration, it is as if the average citizen is satisfied 
perhaps 85 per cent in his physiological needs, 70 per cent in his safety needs, 50 per cent 
in his (belongingness) needs, 40 per cent in his self-esteem needs, and 10 per cent in his 
self-actualization needs (Maslow 1946: 40).
While some theorists have embraced Maslow* s model wholeheartedly, others have 
offered some slight modifications.24 But while it may perhaps be tempting to criticize 
certain aspects of the model (Doyal and Gough 1984), or its abstractness,25 one should not 
lose sight of its overall relevance: “what this line of inquiry promises...is a deductive system 
based on very few and widely accepted value premises: that maximal health and maximal 
development of intercompatible human potentialities are supremely desirable” (Bay 1970: 
12). Who can argue, for example, that “physical sustenance, safety, affection, self-esteem, 
and self-development are not prerequisites or crucial aspects of human welfare” (Bay 
1968: 247)? As Renshon (1977: 57) observes: “(Maslow’s hierarchy) offers an attractive 
compromise between the requirement to fully specify the widest variety of human motives, 
and the practical theoretical necessity to have a useful framework for political analysis”.
2 4 T w o  arguments in particular are worth noting, both focusing on the issue of instrumentality. Bay argues 
that the need for perceived personal freedom - “the sense of efficacy or power to influence the course of one's 
life” (Bay 1977: 8) - should be addedto Maslow’s hierarchy between the needs for ’belongingness’ and ‘self- 
esteem’. Since “freedomis the soil requiredfor the full growth of other values” (Bay 1970: 19), Bay places 
it fourth in his expandedmodel of six categories. Davies (1963: 9) considers Maslow’s second category of 
safety/order needs as instrumental for the realization of the other needs. In his own model, he groups the 
safety/orderneeds together with two new instrumental categories of needs (for power and knowledge), thus 
making a distinction between ‘instrumental’ and ‘substantive’ needs (the remaining four categories in 
Maslow’s hierarchy): “Each (instrumental need) relates to each of the substantive needs. Independendy they 
do not appear to have any priority in relation to one another knowledge does not precede power, security 
does not precede knowledge, and so on. But each of the instrumental needs acquires priority as it becomes 
linked or attached to a substantive need” (Davies 1977a: 168).
25Knutson’s (1972: 103) plant analogy helps to clarify this abstractness: “as with each human personality, 
each bud is formed with the possibilities of development into a perfect, whole flower, but first it must 
successfully bypass the vicissitudes of life which may blight its development. If the bud is attacked by 
insects, disease, et cetera, it may continue to unfold somewhat, but it will never become the perfect flower 
which it inherently could have been: it will always (even after professional intervention) bear evidence of its 
earlier deprivation. Finally, just as only the bud which has successfully reached the stage of full
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Democracy and Human Development
Maslow’s hierarchy has certainly influenced the explanation offered by humanists 
for why democracy corresponds to higher levels of development Since the relative saliency 
of specific needs defines the level of human development, it follows that democracy is more 
valued, and therefore more likely to take root and persist, in countries where lower-order 
needs (subsistence, order/stability) have largely been met and where higher-order needs 
(equality/self-esteem) are most salient.26 By now this idea has become widely accepted 
among contemporary political scientists:
There are several reasons why democracy is so closely related to the physical quality of 
life. First, these conditions generate the circumstances and skills that permit effective and 
autonomous participation. Second, when most of the population is literate, decendy fed 
and sheltered, and otherwise assured of minimal material needs, class tensions and radical 
political orientations tend to diminish...Third, human beings appear to frame their values 
at least partly in response to what the psychologist Abraham Maslow termed a ‘hierarchy 
of needs’...Thus while the satisfaction of lower-order needs does not automatically 
increase the salience of individual needs for political freedom and influence, it makes the 
valuing of those needs more likely (Diamond 1992: 486-7; emphasis added).
In the most underdeveloped countries, where most people are preoccupied with 
merely staying alive (i.e., satisfying Maslow’s first category of physiological needs), the 
instrumental value of democracy is suspect, for while “a momentary worsening of the food 
supply may produce local food riots...extreme hunger, as starvation approaches, produces 
apathy and manipulability” (Davies 1963: 15). Nor does the intrinsic value of democracy 
matter for someone suffering from severe physiological deprivation: “if people starve, it is 
nonsense to expect them to care for free speech except, at most, as a means to articulate their 
demand for food” (Bay 1970: 15). Given the choice, and forced to choose, a starving man 
will choose bread instead of the ballot27
development is considered to be whole and wholesome, so the human personality which, having its earlier 
needs met is able to develop to its fullest potentialities, (has) fully attained the level of mental health”.
26This argument is central to the humanist conception of political development, in which a ‘politically 
developed’ country is one found at relatively high levels of human development. In other words, human 
development conditions determine the degree of political development (Davies 1977a; Park 1984; Pennock 
1966). A very elaborate and highly theoretical interpretation is given by Davies (1977a; 1977b). Shunning 
conventional labels, he proposes five stages of political development: primitive anarchy, anomic anarchy, 
oligarchy, democracy and civilized anarchy (1977a: 190). Countries may therefore be placed on a continuum 
from the stage of ‘primitive anarchy’, where most people are burdened with trying to meet their 
physiological needs, to the stage of ‘civilized anarchy’, where people have satisfied their lower needs to the 
extent that the pursuit of self-actualization needs become their paramount source of motivation.
27The German saying “first comes food, then morality” (Davies 1977a: 158) is echoed in Africa as “Human 
rights begin with breakfast” (S tree ten 1981a: 369). These arguments are certainly not confined to the 
humanists. Galbraith argues that “if people are hungry, ill-clad, unsheltered or diseased, nothing is so 
important as to remedy their condition...It will be time to worry about leisure, contemplation, the 
appreciation of beauty and other higher purposes of life when everyone has had a decent meal” (quoted in 
Goulet 1971: 238). Tellingly, in his wide-ranging survey of attitudes in post-colonial Africa, Cantril (1961: 
7) found that: “among some of the poorest people in black Africa who have long been subjugated by the 
white man, the problem of racial discrimination itself has scarcely emerged in their consciousness, so 
desperate are they to find enough for their families to eat that day and the day after”.
42
Democracy is also of little value (intrinsic or instrumental) in conditions of extreme 
insecurity, where the collective need for stability/order - social , economic and political - 
becomes paramount. Few Peruvians, for example, flinched when President Fujimori 
assumed dictatorial powers in the early 1990s to combat the severe socio-political violence 
unleashed by the Shining Path guerrillas. A sense of security is also characterized by the 
degree of environmental predictability, or “the actual and perceived probability that levels of 
need-satisfaction achieved will continue in the foreseeable future” (Bay 1968: 249). 
Following the harsh initial years of market reform in post-1989 Eastern Europe and Russia, 
the knee-jerk reaction among voters was to seek solace in the predictability of the past.28 
Indeed, the need for predictability is so great that its continued absence is likely, in extreme 
cases, to lead to socio-political rebellion, as Davies’ famous J-Curve Model suggests: a 
revolution will occur when progress is perceived to be blocked or reversed; that is, when an 
intolerable gap emerges between what people expect to receive and what they actually do 
receive from society (Davies 1962: 6).
The question of national identity corresponds to society’s collective need for what 
Maslow called ‘belongingness’. The significance of this concept is easily understood: 
“(people must) develop a sense of community - of a common identity that makes possible 
joint political action” (Davies 1963: 61). The forging of a collective identity, vital for 
ensuring a sense of national cohesion, therefore precedes deliberations over regime-type, 
since “‘What is my nation?’ must be answered before ‘What kind of nation?’ ” (Verba 
quoted in Nordlinger 1970: 333). If a sense of national unity/purpose is not first 
established, especially in less developed societies which are highly polarized along 
ethnic/cultural/religious lines, ‘tribal’ allegiances will almost invariably impede the 
functioning of whatever democratic practices and mechanisms may be in place. To cite the 
most obvious example, recent democratic experiments in Africa - which, for the most part, 
arose from external, not internal pressure - have shown that, with voting patterns strictly 
following tribal/ethnic lines, elections are little more than contests between rival tribal groups 
for political power, the spoils of which flow disproportionately back to the winning group; 
and hence the calls (from Musevini in Uganda, among many) for a form of ‘no-party’
28 “Democracy is good, but sausages are better” was a typical comment of the time (Russian worker quoted 
Dec. 1991 in Vans say and Spindler, 1994: 359). Throughout Eastern Europe, the governing parties 
responsible for implementing the initial market reforms were voted out of office, replaced by ‘reformed 
Socialists’ who pledged to slow the pace of change; recently, of course, the maiket-reformers have made a 
comeback. Many Western observers were taken aback by the widespread support for the extremist politician 
Zhirinovsky during the 1993 Russian Federal Election. That he campaigned against the rapid changes which 
had disrupted ‘the old way of life’ served him well, which should not have been surprising: the Russian 
State Statistics Committee found that 32% of families lived below the official poverty line; that 45% of 
those with children under the age of six were poor; and that 68% of pensioners had monthly incomes below 
$90 (cited in the Toronto Star, 19 December 1993). The widespread insecurity was also reflected in the 
enduring popularity of the Communist Party, which consistently topped opinion polls as the party of 
choice and was the dominant force in the Duma during the first half of the 1990s.
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democracy to reflect ‘African political realities’. Even in more sophisticated democracies 
such as Mauritius and Malaysia, votes are primarily cast along ethnic/religious lines.29
Democracy therefore becomes more meaningful, and thus more likely, once basic 
lower-order needs - for a decent level of subsistence, a secure/predictable environment, and a 
sense of collective (national) identity/purpose - have largely been met and when higher- 
order needs become most salient. Indeed, many political scientists (Cantril 1967; Gallup 
1976; Ingham 1993) concur with the view that: “societies that are more highly developed 
economically and socially also tend to place greater value on political participation...It thus 
acquires value as a goal in and of itself...’’(Huntington and Nelson 1976: 160).
Two landmark studies of global attitudes appeared to confirm this proposition. 
Cantril’s eight-year survey of 14 countries concluded that
the vast majority of people’s hopes and fears revolve around the complex of personal 
well-being as it is rather simply and genuinely defined: a decent standard of living; 
opportunities for children (etc)...But the concern for greater social justice, more freedom, 
better moral standards...appears to be the conscious concern of only a tiny minority of 
people throughout the world...(T)here is little concern for ideology as the term is 
commonly used: few people are basically interested in concepts such as democracy, 
socialism, communism, or capitalism as such... (Cantril 1967: 145; emphasis added).
Almost one decade later, Gallup’s research into 60 countries produced similar results:
Economic well-being plays a far more important role in the hopes of those who live in 
the developing nations. Jobs, a higher standard of living, the chance to own a business, a 
farm or land, and to have ‘wealth’...take precedence over everything... Such things as 
‘self-development’, ‘public service’,...the ‘desire for peace and a better world’, seldom 
mentioned by those in developing nations, are often cited by those in developed nations 
(Gallup 1976: 465).
Again, an explanation may be found in Maslow’s theory of individual motivation: 
people whose higher-order needs are most salient are, by and large, the ones most interested 
in politics as observers and participants. ‘To be treated as an equal, at least politically, 
would seem a prerequisite for dignity...,” Bay argues (1968: 250), “(and) there is a great 
symbolic and psychological value in having this power in principle”.30 Davies (1959: 415)
29These two ‘developmentaldemocracies’,to use Leftwich’s label (1996), will be looked at in Chapter 7. 
In each case, the need to establish a national consensus prompts the formation of a multi-ethnic coalition 
after every election, thereby serving to diffuse any possible ethnic tension which might otherwise arise. The 
constantly-changing nature of coalitional government in Mauritius reflects both the usual inability of any 
one dominant party from gathering enough votes to govern alone, and the generally accepted policy of 
trying to represent all communities. The BN coalition which has governed Malaysia since 1969 consists of 
the dominant United Malay National Organization and several other parties, including ones representing the 
Chinese and Indian communities. The Malay-Chinese race riots of 1969 forced political leaders to seek a 
more consensual form of democracy.
30The distinction between power in fact and power in principle was consistently drawn in the early 
humanist literature. In the tradition of C. Wright Mills (1956), many aigued that, given the lack of any real 
(popular) accountability of political elites, modem liberal-democracy is a ‘sham’. More cynical observers 
would find some merit in this supposedly shambolic front, arguing that the ritual of voting serves other 
purposes (maintaining social cohesion, giving at least the ‘illusion’ of popular empowerment, etc).
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adds that “the only factor which appears to be a reasonable postulate for common 
motivation of intense political participation by the 1 or 2 percent (of the population) is the 
need for self-realization”. Since becoming the subject of considerable political analysis in 
1950s and 1960s, this hypothesis has been consistently confirmed.
The University of Michigan’s influential study of the 1952 U.S. Presidential 
election found that: “People with the highest income...and the most education almost 
without exception are the ones who vote most regularly and frequently and who express the 
belief that voting is worth the trouble and that they have an obligation as citizens to do s o ” 
(Davies 1959: 413). In their own study, Huntington and Nelson (1976: 43) came to a 
similar conclusion: “those with more education, more income, and higher-status 
occupations usually participate more than those who are poor, uneducated and in low-status 
occupations”. Almond and Verba (1989: 193) also found that individuals with a higher 
sense of ‘subjective competence’ - or belief in their own ability and power to ‘make an 
impact’ - almost invariably express the greatest satisfaction with their voting participation.
Furthermore, examining the differences between the ‘voter’ and the ‘non-voter’, 
Hastings (1956: 304-306) found that the latter generally has a significantly higher “degree 
of social withdrawal and immobility”, a lower “level of information”, and comes 
predominantly from the lower economic strata. Regarding the question of political apathy/ 
awareness, Rosenberg (1954: 362) observed that: “...for many people the relatively abstract, 
impersonal, serious, and often complex, subject matter of politics cannot compete 
successfully with the simple, personal, emotional appeal and excitement of kidnapping and 
sports and more entertaining subjects of the mass media”.31 One extensive survey 
conducted in the early 1960s found that
of the approximately 100,000,000 adults in the U.S., 50 million of them do not know 
who Nehru is; 50 million cannot correctly identify Charles de Gaulle; 20 million think 
Russia is a member of NATO; while 20 million just don’t know one way or another. But 
85 million do know about Marilyn Monroe and 80 million can identify Mickey Mantle 
(Cantril 1961: 44).
Though certainly not justifying the outrageous claims made by elite theorists of the 
19th centuiy,32 some argue that, by investigating issues such as political motivation and
31There are, it should be stressed, other reasons for political apathy, as Rosenberg (1954: 366) himself 
noted: “...some people are apathetic because they feel there is no need to do anything; they are contented 
with the social and political system, have faith in their representatives, and see no need for change. This 
basic contentment tends to be linked with a confidence in the basic stability of the society”. Likewise, 
Monis-Jones (1954: 37) wrote that: “A State which has ‘cured’ apathy is likely to be a State in which too 
many people have fallen into the error of believing in the efficiency of political solutions for the problems 
of ordinary lives”.
32Fearing the impact of ‘mass society’ on the democratic process, Le Bon remarked: “The elector stickles 
in particular for the flattery of his greed and vanity. He must be overwhelmed with the most extravagant 
blandishments, and there must be no hesitation in making him the most fantastic promises...(which) 
produce a great effect, and... are not binding for the future, (since) the elector never troubles himself to find 
out how far the candidate he has returned has followed out the electoral programme he applauded, and in 
virtue of which the election was supposed to have been secured” (Le Bon 1896: 202-203).
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awareness, modem social science appears to have contributed “systematic, scientific 
evidence of human behaviour to discount factual truth to the classical democratic faith in the 
rationality, good will, and general competence of the average man” (Meyer 1974: 199). 
Whatever one’s opinion on this specific point, it is hard to disagree that:
Participation (for the majority of people) is not an inherently satisfying experience but 
rather an activity in which they engage to insure their basic security in such things as 
food, clothing, shelter, health and physical safety...or to give them a sense of belonging 
to some social group other than family, church, union or fraternal lodge. For most people 
politics is quite instrumental... (the paradox of course is that) those who are most active 
in politics are not those who by objective judgement are most in need of security and a 
greater sense of belongingness (Davies 1959: 410-413; emphasis added).
Overall, therefore, the humanist approach establishes a theoretical basis for relating 
democracy to human development Interestingly, it also provides a theoretical context in 
which to interpret many of the ‘democratic preconditions’ postulated in the more traditional 
approaches. There is agreement that democracy is typically the by-product of development 
But whereas traditional views often focus on the level of socio-economic development 
humanists consider the level of physiological needs. The same treatment may be applied to 
some of the other broad concepts: political culture underpins the collective need for 
belongingness/identity; socio-political cleavages expose the collective needs for self-esteem 
and equality; and political development theory’s preoccupation with stability and order ties 
directly to the collective needs for safety and security.
The Instrumentality of Politics
Believing in the instrumentality of politics, political humanists argue that 
governments should be evaluated by what they do (in the area of human development) and 
not by what they claim to be (whether democratic or not). Rather than embracing democracy 
as the best form of government in all circumstances, humanists claim that democracy is the 
best form when and where it works: “a political system that fails to provide basic security 
or to provide - or to enable the economy to provide - minimum subsistence cannot be 
judged highly developed no matter how much liberty it succeeds in guaranteeing” (Pennock 
1966: 426). What matters is not regime-type but political effectiveness:
...to protect and expand Most Basic Rights is the only legitimate purpose of government, 
or of politics; every law and institution should be judged as a means to further this 
end...(These rights) are to remain (1) alive, (2) unmolested, and (3) free to develop 
accordingto inner propensities and potentialities (Bay 1971b: 217-218).
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Likewise, Pennock (1966: 420-426) argues that a state must be judged by its ability to 
“deliver political goods”, which consist of: (1) order; (2) welfare; (3) justice; and (4) 
liberty. Lane and Ersson (1993: 193) concur
The famous slogan from the French Revolution - Liberte, Egalitie andFratemite - may be 
interpreted as an attempt to define the piincipal-agent problem in politics. Any 
government should pursue these principles in order to be legitimate to the population.
A government’s effectiveness is therefore measured by how well it improves human 
development conditions, whereas its legitimacy rests upon its degree of effectiveness (Bay 
1977: l).33
Accordingly, a democratic government may or may not be effective and/or 
legitimate. Since “people cannot eat the constitution” (Davies 1977a: 171),34 democracies, 
like other political systems, must be judged by their instrumental merit. Otherwise, there is 
the danger of confusing means and ends, as external trappings become valued for 
themselves:
...a need-based conception of democracy... rejects the notion that the value of the 
democratic method is fulfilled by Bills of Rights, competitive elections, legal and 
institutional guarantees of the citizen’s right to appeal to his leaders, majority rule, rights 
of opposition, and so on. In effect,it demands that what may be necessary conditions for 
democracyshould not be seat as sufficient (Meyer 1974: 211).
This humanist view of democracy is thus at odds with traditional democratic ideology, in 
which “not the sanctity of life but the preservation of a political system, or ‘way of life’, 
becomes the end” (Bay 1971b: 155-156). Expressed differently:
Democrats, as believers in voting, must emphasize responsiveness to popular wants as a 
primary legitimation principle. A primary commitment to human rights, on the other 
hand, requires a different kind of legitimation, for a human right cannot in principle be 
validatedor invalidatedby popular votes (Bay 1990: 237).
The belief in the instrumentality of politics was shared by humanists and political 
development theorists alike. Both groups also recognized that politics is an elitist exercise. 
But whereas the latter displayed a ‘conservative elitism’ concerned with issues of stability 
and institutionalization (Cammack 1994a: 369), the former advocated a ‘radical elitism’, or
33This argument may be expressed in sociological terms: “one may refer to a social condition as authentic, 
when the appearance and the underlying structure are both responsive to basic human needs; as alienating, 
when both the appearances and the structure are unresponsive; and as inauthentic, when the underlying 
structure is unresponsive but an institutional or symbolic front of responsiveness is maintained” (Etziom 
1968: 881).
34Vanssay and Spindler (1994: 361) provide an empirical dimension to this argument by studying “whether 
inclusion...of an explicitly named right in a written constitution has any effect on residents’ economic 
welfare...”. Not surprisingly, they conclude that “the entrenched elements of ‘political structure’, 
‘protections from tyranny’, or ‘ social charter’ are not revealed as important explanatory variables. Indeed, the 
results suggest that ‘actions speak louder than words’...” (ibid: 365).
47
‘militant humanism’ aimed at improving the human condition (Bay 1971b: 157). Quite 
often, this advocacy led critics to assume that an authoritarian streak underlined the 
humanist message, since the question inevitably arises: Who is to determine what society’s 
‘needs’ are, if democratic elections are merely expressions of ‘wants’? As Flew (1977: 
217) recognizes, it is possible “to endow the notion of needs with much charm for anyone 
longing to belong to an authoritative and powerful paternalistic elite”.35
While this observation may be true in a narrow sense, and is readily admitted by 
humanists themselves (Bay 1977: 3), it obscures a distinction which must be made:
It is important to acknowledge that for anyone to claim that he knows someone else’s 
human needs is for the former to assume an authoritative relationship toward the latter.
But this is not enough to make the first authoritarian (Kaufman 1971: 197).3^
Parents are justified in assuming that they ‘know better’ when forcing their children to eat 
their food (for their ‘own good’). We visit doctors because we assume, quite correctly, that 
they are in a better position to determine what ails us (and may prescribe treatment 
accordingly). Hence, one should not fall “into the absurdity of denying that (some people) 
know more than we do about some of our needs” (Watt 1982: 541).
But where does one draw the theoretical line between ‘good’ or ‘bad’ paternalistic 
interventions? Kleining makes a distinction between two sets of dichotomies - positive and 
negative, strong and weak - and proceeds to outline whether or not a paternalistic imposition 
may be justified:
In general, negative paternalism (where X’s rationale for acting is based on a concern to 
protect Y from some harm) is to be prefened;(2) In general, the ‘weaker’ the paternalism 
(where X’s act is based on the relative unlikelihood of Y being able to select a particular 
good for himself), the more likely it is that it can be justified; (3) In general, the more 
serious the detriment to welfare, the more likely it is that paternalism will be justified;
(4) In general, the higher the risk involved the more compelling the case for paternalism; 
ami (5) In general, the more difficult it is to repair the harm or detriment, the more likely 
it is that paternalism will be justified (Kleining in Weigel 1989: 75-76).
Two basic assumptions may be derived from this framework. First, developed countries 
have a moral obligation to help alleviate needs deprivation in developing countries, 
irrespective of whether or not any assistance is actually asked for by their governments 
(Doyal and Gough 1984: 22); which, owing to plain indifference to the welfare of their
35Consider a speech made in 1957 - with the memory of the Hungarian Uprising still lingering - by the 
Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar,in front of the National Assembly: “The task of the leadersis not to put into 
effect the wishes and will of the masses...The task of the leaders is to accomplish the interests of the 
masses. Why do I differentiate between the will and the interests of the masses? In the recent past we have 
encountered the phenomenon of certain categories of workers acting against their interests” (quoted in Flew 
1977: 214).
3^Bay (1970b: 4), for instance, calls freedom of expression the “supreme political value”. Just how 
‘authoritarian’ can he be?
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people, nationalistic pride, or any other reason, may be reluctant to accept ‘outside 
intervention’. Though highly controversial, and open to a number of interpretations - 
ranging from direct military intervention to making foreign aid contingent upon verifiable 
human development gains - the call for such a strongly-enforced benevolent policy, where 
action is taken for the benefit of the most disadvantaged people, is certainly not the same as 
advocating colonialism or imperialism, where societies are subjugated for the benefit of the 
colonial power. Second, political leaders have a moral obligation to try and improve the lives 
of their fellow citizens, using means which may be either democratic (where possible) or 
non-democratic (where necessary). This brings up the interesting case of Singapore: 
whereas political development theorists would applaud its benevolent/paternalistic leadership 
for creating a strong institutional framework to “maximize order and (economic) 
development”, to use Apter’s (1971) phrase, political humanists would applaud the 
tremendous human development gains made over the past decades (Chapter 7).
Because the earlier political humanists did not focus on regime-type distinctions, 
they never directly engaged in the debate over which form of government is most likely to 
rapidly propel a developing country to a higher plateau. But it was assumed that, prior to 
reaching the stage where democracy could truly become meaningful to the majority of a 
country’s inhabitants (i.e. once lower-order needs were satisfied), some form of 
‘oligarchic’ rule would be necessary. This theme, though not sufficiently developed in the 
humanist literature, was touched upon by Davies (1977b: 92):
...the criterion for saying whether a capitalist or socialist economic system is more 
appropriate is its efficiency in creating an abundance of goods, not who controls the 
system. In either case, the system will be controlled by an elite that is not institutionally 
accountable to the public it professes to serve. Oligarchy, in short, seems to be inevitable 
in societies that are commencing intensive economic development and broad social 
integration.
Like political development theorists (and other proponents of the Conflict 
Perspective), political humanists therefore assumed that democratic governance could not be 
maintained during a period of rapid socio-economic change. In a sense, then, democracy 
would have to wait increased material prosperity usually leads to a corresponding 
improvement in human development conditions (Chapter 7), which, in turn, increases the 
possibility that democracy will be established at a future stage.
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CHAPTER 3
MEASURING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: 
CONCEPTS AND VARIABLES
This chapter, divided into two parts, describes the variables to be employed in the 
empirical analysis in succeeding chapters. Section 3.1 discusses my political measure, the 
Level of Democracy Index (LoD), whereas section 3.2 outlines my measure of human 
development, the Integrated Human Development Index (I-HDI), and its constituent indices.
3.1 Measuring Democracy: The Level of Democracy Index (LoD)
Measures of Democracy
“So fluid, complex, and subjective a thing as democracy,” one scholar wrote, 
“cannot be weighed on a grocer’s scales or even on a laboratory balance with complete 
accuracy and satisfaction” (Fitzgibbon 1956: 619). To some extent, this sentiment reflects 
why no one particular index of democracy has emerged as the undisputed standard of 
measurement Indeed, there are many such indices for scholars to choose from (for good 
summaries of existing indices of democracy and their relative merits see: Bollen 1986, 
1990; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990; Inkeles 1990; Vanhanen 1984, 1990). Table 3.1 
summarizes some of the better known indices available for cross-national, time-series 
studies. There are certainly other measures worth noting, but their unavailability in 
widespread time-series formats prevents their inclusion in the table.1
^Here are but a few such measures. Bollen’s (1980) index of political democracy focuses on two points in 
time (1960, 1965) for 113 countries, and uses the following criteria: [ness freedom, freedom of group 
opposition, government sanctions, fairness of elections, executive selection and legislative selection. Moore 
(1995) acknowledges the merits of this index but laments its lack of contemporary data, while Weede (1983) 
and Moon (1991), among many others, have chosen Bollen’s index as the political measure in their 
respective empirical studies. Jackman’s (1973) index of democratic performance covers the same period as 
Bollen’s but is not as widely used. Available for 60 countries, this measure contains four dimensions: 
number of adults voting, competitiveness of party system, electoral irregularity and freedom of the press. 
More recendy, Coppedge and Reinicke’s (1990) Polyarchy Scale is derived from four criteria: freedom erf 
expression, freedom of organization, media pluralism, and the holding of free elections. The authors allocate 
corresponding scores to 170 countries for 1985. Hadenius (1992) constructs a democracy index for 132 
countries. Though available for only one date (cl988), this index has been duly acknowledged and cited 
(Moore 1995: 6; Lane and Ersson 1994: 101). Desai’s (1994) Political Freedom Index is constructed from 
five ‘clusters’: integrity of the self/personal security, rule of law, political participation, freedom cf 
expression, and equality before the law. Based largely on work the author did for the 1992 Human 
Development Report, Desai’s index is available for 101 countries (c!992).
50
Table 3.1 Comparing Several Indices of Democracy
Index Components Time-Series Sample(N)
(1) Cutright’s index of 
political development
-legislative branch of government 
-executive branch of government
1940s-60s 77
(2) Vanhanen’s index of 
democratization
-competitiveness of party system 
-electoral participation
pre1960s-1970s, 
1980-88
119,
147
(3) Humana’s index of 
human rights
-several different measures 
of human rights
1980s 96,98
(4) Gastri’s index of 
political rights
-several different 
criteria from political 
rights ‘checklist’
1972+ 167+
(5) Guir’s index of 
political authority
-competitiveness of participation pre-1960s-1986
-regulation of participation
competitiveness of exec, recruitment
-openness of exec, recruitment
-constraints on chief executive
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A suitable measure for this study would have to meet three criteria: (1) conceptual 
suitability, and availability in both (2) time-series (1970-90) and (3) cross-national (123 
countries) formats. From the table, only those constructed by Vanhanen, Gastil, and Gurr 
seem to satisfy these criteria. But since Gastil and Gurr cover very similar conceptual terrain 
(Lane and Ersson 1994: 101), and given the very high degree of correlation between their 
indices,2 it is appropriate to select one at the expense of the other. Accordingly, Gastil’s 
index has been selected over Gurr’s because it is more accessible, as values are presented 
on an annual basis for the exact period of this study, and because it is much more widely 
accepted and employed by other researchers. We are therefore left with Gastil’s Political 
Rights Index (PRI) and Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization (ID).
Since these two indices differ significantly, both conceptually and methodologically, 
one should not be directly substituted for the other, despite the fact that they are highly 
correlated.3 As will be demonstrated below, it is primarily because of these differences that
2The correlation coefficients are: .86 for 1973 (N=124); .87 for 1980 (N=128); .89 for 1985 (N=128); and 
.91 for 1986 (N=128). Source: Appendix 5.1 in Lane and Ersson 1994, p. 100.
3Lane and Ersson (1994: 100) find correlation coefficients of .82 for 1980 (N=128) and .87 for 1988 
(N=128). For his sample of 147 states for the period 1980-88, Vanhanen (1990: 25) himself observes 
correlations ranging from -.811 (1980) to -.870 (1985). Using as my sample the 123 countries in this 
study, I have found the following correlations between the PRI and ID:
Point Measures___________________________ Period Measures__________________ ..
PRI 1972 with ID 1960/9: -.776 PRI 1972/79 avg with ID 1970/79: -.874
PRI 1979/81 avg with ID 1970/9: -.787 PRI 1980/91 avg with ID 1980/88: -.868
PRI 1989/91 avg with ID 1980/88: -.831 PRI 1972/91 avg with ID 1970/88: -.876
51
it is desirable to keep both, merging them into one composite measure. Before doing so, 
each index should be briefly outlined.
Gastil has been allocating PRI values in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 
surveys annually since 1972. Virtually every country is accorded a PRI value from 1 
(greatest/most political rights) to 7 (lowest/fewest political rights). This seven point scale is 
based upon the following checklist (Gastil 1990b: 30):
1. Chief authority recently elected by a meaningful process.
2. Legislature recently elected by a meaningful process.
3. Fair election laws, campaigning opportunity, polling and tabulation.
4. Fair reflection of voter preference in distribution of power.
5. Multiple political parties.
6. Recent shifts in power through elections.
7. Significant opposition vote.
8. Free of military or foreign control.
9. Major group or groups deniedreasonable self-determination.
10. Decentralized political power.
11. Informal consensus; de facto opposition power.
Two broad criticisms are most often directed against Gastil’s index: (1) it is based 
solely on subjective interpretations; and (2) the evaluations themselves are, in turn, unduly 
influenced by Freedom House’s conservative ideological streak (Scoble and Wiseberg 
1981; Bollen 1986). Discarding claims of ideological and personal bias outright, Gastil 
himself admits that “with more adequate resources, the survey could be made less 
superficial” (Gastil 1990b: 26). However,he adds in his defense:
The unevenness of the sources of available information over time and its incompleteness 
has never been a major reason why the survey never accededto the occasional suggestion 
that a more objective system be devised in which many subindicators would be rated 
numerically, and then summed up for an overall rating. Intuitively, and after trying a few 
experiments, it didnot seem that enough information was easily available to make such a 
system work (Gastil 1990b: 29).
Regardless of the relative merits of subjective measures in general, and without 
necessarily accepting or dismissing the criticisms of Gastil’s index in particular, one should 
in theory be able to detect the existence of undue conceptual bias and methodological 
inadequacies by comparing and verifying Gastil’s findings with those of other researchers. 
It has already been shown that his index is highly correlated with Gurr’s and Vanhanen’s 
measures (footnotes 2 and 3). Furthermore, Lane and Ersson compare Gastil’s PRI and 
Humana’s index and find correlation coefficients of .90 (N=102) for 1983 and .91 (N=88) 
for 1986 (Lane and Ersson 1990: 67). Correlation coefficients of .94 (N=129) are also 
found with Coppedge and Reinecke’s Polyarchy Scale for 1985, and .94 (N=97) with
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Hadenius’ index for 1988 (Lane and Ersson 1994: 101). Quite clearly, Gastil’s findings 
have not been off the mark.4
Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization is, on the other hand, based entirely on 
quantitative indicators. He justifies the selection of his two key variables, competition and 
participation, as follows:
The existence of legal competition indicates that people and their groups are free to 
organize themselves and to oppose government It also indicates the existence of some 
equality in the sense that different groups are equally free to compete for power. The 
degree of participation in crucial decision-making through elections or by some other 
means indicates the extent of “the people” taking part in politics. It seems plausible to 
regard a political system the more democratized the higher the degrees of competition and 
participation there are (Vanhanen 1990: 17).
For his competition variable, Vanhanen takes into account the share of smaller parties’ votes 
in contested elections by subtracting the percentage share of votes won by the largest party 
from 100. The participation variable refers to the degree of electoral participation as a 
percentage of the total population.
The arguments against using the competition variable are three-fold. First, it may be 
claimed that “there is an inherent ethnocentrism, in that the multiparty system that 
characterizes most Western nations is de facto the most democratic” (Bollen 1986: 570). 
However, no one has as yet devised an alternative measure of democracy which is not 
‘ethnocentric’ in this sense. Second, some have argued that the emphasis on smaller 
parties’ votes unduly favours those democracies having a system of proportional 
representation at the expense of those systems with two-party rule (Bollen 1986: 572; 
Bollen 1990: 15; Moore 1995: 9). Hence, according to Vanhanen’s scoring, Iceland (ID 
value of 35) is almost twice as democratic as the United States (ID of 18.7). Third, the 
competition variable does not take into account the fact that an electoral landslide in favour 
of one party may simply reflect people’s overwhelming preference for that party (Bollen 
1990: 572; Moore 1995: 9).
Criticisms of Vanhanen’s participation variable are similar to those levied against all 
measures of electoral participation; namely, that all such measures are generally unreliable 
(Bollen 1986: 571; Bollen 1990: 14). Moore (1995: 9) summarizes the two principal 
arguments:
...high electoral turnouts may reflect no more than the power of the political elite to 
ensure the semblance of democracy in circumstances where there is no real electoral 
contest; and that, in genuine democratic systems, low turnouts may simply reflect that 
voters are satisfied with their political leadership and government
4Among the many empirical studies that have employed Gas til’s measure are the World Development 
Report (1991), Dasgupta and Weale (1992) and Lane and Ersson (1993). The 1991 Human Development 
Report acknowledgedit as a ‘major index’ (UNDP 1991: 98).
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To overcome this conceptual hurdle, one is advised to “use levels of electoral turnout as one 
of several components of a democracy score” (Moore 1995: 9).
Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization is highly correlated with Gastil’s PRI (as 
previously shown) and with other measures of democracy. Using c l960 as the point of 
comparison, Lane and Ersson (1990: 67) find correlations of .79 with Jackson’s index, .80 
with Bollen’s Index (1960) and .76 with Bollen’s index (1965). Vanhanen himself (1990: 
25) finds a correlation of -.820 with Coppedge and Reinecke’s Polyarchy Scale for 1985. 
These correlations show that Vanhanen’s scoring values are generally consistent with those 
of other researchers.
The Level of Democracy Index (LoD)
My chosen measure of democracy, the Level of Democracy index (LoD), is a 
combination of Gastil’s Political Rights Index (PRI) and Vanhanen’s Index of 
Democratization, scaled (ID(S)), and is represented by the formula:
LoD = ( PRI + ID(S) ) / 2
A country’s LoD value equals the sum of its PRI value plus its ID(S) value divided by two 
(PRI values and ID(S) values are weighted equally). Like the PRI and ID(S), the LoD 
employs a seven point scale (with 1.0 the highest or most democratic value, and 7.0 the least 
democratic value). Technical Note 1 describes the construction of the LoD in detail 
(including the method for converting Vanhanen’s raw ID values into scaled ID values). The 
complete list of LoD values for all countries is presented in Appendix B.
There are several reasons for combining the PRI and ID into one index, the LoD. 
First, and most importantly, the LoD provides a more complete picture of the level of 
democracy in a country than could either of its two constituent indices alone, as may be seen 
in light of the preceding criticisms of each index and as a result of the evidence to follow. 
Since the PRI and ID measure different dimensions, there is no danger of overlapping on 
the methodological terrain. The PRI reflects the political liberties available in a country, 
while the ID provides a good indication of how democratic the political system is in 
practice. The LoD therefore effectively captures what Diamond (1992: 455) has called the 
‘ principal dimensions of democracy’: competition, participation and liberty; components 
which correspond to Dahl’s notion of ‘ polyarchy’ (Sorensen 1993a: 15).
Second, each constituent index represents a different operational approach - one 
evaluative (PRI), one quantitative (ID(S)) - which, when combined into the LoD, gives the 
researcher the best of both worlds. Whereas subjective evaluations may overcome the fact 
that statistics sometimes Tie’, quantitative measures may counter any shortcomings or bias 
..................................................................5 4 ......................................................................
in subjective assessments. Consider the case of Botswana. Gastil has consistently classified 
the country as a stable democracy, with a PRI score of 2.0 (like Finland, for example) for 
virtually every year from 1974 onwards. While Vanhanen (1984: 111) recognizes that 
“Botswana is the only African country in which a competitive party system has survived the 
years of independence”, he observes that “it is significant that the largest party’s share of 
the votes has remained high (from 68 to 81%) and the degree of electoral participation is 
low (from 10 to 24%)”. He is thus inclined to consider Botswana as a democracy “only 
with some qualifications”, since it is “doubtful whether democracy in Botswana could 
survive a serious challenge to the (dominant party’s) rule” (Vanhanen 1990: 152). His 
(unsealed) ID values for Botswana - 4.8 (1960/9), 3.1 (1970/9), 5.7 (1980/8) - are actually 
comparable to those found for non-democratic states such as Nicaragua (4.4 for 1960/9; 2.6 
for 1970/9) and Panama (6.6 for 1980/8).
The discrepancies between the assessments of Gastil and Vanhanen are revealed in 
Table 3.2, where the PRI and ID(S) values for Botswana during three periods are compared 
(the corresponding LoD values are presented on the far right). Taking into account the 
magnitudes of both indices, the LoD values would classify Botswana as being semi- 
democratic during the 1970-80 period, largely democratic during the 1980-90 period, and 
somewhat democratic over the entire 1970-90 period.
Table 3.2 Botswana’s Democratic Credentials
Indices of Democracy 
Period PRI ID(S)_______ LoD_______
1970/80 2.1 5.0 3.6
1980/90 1.8 3.0 2.4
1970/90 1.9 4.0 3.0
All indices are scaled from 1.0 (most democratic) to 7.0
The case of Botswana helps to illustrate another advantage of employing the LoD 
index: by combining the PRI and the ID(S), the likelihood is reduced that any classification 
scheme will stray too far off the mark. According to its PRI value (2.1), Botswana was 
democratic during the 1970-80 period, whereas its ID(S) value (5.0) indicates that this was 
far from true. Botswana’s LoD value (3.6) essentially shows that the country was neither 
strongly democratic nor strongly authoritarian (in other words, ‘semi-democratic’). 
Consider the additional examples in Table 3.3 of countries in my sample with discrepancies 
of +/-2.0 in their respective average PRI and ID(S) values (with corresponding LoD values) 
for the period 1970-80.
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Table 3.3 Comparing PRI, ID(S) and LoD Values 
for Selected Countries, 1970-80
Country
Indices of Democracy 
PRI ID(S) LoD
Brazil 4.3 7.0 5.7
Burkina Faso 4.0 7.0 5.5
Greece 4.2 2.0 3.1
South Korea 4.8 7.0 5.9
Kuwait 5.0 7.0 6.0
Morocco 4.4 7.0 5.7
Paraguay 4.9 2.0 3.5
Philippines 4.9 7.0 6.0
In 6 of the 8 cases, Gastil*s PRI provides a more favourable view of a country’s 
degree of democratization than does Vanhanen’s ID(S), although these countries were by 
no means democratic. Significantly, two countries (Greece and Paraguay) are judged by 
their ID(S) values to have been (on average) democratic during the period, but non- 
democratic by their PRI values.
By combining point (PRI) and period (ID(S)) measures one may better assess the 
true political environment responsible for a country’s human development status. As 
countries may fluctuate between democratic and non-democratic forms of government with 
some regularity, given the inherent instability of many political regimes in the developing 
world, it would be unwise to focus exclusively on a country’s level of democracy at one 
particular point in time (Sloan and Tedin 1987: 99; Muller 1988: 50; Dasgupta and Weale 
1992: 124). Otherwise, it is possible to fall into the trap of allocating credit or blame for a 
country’s human development situation on the ‘wrong’ political system. To cite an obvious 
example: the period of communist rule in the former USSR and its former satellites in 
Eastern Europe must be held as the true political environment in which to examine these 
countries’ respective levels of human development circa 1990, despite the more democratic 
scores they acquired in the immediate aftermath of the 1989-90 upheavals.
Consider the similar cases of Burkina Faso and Ghana, two African countries whose 
annual PRI values hovered primarily between 6.0 and 7.0 (the most authoritarian range) for 
the period 1972-83, except for the briefest of democratic interludes (Burkina Faso in 1978- 
9, Ghana in 1981-2) for which they were accorded democratic PRI values of 2.0. Someone 
investigating the political factors behind the low human development status of both 
countries around 1980 might, inadvertently or not, select these democratic PRI values 
(cl980 after all) as proof that ‘ democracy is holding back Africa’s development’ when the 
reality was much different: taking into account the period (1970-79) leading up to this date, 
each country receives the most authoritarian ID(S) value (7.0).
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The LoD measure reflects, and gives equal weight to, both the immediate (PRI) and 
preceding (ID(S)) political environments for a given reference date (Technical Note 1). 
Thus, in the above examples, the LoD values for Burkina Faso and Ghana would be 
calculated as follows:
LoD(1980)= (PRI 1979/81 avg. + ID(S) 1970/9) / 2
Burkina Faso Ghana
LoD( 1980)= (3.0 + 7.0) / 2= 5.0 LoD( 1980)= (2.7 + 7.0) / 2= 4.9
One would therefore conclude that, despite the brief periods of democratic rule, the human 
development profiles of both countries circa 1980 would have to be analyzed primarily 
against their respective authoritarian political environments.
The need to take both immediate and preceding averages into consideration is 
further highlighted in Table 3.4, where PRI, ID(S) and LoD values are compared for those 
countries in my sample (N=123) with very large discrepancies (+/- 3.0) between their point 
and period values around 1970. The most striking example of all is Lesotho: accorded the 
highest possible democratic value (1.0) in one index (ID(S)) but the lowest possible 
democratic value (7.0) in the other (PRI). Six countries - Argentina, Greece, South Korea, 
Lesotho, Panama and Somalia - changed from democratic period (ID(S)) values to 
authoritarian point (PRI) values, whereas El Salvador’s authoritarian period (ID(S)) value 
was followed by a democratic point (PRI) value. These examples demonstrate how one’s 
analysis may be severely affected by the choice of either point or period measures. The LoD 
values, however, capture both dimensions, allowing possible fluctuations in the levels of 
democracy in the context of a broader measure of the political environment
Table 3.4 Discrepancies Between Point and Period Values 
for Selected Countries, cl970
Country ID(S) PRI 
1960/9 1972
LoD
cl970
Afghanistan 7.0 4.0 5.5
Argentina 2.0 6.0 4.0
Cameroon 3.0 6.0 4.5
El Salvador 6.0 2.0 4.0
Greece 2.0 6.0 4.0
South Korea 2.0 5.0 3.5
Kuwait 7.0 4.0 5.5
Lesotho 1.0 7.0 4.0
Pakistan 7.0 3.0 5.0
Panama 2.0 7.0 4.5
Peru 3.0 7.0 5.0
Somalia 2.0 7.0 4.5
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In short, there are four principal reasons why the Level of Democracy index has 
been selected for the purposes of this research: (1) it is a fairly complete measure of 
democracy, capturing the key dimensions of this concept; (2) it embodies both qualitative 
and quantitative constituent indicators; (3) it minimizes the likelihood that obvious errors of 
classification will occur; and (4) it reflects the broad political environment by taking into 
account both point and period values.
An Overview of Levels of Democracy, 1970-90
The number of democracies - those countries with LoD values between 1.0 and 2.9 - 
increased noticeably during the course of the 1970-90 period, from 37 countries (or 30% of 
the total sample) in 1970 to 51 countries (41%) in 1990 (Figure 3.1). While there was little 
aggregate change between 1970 and 1980, the number of democratic states increased 
sharply between 1980 and 1990, from 38 to 51 (or from 31% to 41% of the total sample). 
Given that the number of democracies in the sample of industrial states (N=35) consistently 
remained high (23 in 1970,24 in 1980 and 26 in 1990), the real movement occurred in the 
developing world (N=88): the number of democracies rose from 14 (1970 and 1980) to 25 
(1990).5 In percentage terms, however, the figures remained largely unimpressive: just over 
one-quarter (28%) of all developing states in 1990 were democratic, up from a paltry 16% 
in both 1970 and 1980. By contrast, between two-thirds (1970) and three quarters (1990) of 
all industrial states had democratic forms of government; the principal exceptions being the 
former Soviet bloc states,6 and the three former dictatorships (Greece, Spain and Portugal) 
which subsequently reverted to democratic rule.
^The ‘industrial’ I ‘developing’ distinctions are borrowed direcdy from the UNDP’s statistical tables (1994 
Human Development Report). The only change is my decision to include Cyprus in the industrial sample.
6Although the former Soviet bloc states technically began their democratic transitions in 1989-91, their 
LoD values circa 1990, which take into account both the preceding decade and the more immediate years, 
reflect the fact that their political environments leading up to and including the end of the 1980s were far 
from democratic. Judging by their slightly less authoritarian LoD values, the two countries which had by 
this date made the most progress towards any semblance of democratic rule were Hungary and Poland (both 
5.3); the remaining states still displayed LoD values between 6.0-7.0.
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Fig. 3.1 Changes In Levels of Democracy, 1970-90
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Another means of analyzing democratic trends involves computing average levels of 
democracy (Figure 3.2). Of the four developing regions considered in this study,7 Latin 
America (LAT, comprising Central and South America) remained the most democratic (or, 
alternatively, the least authoritarian) throughout the period, with average LoD values of 3.7 
in 1970, 4.1 in 1980, and 2.7 in 1990. Whereas only 8 o f the 23 LAT states (or 35%) 
displayed democratic LoD values in 1980, this number had increased to 16 states (70%) by 
1990.8 It is worth noting that this increase (8) accounts for almost the entire number of new 
democracies (11) in the sample of developing states (Figure 3.1 above); in other words, the 
modest democratization trend that appeared to affect the developing world in general (from 
16% to 28% of the total) could more accurately be attributed to changes in the LAT region. 
Moreover, irrespective of date, the majority of developing democracies were found in Latin 
America: 57% in 1970; 50% in 1980; and 64% in 1990.
7The detailed breakdown of developing countries by regional group and LoD values per period is given in 
Chapter 4.
8The eight democratic LAT states circa 1970 were: Jamaica, Barbados, Venezuela, Chile, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Colombia. Chile and Uruguay had fallen from this list by 1980, but the 
Dominican Republic had joined it. All LAT states had democratic LoD values for c l990 except for 
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Chile, Haiti and Cuba.
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Fig. 3.2 Average Levels of Democracy By Developing Region, 1970-90
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The next most democratic / least authoritarian region was Asia (ASI), with average 
LoD values o f 4.4  in 1970, 4.6 in 1980, and 4.1 in 1990. The number of democratic states 
hovered between 4  and 5, or between one-quarter and just under one-third of the regional 
sample. Only Sri Lanka and India managed to maintain democratic LoD values for all three 
dates, while Malaysia (1970 and 1980) and Papua New Guinea (1980 and 1990) had 
democratic values for two dates (Japan is not included here as it is classified as an industrial 
country). Five countries had democratic LoD values circa 1990: India, Sri Lanka, South 
Korea, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines.
The two remaining regions, the Middle East and North Africa (MID) and sub- 
Saharan Africa (AFR), were staunchly authoritarian overall. Very little separated their 
respective regional LoD averages: 6.2 (MID) and 5.8 (AFR) in 1970, 5.8 and 5.9 in 1980, 
5.9 and 5.8 in 1990. The only MID state to (barely) qualify as a democracy was Turkey 
(for all three dates).9 The only AFR state to qualify for all three dates was Gambia, which 
was joined by Mauritius in 1980 and 1990 (it technically fell just outside the 1.0-2.9 range 
in 1970, with a value of 3.0), and by Botswana in 1990 (it fell just shy o f the democratic 
threshold in 1970 and 1980, with values of 3.0 and 3.5). Although democratic experiments 
did eventually emerge in the AFR region in the post-1990 period, they failed to take root in 
the MID region to any significant extent.
Israel is not classified with this regional group since it is consideredto be an industrial country. 
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These general observations may be complemented further by looking at the actual 
distribution of countries by level of democracy. Figure 3.3 presents the results across the 
four developing regions, focusing specifically on average LoD values over three different 
periods. With the exception of the LAT region, which witnessed a staggering jump in the 
number of democratic states (from 9 to 16) from the first shorter period (1970-80) to the 
second (1980-90), the number of democratic states increased only fractionally in both the 
ASI and AFR regions (among MID states, only Turkey displayed democratic LoD values in 
both periods). As suggested by their average regional LoD values, most non-democratic 
MID and AFR states tended to be strongly authoritarian (6.0-7.0), whereas non-democratic 
ASI states were fairly evenly divided between those with values in the 3.0-5.9 and 6.0-7.0  
ranges; over the entire 1970-90 period, however, 9  of the 12 non-democratic ASI states had 
period LoD values of 3.0-5.9 (the three exceptions were China, Afghanistan and Myanmar).
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Fig. 3.3 Distribution of Countries By Level of Democracy (Period Values) 
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Just under one in five developing states (17 or 19%) managed to produce a 
democratic LoD average over the entire 1970-90 period (the complete country list by region 
is presented in Table 3.5); the corresponding numbers for the shorter terms were 16 or 18% 
(1970-80) and 26 or 30% (1980-90). Of the 17 states with LoD values between 1.0-2.9, 
four came from the ASI region, ten came from the LAT region, one came from the MID 
region, and two came from the AFR region.
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Table 3.5 Levels of Democracy Across Developing Regions, 1970-90 Averages
ASI Country LoD LAT Country LoD MID Country LoDi
India 1.5 Barbados 1.0 Turkey 2.4 j
Sri Lanka 1.8 Costa Rica 1.0 U.A.E 5.4 !
Papua New G. 2.1 Venezuela 1.1 Morocco 5.6 I
Malaysia 2.6 Trinidad & T. 1.8 Iran 5.7 i
Hong Kong 4.0 Jamaica 1.9 Egypt 6.0 1
Korea, S. 4.1 Domin. Rep. 2.0 Kuwait 6.1 I
Philippines 4.1 Colombia 2.1 Tunisia 6.3 i
Thailand 4.4 El Salvador 2.6 Jordan 6.3 I
Singapore 4.5 Peru 2.8 Syria 6.4 I
Bangladesh 4.5 Honduras 2.9 Algeria 6.5 I
Pakistan 4.9 Uruguay 3.0 Saudi Arabia 6.6 I
Indonesia 5.5 Argentina 3.2 Libya 6.7 j
Nepal 5.6 Ecuador 3.3 Iraq 6.9 1
China 6.7 Mexico 3.3
Afghanistan 6.9 Bolivia 3.4
Myanmar 7.0 Guatemala 3.4
Paraguay 4.0
Nicaragua 4.0
Brazil 4.2
Panama 5.3
Chile 6.3
Haiti 6.7
Cuba 6.8
AFR Country LoD
Mauritius
Gambia
Botswana
Madagascar
Uganda
Zimbabwe
Nigeria
Zambia
Senegal
South Africa
SieiTa Leone
Sudan
Liberia
Gabon
Tanzania
Lesotho
Kenya
Burkina Faso
Ivory Coast
Mozambique
Ghana
Cameroon
Rwanda
Malawi
Zaire
Congo
Chad
Togo
Angola
Cen.Afr.Rep
Niger
Mali
Burundi
Benin
Guinea
Somalia
2.2
2.5
3.0
4.6
4.9
4.9
5.0
5.1
5.1
5.3
5.6
5.7
5.9
5.9 
6.0
6.2 
6.2 
6.2
6.4
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.7
6.7
6.8 
6.8 
6.8 
6.8 
6.8
6.9
6.9
6.9
6.9
7.0
7.0
7.0
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3.2 Measuring Human Development: The Integrated Human Development 
Index (I-HDI) and its Constituent Indices
Conceptions of Human Development
Despite the very general consensus among academics and policy-planners which 
has recently emerged over how to define human development, sufficiently representative 
indices have not been forwarded. The problem here is that, as the UNDP acknowledges, 
“the concept of human developmentis much broader than its measurement” (UNDP 1991: 
15).
Most interpretations stress the morality and universality of the concept of human 
development, while broadly defining its focus as the realization of the human potential. The 
UNDP* s own definition is perhaps the best known:
Human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. The most critical of these 
wide-ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access 
to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political 
freedom, guaranteedhuman rights and personal self-respect....(UNDP 1990: 1)
A decade earlier, Streeten (1981a: 335) had written that: “a basic needs approach to 
development starts with the objective of providing the opportunities for the full physical, 
mental and social development of the human personality...”.
Early writers on basic needs made a necessary conceptual distinction between 
‘material needs’ (the survival needs of food, water,sanitation, shelter, etc) and ‘non-material 
needs’ (human rights, security, equality, participation). They warned, however, against 
focusing on one set of needs at the expense of the other (Ghai and Alfthan 1977; Streeten 
1981a; Hopkins and Van Der Hoeven 1983). Indeed, it was commonly argued that
(The) separability between material and non-material needs..is false. The satisfaction of 
material basic needs is not an end in itself and, therefore, not separable from how these 
needs are satisfied. It would thus be wrong to pose the problem as though it were one of 
providing people with a list of material goods, with 'non-material' goods as an optional 
extra (Lee 1977: 61).
Yet despite this insistence on the inseparability of the two sets of needs, when it 
came to selecting indicators of basic needs, the non-material needs were neglected 
altogether.10 This neglect may be traced to two factors: (1) the lack of appropriate 
measures of non-material needs; and (2) the central preoccupation of researchers with
10 Drewnowski’s Level of Living Index (1970) consists of 5 indicators: nutrition, medical care, literacy, 
primacy school enrollment, and housing. Hicks and Streeten (1981) select the following eight indicators of 
basic needs: life expectancy, infant mortality, nutrition, water, sanitation, literacy, primary school 
enrollment, and housing.
indicators of material needs as new measures of individual welfare (replacing the more 
traditionally-accepted GNP measure). Even Morris’ PQLI,the most widely used composite 
index of basic needs of its time, is (as its name implies) a Physical Quality of Life Index, 
capturing,by its author’s own admission, “some (but certainly not all) desired qualities of 
life” (Morris 1979: 94).
Like the PQLI, the Human Development Index (HDI) is also a measure of basic 
needs / capabilities. Indeed, the authors of the first Human Development Report confessed 
that the HDI:
...is an approximation for capturing the many dimensions of human choice...(It) captures 
a few of people’s choices and leaves out many that people may value highly-economic, 
social and political freedom, and protection against violence, insecurity and 
discrimination, to name but a few. The HDI thus has its limitations (UNDP 1990: 1,
16).
While subsequent reports have sought address some of the other ‘highly valued choices’ 
(or non-material needs) - Human Freedom (Human Development Report 1991, 1992), 
Political Participation (Human Development Report 1993), Human Security (Human 
Development Report 1994), Social and Gender Equity (Human Development Report 1995) 
- these other dimensions have not been systematically incorporated into a measure which 
more accurately reflects the UNDP’s own broader conceptualizations. For example, despite 
professing the desire to do so in the 1991 Human Development Report, the UNDP never 
merged the HDI and its own Human Freedom Index into a broader composite index 
(UNDP 1991: 21).11 Partly because of such limitations, some claim that “caution is needed 
in interpreting a country’s HDI value as a measure of achieved well-being for all its 
people” (Griffin and McKinley 1993: 77).
As the UNDP recognizes, there is a gulf between the concept of human development 
and its measurement which no existing index - the HDI included - seems able to bridge. For 
this reason, a new index of human development has been constructed for this study.
In its broadest and most complete context, human development must embody what 
has been called the “total life situation” (Baster 1972: 7). This involves taking both material 
and non-material needs into account. To begin with, human development must reflect the 
‘capabilities approach’ favoured by the UNDP and others (Desai 1989, Sen 1990), which 
maintains that individuals must be empowered to enable them to exercise greater life 
opportunities. The HDI’s constituent variables reflect the UNDP’s belief that individual 
empowerment involves providing for the “three essential elements of human life - longevity,
^The main reason given by the UNDP is “lack of data”. Perhaps the UNDP would have selected Gas til’s 
civil rights measure, for which data is certainly available, had it been assured that no political opposition 
would be forthcoming from members of the UN who might object to the index’s supposedly ‘Western’ 
bias.
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knowledge and decent living standards” (UNDP 1990: 12). In turn, it is “the basic 
objective of development (to) create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, 
healthy and creative lives” (UNDP 1990: 9, emphasis added).
This reference to ‘an enabling environment’, which must incorporate some of the 
aforementioned non-material needs, highlights an important fact the human condition 
cannot truly be understood without reference to the prevailing conditions of society. Desai 
(1989: 8) notes that while: “...the resources available to the individual depend on skills and 
disabilities as well as endowments..., (the) environment will influence available resources”. 
Crucially, therefore, we must “seek to overcome the polarity that treats ‘individual 
development5 as distinct from ‘social development’...(for) neither can live in isolation” 
(Miles 1985: 10).
In order to fulfill its conceptual potential, human development must be defined in 
terms of both individual and social development More accurately, it should reflect the level 
of individual capabilities and the nature of the social environment in which these capabilities 
are exercised. A proper measure of human development, then, must incorporate both 
dimensions.
Measuring Individual Capabilities and the Social Environment: The Human 
Development Index (HDI) and the Index of Social Conditions (ISC)
Despite some of the criticism levied against the UNDP’s Human Development 
Index (HDI),12 it is still the best and most widely-accepted index of its kind. For this 
reason, it is selected as my measure of individual capabilities.
Though modified in several technical respects since the first Human Development 
Report appeared in 1990, the HDI has focused on the same three areas of individual 
empowerment: longevity (life expectancy), knowledge (mean years of schooling and adult 
literacy rate), and basic living standards (PPP$).13 The HDI has been constructed as 
follows (details are found in Technical Note 2):
HDI= ( I(LE) + I(ED) + I(AI) ) 13
where: I(LE) is Indexed Life Expectancy
I(ED)is Indexed Educational Attainment 
I(AI) is Indexed Adjusted Income
12Most criticisms directed against the HDI focus on the technical aspects behind its construction or the 
selection of indicators (McGillivray 1991; Hopkins 1991; McGillivray and White 1993; Ogwang 1994; 
Doessel and Gounder 1994). Others acknowledge the HDI’s importance as a ‘first step’ towards the 
construction of an acceptable human development measure, but lament its failure to encompass the broader 
range of human development dimensions (Rao 1991; Desai 1991; Monshipouri 1995).
13The version of the HDI employed in this study comes from the 1994 Human Development Report (see 
Technical Note 1 in UNDP 1994: 108). This version was selected for methodological consistency: my 
time-series data comes principally from Annex Table A5.3 in the same Repeat.
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The 1994 Report provides the time-series HDI values for this study, with some notable 
exceptions: data for several countries, including the former Communist states and Cuba, 
were unavailable for the period under review and had to be calculated from individual 
sources. The list of HDI values for all countries in my sample is found in Appendix C.
My measure of the prevailing social environment, the Index of Social Conditions 
(ISC), has been specifically constructed for this study, as have the ISC’s three constituent 
indices: the Security Index (SEC), the Liberty Index (LIB), and the Mobility Index (MOB). 
As described in Technical Note 3, the following formula is employed:
ISC = (SEC x .4) + (LIB x .4) + (MOB x .2)
Given their greater instrumental value, the Security Index and the Liberty Index have both 
been accorded twice as much weight (40% each) as the Mobility Index (20%). To 
correspond with the HDI scale, all indices have been scaled from 1.000 (highest possible 
value) to 0.000 (lowest possible value). The complete set of ISC values is given in Appendix 
D. Each constituent index, described in turn below, has been designed to broadly capture 
one crucial dimension of social conditions.
The 1994 Human Development Report outlined the various components of human 
security and their importance to human development The UNDP’s own definition is 
necessarily general and built on a two-fold premise: “Human security means that people 
can exercise (choices) safely and freely - and that they can be relatively confident that the 
opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow” (UNDP 1994: 23; emphasis 
added). Instead of attempting to devise one fairly unwieldy measure, I have chosen to 
represent these two distinct aspects in two separate indices: the Security Index measures the 
‘safety’ component and the Liberty Index measures the ‘freedom’ component14
The Security Index is broadly represented by two dimensions, one economic and 
one socio-political. Inflation is perhaps the greatest single indicator of economic 
(insecurity.15 Taken to one extreme, ‘zero’ inflation (as purportedly witnessed in the
14The UNDP’s seven components of human security - economic, food, health, environmental, personal, 
community, and political (civil) - are largely captured by my Security and liberty indices. For instance, the 
Inflation variable is a prime indicator of economic (in)security, the Child Survival rate captures the relative 
degree of social deprivation associated with food and health (in)security, and the Peace/Conflict and Civil 
Liberties measures capture the degree of personal, community and political (in)security. A measure of 
environmental security has not been included since there are no appropriate environmental indicators 
available in the requiredformats.
15It was my original intention to combine the inflation indicator and an unemployment indicator into a 
‘misery index’. However, unemployment statistics were largely unavailable for the non-industrialized 
countries in the required time-series format Moreover, it soon became apparent that unemployment 
statistics are generally inconsistent. Sullivan (1991: 111-112) notes that “Unfortunately, accurate statistics 
for such a politically sensitive measure are often impossible to obtain...(This is) a measure for which data 
goes a-begging”.
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former Communist states) suggests an economic environment characterized by stable and 
predictable wages and prices, while,on the other hand, ‘runaway’ inflation almost inevitably 
indicates economic collapse (e.g. Germany in the 1920s). The second component in the 
index reflects the degree of socio-political conflict in a society (or between states). After 
indexing, the inflation (INFL) and conflict (CONF) variables are given equal weight in the 
Security Index (SEC):
SEC = ( INFL + CONF) 12
A country with a high SEC value would therefore be characterized as having both a secure 
economic environment underpinned by low inflation and a socio-political environment 
largely free of conflict (see Technical Note 3, part 2 for sources and methodology; the SEC 
values for all the countries in my sample are given in Appendix E, the INFL values are 
found in Appendix F, and the CONF values are found in Appendix G).
The concept of freedom is more controversial. Aside from the inherent problems of 
interpretation, ideological and cultural differences invariably arise during any debate over the 
priority to be assigned to human rights versus social rights.16 Receiving considerable 
attention in the Human Development Reports (especially the 1991,1992 and 1994 editions), 
the UNDP adopts a broad definition, arguing that “human freedom must include economic, 
social and political (civil) rights” (UNDP 1992: 29).
The Liberty Index consists of variables which measure both individual (civil) and 
social rights. The Civil Liberties indicator (CIVIL) is derived by scaling Gastil’s composite 
measure of civil liberties. Fourteen basic aspects are assessed by Gastil, covering a fairly 
wide spectrum.17 UNICEF s scaled Under Five Mortality Rate has been converted into a 
Child Survival index (SURV), my measure of social deprivation. As an output indicator, it is 
a good reflection of food availability (caloric intake), access to safe water and sanitation, and 
access to basic health facilities and treatments. Both components are given equal weight in 
the Liberty Index (LIB):
LIB= ( CIVIL + SURV ) 12
16Indicatively, the United Nations’ 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna pitted East against 
West, Collectivism against Individualism, Social Rights against Individual Human Rights. The Malaysian 
Prime Minister encapsulated the former position by maintaining that: “when people are dying and starving, 
they can’t exercise human rights anyway, so priorities must be set on which comes first” (The Independent, 
14 June 1993). The West contested this stance with the familiar argument that certain rights are 
fundamental and inalienable, and must therefore be secured at all cost Naturally, a deadlock emerged
17Gastil’s index is constructed after consulting a ‘checklist of civil liberties’ which includes: media 
freedom, open public discussion, freedom of assembly and demonstration, freedom of political organization, 
nondiscriminatory rule of law (independent judiciary and safety from intimidation by security forces), 
freedom from unjustified political terror or imprisonment, existence of free trade unions etc, free businesses, 
free professional or other private organizations, free religious institutions, personal social rights, 
socioeconomic rights, freedom from gross socioeconomic inequality, freedom from gross government 
corruption (Gastil 1990b: 36).
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A country with a high LIB value thus exhibits a high level of civil liberties coupled with a 
high level of child survival (see Technical Note 3, part 3 for sources and methodology; the 
LIB values for all the countries in my sample are given in Appendix H, the CIVIL values are 
found in Appendix I, and the SURV values are found in Appendix J).
Social mobility is another vital dimension which is too often neglected. Three 
general aspects should be captured by a composite measure: (1) the degree of social 
equality (of opportunity, and access to resources); (2) the degree of social (occupational) 
stratification; and (3) the opportunity for socio-economic advancement
The measure of social equality is my Gender Equity Index (GEND), a composite 
indicator I have constructed using two variables, gross female secondary school enrollment 
rates and women as a percentage of the labour force. Simply put, if women are not permitted 
to enjoy the basic opportunities they should rightfully be entitled to, roughly half the 
population is denied a true sense of justice. The percentage of people not employed in 
agriculture (%NAgr) is my measure of occupational stratification. An economy based 
predominantly on agricultural production offers little room for occupational diversification 
and the opportunities for advancement that more sophisticated manufacturing- and service- 
based economies allow. The tertiary enrollment rate (TERT) has been selected as my 
indicator of the opportunities for self-realization / social advancement. Whether valued for 
its own sake (the need/desire to learn) or for its instrumental value (as a qualification 
entitling one to better job prospects), this variable highlights the vast discrepancy in socio­
economic opportunities between developed and developing states. These three dimensions 
are embodied, in equal measure, in the Mobility Index (MOB):
MOB = ( GEND + %NAgr + TERT ) /  3
A high MOB value thus indicates that a country offers ample opportunities for social 
mobility / advancement, as represented by a high degree of gender equity, a high percentage 
of people not employed in the agricultural sector, and a high level of tertiary enrolment (see 
Technical Note 3, part 4 for sources and methodology; the MOB values for all the countries 
in my sample are given in Appendix K, the GEND values are found in Appendix L, the 
%NAgr values are found in Appendix M, and the TERT values are found in Appendix N).
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Measuring Human Development: The Integrated Human Development Index (I-HDI)
To more fully capture the essence of the concept of human development, the HDI 
and ISC have been combined into a composite measure, hereinafter referred to as the 
Integrated Human Development Index (I-HDI). With the sub-indices weighted equally, the 
I-HDI is represented by the formula;
where:
I-HDI = (HDI + ISC) / 2
HDI •longevity; life expectancy I(LE)
•living standard purchasing power I(AI)
•knowledge: mean years of 
schooling/literacy rates
I(ED)
ISC •liberty (LIB): civil liberties +
degree of social deprivation
CIVIL
SURV
•security (SEC): economic (in)security + 
socio-political (in)security
INFL
CONF
•mobility (MOB): social/gender equity+ 
absence of occup.stratif. + 
soc. opport/advancement
GEND
%NAgr
TERT
A country with a high I-HDI value scores well in terms of both individual 
capabilities (longevity, living standard, knowledge) and social conditions (liberty, security, 
social mobility). Like the HDI and the ISC, the I-HDI employs a scale ranging from 1.000 
(highest possible value) to 0.000. The complete list of I-HDI values may be found in 
Appendix O.
The I-HDI therefore embraces the dimensions of human development - ‘material* 
and ‘non-material’ - described by the UNDP and prominent researchers in the field.18 This 
index also recognizes the inseparability of individual empowerment from the broader social 
context, and vice versa. A narrow focus on the former, as the PQLI and HDI provide,
18Six classifications of material and non-material needs may be cited here. Streeten (1981a) lists (1) basic 
needs, (2) self-determination, (3) self-reliance, (4) security, (5) participation, (6) national /cultural identity, 
and (7) sense of purpose in life and work. Galtung (1994) considers (1) security, (2) welfare, (3) freedom, 
and (4) identity. Doyal and Gough (1984) focus on (1) survival/health, (2) autonomy/learning, (3) 
production (material), (4) culture/communication, and (5) political authority. Weigel (1986) rites (1) 
existence (basic needs), (2) intelligence (communication, education, information), and (3) sociality (freedom 
of expression, freedom of association). Desai (1990) looks at (1) capability to stay alive, capability for 
healthy living, capability to ensure biological reproduction, (2) capability for social interaction, and (3) 
capability to have knowledge and freedom of expression and thought. The UNDP has considered, in various 
Human Development Reports (HDRs), (1) individual capabilities (all HDRs), (2) freedom (HDR 1991, 
1992), (3) security (HDR 1994), and (4) social/gender equity (HDR 1995).
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excludes the latter. Why should, for instance, the issue of civil (or human) rights, or for that 
matter security or social mobility, necessarily be separated from a consideration of basic 
health or educational levels, when these components, taken together, are part of one’s overall 
sense of well-being? Furthermore, on a purely theoretical level, it is interesting to observe 
that the I-HDI covers quite comprehensively the human development dimensions envisioned 
by Maslow.19
Since the I-HDI provides a fairly good approximation of the “total life situation” in 
a given country, it may be confidently stated that a country is more developed than another if 
it displays a higher I-HDI value. The same claim may not be reasonably made on the basis 
of the HDI or any other existing index.20 Indeed, to focus on a country’s HDI value alone, 
without reference to the social environment, is to neglect an integral part of the human 
development equation.
Countries with very similar HDI values may have completely different social 
environments (ISC values), which may be either more or less conducive to the promotion of 
individual capabilities. Consider the three sets of countries presented in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6 How HDI Values Alone Can Be Misleading: 
Comparing Human Development Profiles (c!980)
Country HDI LIB SEC MOB ISC I-HDI
USSR 0.841 0.488 0.497 0.664 0.527 0.684
Greece 0.839 0.894 0.855 0.513 0.802 0.821
Argentina 0.790 0.620 0.265 0.574 0.469 0.629
Costa Rica 0.746 0.975 0.847 0.487 0.826 0.786
Uganda 0.215 0.456 0.000 0.144 0.211 0.213
Nepal 0.209 0.528 0.920 0.120 0.603 0.406
19For example, Maslow’s ‘Physiological Needs’ dimension is represented, directly or indirectly, by all 
three of the HDI’s constituent indices (I(LE), I(AI), I(ED)), the LIB index’s two constituent parts (CIVIL, 
SURV), and the CONF variable in the SEC index. His second dimension, ‘Safety Needs’, is represented by 
two constituent parts of the HDI (I(LE) and I(AI)), the SURV variable, and both parts of the SEC index 
(CONF and INFL). The third dimension, ‘Social/Belonging Needs’, is covered by the CONF and GEND 
variables. The fourth dimension, ‘Equality/Esteem Needs’, is represented by the I(ED) and CIVIL variables, 
and all three components of the MOB index (GEND, %NAgr, TERT). The fifth dimension, ‘Self- 
Realization/Actualization Needs’, is represented by the I(ED), GEND and TERT variables. Undoubtedly, 
other configurations may exist and others may choose to interpret the variables differently.
20Regardinghis own index, Monis readily admits that “the PQLI does not measure total welfare. Just as it 
cannot be said that a country with a higher GNP is ‘better off than a country with a lower GNP...so, too, 
it cannot be said that a country with a higher PQLI is ‘better off than one with a lower PQLI - except in 
terms of what it measures, that is, some (but certainly not all) desired qualities of life” (Morris 1979: 94). 
Other indices have employed many diverse indicators in the hope of presenting a more balanced overall 
picture of development (see Estes 1988; and Slottje et al 1991). However, quantity does not necessarily 
imply quality, as the methodological shortcomings of such blanket approaches are further undermined  by 
the absence of any coherent conceptual reference to human development For this reason, using some highly 
dubious indicators (among them ‘national territory per square km of road’, ‘radio receivers per 1000’, 
‘number of daily newspapers in each country’), Slottje et al’s (1991) country rankings reveal some absurd 
conclusions: Jamaica (4th), New Guinea (5th) and Gambia (16th) are more ‘developed’ than 10 states of the 
European Union (France, for instance, is ranked43rd).
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In each comparison group, two countries with similar HDI values (cl980) were 
found to exhibit altogether different ISC values and, consequently, different I-HDI values. 
The size of the gulf between their respective ISC values was, in turn, dependent upon on the 
degree of divergence among the ISC’s constituent indicators (notice the difference in SEC 
values between war-torn Uganda and peaceful Nepal). Hence, the similar HDI values 
present a somewhat misleading picture for each set of countries, as the discrepancies in 
social conditions demonstrate (because of its noticeably better LIB and SEC values, Greece 
had a substantially higher ISC rate than the USSR, which was translated into a much higher 
I-HDI value). On the basis of their I-HDI values, it is claimed that, at that particular point in 
time, Greece (0.821) was more developed than the USSR (0.684), Costa Rica (0.786) was 
more developed than Argentina (0.629), and Nepal (0.406) was more developed than 
Uganda (0.213).
Just as the ISC should not be neglected in favour of the HDI alone, the reverse is 
also true. Quite often, similar social conditions may, on the surface, conceal vast differences 
between countries in terms of levels of individual empowerment. Clearly, there are 
significant differences in HDI values within the comparison groups in Table 3.7 below, 
despite the almost identical ISC values displayed by the two countries in each set (the 
contrast between Israel and Benin is particularly striking). Encompassing these differences, 
the I-HDI provides a better indication of the true gulf between the states in terms of human 
development at that point in time (cl970): Hungary (0.705) was much more developed than 
Papua New Guinea (0.516); Israel (0.720) was much more developed than Benin (0.383); 
and Uruguay (0.674) was much more developed than Egypt (0.424).
Table 3.7 How ISC Values Alone Can Be Misleading: 
Comparing Human Development Profiles (c!970)
Country ISC HDI I-HDI
Papua NG 0.707 0.325 0.516
Hungary 0.706 0.705 0.705
Israel 0.614 0.826 0.720
Benin 0.611 0.162 0.383
Uruguay 0.585 0.762 0.674
Egypt 0.579 0.269 0.424
Since the HDI and ISC are attributed equal weight, it is possible for countries to 
arrive at the same human development plateau in distinctly different ways. In other words, 
two states may exhibit very similar I-HDI values, but rather different HDI and ISC values.
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Table 3.8 provides the detailed human development profiles for two Latin American 
countries, Honduras and Brazil, for 1970.
Table 3.8 Comparing the Human Development Profiles of 
Honduras and Brazil, c l970
Country HDI LIB1 SEC2 MOB3 ISC I-HDI
Brazil 0.507 0.535 0.539 0.305 0.490 0.499
Honduras 0.350 0.648 0.835 0.178 0.629 0.489
where: 1. UB 2. SEC 3. MOB
CIVIL SURV TNFL CONF CiLND ^NApr TFRT
Brazil 0.333 0.736 0.078 1.000 0.307 0.540 0.068
Honduras 0.667 0.630 0.942 0.728 0.173 0.330 0.031
These two countries provide for interesting contrasts. Though enjoying a higher 
HDI value(0.507) than Honduras (0.350), Brazil’s ISC value (0.490) was noticeably lower 
than Honduras’ (0.629). This is explained by the higher values Honduras exhibited in the 
Liberty Index and Security Index (0.648 and 0.835, compared to 0.535 and 0.539 for 
Brazil). Regarding the Liberty Index, Honduras had a much better record on civil liberties 
than Brazil (the CIVIL values were 0.667 and 0.333, respectively). The discrepancies in 
SEC values were primarily due to their inflation rates (Honduras’ rate was stable, while 
Brazil experienced runaway inflation). Despite the above differences, when the overall 
profiles were assessed, the two countries shared almost identical human development (I- 
HDI) scores.
The Measures In Perspective
Having outlined the various measures, the question naturally arises: to what extent 
are they related? As Table 3.9 shows, using data for the entire sample (N=123) cl990, there 
is a very high degree of inter-correlation. Predictably, given its composition, the I-HDI is 
very strongly correlated with both the HDI (0.957) and the ISC (0.919). The HDI is highly 
correlated with the ISC (0.765), confirming that there is a strong relationship between levels 
of individual capabilities and social conditions. Among its constituent indicators, the ISC is 
most highly correlated with the Liberty Index (0.843) and least correlated - although the 
correlation is still strong - with the Security Index (0.746). The strongest correlation
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Table 3.9 Inter-Correlations Among the Measures c!990 (N=123)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) HDI .765 .957 .838 .247 .929
(2) ISC .765 .919 .843 .746 .761
(3) I-HDI .957 .919 .893 .488 .911
(4) LIB .838 .843 .893 .298 .814
(5) SEC .247 .746 .488 .298 .229
(6) MOB .929 .761 .911 .814 .229
produced by the ISC’s constituent indicators is the one between the Liberty Index and the 
Mobility Index (0.814). All the correlations in the table are positive and relatively strong 
except those involving the Security Index (which are generally weak).
Given that they together comprise the I-HDI, the relationship between the HDI and 
the ISC is of particular interest The fact that they are strongly correlated leads one to expect 
a fair degree of consistency in distribution patterns. Taking 1970 as the point of reference, 
Table 3.10 classifies the countries in my sample (N=123) according to general HDI and 
ISC value categories (High, Medium, and Low).
Table 3.10 Distribution of Countries by HDI and ISC Categories, c 1970
ISC Category
HDI Category High Med. Low Total
High 20 3 - 23
Medium 5 28 2 35
Low 0 45 20 65
Total 25 76 22
where: High=values of 0.800+, Medium=0.500-0.799, Low= 0.000-0.499
The predicted degree of consistency is evident. All but three of the countries with 
High HDI values also had High ISC values.21 The vast majority (28 of 35) of countries 
with Medium HDI values had Medium ISC values; most countries (45 of 65) with Low 
HDI values also had Medium ISC values. From the opposite perspective, the vast majority
21The three exceptions were Israel (ISC of 0.614), Spain (0.673), and the United States (0.741). Israel’s 
lower ISC value was attributable to the conflicts (the Six Day War, the 1973 war) in which the country was 
engaged(reflectedin a lower Security Index value). The United States was in a similar situation with respect 
to the war in Vietnam. Spain’s lower ISC value was largely due to the poor civil rights record of the Franco 
regime (resulting in a lower Liberty Index value).
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(20 of 25) of cases with High ISC values displayed High HDI values (the exceptions were 
Hong Kong, Malta, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Jamaica, which all displayed Medium HDI 
values), and almost all (20 of 22) of the countries with Low ISC values showed Low HDI 
values (the two exceptions were Brazil and Portugal, which both displayed Medium HDI 
values). The Medium ISC category provided some slight deviations: of the 76 countries, 3 
had High HDI values, 28 had Medium HDI values, and 45 had Low HDI values. There 
were no extreme cases where a country had either a High HDI value and a Low ISC value, 
or a High ISC value and a Low HDI value.22
In relative terms, however, a country’s HDI and ISC ranks are sometimes far apart 
(Table 3.11). In the case of Portugal (cl970), individuals were empowered to a respectable 
degree (HDI rank of 48), but social conditions were comparatively unsatisfactory (ISC rank 
of 106).23 The top of the table (section a) is largely occupied by countries in the top third 
of the HDI scale whose ISC values placed them in the bottom third of the ISC range (e.g. 
Argentina and the USSR in 1980, and Yugoslavia, Israel and the USSR in 1990). The 
bottom part of the table (section b) primarily consists of countries at the lower end of the 
HDI scale whose ISC ranks were relatively better (principally countries in Africa).
Table 3.11 Differences in HDI and ISC Ranks: 
Largest Rank Discrepancies
(a) BETTER HDI RANK
cl 970
Country HDI ISC Diff
cl980
Country HDI ISC Diff
c l 990 
Country HDI ISC Diff
Portug. 48 106 58 Argent. 36 110 74 Yugos. 30 117 87
Chile 38 90 52 USSR 27 95 68 T urkey 55 105 50
Umgu. 26 78 52 Syria 53 113 60 Iran 63 112 49
Iraq 66 117 51 Iraq 63 117 54 Israel 19 67 48
UAE 44 94 50 Urugu. 32 84 52 USSR 33 80 47
(b) BETTER ISC RANK
cl970 cl 980 c l 990
Country HDI ISC Diff Country HDI ISC Diff Country HDI ISC Diff
Gambia 122 50 72 Gambia 121 62 59 PapNG 89 42 47
Burk. F 120 75 45 Nepal 113 66 47 Gambia 116 71 45
Kenya 92 49 43 PapNG 88 42 46 Senegal 100 57 43
PapNG 80 38 42 Burk. F 119 74 45 Hondu. 83 44 39
Benin 112 70 42 Senegal 106 64 42 Haiti 96 60 36
22There was only one such extreme case found throughout the 1970-90 period: Yugoslavia circa 1990. 
Despite having a High HDI value (0.861), the country’s collapse into war (its Security Index value stood at 
0.000) causedits ISC value to plunge to only 0.394 (from 0.696 in 1980).
23Portugal’s various colonial ventures took their toll in human and material costs: an estimated 150,000 
people were killed in the struggles in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau. Portugal’s low Security 
Index value (0.470) was therefore primarily a reflection of its dismal CONF value (0.000). Its Liberty Index 
value (0.511) was not very good either, primarily because of the poor state of civil liberties in the country 
(its CIVIL value was only 0.167). Portugal had the second-worst Mobility Index value (0.427) among die 
industrial states in my sample (marginally ahead of Greece at 0.416).
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Whereas the preceding analysis focused on index levels, involving point measures, it 
is important to realize that changes in index levels over time, involving period measures, do 
not follow the same patterns. The correlations cited in Table 3.12, computed for the 1970-80 
period, sufficiently illustrate this argument. Changes in HDI values over the period seem to 
be marginally (though positively) related to the changes in the ISC (0.241) and its 
constituent sub-indices (0.190 with the Liberty Index, 0.134 with the Security Index, and 
0.365 with the Mobility Index). Furthermore, while there is a very strong and positive 
association between period changes in the ISC and the I-HDI (0.880), the corresponding 
relationship between the HDI and the I-HDI is not as strong (0.671). Changes in the ISC 
are very strongly correlated with changes in the Security Index (0.871), moderately 
correlated with changes in the Liberty Index (0.581), and weakly correlated with changes in 
the Mobility Index (0.290). Correlations between the ISC’s three sub-indices are all very 
weak. In general, then, changes in the levels of one index are not necessarily followed by 
changes of similar magnitude in the levels of other indices.
Table 3.12 Inter-Correlations Among the Measures, 1970-80 (N=123)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) HDI .241 .671 .190 .134 .365
(2) ISC .241 .880 .581 .871 .290
(3) I-HDI .671 .880 .535 .728 .409
(4) LIB .190 .581 .535 .126 .192
(5) SEC .134 .871 .728 .126 .092
(6) MOB .365 .290 .409 .192 .092
An Overview o f Human Development Trends, 1970-90
The extent to which the overall human development situation changed throughout 
the 1970-90 period may be traced in Figure 3.4. The average (a) HDI, (b) ISC and (c) I- 
HDI levels are given for the industrialized countries (IND) and the four developing regions. 
The gap between them becomes immediately apparent In 1970, for instance, the AFR 
region had only 29% of the IND region’s HDI value, the ASI region had 49%, the MID 
region had 54%, and the LAT region had 71%. Like the ISC and the I-HDI, the HDI uses a 
fixed scale, which suggests that these gaps were bound to narrow in proportional terms by 
1990: the AFR region had 39% of the IND region’s HDI value, while the corresponding 
percentages for the other regions were 64% (ASI), 76% (MID) and 80% (LAT).
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Fig. 3.4 Human Development Trends: HDI, ISC and I-HDI Levels, 1970-90
(a) HDI
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The LAT and AFR regions maintained the highest and lowest average values, 
respectively, among the developing regions. As shown by their ISC levels, both regions also 
experienced deteriorating social conditions between 1970 and 1980 (from 0.679 to 0.651 
for the LAT region, and from 0.533 to 0.520 for the AFR region). The MID region 
produced the most interesting trends. Beginning with an average HDI value o f 0.426, this 
region managed to close the gap considerably with the LAT region by 1980 (the respective 
values were 0.639 and 0.565), and by 1990 the regional averages were quite similar (0.711 
and 0.673). Almost identical patterns are found for the ISC and I-HDI. Looking specifically 
at the latter, whereas the two regions were separated by 0.127 in 1970, they were separated 
by only 0.049 by 1990. The ASI region started from virtually the same index levels as the 
MID region in 1970, but only for the ISC did the two lines move in tandem (the gaps 
widened for both the HDI and I-HDI).
The absolute changes recorded by each developing region over the entire 1970-90 
period are presented in Figure 3.5. The MID region had by far the highest HDI increase 
(0.247), followed by the ASI (0.181), LAT (0.150) and AFR (0.113) regions. The ASI 
region had a marginally higher ISC increase (0.065) than the MID region (0.054), while the 
LAT and AFR regions displayed slight ISC decreases of -0.006 and -0.013, respectively. 
As captured by the I-HDI, the MID region made the greatest progress overall (0.150), 
followed at a short distance by the ASI region (0.123). The LAT region produced a modest 
increase (0.072), but the AFR region appears to have made little headway (0.049).
Fig. 3.5 Changes In Human Development Levels 
Across Developing Regions. 1970-90
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Table 3.13 presents the top and bottom 20 developing states in terms of I-HDI 
values for 1970 and 1990 (the HDI and ISC values are also given for reference). Thirteen of 
the top 20 developing states in 1970 came from the LAT region, compared to 4 from the 
ASI region (Hong Kong, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia), one from the MID region 
(Kuwait), and 2 from the AFR region (Mauritius and South Africa). By 1990 the number of 
LAT countries had declined slightly to 10, with 5 coming from the ASI region (Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia), 3 from the MID region (UAE, Kuwait 
and Tunisia), and 2 from the AFR region (Mauritius and Botswana). The AFR region 
accounted for 15 of the bottom 20 countries in 1970, and 18 of the bottom 20 in 1990.
Table 3.13 The Top/Bottom 20 Developing States, 1970 and 1990
(a) 1970 
R Country HDI ISC I-HDI
(b) 1990 
R Country HDI ISC I-HDI
1 Barbados 0.824 0.857 0.841 1 Barbados 0.894 0.910 0.902
2 Hong Kong 0.737 0.845 0.791 2 Hong Kong 0.875 0.863 0.869
3 Trinid. & T. 0.789 0.789 0.789 3 Trinid. & T 0.855 0.882 0.868
4 Venezuela 0.728 0.817 0.773 4 Korea, S. 0.859 0.839 0.849
5 Costa Rica 0.647 0.837 0.742 5 Costa Rica 0.848 0.803 0.825
6 Jamaica 0.662 0.816 0.739 6 Singapore 0.836 0.796 0.816
7 Kuwait 0.684 0.772 0.728 7 Chile 0.848 0.759 0.804
8 Singapore 0.682 0.751 0.717 8 Mauritius 0.778 0.815 0.797
9 Argentina 0.748 0.681 0.715 9 Venezuela 0.820 0.752 0.786
10 Mexico 0.642 0.732 0.687 10 Uruguay 0.859 0.695 0.777
11 Uruguay 0.762 0.585 0.674 11 Panama 0.816 0.731 0.774
12 Mauritius 0.524 0.787 0.656 12 Argentina 0.853 0.690 0.772
13 Colombia 0.554 0.737 0.646 13 Jamaica 0.749 0.782 0.765
14 Panama 0.592 0.671 0.632 14 UAE 0.771 0.758 0.765
15 Chile 0.682 0.560 0.621 15 Thailand 0.798 0.730 0.764
16 Cuba 0.582 0.644 0.613 16 Malaysia 0.794 0.722 0.758
17 South Africa 0.591 0.620 0.606 17 Kuwait 0.804 0.677 0.740
18 Ecuador 0.485 0.709 0.597 18 Colombia 0.813 0.636 0.724
19 Sri Lanka 0.506 0.685 0.595 19 Tunisia 0.690 0.738 0.714
20 Malaysia 0.471 0.720 0.595 20 Botswana 0.670 0.754 0.712
"69 India 0.254 0.460 0.357 69 Gambia " o J iJ 0.619 0.417
70 Sierra Leone 0.155 0.556 0.355 70 Cen.Afr.R. 0.249 0.568 0.409
71 Cen.Afr.R. 0.196 0.512 0.354 71 Tanzania 0.306 0.501 0.403
72 Zaire 0.235 0.461 0.348 72 Liberia 0.317 0.474 0.395
73 Malawi 0.176 0.503 0.339 73 Niger0.209 0.573 0.391
74 Niger 0.134 0.532 0.333 74 Rwanda 0.274 0.506 0.390
75 Nigeria 0.230 0.431 0.330 75 Burkina F. 0.203 0.577 0.390
76 Pakistan 0.244 0.401 0.322 76 Bangladesh 0.309 0.465 0.387
77 Afghanistan 0.131 0.496 0.313 77 Zaire 0.341 0.411 0.376
78 Bangladesh 0.199 0.415 0.307 78 Malawi 0.260 0.486 0.373
79 Guinea 0.111 0.499 0.305 79 Mali 0.214 0.529 0.372
80 Mozambiq. 0.248 0.342 0.295 80 Chad 0.212 0.489 0.350
81 Mali 0.102 0.483 0.293 81 Guinea 0.191 0.491 0.341
82 Uganda 0.213 0.336 0.274 82 Sierra Leo. 0.209 0.401 0.305
83 Somalia 0.124 0.418 0.271 83 Sudan 0.276 0.258 0.267
84 Indonesia 0.306 0.235 0.271 84 Uganda 0.272 0.252 0.262
85 Angola 0.195 0.342 0.268 85 Afghanistan 0.208 0.225 0.216
86 Chad 0.135 0.401 0.268 86 Mozambiq. 0.252 0.170 0.211
87 Sudan 0.188 0.339 0.264 87 Angola 0.271 0.120 0.195
88 Burundi 0.157 0.319 0.238 88 Somalia 0.217 0.148 0.183
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The only country to register a High I-HDI value (0.800+) in 1970 was Barbados 
(which also displayed High HDI and ISC values). Seven developing states had surpassed 
the High I-HDI threshold by 1990: Barbados; Hong Kong; Trinidad and Tobago; South 
Korea; Costa Rica; Singapore and Chile. The biggest net change involved the number of 
countries with High HDI values: from only one (Barbados) in 1970 to 13 developing states 
by 1990. The number of countries with High ISC values increased fractionally, from 5 
(Barbados, Hong Kong, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Jamaica) in 1970 to 6 (Barbados, Hong 
Kong, Trinidad and Tobago, South Korea, Costa Rica and Mauritius) by 1990. Fifteen of 
the 20 least developed states in 1970 also appeared among the 20 least developed states in 
1990.
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CHAPTER 4
DEMOCRACY AND LEVELS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
This chapter provides a detailed examination of the relationship between democracy 
and levels of human development As was noted in Chapter 2, democracy and development 
were viewed as complementary concepts by both political development theorists and 
humanists alike. Indeed, from Lipset onwards there has been an overriding belief in political 
science that democratic political systems are more likely to emerge as states reach ever 
higher developmental plateaus; in short, that democracy is the by-product of development.
Although originally defined in an economic context, with the GNP variable 
supporting the affluence-brings-democracy theory, many contend that this argument is in 
fact strengthened when the concept of human development is introduced (Diamond 1992: 
458; Lane and Ersson, 1994: 215; Diamond et al, 1995: 22). The empirical evidence in this 
chapter, based on data for three separate reference dates (1970, 1980 and 1990), largely 
supports this proposition.
It will be recalled (Chapter 3) that the Level of Democracy (LoD) measure uses a 
seven-point scale, with 1.0 being the most democratic value and 7.0 the least democratic 
value. Countries will occasionally be grouped into three broad levels according to their LoD 
values: those with values between 1.0-2.9 (sometimes denoted as ‘ 1-2*’) are classified as 
‘ democratic states’; those with values between 3.0-5.9 (denoted as ‘3-5*’) are classified as 
‘non-democratic (3-5*) states’; and those with values between 6.0-7.0 (denoted as ‘6-7’) 
are classified as ‘non-democratic (6-7) states’. The values for the Human Development 
Index (HDI), the Index of Social Conditions (ISC), and the Integrated Human Development 
Index (I-HDI), are all scaled from a low of 0.000 to a high of 1.000.
This chapter is divided into four parts. Section 4.1 portrays the general relationship 
between democracy and levels of human development from several perspectives: correlation 
analysis; rank group profiles; distributional patterns; and index averages per level of 
democracy. Section 4.2 examines whether these findings hold when one controls for 
countries at similar levels of economic development (GDP/C). Section 4.3 assesses whether 
regional distinctions alter the established relationships between the variables. Section 4.4 
summarizes the chapter’s findings.
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4.1 General Patterns
Determining the Strength of Relationships and Lines of Causation: Correlations and 
Rank Group Profiles
Before moving on to a more comprehensive overview of the patterns between the 
variables, the strength of the general relationship between democracy and levels of human 
development must first be established. Table 4.1 presents the correlations between LoD 
values and human development values (HDI, ISC I-HDI) for two sample groups - All States 
and Developing States - at three points in time.
Table 4.1 Correlations Between Levels of Democracy and 
Human Development Values
Index
All States (N=123) 
cl970 cl980 cl990
Developing (N=88) 
cl970 cl980 cl990
HDI r= -0.629 -0.581 -0.631 -0.491 -0.401 -0.531
!■*= 0.396 0.340 0.398 0.241 0.161 0.282
ISC r = -0.687 -0.701 -0.639 -0.514 -0.519 -0.442
0.473 0.492 0.408 0.264 0.269 0.195
I-HDI r = -0.687 -0.665 -0.674 -0.551 -0.496 -0.540
r ^ 0.473 0.442 0.454 0.304 0.246 0.291
When the All States sample is considered, it is hardly surprising that relatively 
strong and negative correlations are produced for all three indices (indicating that lower, 
more democratic values correspond to higher index values), given the respective positions of 
democratic OECD states and authoritarian sub-Saharan states at the top and bottom of each 
index scale (Table 4.2 overleaf). However, when the influence of the OECD states is 
removed for the Developing States sample, the correlations are somewhat weaker, though 
still noteworthy. This observation holds across all indices and for all three dates.
The correlations between LoD and HDI values are consistently strong for the All 
States sample, with a high of -0.631 for 1990. Interestingly, Diamond (1992) and Lane and 
Ersson (1994) find correlation coefficients of similar magnitude: 0.710 and 0.590 
respectively (the coefficients are positive because their measures of democracy are inverted). 
The relationship is weaker for the Developing States sample: HDI values may explain 
between 16% and 28% of the variation in levels of democracy (compared to between 34% 
and 40% for the All States sample).
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Table 
4.2 
The 
M
ost/Least Developed 
C
ountries, 1970-90
The correlations between levels of democracy and ISC values are very similar. In the 
All States sample, the coefficients range from a high of -0.701 (1980) to a low of -0.639 
(1990), suggesting that between 41-49% of the variation in LoD values may be explained by 
ISC rates. In contrast, the r-squared values for the Developing States sample suggest that 
between 20-27% of the variation in LoD values may be explained by ISC rates. While there 
is a relationship between democracy and better overall social conditions, the correlations 
between levels of democracy and the ISC’s three constituent indices fluctuate greatly: 
ranging from extremely weak correlations for the Security Index, to moderate correlations 
for the Mobility Index, to very strong correlations (of course) for the Liberty Index.1
Given the strong correlations found for its two constituent indices, one would expect 
to find roughly similar correlations between LoD and I-HDI values. Indeed, just under half 
(44-47%) of the variation in levels of democracy for the All States sample may be explained 
by I-HDI values (compared to between 25% and 30% for the Developing States sample). 
Although a fairly strong relationship does exist between democracy and human 
development, this relationship is far from automatic (especially for developing countries).
Exploring this point further, the direction of causation may be confirmed by charting 
this relationship through a series of rank-group profiles, thereby allowing one to trace 
average levels o f democracy throughout the continuum of human development values. This 
involves moving from a simple consideration of the most and least developed states (Table
4.2 above) to the broader human development spectrum. Accordingly, in the following 
series of illustrations (Figure 4.1) countries were first ranked by their respective index 
values (HDI, ISC and I-HDI) and divided into five‘rank groups’, with the top 25-ranked 
countries comprising the Rl-25 group. The average level of democracy (LoD value) for 
each rank group of countries was then calculated.
^The correlations between LoD values and the ISC’s constituent indices (and their respective component 
indicators) are presented below (All States, N=123). In general, it may be argued that: there is virtually no 
relationship between democracy and the Security Index (SEC), as all regimes appear equally vulnerable to 
both types of insecurity, Conflict (CONF) and Inflation (INFL); there is a very strong relationship between 
democracy and the Liberty Index (LIB), although this association is much stronger for the civil rights 
(CIVIL) measure than for the social deprivation measure (child survival, SURV); and there is a strong 
relationship between democracy and the Mobility Index (MOB), with similar correlations observed for all 
three indicators, Gender Equity Index (GEND), % of Non-Agricultural Employment (%NAgr), Tertiary 
Enrollment (TERT).
Index/Indicator cl970 cl980 cl 990 Index/Indicator cl970 cl980 cl990
SEC F= -0.087 -0.162 -0.111 MOB r= -0.591 -0.559 -0.623
F= 0.008 0.026 0.012 F= 0.292 0.252 0.288
CONF r= -0.110 -0.215 -0.221 GEND F= -0.540 -0.502 -0.537•>r= 0.012 0.046 0.049 I*= 0.292 0.252 0.288
Inflation F= 0.024 0.019 0.043 %NAgr r= -0.554 -0.541 -0.573
0.001 0.000 0.002 F= 0.307 0.292 0.329
LIB F= -0.859 -0.878 -0.883 TERT F= -0.458 -0.480 -0.604
0.738 0.771 0.780 r^ 0.210 0.230 0.365
CIVIL it 11
-0.870
0.757
-0.909
0.826
-0.924
0.854
SURV F=
1*=
-0.540
0.292
-0.562
0.316
-0.560
0.314
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Fig. 4.1 Average Levels of Democracy By Human Development Ranks
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For all three dates and across all indices, the resulting patterns are consistent and 
unambiguous: the resulting slopes, though not perfectly linear, ascend from left to right (i.e., 
from the highest to lowest rank groups), thereby confirming that: (1) democratic LoD 
averages correspond to higher index values; and (2) LoD values, on average, become 
progressively more authoritarian (higher) as one descends levels of human development.
The HDI rank-group profile is depicted in graph (a). The top 25 HDI-ranked 
countries exhibited average LoD values of 1.6 in both 1970 and 1980 and 1.4 in 1990. At 
the other end of the HDI scale, the R101-123 group exhibited average LoD values of 5.9 in 
1970, 6.2 in 1980, and 6.1 in 1990. Unmistakably, as HDI ranks decreased, LoD values 
increased towards the most authoritarian range. In 1990, for example, the LoD averages per 
HDI-rank group were: 1.4 (Rl-25), 3.2 (R26-50), 4.7 (R51-75), 4.9 (R76-100) and 6.1 
(R101-123).
The same basic trend is evident in the ISC rank-group profile (graph b). Democratic 
averages were found for the Rl-25 group (1.3 for 1970 and 1980,1.1 for 1990), while quite 
authoritarian averages were found for the R101-123 group (5.9 for 1970, 6.1 for 1980, and 
5.5 for 1990). The rank groups located between these two poles produced LoD averages in 
the3.0-5.9 range. The LoD averages for 1990 were: 1.1 (Rl-25), 3.7 (R26-50), 4.6 (R51- 
75), 5.2 (R76-100), and 5.5 (R101-123).
The I-HDI rank-group profile (graph c) is similar to the HDI and ISC profiles. The 
Rl-25 group displayed democratic averages (1.5 for 1970,1.4 for 1980, and 1.1 for 1990), 
whereas the R101-123 group showed decidedly authoritarian averages (5.8 for 1970,6.1 for 
both 1980 and 1990). LoD averages became progressively less democratic as I-HDI ranks 
decreased in 1990 (as was found for the other dates as well): 1.1 (Rl-25), 3.4 (R26-50), 4.8 
(R51-75), 4.8 (R76-100), and 6.1 (R101-123).
Distribution Patterns and Average Index Levels
Precisely how states were distributed by level of democracy and human development 
values over the 1970-90 period will now be considered. Whereas the previous section dealt 
with relative positions, in the form of index ranks, distribution patterns will hereby be 
depicted by absolute value ranges: countries with index values of 0.800 or more are deemed 
to be at the High Level (H); those with values between 0.500 and 0.799 are at the Medium 
Level (M); and those with values between 0.000 and 0.499 are at the Low Level (L).2
2These are the same category distinctions employed by the UNDP with respect to the Human Development 
Index.
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Figure 4.2 (overleaf) illustrates the distribution patterns by human development 
level. Regardless of date and index, the High index levels were characterized by the 
overwhelming presence of democratic states (largely OECD), whereas the Low levels were 
characterized by strongly authoritarian states (mainly from sub-Saharan Africa). In other 
words, relatively few non-democratic states managed to cross the 0.800+ value threshold, 
and relatively few democratic states were found below the 0.500 barrier. Taking cl970 as 
the reference date: 22 of 23 states (96%) at the High HDI level were democratic (excepting 
Spain), as were 24 of the 25 states (96%) at the High ISC level (excepting Hong Kong), and 
all 21 states at the High I-HDI level; at the other extreme, there were only five democratic 
states (Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, Gambia and Turkey) at the Low HDI level, two (India 
and Bangladesh) at the Low ISC level,and three (Gambia, India and Bangladesh) at the Low 
I-HDI level. By 1980, democratic states constituted a smaller percentage of the states found 
at the High HDI level (74%) and at the High I-HDI level (83%), principally due to the 
inclusion of several Communist states, but they still constituted 92% of all states at the High 
ISC level.3 There were, in turn, only three democratic states (India, Gambia, and Papua New 
Guinea) at the Low HDI level, and two (India and Gambia) at the Low I-HDI level; no 
democratic states were found at the Low ISC level. The picture had barely changed by 1990: 
35 of the 47 (74%) states at the High HDI level were democratic, as were 30 of the 32 
(94%) states at the High ISC level and 29 of the 35 (83%) states at the High I-HDI level.4 
India and Gambia continued to be the only democracies at the Low I-HDI level, and were 
joined by Papua New Guinea at the Low HDI level;three conflict-stricken democratic states 
- Turkey, El Salvador and Peru - were found at the Low ISC level.
The three levels of democracy were more finely balanced across the Medium index 
levels (slightly less so for the ISC). Democratic states comprised between 26-36% of all 
states found at the Medium HDI level, between 14-26% of the states at the Medium ISC 
level, and between 24-36% of the states found at the Medium I-HDI level. The two non- 
democratic LoD groups were represented in largely equal measure. At the Medium HDI 
level there were thirteen non-democratic (3-5*) states and twelve non-democratic (6-7) 
states in 1970, thirteen states apiece in 1980, and eleven non-democratic (3-5*) states and 
twelve non-democratic (6-7) states in 1990.
The Low index levels were largely occupied by the most authoritarian (non- 
democratic (6-7)) states. They accounted for between 62% (1980) and 68% (1990) of all 
states at the Low HDI Level, 59% (1990) and 84% (1980) of all states at the Low ISC 
Level,and 63% (1980) to 72% (1970) of all states at the Low I-HDI Level. Democratic
3The new entrants at the High HDI level in 1980 were Poland (0.836), the USSR (0.841), Bulgaria 
(0.823), Hungary (0.838), the GDR (0.859), Czechoslovakia (0.848), Uruguay (0.830) and Hong Kong 
(0.830). The five new states at the High I-HDI level were Spain (0.826), Hong Kong (0.836), Poland 
(0.806), the GDR (802) and Czechoslovakia (0.801). Spain (0.800) and Hong Kong (0.842) were the only 
two cases found at the High ISC level outside the democratic (1-2*) LoD range.
4There were five new non-democratic entrants at the High HDI level by 1990 - Panama (0.816), Chile 
(0.848), Singapore (0.836), Yugoslavia (0.861) and Kuwait (0.804) - and three at the High I-HDI level - 
Singapore (0.816), Hungary (0.836) and Chile (0.804).
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Fig. 4.2 Distribution of Countries By Levels of Democracy and
Human Development Levels
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states typically comprised between 6-8% of the states at the Low HDI Level, 0-14% of the 
states at the Low ISC level, and 4-6% of the states at the Low I-HDI level. The non- 
democratic (3-5*) states comprised around one-quarter to one-third of all states at the Low 
index levels for any given date.
Table 4.3 interprets the distribution patterns by level of democracy, showing the 
percentage of states from each LoD group found at the High, Medium and Low index levels 
over the 1970-90 period. A solid majority of all democratic states (57-69%) were found at 
the High HDI, ISC and I-HDI levels (0.800+); between 24-39% were found at Medium 
index levels (0.500-0.799); and only 0-14% were found at Low index levels (0.000-0.499). 
In most cases, fewer than 10% of all non-democratic states displayed High index values; 
moreover, no non-democratic (3-5*) state had a High HDI or I-HDI value in 1970, and no 
non-democratic (6-7) state had a High ISC value (any date) or a High I-HDI value in 1970. 
The non-democratic (3-5*) states were roughly divided between the Medium and Low 
levels for the HDI, but were overwhelmingly found at the Medium level for the ISC (70- 
85%); for two dates (save for 1980), the majority of non-democratic (3-5*) states (56-60%) 
were found at the Medium I-HDI level. A significant majority (60-77%) of all non- 
democratic (6-7) states had Low HDI values, Medium ISC values (69-73%), and Low I- 
HDI values (65-70% for 1970 and 1980, but 49% for 1990).
Table 4.3 Distribution of States (%) By Level of Democracy 
and Human Development Level
LoD Index
Level
HDI
1970 1980 1990
ISC
1970 1980 1990
I-HDI
1970 1980 1990
1-2* High 59% 68 69 65 61 59 57 66 57
Med. 27 24 25 30 39 35 35 29 39
Low 14
100%
8
100
6
100
5
100
0
100
6
100
8
100
5
100
4
100
3-5* High 0% 9 22 3 6 7 0 6 15
Med. 43 39 41 80 85 70 60 45 56
Low 57
100%
52
100
37
100
17
100
9
100
23
100
40
100
49
100
29
100
6-7 High 2% 11 13 0 0 0 0 6 4
Med. 21 25 27 73 69 71 30 29 47
Low 77
100%
64
100
60
100
27
100
31
100
29
100
70
100
65
100
49
100
Notes. For each index: High=0.80Oi-; Medium=0.500/0.799; Low=0.000/0.499
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Hence, to simplify the observations: most democratic states had High human 
development values, most non-democratic (3-5*) states had Medium-range values, and most 
non-democratic (6-7) states had Low values. Or expressed slightly differently: there was a 
dramatic decrease in the number of democratic states as one descended human development 
levels, with the reverse pattern for the most authoritarian regimes.
There is perhaps one basis of comparison which addresses Lipset’s famous dictum 
most explicitly: the average human development values produced by each level of 
democracy. Figure 4.3 below depicts the average HDI, ISC and I-HDI values for each level 
of democracy over the 1970-90 period. To avoid some of the criticism which accompanied 
Lipset’s own choice of samples, two different sample groups are considered here: graph (a) 
portrays the results for all states (developed and developing, N=123), whereas graph (b) 
portrays the results for only the developing states (N=88).5 Regardless of the sample, 
Lipset’s basic premise could be validated for this period: democracies were, on average, 
more4 developed’ than non-democratic states. Moreover, the least democratic states (LoD 6- 
7) were also, on average, the least developed. These observations hold across all three 
indices and for all dates.
The gaps between the levels of democracy were quite large in the All States sample. 
Democratic states had average HDI values of 0.732 in 1970, 0.772 in 1980 and 0.799 in 
1990. Conversely, the non-democratic (3-5*) states displayed average HDI values of 0.435, 
0.504 and 0.577, whereas the non-democratic (6-7) states showed average HDI values of 
0.365,0.453 and 0.472. Interpreted in percentage terms, non-democratic (3-5*) states were, 
on average, between 59% (1970) and 72% (1990) as developed as democratic states, 
whereas non-democratic (6-7) states were between 50% (1970) and 59% (1990) as 
developed. The average ISC values for democratic states (0.791, 0.803, 0.787) were also 
much greater than the averages for the non-democratic LoD groups (0.625, 0.613, 0.613 for 
non-democratic (3-5*) states, and 0.548, 0.541, 0.551 for non-democratic (6-7) states). In 
percentage terms, however, the gaps were smaller than for the HDI: non-democratic (3-5*) 
states were 76-79% as developed as democratic states; non-democratic (6-7) states were 67- 
70% as developed The findings for the I-HDI were similar with average I-HDI values 
between 0.530 and 0.595, non-democratic (3-5*) states were 70-75% as developed as 
democratic states (average I-HDI values between 0.761 and 0.793); non-democratic (6-7) 
states were 60-64% as developed (I-HDI averages between 0.456 and 0.511).
The average values for all three LoD groups were significantly lower in the 
Developing States sample. With the impact of the industrialized democracies removed, the
:5The breakdown of countries in the .411 States sample (N=123) by level of democracy (1-2*, 3-5*, 6-7) is 
as follows: 37, 30, 56 for 1970; 38, 33, 52 for 1980; and 51, 27, 45 for 1990. The breakdown for the 
Developing States sample (N=88) is: 14, 29, 45 for 1970; 14, 31, 43 for 1980; and 25, 25, 38 for 1990.
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Fig. 4.3 Average Human Development Values By Level of Democracy, 1970-90
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gaps in human development levels were also noticeably less pronounced.6 The non- 
democratic (3-5*) states were, on average, 78-81% as developed as democratic states in 
terms of the HDI, 86-92% as developed in terms o f the ISC, and 84-86% as developed in 
terms of the I-HDI. The gaps between the democratic and the non-democratic (6-7) states
^ h e  HDI averages by level of democracy (1-2*, 3-5*, 6-7) were: 0.545, 0.425, 0.290 for 1970; 0.590, 
0.485, 0.380 for 1980; and 0.687, 0.556, 0.408 for 1990. The ISC averages were: 0.680, 0.625, 0.521 for 
1970; 0.701, 0.601, 0.507 for 1980; and 0.678, 0.604, 0.531 for 1990. The I-HDI averages were: 0.613, 
0.525, 0.405 for 1970; 0.645, 0.543, 0.444 for 1980; and0.683, 0.580, 0.469 for 1990.
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narrowed to a slighter extent non-democratic (6-7) states were, on average, 53-64% as 
developed in terms of the HDI; 72-78% as developed in terms of the ISC; and 66-69% as 
developed in terms of the I-HDI. Lipset’s hypothesis appears to be applicable to the 
developing world as well.
There is another comparison worth making, specifically regarding the developing 
world. By employing an independent standard threshold - the average index value for all 
developing states (the ‘developing threshold’) - one may evaluate the percentage of 
countries from each level of democracy with ‘above average’ human development values. 
Table 4.4 presents the results for three dates.
Table 4.4 Percentage of ‘Above Average’ States 
By Level of Democracy, Developing Threshold (1970-90)
LoD HDI
1970 1980 1990
ISC
1970 1980 1990
I-HDI
1970 1980 1990
1-2*
3-5*
6-7
79% 79 84 
59 52 56 
24 35 29
79 86 72 
72 61 60 
27 28 37
79 86 80 
66 48 56 
16 28 26
Note. The average index values for all developing states were, from 1970 to 1990: 0.376, 0.450 and 
0.529 for the HDI; 0.581, 0.571, and0.593 for the ISC; and 0.478, 0.511 and 0.561 for the I-HDI.
As expected, given the results in Figure 4.3(b) above, far more developing 
democracies, proportionally, exhibited ‘above average’ human development values 
irrespective of date. Indicatively,79% of all developing democracies had HDI values greater 
than 0.376 (the developing average) in 1970, compared to 59% of all non-democratic (3-5*) 
states and only 24% of all non-democratic (6-7) states. Over the entire period, between 79- 
84% of all democratic states surpassed the developing HDI averages, 72-86% surpassed the 
developing ISC averages, and 79-86% surpassed the developing I-HDI averages. The 
percentages for the two non-democratic groups were markedly lower. Just over half (52- 
59%) of all non-democratic (3-5*) states exceeded the developing HDI averages, between 
60-72% exceeded the developing ISC averages, and 48-66% exceeded the developing I- 
HDI averages. The figures for non-democratic (6-7) states were dismal: 24-35% surpassed 
the developing HDI averages; 27-37% surpassed the developing ISC averages; and only 16- 
28% surpassed the developing I-HDI averages.
Thus, over three-quarters of all developing democracies consistently showed above 
average values across all three indices and for all three dates, compared to between one-half 
and two-thirds of all non-democratic (3-5*) states, and between one-quarter and one-third 
of non-democratic (6-7) states. To put these findings into further perspective: more than 
three times as many developing democracies, proportionally, displayed above average I-HDI 
values in 1990 than did the most authoritarian (LoD 6-7) states.
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4.2 Controlling For Levels of Economic Development
This section explores the relationship between democracy and human development 
once levels of economic development are controlled for. Since economic development is 
strongly correlated with both democracy and human development, it is imperative to 
properly account for its influence on the relationship between the two.
Democracy, Human Development and Economic Development:
The General Relationships
Before examining the democracy-human development relationship in the context of 
economic development, hereinafter defined by the GDP per capita (GDP/C) variable,7 the 
triangular relationship between the three variables should be established. While much has 
been written on the relationship between democracy and economic development (Chapters 1 
and 2), comparatively little has been written about the relationship between human 
development and economic development, for two main reasons: (1) the relatively recent 
interest in the concept of human development (and its corresponding measures); and (2) the 
assumption, taken for granted, that one form of development complements the other. Both 
relationships will be explored in tandem from several different perspectives.
Table 4.5 presents the correlations between economic development and democracy, 
and between economic development and human development (all three measures), for two 
samples and three dates. Clearly, while economic development is linked to both democracy 
and human development, the bonds are weaker in the former case.
Table 4.5 Correlations Between Economic Development (GDP/C) and 
Democracy, Human Development
Variable
All (N= 
cl970
123)
C1980 C1990
Developing (N=88) 
cl970 C1980 cl990
LoD n= -0.533 -0.478 -0.556 -0.105 -0.022 -0.128
f = 0.284 0.228 0.310 0.011 0.001 0.017
HDI r= 0.781 0.647 0.666 0.583 0.460 0.555
P= 0.610 0.419 0.443 0.340 0.212 0.308
ISC r= 0.669 0.589 0.682 0.348 0.262 0.428
P= 0.448 0.347 0.465 0.121 0.069 0.184
I-HDI r= 0.779 0.662 0.715 0.539 0.427 0.549
r*= 0.606 0.438 0.511 0.291 0.182 0.301
7Per capita GDP has been calculated according to the World Bank Atlas method (UN 1993a).
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When all of the states in the sample are considered, moderately strong and negative 
correlations are produced, showing the tendency for lower (more democratic) LoD values to 
correspond to higher GDP/C levels, and vice versa. But when developing states are 
considered alone, extremely weak correlations are found for all three dates, suggesting that 
the level of economic development has little or nothing to do with levels of democracy in the 
developing world. At most, economic development may explain 31% of the variation in 
levels of democracy for the All States sample, but only around 1.7% of the variation for the 
Developing States sample. Recalling the earlier correlations in Table 4.1, it may therefore be 
argued that the relationship between democracy and human development is stronger than the 
one between democracy and economic development, a point acknowledged in several other 
studies as well (Diamond, 1992: 458; Lane and Ersson, 1994: 215; Diamond et al, 1995: 
22). For example, I-HDI values may explain between 44-47% of the variation in levels of 
democracy for the All States sample (25-30% for Developing states), whereas GDP/C rates 
may explain only between 23-31% of the variation (0-2% for Developing states).
The second set of correlations undoubtedly show that, as many have speculated 
(Hopkins and Van Der Hoeven, 1983: 3; Moon and Dixon, 1985: 678), the relationship 
between economic development and human development is strong. What is truly interesting, 
however, is that the correlations shed light on the proposition that “the level of economic 
development is the major determinant of quality of life in developing nations” (Williamson 
1987: 221). This view is shared by Lane and Ersson (1994: 98), who argue more 
specifically that human development “is determined more by the overall economic situation 
than by politics”. In fact, the level of economic development may account for roughly 42- 
61% of the variationin HDI values (21-34% for developing states), 35-47% of the variation 
in ISC values (7-18% for developing states), and 43-61% of the variation in I-HDI values 
(18-30% for developing states). By way of comparison, the correlations in Table 4.1 
indicate that HDI values may explain 34-40% of the variation in levels of democracy (16- 
28% for developing states), ISC values may explain 41-49% (20-27% for developing 
states), and I-HDI values may explain 44-47% (25-30% for developing states). Hence, the 
relationship between economic development and human development is stronger than the 
relationship between democracy and human development, but not when social conditions 
(ISC) are measured in isolation or when developing states comprise the sample (in both 
cases, economic development and democracy explain roughly as much of the variation).
In effect, the level of democracy is more closely related to human development than 
to economic development; in turn, economic development is more closely related to human 
development than is the level of democracy. Of the three relationships, the strongest is 
between economic development and human development (r2 = 44-61% for the I-HDI), and 
the weakest is between democracy and economic development (r2 = 23-31%); the 
relationship between democracy and human development falls in the middle (r2 = 44-47% 
for the I-HDI). For developing states, however, the democracy-human development 
relationship (r2 = 25-30% for the I-HDI) is basically as strong as the economic 
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development-human development relationship (r2 = 18-30% for the I-HDI). The
relationships between the variables may be classified as follows: ‘strong’ between human 
development and economic development (‘moderately strong’ for developing states); 
‘strong’ between democracy and human development (‘moderately strong’ for developing 
states); and ‘moderately strong’ between democracy and economic development 
(‘extremely weak’ for developing states).
Moving beyond generalities, Figure 4.4 depicts the relationships over the 1970-90 
period, focusing specifically on the average GDP/C rates produced by (a) each level of 
democracy (LoD) and (b) each level of human development (I-HDI). For comparative 
purposes, both samples - All States and Developing States - are portrayed side by side.
Democracy is associated with higher levels of economic development (graph a), but 
only when the sample consists of the entire spectrum of states. When the impact of the 
industrialized democracies is removed, the picture changes dramatically. In the All States 
sample, the average GDP/C for democracies was $1831 in 1970, rising to $7110 in 1980 
and then to $8990 in 1990. By contrast, the non-democratic (3-5*) states had average 
GDP/C rates of $503 in 1970, $2389 in 1980, and $2525 in 1990. The least democratic 
states (LoD 6-7) were also the poorest, with average GDP/C rates of $472 (1970), $2088 
(1980), and $ 1599 (1990). For any given date, democratic states were three times as wealthy 
as non-democratic (3-5*) states and between three and five times as wealthy as the non- 
democratic (6-7) states.
When industrialized states were omitted from the sample, developing democracies 
were not, on average, wealthier than the non-democratic states. Only in 1970 did the 
democratic states produce the highest average GDP/C rate ($518, compared to $481 for 
non-democratic (3-5*) states and $328 for non-democratic (6-7) states). For both other 
dates, the non-democratic (3-5*) states were the wealthiest; the average GDP/C rates by 
level of democracy (1-2*, 3-5*, 6-7) were: $1836, $2278 and $1944 for 1980; and $1839, 
$2543, $1108 for 1990.
Unsurprisingly, the most developed states in terms of human development were also 
the wealthiest, whereas the least developed states were also the poorest (graph b). Regarding 
the All States sample, High-level countries (0.800+) were, on average, between three and 
four times as wealthy as Medium-level countries (0.500-0.799), and between twelve and 
twenty-five times as wealthy as Low-level countries (0.000-0.499). The average GDP/C 
rates by I-HDI level (High, Medium, Low) were: $2708, $843, $220 for 1970; $11017, 
$3915, $710 for 1980; $17460, $4076, $673 for 1990.
The basic trends were similar for the sample of developing states, but on a much less 
pronounced scale. Since there was only one developing state (Barbados) found at the High 
I-HDI level in 1970, comparisons between the LoD groups are largely moot: Barbados had
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Fig. 4.4 Average Level of Economic Development (GDP/C) By 
Level of Democracy and Human Development, 1970-90
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a lower GDP/C ($553) than the Medium-level countries (average GDP/C of $712).8 The 
three developing states with High I-HDI values in 1980 - Barbados, Hong Kong, Trinidad
8Interestingly, one of the non-democratic (3-5*) states, the UAE ($2976), was almost six times as wealthy 
as Barbados, but was only two-thirds as ‘developed’ (I-HDI of 0.578, against 0.841 for Barbados).
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and Tobago - displayed an average GDP/C of $4891, whereas the Medium-level countries 
had an average GDP/C of $3601 and Low-level countries had an average GDP/C of $667. 
By 1990, the gaps between the I-HDI levels had increased: the seven countries found at the 
High I-HDI level - the three from 1980 plus South Korea, Costa Rica, Singapore, and Chile 
- had an average GDP/C of $5725; with an average of $2087, the Medium-level countries 
(N=49) were less than half as wealthy; the Low-level countries (N=32) had an average 
GDP/C of only $292.
As indicated by the correlations and average GDP/C rates, the relationship between 
economic development and human development is more ‘linear’ than the relationship 
between economic development and democracy. This argument may be demonstrated more 
concretely by tracing the average levels of democracy and human development across the 
specific levels o f economic development. By employing a double-Y axis format, Figure 4.5  
allows both relationships to be portrayed together using data for 1990 (the income brackets 
have been separated by rank intervals, from R l-10  or $26,894-$ 19,406 to R111-R123 or 
$218-$84).
Fig. 4.5 Tracing Average Levels of Democracy and Human Development 
Across Levels of Economic Development (c!990)
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Looking first at the left-hand panel, it becomes readily apparent that, while 
democratic LoD averages were clustered at the top of the income scale and strongly 
authoritarian averages were clustered at the bottom, the mid-income levels produced LoD 
averages in the 3.5-4.5 range; in other words, middle-income levels were not characterized 
by the predominance of any one particular level of democracy.9 From strongly democratic 
averages (1.0 and 1.5) for the two wealthiest groups, the slope tracing average levels of 
democracy abruptly ascends before flattening off along the middle-income range (3.5-4.5), 
gradually ascending thereafter before reaching the three poorest income groups (LoD values 
of 6.0,5.5 and 5.7).
The slope tracing average human development values (right-hand panel) follows the 
same general path as the slope for average levels of democracy (which uses an inverted 
scale): from an average I-HDI value of 0.919 for the wealthiest states, the slope descends to 
the upper-middle income range, where it flattens out (I-HDI averages of 0.743-0.746) 
before continuing its progressively downward spiral towards the poorest income level (I- 
HDI average of 0.367).10
These trends are mirrored in the actual distribution of countries by general level of 
economic development. Accordingly, in a format which will be used at various points 
throughout this research, countries in the sample have been slotted into one of four income 
categories, from the richest (INC 1) to the poorest (INC 4) group, depending on their 
respective GDP/C rankings for the date in question: Rl-30 (INC 1), R31-60 (INC 2), R61- 
90 (INC 3), R91-123 (INC 4); see Appendix P for the list of all country GDP/C rates.11 
By adopting relative yardsticks, in the form of GDP/C ranks, the number of countries in 
each income category remains constant despite the changing income levels over time or the 
changing composition of each quartile (since some countries may change income categories 
from one date to the next).
Figure 4.6 provides a vivid and concise snapshot of the findings by (a) level of 
democracy and (b) level of human development Irrespective of date, when states were 
classified by income-control group (INC 1 to INC 4), democracies were overwhelmingly
9The validity of these results was confirmed by looking at data for 1970 and 1980 as well. The general 
patterns were very similar, although the slopes tended to be slightly more erratic in the middle-income 
ranges for both dates (average LoD values of 3.5-5.5). The actual LoD averages by decreasing income group 
were: 2.2, 1.6, 3.5, 3.3, 5.6, 5.2, 3.8, 5.7, 5.2, 5.2, 5.3 and6.1 for 1970; and2.5, 1.6, 2.8, 3.7, 5.2, 5.7, 
3.8, 4.8, 5.3, 6.3, 5.2, and 6.2 for 1980.
1^ The results for 1970 and 1980 confirm this basic tendency, but with one slight deviation: the second 
wealthiest income group (R11-20) displayed a slightly higher I-HDI average than the wealthiest income 
group (Rl-10). The actual I-HDI averages by decreasing income group were: 0.829, 0.858, 0.738, 0.707, 
0.614, 0.561, 0.528, 0.496, 0.461, 0.376, 0.361 and 0.333 for 1970; 0.825, 0.860, 0.815, 0.749, 0.655, 
0.670, 0.612, 0.518, 0.489, 0.367, 0.429 and 0.332 for 1980. 
llrrhe exact breakdown of income categories for each date is as follows:
Rank Category 1970 (High/Low')_______ 1980___________________________________ 1990_
1-30 INC 1 $4922(U.S)/Sl299(Venez.) $29159(UAE)/$5462(Argen) S26894(Swit)/$5538(Saud.Ar)
31-60 INC 2 $1133(Gre)/$388(Iran) $5305(Gabon)/$ 1451 (Ghana) S5479(Malta)/$1807(CostaR)
61-90 INC 3 $378(Nicar)/S187(Philip.) $1444(Ecuad)/$517(Indon.) $1600(Jam.)/$439(Haiti)
91-123 INC 4 $ 175(Camer)/$54(BuikF) $515(Som.)/$124(Ugan) $432(Guinea)/$84(Mozam)
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Fig. 4.6 Distribution Of Countries By Levels of Economic Development and 
Democracy/Human Development, 1970-90
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situated in the INC 1 category and rarely found in the INC 4  category; in between, they 
were scattered among the INC 2 and INC 3 categories. Democracies constituted 73-80% of 
all states in the INC 1 category, 23-43% of the states in the INC 2 category, 13-37% of the 
states in the INC 3 category, and only 9% of the states in the INC 4 category. At the other 
extreme, between 61-76% of all very poor states (INC 4) displayed strongly authoritarian
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(6-7) LoD values, whereas only 10-20% of wealthy states (INC 1) did so (mainly Middle 
Eastern autocracies and Communist states). From another perspective, between one-half and 
three-fifths of all democracies during this period were ‘wealthy’, while under one-tenth 
were ‘poor’ (Table 4.6 below provides the breakdown by N and %). In contrast, 
approximately one-half of all non-democratic (6-7) states were‘poor’ (save for 1970, when 
the Figure stood at around one-third the total), and only around one-tenth were ‘wealthy’. 
The majority of non-democratic (3-5*) states were neither wealthy nor poor (INC 2 and 
INC 3).
Table 4.6 Distribution of Countries By Level of Democracy 
and Economic Development (N and %)
1970 1980 1990
Econ
Level
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
INC 1 
INC 2 
INC 3 
INC 4
23(62%) 1 (3) 
7 (19) 9 (31) 
4(11) 10(33) 
3 (8) 10(33)
6(11)
14(25)
16(28)
20(36)
22(58)
7(18)
6(16)
3(B)
3 (9) 
9(27) 
16 (49) 
5(15)
5(10)
14(27)
8(15)
25(48)
24(47) 3(11) 
13 (25) 9 (33) 
11 (22) 8(30) 
3 (6) 7(26)
3 (7) 
8(18) 
11 (24) 
23(51)
37(100%) 30(100) 56(100) 38 (100) 33 (100) 52 (100) 51 (100) 27 (100) 45 (100)
Graph 4.6 (b) illustrates the extent to which high levels of economic development 
correspond to high levels of human development Twenty (1970), 24 (1980), and 26 (1990) 
of the thirty wealthiest states (INC 1) were also located at the High I-HDI Level; that is, 
between 67% and 87% of all wealthy states had I-HDI values of at least 0.800. Equally as 
revealing is the fact that almost all of the very poorest states (INC 4) were found at the Low 
I-HDI Level. In 1970, all 33 of the states in the INC 4 category (GDP/C $432/84) had I- 
HDI values of 0.499 or less. The figures for the other two dates were only marginally 
better 94% (1980) and 85% (1990) of the INC 4 states had Low I-HDI values. The two 
middle income categories balanced the two extremes: the vast majority of countries in the 
upper-middle income category (INC 2) displayed Medium I-HDI values (0.799/0.500), 
whereas states in the lower-middle income category (INC 3) displayed either Medium or 
Low I-HDI values (save for 1990, when almost all displayed Medium values).
In brief, wealthy states tend to have democratic systems and high levels of human 
development, poor states tend to have strongly authoritarian regimes and very low levels of 
human development; middle-income states may not be classified by level of democracy, but 
tend to display mid-range human development values. While there are exceptions, of course,
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this rule generally holds. All but two of the ten wealthiest countries in 1970 were 
democratic, as were seven of the ten wealthiest countries in 1980 and all ten of the wealthiest 
countries in 1990 (Table 4.7). Alternatively, none of the ten poorest countries were 
democracies. From the human developmentperspective,itis interesting to note that the non- 
democratic states in the wealthiest samples - Kuwait and the UAE in 1970, joined by Saudi 
Arabiain 1980 - all displayed considerably lower I-HDI values (within the Medium I-HDI 
level) than the democracies (all of which had values in the High I-HDI range). Irrespective 
of date, all ten of the poorest states had very low I-HDI values.
Table 4.7 The Wealthiest/Poorest Countries In Comparative Perspective, 1970-90
1970
Inc Country GDP/ 
Ra C
LoD I-HDI
Value
1980
Inc Country GDP/ LoD 
Ra C
I-HDI
Value
Inc
Ra
1990 
Country GDP/
C
LoD I-HDI
Value
1 USA $4922 1.0 0.811 1 UAE $29159 5.3 0.704 1 Switz. $26894 1.0 0.926
2 Sweden $4164 1.0 0.896 2 Kuwait $20688 6.2 0.768 2 Finland $23258 1.0 0.920
3 Canada $3960 1.0 0.900 3 Switz. $16083 1.0 0.902 3 Japan $23052 1.0 0.934
4 Kuwait $3856 5.5 0.728 4 Sweden $15028 1.0 0.903 4 Sweden $22538 1.0 0.924
5 Switz. $3351 1.0 0.876 5 Norway $14124 1.0 0.904 5 Norway $21636 1.0 0.931
6 Luxemb $3238 2.0 0.854 6 Iceland $14105 1.0 0.837 6 USA $20739 1.0 0.896
7 Denma $3209 1.0 0.885 7 Germ,W $13216 1.0 0.882 7 Canada $20739 1.0 0.950
8 Austral $3133 1.0 0.884 8 Denma $12943 1.0 0.897 8 Iceland $20598 1.0 0.866
9 Germ,W $3042 1.0 0.879 9 Luxemb $12454 1.3 0.872 9 Denma $20373 1.0 0.921
10 UAE $2976 7.0 0.578 10 S.Arabia $12373 7.0 0.578 10 Germ,W $19406 1.0 0.919
114 Chad $89 6.0 0.268 114 Afghan $225 6.5 0.224 114 Malawi $195 6.9 0.373
115 Indone $79 6.0 0.271 115 Sudan $209 6.0 0.288 115 Somalia $173 7.0 0.183
116 Nepal $75 6.5 0.360 116 Chad $205 6.7 0.297 116 Uganda $165 3.9 0.262
117 Haiti $73 7.0 0.394 117 Malawi $201 6.5 0.344 117 Chad $165 6.9 0.350
118 Malawi $71 7.0 0.339 118 Mozamb $199 6.9 0.272 118 Nepal $164 5.3 0.447
119 Burundi $70 7.0 0.238 119 BurkFa $185 5.0 0.365 119 Nigeria $157 4.2 0.471
120 Lesotho $66 4.0 0.475 120 Banglad $179 4.0 0.326 120 Madaga $139 3.4 0.493
121 Mali $63 7.0 0.293 121 Myanm $165 7.0 0.445 121 Tanzan $107 6.0 0.403
122 Rwanda $58 7.0 0.362 122 Nepal $131 5.3 0.406 122 Zaire $102 6.7 0.376
123 BurkFa $54 5.0 0.358 123 Uganda $124 6.2 0.213 123 Mozamb $84 6.2 0.211
There is, moreover, some degree of overlap between the groups of states found here 
and those cited earlier in Table 4.2. Five of the ten wealthiest states in 1970 - Sweden, 
Canada, Denmark, Australia, and West Germany - also made the list of top ten developed 
states (I-HDI). Four states made both top ten lists in 1980 - Switzerland, Sweden, Norway 
and Denmark - and six did so in 1990 - Switzerland, Japan, Sweden, Norway, Canada, and 
Denmark. On the other hand, four states (Chad, Indonesia, Burundi and Mali) had the 
dubious distinction of appearing among the ten poorest and least developed states in 1970,
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six states (Afghanistan, Sudan, Chad, Mozambique, Bangladesh and Uganda) shared this 
distinction in 1980, and four (Somalia, Uganda, Chad and Mozambique) did so in 1990.
Controlling For Levels of Economic Development: The Evidence, 1970-90
Having established the general relationships between the three variables, it is 
possible to address a key question in the development debate: How do countries at similar 
levels of economic development, but maintaining altogether different political systems, 
compare in terms of human development scores? Table 4.8 presents the complete set of 
average human development values produced by each level of democracy in the four income 
categories.
Table 4.8 Average Human Development Values By Level of Democracy, 
Controlling For Economic Development
Index Inc Cat
1970
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
1980
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
1990
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
HDI INC 1 
INC 2 
INC 3 
INC 4
0.850 0.684 0.652 
0.712 0.639 0.516 
0.493 0.447 0.320 
0.187 0.213 0.208
0.883 0.800 0.745 
0.794 0.676 0.707 
0.562 0.443 0.461 
0.332 0.212 0.249
0.913 0.827 0.815 
0.820 0.726 0.765 
0.630 0.536 0.527 
0.421 0.326 0.299
ISC INC 1 
INC 2 
INC 3 
INC 4
0.857 0.772 0.645 
0.756 0.672 0.596 
0.683 0.647 0.559 
0.510 0.545 0.477
0.866 0.777 0.613 
0.800 0.649 0.607 
0.666 0.588 0.605 
0.620 0.529 0.469
0.899 0.806 0.669 
0.764 0.665 0.616 
0.626 0.592 0.609 
0.582 0.485 0.485
I-HDI INC 1 
INC 2 
INC 3 
INC 4
0.854 0.728 0.648 
0.734 0.655 0.556 
0.588 0.547 0.439 
0.348 0.379 0.343
0.874 0.788 0.679 
0.797 0.662 0.657 
0.614 0.515 0.533 
0.476 0.370 0.359
0.906 0.817 0.742 
0.792 0.696 0.690 
0.628 0.564 0.568 
0.501 0.406 0.392
Across every income category and for every date, democratic states consistently 
exhibited the highest index averages. This phenomenon was not observed on only one 
occasion: for cl970, the three democratic states in the INC 4 category ($175/54) - India, 
Bangladesh and Gambia - did not produce the highest average HDI, ISC or I-HDI value. In 
every other comparative case, the democratic states in each income category displayed 
higher average human development values than non-democratic states.
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The gaps between the democratic and non-democratic countries become readily 
apparent when the findings are interpreted by income category (Figure 4.8 below). 
Focusing specifically on the I-HDI measure, it may be argued that in the wealthiest quartile 
(INC 1), democracies were 11-17% more developed than non-democratic (3-5*) states and 
22-32% more developed than non-democratic (6-7) states (primarily the former Communist 
states and several oil-rich Middle Eastern autocracies). In the next highest quartile (INC 2), 
the index averages suggest that democracies were 12-20% more developed than non- 
democratic (3-5*) states and 15-32% more developed than non-democratic (6-7) states. 
Similar gaps are observed at the lower-middle income level (INC 3): democracies were 7- 
19% more developed than non-democratic (3-5*) states and 11-34% more developed than 
non-democratic (6-7) states. In the poorest quartile (INC 4), aside from the findings for 
1970, democratic states were between one-quarter and one-third more developed than non- 
democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states. Bringing the two other indices into this 
analysis, one finds that, when the percentage differences across all four income groups are 
averaged out for the period, democratic states were, in terms of the HDI, around 20% more 
developed than the non-democratic (3-5*) states and 26% more developed than non- 
democratic (6-7) states and, in terms of the ISC, 13% more developed than non-democratic 
(3-5*) states and 25% more developed than non-democratic (6-7) states.
Furthermore, it appears that having a democratic form of government may 
sometimes compensate for a lower level of economic development Consider some of the 
evidence for 1970: the democratic states in the INC 2 category produced a higher HDI 
average (0.712) than the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states in the INC 
1 category (at 0.684 and 0.652), and the democratic states in the INC 3 category produced 
an HDI average (0.493) roughly comparable to that found for the non-democratic (6-7) 
states in the INC 2 category (0.516). Moving on to the ISC, the average for the democratic 
states in the INC 2 category (0.756) was higher than the average for the non-democratic (6- 
7) states in the INC 1 category (0.645), and was comparable to the average produced by the 
non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.772). Likewise, the democratic states in the INC 3 category 
exhibited a higher ISC average (0.683) than the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic 
(6-7) states in the INC 2 category (at 0.672 and 0.596). Regarding the I-HDI, the 
democratic states in the INC 2 category displayed a higher average (0.734) than the two 
non-democratic groups of states in the INC 1 category (0.728 and 0.648), and democratic 
states in the INC 3 category displayed a higher average (0.588) than the non-democratic (6- 
7) states in the INC 2 category (0.556). Similar cases can be observed for both 1980 and 
1990 (note especially that, in 1980, democratic states in the INC 4 category actually 
produced a higher ISC average than the non-democratic (6-7) states in the INC 1 category).
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How does a given state’s human development score compare against the average 
found for all states at the same general level o f economic development? By employing an 
independent standard - the average for all countries in the same income category (the 
‘income threshold’) - it is possible to determine just how many countries from each level of  
democracy displayed ‘above average’ human development scores, relative to their national 
wealth. The results are expressed as percentages in Table 4.9, where the focus is on the 
developing world (N=88).
Table 4.9 Percentage of ‘Above Average’ Developing States 
By Level of Democracy, Income Threshold (1970-90)
LoD
HDI
1970 1980 1990
ISC
1970 1980 1990
I-HDI 
1970 1980 1990
1-2*
3-5*
6-7
79% 71 68  
62 32 36  
31 35 29
64 86 72  
72 48 44  
36 42 58
79 71 72 
69 42 36  
27 37 39
Note. The average HDI values for each income category were, from INC 1 to INC 4: 0.805, 0.599, 
0.385 and0.208 for 1970; 0.851, 0.718, 0.472 andO.251 for 1980; andO.895, 0.777, 0.567 and 0.316 
for 1990. The ISC averages per income category were: 0.812, 0.656, 0.605 and 0.501 for 1970; 0.815, 
0.664, 0.608 and0.492 for 1980; and 0.867, 0.695, 0.611 and0.494 for 1990. The I-HDI averages per 
income category were: 0.808, 0.627, 0.495 and 0.354 for 1970; 0.833, 0.691, 0.540 and 0.372 for 
1980; and 0.881, 0.736, 0.589 and0.405 for 1990.
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Proportionally, far more developing democracies surpassed their respective income 
thresholds. For example, 72% of all democratic states had above average I-HDI values in 
1990, compared to only 36% of non-democratic (3-5*) states and 39% of non-democratic 
(6-7) states. The only partial exception to this rule was found for 1970: the gaps in HDI and 
I-HDI percentages were quite small between the democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) 
states, and a slightly higher percentage of non-democratic (3-5*) states had above average 
ISC values. Over the course of the entire period, approximately 75% of all democracies in 
the developing world exhibited above average HDI, ISC and I-HDI values, relative to their 
income levels, compared to roughly 40% of all non-democratic (3-5*) states and 35% of all 
non-democratic (6-7) states.
4.3 Levels of Democracy and Human Development By Region
The preceding evidence has shown that the relationship between democracy and 
human development is largely affected by the level of economic development, but that, even 
when controls are made for national affluence, democratic states still tend to display higher 
human development values. When explored on a regional basis, in the absence of controls 
for economic development, this relationship is severely weakened: insofar as the developing 
world is concerned, democratic states are not invariably the most developed.
In the analysis to follow, the 88 developing countries in my sample have been 
divided into four regional groups: Asia (ASI, N=16), South and Central America 
(hereinafter referred to as Latin America, LAT, N=23), the Middle East and North Africa 
(MID, N=13), and sub-Saharan Africa (AFR, N=36).12 After initially assessing the general 
patterns across regions, the specific trends within each region will be addressed in turn.
12The countries belonging to each regional group are given below:
ASI (N=16): Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand,
China, Papua New Guinea, Myanmar, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Afghanistan.
LAT (N=23): Barbados, Trinidad and T obago, Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Jamaica, Costa
Rica, Mexico, Panama, Cuba, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Bolivia, Honduras, Haiti.
MID (N=13): Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria,
Morocco, Egypt.
AFR (N=36): Mauritius, South Africa, Gabon, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Cameroon, Mozambique, Ivory Coast, Zaire, Nigeria, Liberia, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Central African Republic, Angola, Sudan, Togo, Malawi, 
Senegal, Benin, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Chad, Niger, Somalia, Burkina Faso, Guinea, 
Gambia, Mali.
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Overview o f Regional Variations
The tendency to view democracy as a culturally-specific (i.e., ‘Western’) political 
prescription which is, by definition, alien to the indigenous political cultures of the 
developing world was touched upon in Chapter 2. Whether or not one agrees with this view, 
and leaving the philosophical issues aside, it is certainly true that democracies are a rarity in 
the developing regions. There were only fourteen developing democracies in 1970 and 
1980, and twenty-five in 1990; figures which translate into 16% and 28% of the total 
sample.13 Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4.8 (graph a), the democratic states were mostly 
concentrated in one region: between one-half (1970) and two-thirds (1990) were in Latin 
America. Democratic governance was virtually unheard of in the MID and AFR regions.
The number of democratic states in Asia remained fairly constant throughout the 
period: four in both 1970 and 1980, five in 1990 (representing about one-quarter of the 
regional total). Most Asian countries had LoD values in 3-5* range. The largest regional 
change occurred in Latin America, where the number of democracies doubled from eight in 
1970 to sixteen in 1990 (or from around 35% to 70% of the total). There was very little 
movement in the MID region during the period, with Turkey being the solitary (somewhat) 
democratic representative. In sub-Saharan Africa, democratic LoD values were found for 
only Gambia (all three dates), Mauritius (1980 and 1990) and Botswana (1990). This 
region remained solidly authoritarian (about 70% of the countries had LoD values of 6-7), 
and accounted for 56-63% of all strongly authoritarian states in the developing world.
Looking at the second part of the relationship (graph b), another generalization may 
be forwarded: there were preciously few developing states with high human development 
values. Only Barbados had reached the High I-HDI Level (0.800+) by 1970, to be joined 
by Trinidad and Tobago and Hong Kong in 1980. Four other states - Chile, Costa Rica, 
South Korea and Singapore - had attained this status by 1990, bringing the total number of 
High I-HDI countries to seven (or 8% of the developing sample). In contrast, there were 54 
developing states (61% of the total) with Low I-HDI values in 1970, declining to 26 states 
(or 30%) by 1990. A disproportionately large number of these states were found in sub- 
Saharan Africa: this region provided between 63% (1970) and 81% (1990) of all states with 
I-HDI values of 0.499 or less. In effect, then, by 1990 most ASI and LAT states were at the 
Medium Level, as were all thirteen MID states, while the vast majority of AFR states 
remained at the Low Level.
13The developing democracies (LoD 1.0-2.9) were: Barbados, Jamaica, Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Bangladesh (after independence), Gambia, India, 
Colombia and Turkey in 1970; Barbados, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Sri T .anka, India, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Jamaica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Gambia, Papua New Guinea, Mauritius, Malaysia and 
Turkey in 1980; Barbados, Venezuela, Costa Rica, TrirridadandTobago, Argentina, Uruguay, South Korea, 
Mauritius, Botswana, Brazil, Mexico, Dominican Republic, India, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Peru, the Philippines, Colombia, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, and Gambia in 
1990.
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Fig. 4.8 Regional Distribution of Countries By Level of Democracy 
and Human Development
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Given these general, region-wide observations, does the democracy-development 
relationship still hold? In other words, do democracies consistently display the highest 
human development values in every region? Despite the uneven distribution of countries by 
LoD group in the MID and AFR regions, and the accompanying doubts about the 
representativeness of single- or few- country cases, these questions are still worth posing.
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Table 4.10 gives a detailed breakdown of the average index values produced by each 
level of democracy. Cases where the democratic states displayed the highest index average 
appear in italics. They produced the highest HDI average in only one (LAT) of the four 
regions in 1970, in two regions (LAT and AFR) in 1980, and in three regions (excluding 
ASI) in 1990. Democratic states produced the highest ISC average in two regions (LAT and 
AFR) in both 1970 and 1990, and in three regions in 1980 (excluding MID). Democratic 
states produced the highest I-HDI average in only one region (LAT) in 1970, in three 
regions in 1980 (excluding MID), and in two regions (LAT and AFR) in 1990. Across the 
four regions, democratic states had the highest HDI and I-HDI averages in exactly half of 
the comparative cases (12 of 24), and the highest ISC average in 7 of the 12 cases.
Table 4.10 Average Human Development Values By Level of Democracy,
Regional Breakdown
1970 1980 1990
Index Regior
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6 -7 '
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
HDI ASI
LAT
MID
AFR
0.358
0.706
0.441
0.107
0.447
0.512
0.684
0.287
0.325
0.409
0.401
0.215
0.471
0.722
0.549
0.387
0.497
0.605
0.487
0.328
0.384
0.600
0.593
0.258
0.587
0.740
0.739
0.554
0.613
0.698
0.636
0.398
0.461
0.510
0.682
0.299
ISC ASI
LAT
MID
AFR
0.570
0.750
0.592
0.655
0.617
0.642
0.772
0.597
0.482
0.638
0.538
0.503
0.658
0.762
0.513
0.667
0.602
0.611
0.629
0.580
0.447
0.586
0.549
0.486
0.664
0.685
0.491
0.730
0.688
0.629
0.618
0.517
0.478
0.685
0.628
0.494
I-HDI ASI
LAT
MID
AFR
0.464
0.728
0.516
0.381
0.532
0.577
0.728
0.442
0.403
0.523
0.469
0.359
0.565
0.742
0.531
0.527
0.549
0.608
0.558
0.454
0.415
0.593
0.571
0.372
0.626
0.713
0.615
0.642
0.651
0.664
0.627
0.458
0.469
0.598
0.655
0.397
These results are still impressive, though not entirely conclusive given the variations 
and the distributional imbalances in some regional samples. The Asian democracies did not 
display the highest HDI average for any date, and displayed the highest ISC and I-HDI 
averages for only 1980.14 In sharp contrast, the Latin American democracies posted the 
highest HDI, ISC and I-HDI averages for all three dates. Only once did the sole democracy
14Japan’s omission from the calculations, given its status as an industrialized or developed state, is 
noteworthy. If one were to factor in Japan’s extremely high 1990 index values - 0.929 for the HDI, 0.938 
for the ISC, 0.934 for the I-HDI - the democratic group’s averages would have increased to 0.644 (HDI), 
0.710 (ISC) and 0.677 (I-HDI), giving this group the highest averagerates in the region (though, it should 
be said, by not much).
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in the MID region, Turkey, produce a higher index value than the averages for the non- 
democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states (the HDI in 1990). The only African 
state to statistically qualify as a democracy in 1970, Gambia, exhibited an ISC value which 
was higher than the averages for the non-democratic groups (although its HDI value was 
very dismal); with Mauritius (1980) and Botswana (1990) also exhibiting democratic LoD 
scores, the African democracies produced the highest HDI, ISC, and I-HDI averages for 
1980 and 1990. It is not, therefore, strictly accurate to say that the democracy-development 
relationship remained strong across regions, for only in Latin America were the most 
democratic states undoubtedly the most developed over the course of the 1970-90 period.
Blurring regional distinctions for the moment, it is also worth noting just how many 
states from each level of democracy produced human development values above their 
respective regional ‘thresholds’ (averages). The results, computed as a percentage of each 
LoD group, are presented in Table 4.11.
Table 4.11 Percentage of ‘Above Average’ Developing States 
By Level of Democracy, Regional Threshold (1970-90)
LoD
HDI
1970 1980 1990
ISC
1970 1980 1990
I-HDI
1970 1980 1990
1-2*
3-5*
6-7
71% 64 68 
48 48 48 
31 40 37
71 78 60 
64 68 64 
49 40 45
79 64 60 
52 52 52 
31 40 45
Note. The average HDI values for each region (ASI, LAT, MID, AFR) were: 0.386, 0.561, 0.426 and 
0.232 for 1970; 0.462, 0.639, 0.565 and 0.283 for 1980; and 0.567, 0.711, 0.673 and 0.345 for 1990. 
The ISC averages per region were: 0.563, 0.679, 0.560 and 0.533 for 1970; 0.577, 0.651, 0.565 and 
0.520 for 1980; and 0.628, 0.673, 0.614 and 0.520 for 1990. The I-HDI averages per region were: 
0.475, 0.620, 0.493 andO.383 for 1970; 0.520, 0.645, 0.565 and 0.401 for 1980; and 0.598, 0.692, 
0.643 and0.432 for 1990.
Save for one case (ISC 1990), far more democratic states, proportionally, surpassed 
their regional thresholds than did the two non-democratic groups of states. Roughly three- 
quarters of all developing democracies produced HDI, ISC and I-HDI values above their 
regional averages during this period, compared to around 48-68% of non-democratic (3-5*) 
states and only 31-49% of non-democratic (6-7) states. Once again, these results must be 
qualified. Given the preponderance of Latin American states among the developing 
democracies, one might claim that these results simply confirm that Latin American 
democracies tended to display higher index values than their regional (LAT) averages. The 
extent to which this is the case will soon become apparent
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Levels o f Democracy and Human Development in Asia, 1970-90
Democratic rule was not the norm in the ASI region during the 1970-90 period, with 
the percentage of democracies hovering around 25% of the regional sample. Only India and 
Sri Lanka enjoyed any semblance of a democratic tradition and, as will be demonstrated 
shortly, their respective human development records varied dramatically. Relatively 
developed Malaysia displayed somewhat questionable democratic credentials in 1970 and 
1980, and fell outside the democratic group altogether by 1990 (LoD of 3.4). Bangladesh’s 
inclusion in the democratic camp was short lived (only cl970), Papua New Guinea qualified 
in 1980 and 1990, and, following the overthrow of their respective dictatorships, South 
Korea and the Philippines had become democratic by 1990.
Precisely how the democratic states fared can be seen in Figure 4.9, where a double- 
Y axis format is employed to show the triangular relationship between levels o f democracy 
(LoD values are given for each state), and levels o f human development (left hand panel) 
and economic development (right hand panel). This format provides a snapshot o f how 
closely human development values mirror levels of economic development (GDP/C rates), 
the distribution of LoD values along the scales o f human development and economic 
development, and how democratic states compare in terms of human development against 
non-democratic states of similar economic means. The countries are arranged left to right by 
descending human development(I-HDI) scores.
Fig. 4.9 Levels of Human and Economic Development in ASI Region, 1970-90
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To a large extent, the lines depicting the range of human development values for all 
three dates broadly correspond to the lines representing the GDP1C values; in other words, 
the degree of national affluence appeared to influence human development ranks. The two 
wealthiest cases in 1970, Hong Kong ($916) and Singapore ($914), were also the most 
developed (I-HDI values of 0.791 and 0.717). The same may be observed for 1980: Hong 
Kong was the wealthiest ($5467) and most developed (0.836), followed by Singapore 
($4852 and 0.765). This pattern remained broadly intact in 1990: the three wealthiest states 
were also the most developed; although, with almost half the GDP/C rate of Singapore, 
South Korea displayed a marginally higher I-HDI value.
At the other end of the two scales, the least developed states were also among the 
very poorest in the region. With a GDP/C of $79 in 1970 (above only Nepal at $75), 
Indonesia displayed the lowest I-HDI value (0.271). The least developed state in 1980 and 
1990, Afghanistan (0.224 and 0.216), had GDP/C rates of $219 and $400. In general, 
however, the states found in the bottom half of the income scale largely fell within the same 
narrow range of GDP/C values, but tended to have widely varying I-HDI values. In 1990, 
for example, a vast gulf separated China (0.613) and Afghanistan (0.216) in terms of I-HDI 
scores, despite the almost identical GDP/C values ($381 and $400).
The handful of democratic states in this region were not clustered at any particular 
interval along the I-HDI scale. Sri Lanka and Malaysia were ranked third and fourth in 
terms of I-HDI values in 1970, whereas India and Bangladesh were ranked 12th and 15th. 
In 1980, Malaysia and Sri Lanka were found in the top part of the I-HDI scale, Papua New 
Guinea was near the middle, and India was in the bottom third. By 1990, newly- 
democratized South Korea was the second most developed state (after Hong Kong), the 
Philippines and Sri Lanka were located in the middle of the scale, Papua New Guinea was 
slightly further back, and India remained in the bottom third.
How the democratic states fared against non-democratic states of similar economic 
means varied to such an extent that generalizations are insupportable. In 1970, Sri Lanka 
and Malaysia compared favourably, India and Bangladesh did not More specifically: Sri 
Lanka had virtually the same GDP/C ($190) as the Philippines ($187), but displayed a 
better I-HDI score (0.595, compared to 0.503); Malaysia had a higher I-HDI value (0.595) 
than Papua New Guinea (0.516) although their GDP/C rates were identical ($319 and 
$317); despite having similar GDP/C rates ($75-111), India had a lower I-HDI value 
(0.357) than Myanmar (0.455), China (0.390) and Nepal (0.360); Bangladesh too fell 
within this GDP/C range, but surpassed only Indonesia in I-HDI values (0.307 and 0.235). 
The patterns were less clear in 1980: Malaysia and South Korea had virtually 
indistinguishable GDP/C and I-HDI values; Sri Lanka compared very favourably against all 
the other states in its GDP/C range ($279); in the $650-900 GDP/C range, Papua New 
Guinea had a similar I-HDI value (0.532) as the Philippines (0.529), although its value was 
lower than Thailand’s (0.607); among the very poorest states, India’s I-HDI value (0.427) 
was lower than China’s (0.463) and Myanmar’s (0.445), but higher than the values for five 
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other states. The records of democratic states were mixed for 1990: since no other country 
fell within the GDP/C range of South Korea, comparisons here are moot; in the middle of 
the scale, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea had I-HDI values similar to 
China and Indonesia (0.613 and 0.602), despite being (with the exception of Sri Lanka) 
much wealthier than the two non-democratic states (the GDP/C rates were $728 for the 
Philippines, $405 for Sri Lanka, $926 for Papua New Guinea, $520 for Indonesia and 
$381 for China); of the seven states with GDP/C rates of $400 or less, India produced a 
better I-HDI value (0.467) than all but Pakistan (0.513) and China (0.613).
The exact breakdown of human development values (HDI, ISC and I-HDI) and 
GDP/C rates, arranged by level of democracy, is given in Table 4.12 (overleaf) for all three 
dates. Undoubtedly, the democratic group contained two successful states circa 1970, Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia, and two unsuccessful states, India and Bangladesh. The former two 
placed within the top seven regional ranks in terms of human development scores and 
GDP/C rates, whereas the latter two were to be found near the bottom of every measure. By 
1980, the replacement for Bangladesh in the democratic group, Papua New Guinea, 
displayed an unimpressive HDI score but, owing to its comparably better ISC value, secured 
a relatively respectable I-HDI rank. Malaysia continued to exhibit good human development 
and GDP/C values, as did Sri Lanka (although it had slipped in the GDP/C rankings from 
7th to 11th). India remained mired near the bottom ranks. Of the two recent converts to 
democracy by 1990, South Korea was ranked second for every human development 
measure and third for GDP/C, while the Philippines exhibited mediocre scores (middle 
ranks). Relative to their respective ranks in 1980, Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea did not 
produce impressive results. India was ranked 13th for HDI, ISC and GDP/C values, and 
12th for the I-HDI. Only two states remained democratic for all three dates, of which India 
consistently displayed sub-par scores while Sri Lanka, owing to its civil war, gradually 
descended into the middle ranks.
A primary advantage in listing the HDI and ISC results side by side is that one may 
observe precisely how a country* s overall human development situation, as captured by the 
I-HDI, has been determined For instance, a country with a high HDI rank but a low ISC 
rank may be deemed to have done a (relatively) good job at strengthening individual 
capabilities, but a poor job at fostering a free, secure, and equitable social environment. A 
high ISC rank coupled with a low HDI rank would indicate the opposite type of imbalance.
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Table 4.12 Human Development Values By Level of Democracy, ASI Region
Year Country LoD HDI Rank ISC Rank I-HDI Rank GDP/C Rank
1970 Sri Lanka 1.5 0.506 4 0.685 5 0.595 3 190 7
Malaysia 2.0 0.471 6 0.720 3 0.595 4 319 3
India 2.0 0.254 12 0.460 12 0.357 12 104 12
Bangladesh 2.0 0.199 14 0.415 13 0.307 15 97 13
Philippines 3.0 0.489 5 0.517 10 0.503 8 187 8
Korea, S. 3.5 0.523 3 0.602 7 0.563 5 279 5
Hong Kong 4.0 0.737 1 0.845 1 0.791 1 916 1
Papua NG 4.0 0.325 9 0.707 4 0.516 7 317 4
Singapore 5.0 0.682 2 0.751 2 0.717 2 914 2
Pakistan 5.0 0.244 13 0.401 15 0.322 13 162 9
Afghanistan 5.5 0.131 16 0.496 11 0.313 14 93 14
Indonesia 6.0 0.306 11 0.235 16 0.271 16 79 15
Nepal 6.5 0.162 15 0.557 9 0.360 11 75 16
Thailand 7.0 0.465 7 0.616 6 0.541 6 198 6
China 7.0 0.372 8 0.408 14 0.390 10 111 10
Myanmar 7.0 0.318 10 0.592 8 0.455 9 104 11
1980 Sri Lanka 1.5 0.552 6 0.677 5 0.615 5 279 11
India 1.5 0.296 12 0.559 9 0.427 11 250 12
Papua NG. 2.2 0.348 11 0.715 3 0.532 7 896 5
Malaysia 2.5 0.687 3 0.682 4 0.684 3 1779 3
Bangladesh 4.0 0.234 14 0.418 14 0.326 15 179 14
Hong Kong 4.0 0.830 1 0.842 1 0.836 1 5467 1
Singapore 4.9 0.780 2 0.749 2 0.765 2 4852 2
Indonesia 5.0 0.418 9 0.385 15 0.401 13 517 8
Thailand 5.2 0.551 7 0.663 6 0.607 6 688 7
Nepal 5.3 0.209 15 0.603 8 0.406 12 131 16
Pakistan 5.4 0.287 13 0.508 11 0.398 14 333 9
Korea, S. 5.9 0.666 4 0.648 7 0.657 4 1643 4
Philippines 6.0 0.557 5 0.501 12 0.529 8 729 6
China 6.5 0.457 8 0.469 13 0.463 9 305 10
Afghanistan 7.0 0.165 16 0.283 16 0.224 16 219 13
Myanmar 7.0 0.356 10 0.535 10 0.445 10 165 15
1990 India 1.5 0.382 13 0.551 13 0.467 12 317 13
Korea, S. 2.0 0.859 2 0.839 2 0.849 2 5030 3
Papua NG. 2.0 0.408 10 0.738 4 0.573 10 926 6
Philippines 2.2 0.621 8 0.620 8 0.621 6 728 7
Sri Lanka 2.3 0.665 6 0.574 12 0.620 7 405 9
Thailand 3.2 0.798 4 0.730 5 0.764 4 1269 5
Malaysia 3.4 0.794 5 0.722 6 0.758 5 2149 4
Hong Kong 4.0 0.875 1 0.863 1 0.869 1 10877 1
Singapore 4.1 0.836 3 0.796 3 0.816 3 10539 2
Bangladesh 4.4 0.309 14 0.465 15 0.387 15 218 15
Pakistan 4.7 0.393 12 0.634 7 0.513 11 386 11
Nepal 5.3 0.289 15 0.605 10 0.447 13 164 16
Indonesia 6.2 0.586 9 0.617 9 0.602 9 520 8
Afghanistan 6.9 0.208 16 0.225 16 0.216 16 400 10
China 6.9 0.644 7 0.583 11 0.613 8 381 12
Myanmar 7.0 0.406 11 0.487 14 0.446 14 303 14
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For the most part, such ‘imbalances’ of either type were uncommon in this region 
during the period: high HDI ranks were usually accompanied by high ISC ranks, low HDI 
ranks were accompanied by low ISC ranks. There were two exceptions in 1970, five in 
1980, and two in 1990. In regional terms, the Philippines produced a good HDI rank (5th) 
in 1970, followed by a mediocre ISC rank (10th), while China exhibited a much better HDI 
rank (8th) than its ISC rank (14th) might have otherwise suggested (although, in absolute 
terms, its HDI value of 0.372 was poor). The only democratic state in 1980 to show an 
imbalance of any magnitude was Papua New Guinea: ranked 11th for the HDI, it produced 
the 3rd best regional ISC value. Among the non-democratic (3-5*) states, Indonesia had the 
second worst ISC value in the region but a mediocre HDI rank (9th), while Nepal showed a 
mediocre ISC rank (8th) and the second worst HDI rank. In the non-democratic (6-7) 
group, China and the Philippines had virtually the same imbalances they had in 1970. In 
1990, the only two states with HDI/ISC imbalances were democratic: Papua New Guinea 
continued to exhibit a poor HDI rank (10th) but a good ISC rank (4th), while Sri Lanka had 
a good HDI rank (6th) but a poor ISC rank (12th); Sri Lanka’s civil war forced its ISC 
rank down (from 5th in both 1970 and 1980).
Another type of ‘imbalance’ to be observed in the table is between a country’s 
overall human development (I-HDI) rank and its economic development (GDP/C) rank. As 
suggested by Figure 4.9, regardless of date, the states with the highest GDP/C ranks almost 
invariably had the highest index ranks; and by the same token, the states with the lowest 
GDP/C ranks tended have lower index ranks. There were virtually no cases where a country 
had a GDP/C rank in the bottom half of the income scale (R9-R16), but index ranks 
consistently in the top half of the human development scale (Rl-8) - or vice versa. Only two 
such cases can be found in the table: Sri Lanka was ranked 11th in terms of GDP/C in 
1980, but 6th for the HDI, 5th for the ISC and 5th for the I-HDI; Papua New Guinea was 
ranked 6th in terms of GDP/C in 1990, but only 10th for the HDI, 4th for the ISC and 10th 
for the I-HDI. By and large, the wealthiest states were the most developed, the poorest states 
were the least developed.
Table 4.13 below portrays the human development picture in a different light by 
showing how each Asian state fared against the three independent thresholds employed in 
this chapter. This method allows one to evaluate how states compared against: (1) the 
average for all developing states; (2) the average for all developing states at similar levels of 
economic development;and (3) the average for all states in the ASI region. A positive sign 
(+) indicates that a country’s human development value was above the given threshold 
standard for that date. Countries are listed by LoD group.
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Table 4.13 Evaluating Levels of Human Development Against
Threshold Standards, ASI Region
Year Country LoD Developing Avg. 
HDI ISC I-HDI
Income Avg.
HDI ISC I-HDI
Regional Avg. 
HDI ISC I-HDI
1970 Sri Lanka 1.5 + + + + + + + + +
Bangladesh 2.0 - - - - - - - - -
India 2.0 - - - + - + - - -
Malaysia 2.0 + + + + + + + + +
Philippines 3.0 + - + + - + + - +
Korea, S. 3.5 + + + + - + + + +
Hong Kong 4.0 + + + + + + + + +
Papua NG. 4.0 - + + - + + - + +
Pakistan 5.0 - - - + - - - - -
Singapore 5.0 + + + + + + + + +
Afghanistan 5.5 - - - - - - - - -
Indonesia 6.0 - - - + - - - - -
Nepal 6.5 - - - - + + - + -
China 7.0 - - - + - + - - -
Myanmar 7.0 - + - + + + - + -
Thailand 7.0 + + + + + + + + +
1980 India 1.5 _ _ _ + + + . _ _
Sri Lanka 1.5 + + + + + + + + +
Papua NG. 2.2 - + + - + - - + +
Malaysia 2.5 + + + - + - + + +
Bangladesh 4.0 - - - - - - - - -
Hong Kong 4.0 + + + - + + + + +
Singapore 4.9 + + + + + + + + +
Indonesia 5.0 - - - - - - - - -
Thailand 5.2 + + + + + + + + +
Nepal 5.3 - + - - + + - + -
Pakistan 5.4 - - - + + + - - -
Korea, S. 5.9 + + + - - - + + +
Philippines 6.0 + - + + - - + - +
China 6.5 + - - + - + - - -
Afghanistan 7.0 - - - - - - - - -
Myanmar 7.0 - - - + + + - - -
1990 India 1.5 . _ _ + + + - - -
Korea, S. 2.0 + + + + + + + + +
Papua NG. 2.0 - + + - + - - + -
Philippines 2.2 + + + + + + + - +
Sri Lanka 2.3 + - + + + + + - +
Thailand 3.2 + + + + + + + + +
Malaysia 3.4 + + + + + + + + +
Hong Kong 4.0 + + + - - - + + +
Singapore 4.1 + + + - - - + + +
Bangladesh 4.4 - - - - - - - - -
Pakistan 4.7 - + . - + + + - + -
Nepal 5.3 - + - - + + - - -
Indonesia 6.2 + + + + + + + - +
Afghanistan 6.9 - - - - - - - - -
China 6.9 + - + + + + + - +
Myanmar 7.0 - - - + - + - - -
Notes. The actual 1970-90 averages were given in Tables 4.4 (Dev), 4.9 (Inc), 4.11 (Reg).
(+) above threshold average, (-) below threshold average.
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The records of democratic states circa 1970 could not be any different: Sri Lanka 
and Malaysia surpassed every threshold for all indices, Bangladesh failed to surpass any 
threshold, and India could only surpass its HDI and I-HDI income thresholds (not 
surprisingly, given that India fell within the same income category, INC 4, as the poorest 
states in sub-Saharan Africa). In the non-democratic (3-5*) group, Hong Kong and 
Singapore surpassed every threshold, whereas South Korea surpassed all but one (the ISC 
average for its income category). The Philippines fared well against the various HDI and I- 
HDI thresholds (but not the ISC thresholds), Papua New Guinea fared well against the ISC 
and I-HDI thresholds (but not the HDI thresholds), and both Pakistan and Afghanistan 
fared very poorly across the thresholds. The only exceptional record among the non- 
democratic (6-7) states belonged to Thailand, which surpassed every threshold for all three 
indices. The records of Indonesia, Nepal, China, and Myanmar were generally poor; with 
the exception of Indonesia, all fared better against their income thresholds.
Of the four democratic states in 1980, only Sri Lanka exceeded every threshold for 
all three indices. Malaysia displayed a strong record against the developing and regional 
averages, but failed to cross its respective HDI and I-HDI income thresholds. Once again, 
India only compared favourably against its income thresholds (INC 4). The newest entrant 
to the democratic camp, Papua New Guinea, posted below average HDI values (although its 
ISC values were above average). Singapore and Thailand were the only non-democratic (3- 
5*) states with above average values across all thresholds. Hong Kong failed to surpass 
only its income threshold for the HDI, largely due to its INC 1 status (i.e., it was evaluated 
against the average for most of the OECD countries). South Korea, too, managed to surpass 
the developing and regional thresholds, but not the income thresholds (it was evaluated 
against the averages produced by the INC 2 countries). Pakistan and Nepal exhibited poor 
records, managing to surpass very few thresholds, while Bangladesh and Indonesia failed to 
surpass any threshold. None of the non-democratic (6-7) states displayed particularly good 
records, although the Philippines compared well against the HDI and I-HDI thresholds. 
China had a respectable record against the HDI thresholds only (although it did not surpass 
the regional HDI average), Myanmar managed to display above average values against only 
the income thresholds (INC 4 category), and Afghanistan failed to surpass any threshold.
With the exception of India, which compared favourably against only its income 
thresholds (still INC 4), the democratic states posted strong records in 1990. South Korea 
had above average values across all thresholds, the Philippines failed only to surpass the 
regional ISC average, and Sri Lanka failed to surpass only the developing and regional ISC 
averages (due to its lower Security Index value, reflecting its civil war). The remaining 
democracy, Papua New Guinea, continued to display above average ISC values but below 
average HDI and I-HDI values. The exceptional records among the non-democratic (3-5*) 
states belonged to Thailand and Malaysia, which managed to exceed all thresholds, and to 
Hong Kong and Singapore, both of which exceeded all developing and regional thresholds 
but no income thresholds (given their INC 1 status, they were evaluated against the averages
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for the largely OECD states). Pakistan and Nepal did not produce good records, and 
Bangladesh once again failed to surpass any threshold. Among the non-democratic (6-7) 
states, Indonesia and China both showed vastly improved records. Indonesia succeeded in 
surpassing all but the regional ISC average, while China surpassed all but the developing 
and regional ISC averages. Myanmar and Afghanistan displayed dismal records.
In light of the above evidence, no generalizations are warranted regarding democracy 
and human development in Asia. Every level of democracy spawned its share of states with 
good and poor human development records. It would perhaps be more accurate to suggest 
that the level of economic development had a stronger impact on the placement of states 
along the continuum of human development values. In turn, levels of economic development 
were not in any way associated with levels of democracy: there were (relatively) wealthy and 
poor states within each LoD group.
Levels of Democracy and Human Developments Latin America, 1970-90
As previously acknowledged, the majority of democratic states in the developing 
world were concentrated in Latin America (LAT).15 Consequently, the LAT region exerted 
a disproportionate influence on the cross-regional evaluations of democracy and 
development. Six states remained democratic throughout the entire period: Barbados, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Colombia. Chile had a democratic 
LoD value in 1970 only. Uruguay displayed democratic credentials in 1970 and 1990, but 
not in 1980. The Dominican Republic posted democratic LoD values in 1980 and 1990, 
while Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico (loosely), Brazil, Honduras, Peru, Bolivia and El Salvador 
had joined the democratic camp by 1990. There were eight democracies in 1970, seven in 
1980, and sixteen in 1990. The percentage of democracies thus increased from around one- 
third the regional total (23 LAT states) in 1970 and 1980 to just under three-quarters by 
1990.
Figure 4.10 depicts the levels of human and economic development in Latin America 
for the 1970-90 period. The LoD value for each country is provided, and countries are listed 
from left to right by decreasing I-HDI values. It takes just a brief glance at the graphs to 
conclude that, unlike the patterns found for the ASI region, the lines portraying the I-HDI 
and GDP/C values did not generally move in tandem; in other words, a country’s human 
development value was not necessarily influenced by its relative level of economic 
development For example, the most developed state in 1970, Barbados, actually had the
15 This designation is a term of convenience which is used for geographic rather than cultural purposes, and 
therefore also includes non-Spanish speaking states in Central and South America (Barbados, Jamaica, etc).
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11th highest GDP/C rate ($553), while the second most developed state, Trinidad and 
Tobago, was ranked fifth ($847). Chile was found near the middle of the I-HDI scale (1 1th) 
and yet had the third highest GDP/C ($858). Such apparent inconsistencies were readily 
observed for the other dates as well: Argentina and Brazil exhibited the second highest 
GDP/C rates in 1980 and 1990, respectively, but each country was ranked only 14th in 
terms of I-HDI values for each date. Despite the lack of any clear patterns, however, one 
may still draw a rough line down the middle o f the scale and observe that, save for the odd 
exception, the wealthier states tended to fall within the top half of the human development 
scale, while the poorer states tended to be located in the bottom half. Consequently, the 
significance of economic development should not be dismissed altogether, although its 
impact was less visible in this region.
To a rather extraordinary extent, the Latin American democracies were clustered 
along the top o f the human development scale. The five most developed states in 1970 were 
democratic (Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Jamaica); the three 
other democratic states (Uruguay, Colombia and Chile) were all located in the upper-middle 
part of the scale. This situation had changed only slightly by 1980: the four most developed 
states were democratic (the four from 1970 minus Jamaica, which had slipped to the middle 
of the scale, just slightly ahead of the two other democracies, Colombia and the Dominican 
Republic). The wave of democratization which had swept the region by 1990 ensured that 
democratic states were to be found at every human development interval: eight o f the ten 
most developed states were democratic, as were three o f the five least developed states.
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On the whole, democratic states tended to display higher I-HDI values than non- 
democratic states with similar or higher GDP/C rates. Non-democratic Argentina was the 
second wealthiest country in the region in 1970 (after Venezuela), but showed a lower I- 
HDI value (0.715) than the five more developed, democratic states; Barbados had just over 
half of Argentina’s GDP/C but was considerably more developed (0.841). Panama had a 
slightly higher GDP/C rate ($667) than Costa Rica ($569), but possessed a much lower I- 
HDI score (0.632, compared to 0.742 for Costa Rica). Although Jamaica ($748), Mexico 
($704) and Cuba ($701) had similar GDP/C rates, the latter two states had much lower I- 
HDI values (0.687 and 0.613, respectively, compared to 0.739 for Jamaica). Peru ($529) 
and Brazil ($454) both had higher GDP/C rates than Colombia ($337), but lower I-HDI 
values. The comparison which stands out most starkly in 1980 involves the region’s two 
wealthiest states, Venezuela ($4644) and Argentina ($5462): whereas Venezuela was ranked 
third for I-HDI values (0.789), Argentina was ranked 14th (0.629). Moreover, although 
Costa Rica and Brazil had similar GDP/C rates ($2114 and $1877), Costa Rica was ranked 
4th in terms of I-HDI values (0.786) while Brazil was ranked only 16th (0.625). One may 
also compare the records of two democratic states, Jamaica ($1250) and the Dominican 
Republic ($1164), against those of two non-democratic states with similar GDP/C rates, 
Peru ($1161) and Guatemala ($1139): the two democracies scored much better in terms of 
the I-HDI (0.684 and 0.630, against 0.575 and 0.495). Given the large number of recent 
converts to democratic rule by 1990, such comparisons between the LoD groups are largely 
insignificant for this date.
The breakdown of human development values and GDP/C rates by level of 
democracy is presented in Table 4.14. The top five HDI, ISC and I-HDI ranks in 1970 were 
held by democratic states. Moreover, all eight democratic states had I-HDI ranks in the top 
half of the I-HDI scale, with the lowest rank belonging to Chile (11th). The picture changed 
slightly by 1980, when a clearer distinction emerged between democracies with very good 
records (Barbados, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica) and those with modest 
records (Jamaica, Colombia and the Dominican Republic); the former group had top five I- 
HDI ranks, whereas the latter group had I-HDI ranks of 10th, 12th and 13th. The only two 
non-democratic states with consistently decent (top 10) index ranks for this date were Cuba 
(9th for the HDI, 7th for the ISC, 5th for the I-HDI) and Panama (10th for the HDI, 6th for 
the ISC and 7th for the I-HDI). Judging by their index ranks in 1990, four of the sixteen 
democratic states displayed ‘very good’ human development records (Barbados, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Venezuela, Costa Rica), two had ‘good’ records (Uruguay and Argentina), five 
had ‘modest’ records (Jamaica, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil and Mexico), and five had 
‘poor’ records (the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Bolivia, Peru, and El Salvador). To 
place these assessments into further context: of those nine states returning to democratic 
rule, two had ‘good’ human development records, three had ‘modest’ records, and four had 
‘poor’ records. The two non-democratic states with respectable human development ranks
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Table 4.14 Human Development Values By Level of Democracy, LAT Region
Year Country LoD HDI R ISC R I-HDI R GDP/C R
1970 Jamaica 1.0 0.662 7 0.816 4 0.739 5 748 6
Barbados 1.0 0.824 1 0.857 1 0.841 1 553 11
Venezuela 1.5 0.728 5 0.817 3 0.773 3 1299 1
Chile 1.5 0.682 6 0.560 22 0.621 11 858 3
Trinidad &T 1.5 0.789 2 0.789 5 0.789 2 847 5
Costa Rica 1.5 0.647 8 0.837 2 0.742 4 569 10
Uruguay 2.0 0.762 3 0.585 19 0.674 8 856 4
Colombia 2.5 0.554 12 0.737 6 0.646 9 337 16
Guatemala 3.0 0.392 20 0.564 21 0.478 22 363 15
Dominican R 3.0 0.455 18 0.702 9 0.578 14 336 17
Paraguay 3.5 0.511 14 0.636 16 0.573 16 253 21
Argentina 4.0 0.748 4 0.681 10 0.715 6 991 2
Nicaragua 4.0 0.462 17 0.653 13 0.558 17 378 14
El Salvador 4.0 0.422 19 0.661 12 0.541 18 287 18
Panama 4.5 0.592 10 0.671 11 0.632 10 667 9
Bolivia 4.5 0.369 21 0.644 14 0.507 19 234 22
Mexico 5.0 0.642 9 0.732 7 0.687 7 704 7
Peru 5.0 0.528 13 0.623 18 0.576 15 529 12
Brazil 5.5 0.507 15 0.490 23 0.499 20 454 13
Ecuador 6.0 0.485 16 0.709 8 0.597 13 277 19
Cuba 7.0 0.582 11 0.644 15 0.613 12 701 8
Honduras 7.0 0.350 22 0.629 17 0.489 21 263 20
Haiti 7.0 0.218 23 0.571 20 0.394 23 73 23
1980 Venezuela 1.0 0.784 5 0.794 3 0.789 3 4644 3
Barbados 1.0 0.856 1 0.868 1 0.862 1 3442 5
Costa Rica 1.0 0.746 8 0.826 2 0.786 4 2114 8
Trinidad &T. 2.0 0.816 3 0.788 4 0.802 2 5763 1
Jamaica 2.0 0.654 13 0.714 9 0.684 10 1250 14
Colombia 2.0 0.656 12 0.627 13 0.641 12 1241 15
Dominican R. 2.0 0.541 17 0.718 8 0.630 13 1164 16
Guatemala 3.4 0.477 19 0.514 20 0.495 21 1139 18
Paraguay 3.5 0.602 15 0.649 12 0.626 15 1413 13
El Salvador 3.7 0.454 20 0.503 21 0.479 22 788 20
Mexico 4.0 0.758 6 0.695 11 0.727 6 2766 6
Ecuador 4.5 0.613 14 0.762 5 0.687 9 1444 12
Peru 5.0 0.590 16 0.560 17 0.575 17 1161 17
Uruguay 5.2 0.830 2 0.553 18 0.692 8 3477 4
Nicaragua 5.2 0.534 18 0.460 23 0.497 20 786 21
Brazil 5.5 0.673 11 0.578 16 0.625 16 1877 9
Panama 5.7 0.687 10 0.749 6 0.718 7 1818 10
Honduras 5.7 0.435 22 0.696 10 0.565 18 695 22
Argentina 6.0 0.790 4 0.469 22 0.629 14 5462 2
Chile 6.0 0.753 7 0.550 19 0.652 11 2474 7
Bolivia 6.4 0.442 21 0.594 14 0.518 19 900 19
Cuba 6.5 0.719 9 0.737 7 0.728 5 1575 11
Haiti 6.7 0.295 23 0.581 15 0.438 23 267 23
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(cont’d)
(Table 4.14 cont’d)
Year Country LoD HDI R ISC R I-HDI R GDP/C R
1990 Barbados 1.0 0.894 1 0.910 1 0.902 1 6656 1
Trinidad &T. 1.0 0.855 3 0.882 2 0.868 2 3209 3
Venezuela 1.0 0.820 7 0.752 6 0.786 5 2353 6
Costa Rica 1.0 0.848 5 0.803 3 0.825 3 1807 11
Uruguay 1.2 0.859 2 0.695 10 0.777 6 2736 4
Argentina 1.2 0.853 4 0.690 11 0.772 8 1892 9
Dominican R, 1.2 0.638 17 0.688 12 0.663 15 953 18
Jamaica 2.0 0.749 12 0.782 4 0.765 9 1600 12
Ecuador 2.0 0.718 13 0.676 13 0.697 12 1005 16
Honduras 2.0 0.524 22 0.737 7 0.630 17 660 21
Bolivia 2.0 0.530 21 0.545 20 0.537 20 609 22
Peru 2.2 0.642 16 0.477 22 0.559 19 1356 13
Colombia 2.3 0.813 9 0.636 16 0.724 10 1219 14
Brazil 2.5 0.756 11 0.601 17 0.678 14 3270 2
El Salvador 2.5 0.543 20 0.498 21 0.521 21 1121 15
Mexico 2.8 0.804 10 0.588 18 0.696 13 2396 5
Nicaragua 3.2 0.583 18 0.449 23 0.516 22 792 20
Guatemala 3.5 0.564 19 0.568 19 0.566 18 949 19
Panama 3.9 0.816 8 0.731 8 0.774 7 1919 8
Paraguay 4.9 0.679 14 0.639 15 0.659 16 990 17
Chile 5.3 0.848 6 0.759 5 0.804 4 1958 7
Haiti 6.5 0.354 23 0.642 14 0.498 23 439 23
Cuba 7.0 0.666 15 0.728 9 0.697 11 1884 10
in 1990 were Panama (8th for the HDI, 8th for the ISC, and 7th for the I-HDI) and Chile 
(6th for the HDI, 5th for the ISC, and 4th for the I-HDI).
Quite a few countries in the LAT region displayed imbalances in their HDI/ISC 
ranks. Among the democratic states in 1970, Chile was ranked 6th for the HDI and 22nd 
for the ISC, Uruguay was ranked 3rd for the HDI and 19th for the ISC, and Colombia was 
ranked 12th for the HDI and 6th for the ISC. Three non-democratic states experienced 
imbalances at this date: the Dominican Republic was ranked 18th for the HDI and 9th for 
the ISC; Argentina was ranked 4th for the HDI and 10th for the ISC; and Ecuador was 
ranked 16th for the HDI and 8th for the ISC. The only democratic state with large 
discrepancies between its HDI and ISC ranks in 1980 was the Dominican Republic, which, 
as was the case in 1970, had a much higher ISC rank (8th) than HDI rank (17th). Among 
the non-democratic (3-5*) states, Ecuador and Honduras had much higher ISC ranks (5th 
and 10th) than HDI ranks (14th and 22nd), whereas Uruguay actually displayed the second 
highest HDI value (0.830) in the region despite having a dismal ISC rank (18th). From the 
non-democratic (6-7) group, Argentina and Chile both had very good HDI ranks (4th and 
7th) but very poor ISC ranks (22nd and 19th). All six countries with imbalances in 1990 
were democratic, of which four had considerably better HDI ranks than ISC ranks
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(Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia and Mexico), while two had much better ISC ranks 
(Jamaica and Honduras).
Noticeably fewer countries in this region had large imbalances between their I-HDI 
ranks and GDP/C ranks. For the most part, those countries with ranks in the top half (R i­
l l)  of the I-HDI scale were also ranked in the top half of the GDP/C scale, and vice versa. 
Throughout the period, there were only five cases where this rule did not apply. In 1970, 
Colombia was ranked 9th for the I-HDI but only 16th for GDP/C rates. In 1980, Brazil and 
Argentina were ranked 16th and 14th, respectively, for the I-HDI despite having relatively 
high GDP/C ranks (9th and 2nd). By 1990, Brazil’s ranks had become even more 
polarized; though enjoying the region’s second highest GDP/C rate ($3270), it was only 
ranked 14th for the I-HDI. Mexico was in a similar predicament: despite having the fifth 
highest GDP/C ($2396), it was ranked 13th for the I-HDI.
Just how the Latin American states compared against the three threshold standards 
can be seen in Table 4.15. On the whole, this region fared very well against the developing 
averages. Only three states (Bolivia, Haiti and Honduras) did not have an HDI value greater 
than the developing average in both 1970 and 1980, and only two (Honduras and Haiti) had 
a below average HDI value in 1990. The figures for the ISC were slightly worse: four states 
(Chile, Guatemala, Brazil and Haiti) had ISC values lower than the developing average in 
1970; seven states (Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile) 
had below average ISC values in 1980; and six states (Bolivia, Peru, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Guatemala) had below average ISC values in 1990. Regarding the I-HDI, 
only one LAT state (Haiti) failed to surpass the developing average in 1970. Owing to 
relatively poorer ISC values, the number of below average states stood at four (Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua and Haiti) in 1980. By 1990, only five states (Bolivia, Peru, H 
Salvador, Nicaragua and Haiti) failed to surpass the I-HDI average for all developing states. 
To place these observations into context, 87-96% of all LAT states had HDI values above 
the developing averages for the period, 70-83% of LAT states had ISC values above the 
developing averages, and 78-96% of LAT states had I-HDI values above the developing 
averages.
The records of democratic states were particularly striking. In 1970, all eight LAT 
democracies surpassed the developing averages for the HDI and I-HDI, and seven (save for 
Chile) surpassed the developing ISC average. When compared to states at similar levels of 
economic development, all LAT democracies but Venezuela had above average HDI values, 
all but Chile and Uruguay had above average ISC values, and all but Chile and Venezuela 
had above average I-HDI values. Only Colombia failed to surpass the regional HDI average, 
and Chile and Uruguay failed to surpass the regional ISC average; all LAT democracies 
surpassed the regional I-HDI average. Four democracies (Barbados, Jamaica, Costa Rica, 
Trinidad and Tobago) exceeded every threshold standard; among the non-democratic states, 
only Argentina and Mexico achieved this feat
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Table 4.15 Evaluating Levels of Human Development Against 
Threshold Standards, LAT Region
Year Country LoD Developing Avg. 
HDI ISC I-HDI
Income Avg.
HDI ISC I-HDI
Regional Avg. 
HDI ISC I-HDI
1970 Barbados 1.0 + + + + + + + + +
Jamaica 1.0 + + + + + + + + +
Chile 1.5 + - + + - - + - +
Costa Rica 1.5 + + + + + + + + +
Trinidad & T 1.5 + + + + + + + + +
Venezuela 1.5 + + + - + - + + +
Uruguay 2.0 + + + + - + + - +
Colombia 2.5 + + + + + + - + +
Dominican R 3.0 + + + + + + - +
Guatemala 3.0 + - + + - - - - -
Paraguay 3.5 + + + + + + - - -
Argentina 4.0 + + + + + + + + +
El Salvador 4.0 + + + + + + - - -
Nicaragua 4.0 + + + + + + - - -
Bolivia 4.5 - + + - + + - - -
Panama 4.5 + + + - + + + - +
Mexico 5.0 + + + + + + + + +
Peru 5.0 + + + - - - - - -
Brazil 5.5 + - + - - - - - -
Ecuador 6.0 + + + + + + + _
Cuba 7.0 + + + - - - + - -
Haiti 7.0 - - - + + + - - -
Honduras 7.0 - + + + + - - - -
1980 Barbados 1.0 + + + + + + + + +
Costa Rica 1.0 + + + + + + + + +
Venezuela 1.0 + + + + + + + + +
Colombia 2.0 + + + + + + + - -
Dominican R. 2.0 + + + + + + - + -
Jamaica 2.0 + + + + + + + + +
Trinidad & T. 2.0 + + + - - - + + + •
Guatemala 3.4 + + _ _ _ _ _
Paraguay 3.5 + + + + + + - - -
El Salvador 3.7 + - - - - - - - -
Mexico 4.0 + + + + + + + + +
Ecuador 4.5 + + + + + + - + +
Peru 5.0 + - + + - + - - -
Nicaragua 5.2 + - - + - - - - -
Uruguay 5.2 + - + + - + + - +
Brazil 5.5 + + + - - - + - -
Honduras 5.7 - + + - + + - + -
Panama 5.7 + + + - + + + + +
Argentina 6.0 + - + - - - + - -
Chile 6.0 + - + + - - + - +
Bolivia 6.4 - + + - - - - -
Cuba 6.5 + + + + + + + + +
Haiti 6.7 - + - + + + - - -
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(cont’d)
(Table 4.15 cont’d)
Year Country LoD Developing Avg. income Avg. Regional Avg.
HDI ISC I-HDI HDI ISC I-HDI HDI ISC I-HDI
1990 Barbados 1.0 + + + - + + + + +
Costa Rica 1.0 + + + + + + + + +
Trinidad & T, 1.0 + + + + + + + + +
Venezuela 1.0 + + + + + + + + +
Argentina 1.2 + + + + - + + + +
Dominican R. 1.2 + + + + + + - + -
Uruguay 1.2 + + + + + + + + +
Bolivia 2.0 + - - - - - - - -
Ecuador 2.0 + + + + + + + + +
Honduras 2.0 - + + - + + - + -
Jamaica 2.0 + + + + + + + + +
Peru 2.2 + - - + - - - - -
Colombia 2.3 + + + + + + + - +
Brazil 2.5 + + + - - - + - -
El Salvador 2.5 + - - - - - - - -
Mexico 2.8 + - + + - - + - +
Nicaragua 3.2 + - - + - - - - -
Guatemala 3.5 + - + - - - - - -
Panama 3.9 + + + + + + + + +
Paraguay 4.9 + + + + + + - - -
Chile 5.3 + + + + + + + + +
Haiti 6.5 - + + _ - - -
Cuba 7.0 + + + - + - - + +
Notes. The actual 1970-90 averages were given in Table 4.4 (Dev), Table 4.9 (Inc), Table 4.11 (Reg). 
(+) above threshold average, (-) below threshold average.
The records were even more impressive in 1980: all seven democratic states had 
HDI, ISC and I-HDI values above the developing averages; six states (excepting Trinidad 
and Tobago) had HDI, ISC and I-HDI values above the averages found for states at similar 
levels of economic development; and five states (excepting Colombia and the Dominican 
Republic) had HDI, ISC and I-HDI values above the regional averages. Four democracies 
(Barbados, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Jamaica) exceeded every threshold standard; the only 
non-democratic states to surpass all thresholds were Mexico and Cuba.
While the ‘stable’ democracies (Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Venezuela, Jamaica and Colombia) continued to display exceptional records by 1990, the 
recently democratized states produced somewhat mixed records. Eleven of the 16 
democracies (save for Bolivia, Honduras, Peru, El Salvador, and Mexico) displayed HDI, 
ISC and I-HDI averages above the developing averages. Against their respective income 
thresholds, most democracies produced above average index values, although the newly 
democratized states fared slightly worse; specifically, they accounted for four of the five
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democratic states with below average HDI values, all six democratic states with below 
average ISC values, and all five democratic states with below average I-HDI values. 
Furthermore, all five democratic states with HDI values below the regional average were 
recently democratized, as were five of the six (excepting Colombia) democratic states with 
below average ISC values, and all six democratic states with below average I-HDI values. In 
all, there were six democratic states (Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Uruguay, 
Ecuador and Jamaica) which surpassed every threshold average, and three democratic states 
(Barbados, Argentina and Colombia) which surpassed every threshold average but one. The 
two non-democratic states with exceptional records, in the sense of also surpassing every 
threshold standard, were Panama and Chile.
The evidence suggests that democratic governance was closely associated with 
higher levels of human development in Latin America. This observation was valid for all 
three dates, although the influx of less developed, newly democratized states by 1990 
created a wider distribution base along the human development scale. Levels of economic 
development and human development coincided very loosely, although, for the most part, the 
wealthy states had relatively high human development values and the poor states had low 
human development values. By this region’s standards, democratic states tended to be 
wealthy, whereas the poorest states were predominantly non-democratic (once again with the 
exception of 1990, by which date some relatively poor states - El Salvador, Bolivia, Peru, 
Honduras - had become democratic).
Levels of Democracy and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa, 
1970-90
Democratic governance was virtually unheard of in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MID=13). Despite intermittent periods of military rule, Turkey was the only MID 
state with democratic LoD values for any of the three dates (2.5 for 1970 and 1980, 2.2 for 
1990). As such, Turkey was a glaring exception to the region’s political landscape: all other 
states were characterized by strongly authoritarian regimes. The democracy-development 
debate, therefore, viewed in the specific context of this region, involves pitting the record of 
Turkey against those of the twelve authoritarian states.
As gathered from Figure 4.11, Turkey was neither the most developed state in the 
region nor the wealthiest From being the fourth most developed state in 1970, Turkey’s 
position fell to ninth in both 1980 and 1990, primarily due to its conflict with its Kurdish 
minority (reflected in lower ISC values, as will be shown shortly). The most developed state 
in 1970, Kuwait (0.728), was also the wealthiest ($3,856), and the second most developed 
state, the UAE (0.578), was the second wealthiest ($2,976). The UAE enjoyed a higher 
GDP/C ($29,159) than Kuwait ($20,688) in 1980, although Kuwait was still more 
developed (I-HDI values of 0.768 for Kuwait and 0.704 for the UAE). By 1990, the UAE
had become the wealthiest ($17,635) and most developed (0.765) state, ahead of Kuwait 
($11,672 and 0.740). A high level of economic development, courtesy of oil revenues, 
underpinned the positions o f the region’s two most developed states.
The picture for the other states was less clear-cut. The great under-achiever in 1970 
was Libya: despite having the region’s third highest GDP/C ($1,873), Libya was ranked 
only eighth in terms of I-HDI values (0.467). Four states - Turkey, Iran, Tunisia and 
Morocco - had almost one-sixth Libya’s GDP/C ($258-388) and yet displayed higher I- 
HDI scores. After the four wealthiest states - Kuwait, the UAE, Libya and Saudi Arabia - 
the remaining nine states shared broadly similar GDP/C rates. In fact, very little separated 
the fourth most developed state, Turkey ($358), from the region’s least developed state, 
Egypt ($255); their respective I-HDI values were 0.516 and 0.324.
The patterns for 1980 showed a closer alignment between levels of economic and 
human development, although the relationship was far from linear. The four wealthiest states 
occupied positions near the top of the I-HDI scale, with relatively poorer Jordan ($1,373) 
separating Kuwait ($20,688) and the UAE ($29,159) from Libya ($11,735) and Saudi 
Arabia ($12373). Hence, despite having approximately one-tenth of their GDP/C rates, 
Jordan exhibited a better I-HDI value (0.620) than both Libya (0.617) and Saudi Arabia 
(0.578). With a GDP/C rate ($1,281) comparable to Jordan’s, Turkey had an I-HDI value 
of only 0.531. Tunisia also exhibited a noteworthy record, sharing an almost identical I- 
HDI value (0.577) as Saudi Arabia despite having a considerably lower GDP/C rate 
($1,370). The two poorest states, Egypt ($526) and Morocco ($971), were located near the 
bottom of the I-HDI scale, ahead of Iraq and Iran.
Fig. 4.11 Levels of Human and Economic Development in MID Region, 1970-90 
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The four wealthiest states in 1990 also occupied positions along the top of the I- 
HDI scale. Sandwiched between the UAE ($17,635) and Kuwait ($11,672), on the one 
hand, and Libya ($5,094) and Saudi Arabia ($5,538) on the other, Jordan and Tunisia 
continued to display decent human development records despite their relatively lower 
GDP/C rates ($1,147 and $1,251). Turkey had a similar GDP/C rate ($1,461) but a lower 
I-HDI value of 0.615, compared to 0.689 for Jordan and 0.714 for Tunisia. The region’s 
poorest states, Egypt ($652), Syria ($884) and Morocco ($916), were ranked 8th, 7th, and 
11th in terms of the I-HDI. War-ravaged Iran and Iraq were found at the bottom of the I- 
HDI scale, despite their upper-middle GDP/C ranks (6th and 5th).
Table 4.16 presents the data for the MID region. Turkey exhibited top five HDI, 
ISC and I-HDI ranks in 1970, although its GDP/C rank (8th) fell into the lower-middle 
range. By 1980, Turkey’s ISC rank had fallen to 10th (its conflict with the Kurds was 
reflected in a worse Security Index value), which, together with a slight decline in its HDI 
rank (8th), meant that its I-HDI rank (9th) had plunged towards the lower-middle part of the 
scale. Its relative ISC position deteriorated further by 1990 (11th), although its I-HDI rank 
remained the same (due to a marked improvement in its HDI value, ranking Turkey 4th).
Unquestionably, the best records for all dates belonged to Kuwait and the UAE The 
majority of states produced inconsistent records across the indices, as reflected by the 
differences in their HDI and ISC ranks. Of the six states with sizeable ‘imbalances’ in 
1970, four - Saudi Arabia (3rd and 7th), the UAE (2nd and 8th), Iraq (4th and 12th) and 
Syria (6th and 11th) - had much better HDI ranks, while two - Morocco (12th and 2nd) and 
Tunisia (10th and 3rd) - had much better ISC ranks. There were seven states with 
imbalances in 1980, of which four - Syria (4th and 11th), Saudi Arabia (5th and 9th), Libya 
(3rd and 8th) and Iraq (6th and 13th) - displayed considerably better HDI ranks, and three - 
Egypt (13th and 5th), Tunisia (9th and 4th) and Algeria (11th and 6th) - displayed 
noticeably better ISC ranks. The imbalances were even more pronounced by 1990, although 
the number of states with these symptoms declined to six: two - Turkey (4th and 11th) and 
Saudi Arabia (3rd and 10th) - had better HDI ranks; four - Morocco (13th and 7th), Algeria 
(11th and 6th), Egypt (12th and 4th) and Jordan (9th and 2nd) - had better ISC ranks.
To a much greater degree than was observed for the ASI and LAT regions, there 
were quite a few cases where I-HDI and GDP/C ranks varied considerably. The largest 
discrepancies in 1970 belonged to Libya (8th for the I-HDI and 3rd for GDP/C) and Iraq 
(10th for the I-HDI and 5th for GDP/C). By 1980, Iraq continued to show a much better 
GDP/C rank (5th) than I-HDI rank (12th), although Iran, too, failed to make the substantial 
I-HDI gains (ranked 13th, or last in the region) that its GDP/C rank (6th) might have 
allowed. Jordan illustrated the opposite tendency, exhibiting the third best I-HDI rank 
despite having a lower-middle GDP/C rank (9th). Of the five states with serious I-HDI and 
GDP/C imbalances in 1990, two - Iran (12th and 6th) and Iraq (13th and 5th) - had better
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Table 4.16 Human Development Values By Level of Democracy, MID Region
Year Country LoD HDI R ISC R I-HDI R GDP/C R
1970 Turkey 2.5 0.441 5 0.592 5 0.516 4 358 8
Kuwait 5.5 0.684 1 0.772 1 0.728 1 3856 1
Iran 6.0 0.406 7 0.607 4 0.507 5 388 6
Morocco 6.0 0.282 12 0.654 2 0.468 7 258 11
Saudi Arabia 6.5 0.511 3 0.567 7 0.539 3 673 4
Algeria 6.5 0.323 11 0.579 6 0.451 9 376 7
Tunisia 6.5 0.340 10 0.626 3 0.483 6 281 10
Jordan 6.5 0.405 8 0.433 10 0.419 11 258 12
Egypt 6.5 0.269 13 0.379 13 0.304 13 255 13
UAE 7.0 0.601 2 0.556 8 0.578 2 2976 2
Libya 7.0 0.403 9 0.532 9 0.467 8 1873 3
Iraq 7.0 0.452 4 0.390 12 0.421 10 391 5
Syria 7.0 0.419 6 0.391 11 0.405 12 344 9
1980 Turkey 2.5 0.549 8 0.513 10 0.531 9 1281 11
UAE 5.3 0.719 2 0.689 2 0.704 2 29159 1
Morocco 5.3 0.383 12 0.579 7 0.481 11 971 12
Egypt 5.5 0.360 13 0.621 5 0.490 10 526 13
Syria 6.0 0.658 4 0.433 11 0.545 7 1484 8
Kuwait 6.2 0.769 1 0.766 1 0.768 1 20688 2
Iran 6.2 0.497 10 0.375 12 0.436 13 2488 6
Tunisia 6.4 0.499 9 0.655 4 0.577 6 1370 10
Saudi Arabia 6.5 0.629 5 0.527 9 0.578 5 12373 3
Libya 6.5 0.676 3 0.559 8 0.617 4 11735 4
Algeria 6.5 0.476 11 0.587 6 0.531 8 2260 7
Jordan 6.5 0.553 7 0.688 3 0.620 3 1373 9
Iraq 6.7 0.581 6 0.356 13 0.468 12 2848 5
1990 Turkey 2.2 0.739 4 0.491 11 0.615 9 1461 8
Iran 5.4 0.672 8 0.460 12 0.566 12 2720 6
UAE 5.5 0.771 2 0.758 1 0.765 1 17635 1
Morocco 5.5 0.549 13 0.614 7 0.582 11 916 11
Algeria 5.7 0.553 11 0.639 6 0.596 10 2024 7
Egypt 6.0 0.551 12 0.704 4 0.628 8 652 13
Tunisia 6.2 0.690 7 0.738 3 0.714 3 1251 9
Jordan 6.2 0.628 9 0.750 2 0.689 4 1147 10
Kuwait 6.7 0.804 1 0.677 5 0.740 2 11672 2
Saudi Arabia 6.9 0.742 3 0.558 10 0.650 6 5538 3
Libya 6.9 0.703 6 0.611 8 0.657 5 5094 4
Syria 6.9 0.727 5 0.560 9 0.643 7 884 12
Iraq 7.0 0.614 10 0.427 13 0.520 13 3220 5
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GDP/C ranks, and three - Egypt (8th and 13th), Tunisia (3rd and 9th), Jordan (4th and 
10th) - had better I-HDI ranks.
When evaluated against the three threshold standards, Turkey’s human development 
record was mixed (Table 4.17 overleaf). In 1970, it surpassed the developing averages for 
the HDI, ISC and I-HDI. Compared to states at the same general level of economic 
development, Turkey had above average HDI and I-HDI values, but a below average ISC 
value. In regional terms, it surpassed the MID averages for the HDI, ISC and I-HDI. 
Turkey’s human development record had, however, worsened by 1980. It still had HDI and 
I-HDI (but not ISC) values greater than the developing averages, but only its HDI value 
exceeded the income threshold averages. Moreover, Turkey’s HDI, ISC and I-HDI values 
were all below the regional averages. Matters had improved very marginally by 1990: 
Turkey’s HDI value was higher than the developing, income and regional averages, and its 
I-HDI value was higher than the developing and income (but not regional) averages; its ISC 
value was lower than the developing, income and regional averages.
On the whole, the MID states had respectable records when evaluated against the 
developing averages. Nine of the 13 states had above average HDI values in 1970 (save for 
Morocco, Algeria,Egypt and Tunisia), eleven had above average HDI values in 1980 (save 
for Morocco and Egypt), and all 13 states had above average HDI values in 1990. 
Considerably fewer states had ISC values higher than the developing averages: only five in 
1970 (Turkey, Kuwait, Iran, Morocco, and Tunisia); seven in 1980 (the UAE, Morocco, 
Egypt, Kuwait, Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan); and eight in 1990 (the UAE, Morocco, Algeria, 
Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Libya). With the exception of 1970, when only five 
states (Turkey, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) surpassed the I-HDI developing 
average, the majority of MID states had above average I-HDI values: nine in 1980 (save for 
Morocco, Egypt, Iran and Iraq); and twelve in 1990 (save for only Iraq).
Arguably the most interesting basis of comparison involves the income thresholds. 
The extent to which this region, in general, failed to translate its vast wealth into human 
development progress can be observed in the large number of below average HDI, ISC and 
I-HDI values found for all three dates. When evaluated against the HDI averages found for 
countries at similar levels of economic development, only three MID states (Turkey, Jordan 
and Syria) had higher values in 1970, three (Turkey, Tunisia and Jordan) had higher values 
in 1980, and four (Turkey, Tunisia, Jordan and Syria) had higher values in 1990. The record 
of MID states against their respective ISC income thresholds was even more dismal: only 
Morocco and Tunisia had above average values in 1970; only Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan 
had above average values in 1980; and only Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia had above 
average values in 1990. Incredibly, only Turkey displayed an above average I-HDI value in 
relation to its income threshold in 1970, only Tunisia and Jordan displayed above average I- 
HDI values in 1980, and only Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Syria displayed I-HDI 
values above their respective income thresholds in 1990. One cannot fail to notice, from this
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Table 4.17 Evaluating Levels of Human Development Against
Threshold Standards, MID Region
Year Country “LoD Developm 
HDI ISC
gAvg.
I-HDI
Income Avg.
HDI ISC I-HDI
Regional Avg. 
HDI ISC I-HDI
1970 Turkey 2.5 + + + + - + + + +
Kuwait 5.5 + + + - - - + + +
Iran 6.0 + + + _ _ _ _ + +
Morocco 6.0 - + - - + - - + -
Algeria 6.5 - - - - - - - + -
Egypt 6.5 - - - - - - - - -
Jordan 6.5 + - - + - - - - -
Saudi Arabia 6.5 + - + - - - + + +
Tunisia 6.5 - + - - + - - + -
Iraq 7.0 + - - - - - + - -
Libya 7.0 + - - - - - - - -
Syria 7.0 + - - + - - - - -
UAE 7.0 + - + - - - + - +
1980 Turkey 2.5 + - + + - - - - -
UAE 5.3 + + + _ _ _ + + +
Morocco 5.3 - + - - - - - + -
Egypt 5.5 - + - - + - - + -
Syria 6.0 + - + - - - + - -
Iran 6.2 + - - - - - - - -
Kuwait 6.2 + + + - - - + + +
Tunisia 6.4 + + + + + + - + +
Algeria 6.5 + + + - - - - + -
Jordan 6.5 + + + + + + - + +
Libya 6.5 + - + - - - + - +
Saudi Arabia 6.5 + - + - - - + - +
Iraq 6.7 + - - - - - + - -
1990 Turkey 2.2 + - + + - + + - -
Iran 5.4 + _ + _ - - _ _ ~
UAE 5.5 + + + - - - + + +
Morocco 5.5 + + + - + - - + -
Algeria 5.7 + + + - - - - + -
Egypt 6.0 + + + - + + - + -
Jordan 6.2 + + + + + + - + +
Tunisia 6.2 + + + + + + + + +
Kuwait 6.7 + + + - - - + + +
Libya 6.9 + + + - - - + - +
Saudi Arabia 6.9 + - + - - - + - +
Syria 6.9 + - + + - + + - +
Iraq 7.0 +
Notes. The actual 1970-90 averages were given in Table 4.4 (Dev), Table 4.9 (Inc), Table 4.11 (Reg). 
(+) above threshold average, (-) below threshold average.
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account, that none of the oil-rich states (Kuwait, the UAE, Iran, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq 
or Libya) managed to surpass any income threshold (HDI, ISC or I-HDI) at any given date. 
The reason is fairly clear most tended to be located in either the INC 1 or INC 2 categories, 
where their records compared very unfavourably against those of the industrialized states 
(OECD and Communist) and the more developed Latin American and Asian states.
Very few states managed to exceed the regional HDI, ISC and I-HDI averages for 
all three dates: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE posted above average HDI and I-HDI 
values; and Kuwait, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia displayed above average ISC values. 
Only Kuwait managed to surpass the regional HDI, ISC and I-HDI averages throughout the 
period. Turkey showed above average HDI, ISC and I-HDI values in 1970, below average 
HDI, ISC and I-HDI values in 1980, and an above average HDI value, but below average 
ISC and I-HDI values, in 1990.
Owing to several factors, then, one would be hard-pressed to formulate any concrete 
generalizations about democracy and development in this region. It would be unwise to 
attach too much significance to the record of Turkey as the solitary democratic 
representative. Turkey compared favourably against some authoritarian states and 
unfavourably against others, although its record varied by index and date. Furthermore, the 
twelve authoritarian states did not constitute a monolithic entity: their human development 
records differed substantially. The wealthiest states in the region were, by and large, the 
most developed There were, however, ample cases where states with similar GDP/C rates 
had considerably different I-HDI values, and vice versa.
Levels of Democracy and Human Development in sub-Saharan Africa 1970-90
Preciously few experiments in democratic governance were attempted in sub- 
Saharan Africa (AFR=36) over the 1970-90 period. In fact, only Gambia met the statistical 
definition of a democracy (LoD 1.0-2.9) for all three dates. Mauritius fell just outside the 
range in 1970 (LoD 3.0) but did qualify in 1980 (LoD 2.2) and 1990 (LoD 2.0). Much the 
same may be said in the case of Botswana (which will be treated at greater length in Chapter 
7): it narrowly failed to qualify in 1970 (LoD 3.0) and 1980 (LoD 3.5), but did so in 1990 
(LoD 2.2). These three states were by far the most democratic in a region characterized by 
strongly authoritarian regimes.
Some idea of the sheer scale of collective misery experienced by this region may be 
gathered from Figure 4.12. In terms of human development (left-hand panel), 34 of the 36 
countries (94%) had Low I-HDI values (less than 0.500); the only exceptions being 
Mauritius (0.656) and South Africa (0.606). The situation had barely improved by 1980: 
with Botswana (0.548) and Lesotho (0.502) also crossing the 0.500 mark, 32 countries 
(89%) remained mired at the Low I-HDI Level. Although ten countries displayed values
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above 0.500 by 1990, still leaving 72% of AFR states at the Low Level, there was a sizeable 
gulf between the two most developed states, Mauritius (0.797) and Botswana (0.712), and 
the rest (the third most developed state, South Africa, had an I-HDI value o f 0.619).
The extent of material poverty may also be measured in terms of economic 
development (right-hand panel): 33 o f the 36 countries had GDP/C rates below $500 in 
1970, the three exceptions being South Africa ($768), Gabon ($664) and Guinea ($518). 
By 1980,29 countries (or 81%) had GDP/C rates o f less than $1000, of which 23 (or 64%) 
had GDP/C rates of less than $500. This picture had become even bleaker by 1990: 31 
countries (or 86%) had GDP/C rates of less than $1000, and 26 countries (or 72%) had 
GDP/C rates of less than $500.
Given the very low levels of human and economic development in the region, one 
should hardly be surprised that democratic rule did not take root and flourish. Nor can one 
make any generalizations on the basis of those states that did succeed in establishing 
democratic institutions: Mauritius began and ended the period with relatively high human 
development values (0.656 and 0.797), and progressed from having a very low GDP/C rate 
($271) in 1970 to a respectable rate ($1939) by 1990; Botswana was poor ($156) and 
undeveloped (0.468) in 1970 but had become relatively prosperous ($1989) and developed 
(0.712) by 1990; Gambia remained very poor and undeveloped throughout the period (from 
$116 and 0.381 in 1970, to $334 and 0.417 in 1990).
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Despite being the most developed state in the region, Mauritius was never the 
wealthiest In terms of GDP/C, Mauritius was ranked 6th in 1970,5th in 1980, and 4th in 
1990. Mauritius’ human development record therefore becomes all the more impressive 
when contrasted with those of the region’s two wealthiest states, South Africa and Gabon. 
In 1970, Mauritius had roughly one-third of South Africa’s GDP/C ($768) and one-half of 
Gabon’s ($664), and yet posted a higher I-HDI value (0.656) than either (0.606 and 
0.467). South Africa’s GDP/C ($2,740) was more than twice as great as Mauritius’ 
($1,170) in 1980, and Gabon’s was five times as great ($5,305); however, Mauritius’ I- 
HDI value (0.668) was considerably higher (0.593 for South Africa and 0.499 for Gabon). 
Interestingly, although the income gap had narrowed by 1990 - with GDP/C rates of $2,569 
for South Africa, $2,978 for Gabon, and $1,939 for Mauritius - the human development 
gap had widened: the I-HDI rates were 0.797 for Mauritius, 0.619 for South Africa, and 
0.581 for Gabon.
Botswana’s accomplishments were even more dramatic, for although it consistently 
appeared among the most developed states (4th in 1970, 3rd in 1980, 2nd in 1990), its 
GDP/C rank improved from 19th in 1970 to 3rd by 1990. To place this progress into 
perspective, one may compare Botswana’s record to those of two states beginning the 
period at very similar I-HDI and GDP/C levels, Lesotho and Madagascar. All three states 
were quite poor (GDP/C rates below $150) and undeveloped (around the 0.470 mark) in 
1970. By 1980, Botswana’s I-HDI value had increased to 0.548, Lesotho’s had increased 
to 0.502, and Madagascar’s had declined slightly to 0.441. However, during that same 
period Botswana’s GDP/C had risen to $990, compared to $274 for Lesotho and $372 for 
Madagascar; in other words, Botswana had become roughly four times as wealthy as 
Lesotho and three times as wealthy as Madagascar. This increased wealth paid handsome 
human development dividends over the next period. Botswana’s I-HDI value had surged to 
0.712 by 1990 (behind only Mauritius at 0.797), while Lesotho and Madagascar still 
hovered around the 0.500 mark (0.555 for Lesotho and 0.493 for Madagascar). Botswana’s 
GDP/C had doubled to $1,989, essentially equaling Mauritius ($1,939), whereas Lesotho’s 
GDP/C decreased slightly to $234 and Madagascar’s dropped to a more pitiful $139.
Gambia did not enjoy any such flattering comparisons. With an I-HDI value of 
0.381 and a GDP/C of $116, Gambia began the period at roughly the same levels of human 
and economic development as Botswana, Lesotho and Madagascar. But by 1990, Botswana 
was six times as wealthy as Gambia and considerably more developed (Gambia had yet to 
cross the 0.500 mark). Furthermore, despite being wealthier ($334) than the two non- 
democratic states, Gambia had a lower I-HDI value (0.417) than both Lesotho and 
Madagascar. Though dire in absolute terms, when judged in relative terms Gambia’s record 
appeared less dismal, for it displayed a higher I-HDI value than 16 of the 23 non- 
democratic states with GDP/C rates of less than $200 in 1970,16 of the 22 non-democratic 
states with GDP/C rates of less than $500 in 1980, and 16 of the 25 non-democratic states 
with GDP/C rates of less than $500 in 1990.
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The importance of economic development to human development may also be 
confirmed for this region. This may not appear obvious upon first glance at the graphs, 
especially given the slightly more erratic patterns for 1970. But although the GDP/C rates 
fell within a quite narrow band, it may be noted that, irrespective of date, the wealthiest states 
were among the most developed. Nine of the 10 wealthiest states in 1970 were located along 
the top half of the I-HDI scale (ranks 1-18), the exception being Guinea (28th). This 
observation was confirmed for the other dates as well: the ten wealthiest states in 1980, and 
9 of the 10 wealthiest states in 1990 (excepting war-torn Angola at R35), were found at the 
top half of the I-HDI scale.
Table 4.18 provides a detailed look at the human development values for the AFR 
region during the period. The three largely democratic states arrived at their overall human 
development (I-HDI) records in different ways. Mauritius consistently displayed high HDI, 
ISC and I-HDI values, ranking 2nd for the HDI and 1st for the ISC and I-HDI in both 
1970 and 1980, and 1st for the HDI, ISC and I-HDI in 1990. Botswana also displayed 
consistently high ranks for every index (HDI, ISC and I-HDI): 9th, 4th and 4th for 1970; 
4th, 2nd and 3rd for 1980; and 2nd for all three indices for 1990. But prior to 1990, 
Botswana’s HDI and I-HDI values were, in absolute terms, quite low, while its ISC values 
could be referred to as decent (above 0.600). Botswana’s index values had improved 
dramatically by 1990, and the disparity between its HDI and ISC values had largely been 
eliminated. Gambia’s relatively mediocre regional I-HDI ranks throughout the period - 18th 
for 1970,19th for 1980 and 1990 - masked enormous imbalances between its HDI and ISC 
ranks: 35th and 3rd for 1970; 34th and 4th for 1980; and 30th and 8th for 1990. Whereas 
Gambia therefore displayed decent ISC values (by-products of its comparatively better 
Liberty and Security Index values), its HDI values, reflecting the individual capability 
indicators, were among the lowest in the world (only 0.215 by 1990).
In addition to Gambia, undoubtedly the region’s most extreme example, the table 
also reveals a number of other cases where such HDI/ISC imbalances occurred: among 
those states with very severe imbalances in favour of ISC ranks were Burkina Faso (1970, 
1980,1990), Benin (1970, 1980, 1990) and Senegal (1980,1990); and among those states 
with severe imbalances in favour of HDI ranks were two of the region’s wealthiest states, 
Gabon (1970,1980) and South Africa (1970,1980,1990).
The three most democratic states struck a fairly consistent balance between their I- 
HDI and GDP/C ranks. Ranked 6th (1970), 5th (1980) and 4th (1990) in terms of GDP/C, 
Mauritius remained the most developed state throughout the period. Botswana displayed the 
4th highest I-HDI value in 1970, despite being ranked only 19th for GDP/C. As Botswana 
became progressively wealthier, the gap between the country’s I-HDI and GDP/C ranks 
started to diminish: it was ranked 3rd and 8th in 1980; and 2nd and 3rd in 1990. Gambia 
exhibited mid-range I-HDI and GDP/C ranks: 18th and 22nd for 1970; 19th and 18th for 
1980; and 19th (both I-HDI and GDP/C) for 1990. Among the authoritarian states which
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Table 4.18 Human Development Values By Level of Democracy, AFR Region
Year Country LoD HDI R ISC R I-HDI R GDP/C R
1970 Gambia 2.0 0.107 35 0.655 3 0.381 18 116 22
Mauritius 3.0 0.524 2 0.787 1 0.656 1 271 6
Sierra Leone 3.0 0.155 29 0.556 20 0.355 22 156 16
Botswana 3.0 0.284 9 0.652 4 0.468 4 134 19
Lesotho 4.0 0.307 6 0.643 5 0.475 3 66 33
South Africa 4.5 0.591 1 0.620 8 0.606 2 768 1
Cameroon 4.5 0.253 12 0.625 7 0.439 11 175 13
Somalia 4.5 0.124 32 0.418 30 0.271 32 93 29
Nigeria 5.0 0.230 16 0.431 29 0.330 27 175 14
Madagascar 5.0 0.291 8 0.634 6 0.462 6 133 20
Burkina Faso 5.0 0.116 33 0.599 12 0.358 21 54 36
Gabon 6.0 0.378 3 0.557 19 0.467 5 664 2
Zambia 6.0 0.315 5 0.600 11 0.457 7 427 4
Zimbabwe 6.0 0.326 4 0.578 13 0.452 9 287 5
Ghana 6.0 0.283 10 0.577 14 0.430 12 257 8
Senegal 6.0 0.176 25 0.563 18 0.370 19 208 11
Kenya 6.0 0.254 11 0.658 2 0.456 8 148 17
Chad 6.0 0.135 30 0.401 31 0.268 34 89 30
Ivory Coast 6.5 0.243 14 0.567 16 0.405 13 271 7
Liberia 6.5 0.229 17 0.536 21 0.382 17 224 9
Congo 6.5 0.307 7 0.573 15 0.440 10 217 10
Uganda 6.5 0.213 19 0.336 35 0.274 31 197 12
Sudan 6.5 0.188 23 0.339 34 0.264 35 167 15
Tanzania 6.5 0.211 20 0.566 17 0.388 15 101 24
Niger 6.5 0.134 31 0.532 22 0.333 26 96 26
Zaire 6.5 0.235 15 0.461 28 0.348 24 95 27
Benin 6.5 0.162 27 0.611 9 0.386 16 93 28
Guinea 7.0 0.111 34 0.499 26 0.305 28 518 3
Angola 7.0 0.195 22 0.342 33 0.268 33 137 18
Togo 7.0 0.183 24 0.606 10 0.395 14 130 21
Mozambique 7.0 0.248 13 0.342 32 0.295 29 108 23
Cen. Afr. Re. 7.0 0.196 21 0.512 23 0.354 23 97 25
Malawi 7.0 0.176 26 0.503 25 0.339 25 71 31
Burundi 7.0 0.157 28 0.319 36 0.238 36 70 32
Mali 7.0 0.102 36 0.483 27 0.293 30 63 34
Rwanda 7.0 0.215 18 0.509 24 0.362 20 58 35
1980 Gambia 2.2 0.148 34 0.623 4 0.386 19 425 18
Mauritius 2.2 0.626 2 0.710 1 0.668 1 1170 5
Botswana 3.5 0.414 4 0.683 2 0.548 3 990 8
Zimbabwe 4.5 0.386 6 0.547 17 0.466 9 751 10
Nigeria 4.5 0.297 14 0.571 12 0.434 13 1125 6
Zambia 4.5 0.342 9 0.593 8 0.467 8 677 11
Ghana 4.8 0.323 13 0.535 20 0.429 14 1451 3
South Africa 5.0 0.629 1 0.557 14 0.593 2 2740 2
Sierra Leone 5.0 0.177 29 0.537 19 0.357 26 337 23
Burkina Faso 5.0 0.151 32 0.580 11 0.365 25 185 35
Senegal 5.5 0.233 21 0.619 5 0.426 15 536 12
Gabon 6.0 0.468 3 0.530 21 0.499 5 5305 1
Kenya 6.0 0.340 10 0.645 3 0.492 6 426 17
Tanzania 6.0 0.282 16 0.477 29 0.380 21 279 25
Lesotho 6.0 0.404 5 0.600 7 0.502 4 274 26
Sudan 6.0 0.229 22 0.348 32 0.288 32 209 31
Uganda 6.2 0.215 26 0.211 36 0.213 36 124 36
Ivory Coast 6.4 0.330 12 0.582 9 0.456 10 1242 4
Cameroon 6.5 0.332 11 0.556 15 0.444 11 779 9
Liberia 6.5 0.277 17 0.548 16 0.413 16 488 14
(cont'd)
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(Table 4.18 cont’d)
Year Country LoD HDI R ISC R I-HDI R GDP/C R
Madagascar 6.5 0.344 8 0.538 18 0.441 12 372 20
Zaire 6.5 0.286 15 0.482 28 0.384 20 234 28
Rwanda 6.5 0.244 20 0.506 26 0.375 23 225 30
Malawi 6.5 0.216 25 0.472 30 0.344 27 201 33
Chad 6.7 0.151 33 0.442 31 0.297 31 205 32
Angola 6.8 0.212 27 0.258 35 0.235 35 363 21
Mozambique 6.9 0.247 19 0.296 34 0.272 33 199 34
Congo 7.0 0.368 7 0.611 6 0.490 7 1022 7
Somalia 7.0 0.162 31 0.332 33 0.247 34 515 13
Niger 7.0 0.163 30 0.516 24 0.340 28 454 15
Togo 7.0 0.255 18 0.570 13 0.412 17 432 16
Guinea 7.0 0.148 35 0.507 25 0.328 29 385 19
Cen. Afr. R. 7.0 0.226 23 0.527 22 0.376 22 343 22
Benin 7.0 0.197 28 0.581 10 0.389 18 336 24
Mali 7.0 0.146 36 0.492 27 0.319 30 243 27
Burundi 7.0 0.219 24 0.520 23 0.370 24 230 29
1990 Mauritius 2.0 0.778 1 0.815 1 0.797 1 1939 4
Botswana 2.2 0.670 2 0.754 2 0.712 2 1989 3
Gambia 2.6 0.215 30 0.619 8 0.417 19 334 19
Madagascar 3.4 0.396 10 0.589 15 0.493 11 139 33
Uganda 3.9 0.272 23 0.252 33 0.262 33 173 29
Nigeria 4.2 0.348 14 0.594 12 0.471 13 157 32
Senegal 4.3 0.322 16 0.658 3 0.490 12 690 8
Sudan 5.0 0.276 20 0.258 32 0.267 32 240 23
Zimbabwe 5.2 0.474 6 0.606 10 0.540 7 625 10
Liberia 5.5 0.317 17 0.474 29 0.395 22 497 11
Gabon 5.6 0.525 4 0.638 6 0.581 4 2978 1
South Africa 5.7 0.650 3 0.588 16 0.619 3 2569 2
Zambia 6.0 0.352 13 0.508 22 0.430 17 388 13
Tanzania 6.0 0.306 19 0.501 24 0.403 21 107 34
Mozambique 6.2 0.252 27 0.170 34 0.211 34 84 36
Sierra Leone 6.4 0.209 33 0.401 31 0.305 31 251 22
Cameroon 6.5 0.447 8 0.594 13 0.520 8 986 6
Ivory Coast 6.5 0.370 12 0.640 5 0.505 10 849 7
Togo 6.5 0.311 18 0.599 11 0.455 14 381 14
Cen. Afr. R. 6.5 0.249 28 0.568 19 0.409 20 374 15
Kenya 6.5 0.434 9 0.590 14 0.512 9 357 16
Ghana 6.5 0.382 11 0.497 25 0.440 15 353 18
Rwanda 6.5 0.274 22 0.506 23 0.390 24 310 20
Mali 6.5 0.214 31 0.529 21 0.372 28 236 24
Lesotho 6.5 0.476 5 0.634 7 0.555 6 234 25
Burkina Faso 6.7 0.203 35 0.577 17 0.390 25 216 26
Zaire 6.7 0.341 15 0.411 30 0.376 26 102 35
Congo 6.9 0.461 7 0.652 4 0.557 5 1031 5
Guinea 6.9 0.191 36 0.491 26 0.341 30 432 12
Benin 6.9 0.261 25 0.609 9 0.435 16 355 17
Niger 6.9 0.209 34 0.573 18 0.391 23 266 21
Malawi 6.9 0.260 26 0.486 28 0.373 27 195 28
Chad 6.9 0.212 32 0.489 27 0.350 29 165 31
Angola 7.0 0.271 24 0.120 36 0.195 35 665 9
Burundi 7.0 0.276 21 0.563 20 0.419 18 207 27
Somalia 7.0 0.217 29 0.148 35 0.183 36 173 30
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managed to do considerably more in human development terms than their GDP/C rates 
might have suggested (i.e., with severe imbalances in favour of their I-HDI ranks), the case 
of Lesotho stands out: despite being one of the poorest states in the region (33rd in 1970, 
26th in 1980, 25th in 1990), it displayed relatively high I-HDI ranks (3rd in 1970, 4th in 
1980,6th in 1990). On the other hand, the individual examples of Guinea in 1970 (28th for 
the I-HDI, 3rd for GDP/C) and Angola in 1990 (35th for the I-HDI, 9th for GDP/C) 
illustrate the opposite imbalance; where, for a variety of reasons (e.g. war in Angola), 
national income appears to have been squandered.
Table 4.19 compares the records of the AFR states against the three threshold 
standards. For the region as a whole, the picture was miserable. Only Mauritius, South 
Africa and Gabon had HDI values above the developing average in 1970 and 1980, and only 
Mauritius, South Africa and Botswana had above average HDI values in 1990. One-third 
(12) of AFR states had ISC values above the developing averages in 1970, 1980 and 1990. 
Only two states, Mauritius and South Africa, had above average I-HDI values for all three 
dates, Botswana had above average I-HDI values in 1980 and 1990, and Gabon had an 
above average I-HDI value in 1990. Regarding the most democratic states: Mauritius 
surpassed the developing HDI, ISC and I-HDI averages for all three dates; Botswana 
surpassed the developing HDI average for 1990 only, the developing ISC averages for all 
three dates, and the developing I-HDI averages for 1980 and 1990; Gambia had below 
average HDI and I-HDI values, and above average ISC values, for all three dates.
Since almost all AFR states were located in the same income category (INC 4) 
throughout the period, the patterns found for the income and regional thresholds were 
broadly similar. Mauritius had above average HDI, ISC and I-HDI values relative to its 
income (INC 3 for 1970 and 1980, INC 2 for 1990) and regional thresholds for all three 
dates. Botswana almost equaled this feat: although it surpassed every index regional 
average, relative to its respective income thresholds (INC 4 for 1970, INC 3 for 1980, INC 2 
for 1990) Botswana failed to surpass the HDI averages for 1980 and 1990, and the I-HDI 
average for 1990. Gambia’s record was unimpressive, though consistent for all three dates: 
relative to its income thresholds (INC 4), it displayed below average HDI values and above 
average ISC and I-HDI values; relative to the regional thresholds, it had below average HDI 
and I-HDI values and above average ISC values.
It would be unwise to forward any generalizations about democracy and 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. As was the case in the MID region, democratic states 
were rare. Moreover, even within this small democratic camp the differences could not be 
more pronounced: what lessons may be drawn, for example, from the successful cases of 
Mauritius and Botswana, on the one hand, and the unsuccessful case of Gambia on the 
other? On a broader note, while the authoritarian states overwhelmingly exhibited very low 
human development values (the partial exceptions being South Africa and Gabon), the 
wealthier states tended have comparatively higher values than the poorest states, once again 
confirming the seminal influence of economic development.
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Table 4.19 Evaluating Levels of Human Development Against
Threshold Standards, AFR Region
Year Country LoD Developing Avg. 
HDI ISC I-HDI
Income Avg.
HDI ISC I-HDI
Regional Avg. 
HDI ISC I-HDI
1970 Gambia 2.0 - + - - + + - + -
Botswana 3.0 - + - + + + + + +
Mauritius 3.0 + + + + + + + + +
Sierra Leone 3.0 - - - - + + - + -
Lesotho 4.0 - + - + + + + + +
Cameroon 4.5 - + - + + + + + +
Somalia 4.5 - - - - - - - - -
South Africa 4.5 + + + - - - + + +
Burkina Faso 5.0 - + - - + + - + -
Madagascar 5.0 - + - + + + + + +
Nigeria 5.0 - - - + - - - - -
Chad 6.0 - - - - - - - - -
Gabon 6.0 + - - - - - + + +
Ghana 6.0 - - - - - - + + +
Kenya 6.0 - + - + + + + + +
Senegal 6.0 - - - - - - - + -
Zambia 6.0 - + - - - - + + +
Zimbabwe 6.0 - - - - - - + + +
Benin 6.5 - + - - + + - + +
Congo 6.5 - - - - - - + + +
Ivory Coast 6.5 - - - - - - + + +
Liberia 6.5 - - - - - - - + -
Niger 6.5 - - - - + - - - -
Sudan 6.5 - - - - - - - - -
Tanzania 6.5 - - - + + + - + +
Uganda 6.5 - - - - - - - - -
Zaire 6.5 - - - + - - + - -
Angola 7.0 - - - - - - - - -
Burundi 7.0 - - - - - - - - -
Cen. Afr. R 7.0 - - - - + + - - -
Guinea 7.0 - - - - - - - - -
Malawi 7.0 - - - - + - - - -
Mali 7.0 - - - - - - - - -
Mozambique 7.0 - - - + - - + - -
Rwanda 7.0 - - - + + + - - -
Togo 7.0 - + - - + + - + +
7980 Gambia I ” - + - - + + - + -
Mauritius 2.2 + + + + + + + + +
Botswana 3.5 - + + - + + + + +
Zimbabwe 4.5 - - - - - - + + +
Nigeria 4.5 - + - - - - + + +
Zambia 4.5 - + - - - - + + +
Ghana 4.8 - - - - - - + + +
Burkina Faso 5.0 - + - - + - - + -
Sierra Leone 5.0 - - - - + - - + -
South Africa 5.0 + - + - - - + + +
Senegal 5.5 - + - - + - - + +
Gabon 6.0 + - - - - - + + +
Kenya 6.0 - + - + + + + + +
Lesotho 6.0 - + - + + + + + +
Sudan 6.0 - - - - - - - - -
Tanzania 6.0 - - - + - + - - -
Uganda 6.2 - - - - - - - - -
Ivory Coast 6.4 - + - - - - + + +
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(Table 4.19 cont’d)
Year Country LoD Developing Avg. 
HDI ISC I-HDI
income Avg.
HDI ISC I-HDI
Regional Avg. 
HDI ISC I-HDI
Cameroon 6.5 _ _ - - - - + + +
Liberia 6.5 - - - + + + - + +
Madagascar 6.5 - - - + + + + + +
Malawi 6.5 - - - - - - - - -
Rwanda 6.5 - - - - + + - - -
Zaire 6.5 - - - + - + + - -
Chad 6.7 - - - - - - - - -
Angola 6.8 - - - - - - - - -
Mozambique 6.9 - - - - - - - - -
Benin 7.0 - + - - + + - + -
Burundi 7.0 - - - - + - - + -
Cen. Afr. R. 7.0 - - - - + + - + -
Congo 7.0 - + - - + - + + +
Guinea 7.0 - - - - + - - - -
Mali 7.0 - - - - + - - - -
Niger 7.0 - - - - + - - - -
Somalia 7.0 - - - - - - - - -
Togo 7.0 - - - + + + - + +
’1990 Mauritius 2.0 + + + + + + + + +
Botswana 2.2 + + + - + - + + +
Gambia 2.6 - + - - + + - + -
Madagascar 3.4 - - - + + + + + +
Uganda 3.9 - - - - - - - - -
Nigeria 4.2 - + - + + + + + +
Senegal 4.3 - - - - + - - + +
Sudan 5.0 - - - - - - - - -
Zimbabwe 5.2 - + - - - - + + +
Liberia 5.5 - - - - - - - - -
Gabon 5.6 - + + - - - + + +
South Africa 5.7 + - + - - - + + +
Tanzania 6.0 _ _ _ - + _ - -
Zambia 6.0 - - - + + + + - -
Mozambique 6.2 - - - - - - - - -
Sierra Leone 6.4 - - - - - - - - -
Cameroon 6.5 - + - - - - + + +
Cen. Afr. R 6.5 - - - - + + - + -
Ghana 6.5 - - - + + + + - +
Ivory Coast 6.5 - + - - + - + + +
Kenya 6.5 - - - + + + + + +
Lesotho 6.5 - + - + + + + + +
Mali 6.5 - - - - + - - + -
Rwanda 6.5 - - - - + - - - -
Togo 6.5 - + - - + + - + +
Burkina Faso 6.7 - - - - + - - + -
Zaire 6.7 - - - + - - - - -
Benin 6.9 - + - - + + - + +
Chad 6.9 - - - - - - - - -
Congo 6.9 - + - - + - + + +
Guinea 6.9 - - - - - - - - -
Malawi 6.9 - - - - - - - - -
Niger 6.9 - - - - + - - + -
Angola 7.0 - - - - - - - - -
Burundi 7.0 - - - - + + - + -
Somalia 7.0 - - - - - - - - -
Notes. The actual 1970-90 averages were given in Table 4.4 (Dev), Table 4.9 (Inc), Table 4.11 (Reg). 
(+) above threshold average, (-) below threshold average.
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4.4 Summary of Chapter Findings
The findings presented in this chapter confirm the existence of a general relationship 
between democracy and levels of human development Specifically, it has been shown that, 
over the course of the 1970-90 period, there were strong correlations between democratic 
governance and higher human development values (Table 4.1). That the lines of causation 
ran from the latter to the former was proven in two respects: democratic averages 
corresponded to higher index rank groups (Figure 4.1); and democracies were 
overwhelmingly located among the highest index levels, declining noticeably in numbers 
thereafter (Figure 4.2, Table 4.3). It was further demonstrated that, on average, democratic 
states consistently displayed by far the highest human development values (Figure 4.3), a 
point also confirmed, albeit to a lesser degree, in the developing world (Figure 4.3b, Table 
4.4).
Given its impact on both variables, the level of economic development must be 
factored into any analysis of democracy and human development (Table 4.5). On average, 
levels of economic development were higher for democratic states when all states were 
considered, but not when developing states were considered alone (Figure 4.4). Moreover, 
as levels of economic development increased, LoD values became, on average, more 
democratic (Figures 4.5a and 4.6a, Table 4.6) and human development values increased 
(Figures 4.5b and 4.6b). After controlling for similar levels of economic development, it 
was shown that democracies, on average, consistently displayed the highest human 
development values (Tables 4.8 and 4.9, Figure 4.7).
Levels of democracy and human development varied greatly from one region to 
another (Figure 4.8). Although democratic states were, on average, the most developed in the 
majority of cases across the regions (Table 4.10), and while a greater number, 
proportionally, displayed human development values above the regional averages (Table 
4.11), a closer look at the regional cases (Tables 4.12-4.19, Figures 4.9-4.12) confirms that 
only in Latin America can one claim, with any conviction, that democratic rule corresponded 
to higher levels of human development; but even here, however, one should also consider the 
impact of economic development and the less convincing picture for 1990.
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CHAPTER 5
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE
Having established that democracy is typically associated with higher levels of 
human development, this chapter focuses on the relationship between democracy and human 
development performance (rates of change). Two interrelated questions will therefore be 
addressed. First, is there a direct linkage between improvements in human development 
conditions and the level of democracy? Second, on average, do democratic states perform 
better, worse, or no different than non-democratic states?
Scholars have been hampered, until recently at least, by the lack of time-series data 
which would make cross-country comparisons of human development performance 
possible. Basic economic data may have been available for decades, but Morris’ Physical 
Quality of Life Index (PQLI) only appeared in the late 1970s (with limited time-series 
coverage), followed by the first Human Development Report in 1990 (subsequent editions 
provided time-series data for the Human Development Index). Consequently, what few 
studies there have been (Chapter 1) have tended to follow the misguided tendency of 
extrapolating, from single-date statistics, generalizations about rates o f change, instead of 
simply accounting for human development levels at particular dates.
This chapter is divided into five parts. Section 5.1 examines the general relationship 
between levels of democracy and index performance rates.1 Section 5.2 considers the 
notion of take-off points and controls for similar index levels. The next two sections provide 
further discriminatory variables: section 5.3 assesses performance rates after controlling for 
similar levels of economic development; section 5.4 depicts how performance rates vary 
across regions. A summary of the findings is presented in section 5.5.
5.1 General Patterns
This section considers the general relationship between levels of democracy and 
human development performance. No discriminating variables will be employed for the 
moment, allowing one to establish the basic terms of the debate, which will then be tested 
and modified in the sections to follow. It will first be argued that, on the basis of the 
correlations and rank-group profiles, there is no clear-cut link whatsoever between levels of
^Since a focus on performance rates involves the use of period measures, LoD and index values have been 
adjusted accordingly. A period LoD value is the average LoD score over a given period; hence, a value in the 
1-2* range signifies that a particular country was democratic (overall) during the period in question (for 
details see Technical Note 1). The index performance rate for a given periodis simply the difference between 
the point index values. For example, a country's I-HDI performance rate for the period 1970-80 is calculated 
as:
I-HDI Perf (1970-80) = I-HDI (1980) - I-HDI (1970)
A positive value indicates an improvement in index conditions, while a negative value indicates a 
deterioration in index conditions.
.......................................................................1 4 5 ...........................................................................
democracy and human development progress. It will then be shown, however, that when 
distribution patterns and average rates are taken into account, democratic states did not 
perform as well over the 1970-90 period as non-democratic states, thereby leading into a 
discussion of the need for controlling variables in section 5.2.
Correlations and Rank Group Profiles
The first indication that there is no general relationship between the level of 
democracy and index performance rates can be found in the extremely weak and erratic 
correlations depicted in Table 5.1 (recorded for two samples, All States and Developing 
States, and for three periods, 1970/80,1980/90, and 1970/90).
Table 5.1 Correlations Between Levels of Democracy 
and Index Performance Rates
Index
All (N= 123) 
1970/80 1980/90 1970/90
Developing (N=88) 
1970/80 1980/90 1970/90
HDI r= 0.318 0.013 0.217 0.050 -0.212 -0.117
I*= 0.101 0.000 0.047 0.003 0.045 0.014
ISC r= 0.013 -0.121 -0.080 0.103 -0.069 0.053
i*= 0.000 0.015 0.006 0.011 0.005 0.003
I-HDI r= 0.169 -0.083 0.054 0.107 -0.155 -0.019
i*= 0.028 0.007 0.003 0.011 0.024 0.000
Over the two shorter periods, LoD values may explain, at most, between 0-10% of 
the variation in HDI rates for the All States sample (0-4.5% for Developing States), 0-1.5% 
of the variationin ISC rates (0-1.1% for Developing States), and 1-2.8% of the variation in 
I-HDI rates (1.1-2.4% for Developing States). Remarkably, over the longer 1970-90 period, 
0% of the variationin I-HDI rates, in both samples, may be explained by LoD values. The 
very nature of the correlations is also confusing, with the results fluctuating between positive 
and negative values; for example, in the All States sample, from 0.013 (1970-80) to -0.121 
(1980-90) for ISC rates, and from 0.169 (1970-80) to -0.083 (1980-90) for I-HDI rates.
Performance rank group profiles provide further confirmation that no clear-cut 
relationships exist between the variables (Figure 5.1). The profiles for the HDI, ISC and I- 
HDI have been constructed using the methods described in Chapter 4 (section 4.1). 
Countries were first ranked according to their respective index performance rates and 
divided into Five rank groups, with the top 25-ranked countries comprising the Rl-25 group. 
The average level of democracy (LoD value) for each rank group was then calculated.
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Fig. 5.1 Average Level O f Democracy Per Index Performance Rank Group
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Given the weak and inconsistent correlations, it is not surprising that fairly 
‘horizontal’ patterns were produced. Instead of progressively increasing LoD averages 
across rank groups (translated into ascending slopes for index levels in Chapter 4), LoD 
averages fell within a quite narrow value band, largely in the 3.0-5.5 range. Since any 
fluctuations from this band were slight, it follows that performance rank groups were 
generally not distinguishable by levels of democracy.
The rank group profile for HDI performance rates is presented in graph (a). The 
patterns produced for each period were somewhat erratic, although still within the 
aforementioned narrow band of averages; over the 1970-90 period the LoD averages were:
4.7,4.5,5.4,4.2 and 2.5. The only consistency appears to be the democratic averages found 
among the poorest performing groups. Indicatively, the R101-123 group displayed the most 
democratic LoD average for two of the periods (2.3 for 1970-80, and 2.5 for 1970-90), 
while the R76-100 group displayed an LoD average of 2.6 for 1980-90. These findings 
suggest that democracies, primarily in the form of the OECD states, tended to exhibit 
relatively lower HDI performance rates; but, as will be demonstrated, this phenomenon is 
explained by the fact that they were already concentrated at the uppermost HDI levels, 
leaving them comparably less ‘room to develop’ on the fixed HDI scale.
The patterns produced in the rank group profile for ISC performance rates (graph b) 
were also somewhat uniform. That the LoD averages fell within a narrow value band is 
depicted by the almost horizontal slopes across the rank groups (excepting the occasional 
dip). The LoD averages for the top and bottom performing groups (Rl-25 and R101-123) 
were virtually identical (5.2 and 4.9 for 1970-80, 4.5 and 4.8 for 1970-90). Moreover, LoD 
averages fluctuated among the performance rank groups by differences of only 1.5 (1970- 
80), 1.7 (1980-90), and 2.6 (1970-90). The only democratic LoD average (2.6) was found 
for the R51-75 group (1970-90), an indication of how widely dispersed democracies were 
throughout the performance rank groups.
The rank group profile for I-HDI performance rates is given in graph (c). Despite 
some slight dips for each period (at R51-75 for 1980-90, and R76-100 for 1970-80 and 
1970-90), the patterns here appear to be even more ‘horizontal’ than those found for the 
other indices. For instance, the 1970-80 period produced LoD averages of 5.3,5.2,4.5,3.3, 
and 4.8. Furthermore, the LoD averages for the top and bottom performing groups (Rl-25 
and R101-123) were essentially indistinguishable: 5.3 and 4.8 for 1970-80; 4.4 and 4.9 for 
1980-90; and 4.7 and 5.0 for 1970-90. As expected, performance rank groups could not be 
distinguished on the basis of average levels of democracy.
Comparing Levels of Democracy: General Performance Rates In Perspective, 1970-90
Given that no firm rules govern the general relationship between democracy and 
human development performance, one may consider how the three levels of democracy 
compared in terms of improving HDI, ISC and I-HDI conditions over the period of this 
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study. Specifically, after initially examining the distribution of countries by performance 
rate brackets, the actual average index rates (1970-90) produced by the LoD groups will be 
analyzed.
Performance rate brackets indicate the range of index increases produced by each 
level of democracy. The obvious question that arises is whether democracies tended to be 
located among the best or worst performers (or somewhere in between) for the period? 
Figure 5.2 (overleaf) depicts the distribution of countries by (a) HDI, (b) ISC and (c) I-HDI 
performance rates and levels of democracy (the percentage of democratic states in each 
performance rate bracket is given in parenthesis).
Looking first at HDI rates (graph a), it is apparent that most countries in the sample 
(50 of 123) were located in the lowest HDI performance bracket, with increases between 
0.099/0.000 index points. A disproportionately high number of these countries (27, or 
54%) were democracies. At the other extreme, seven countries exhibited performance rates 
in the highest range (0.399/0.300): three non-democratic (3-5*) states (South Korea, 
Thailand,and Botswana); three non-democratic (6-7) states (Syria, Libya, and Tunisia); and 
one democratic state (Malaysia). Democratic states were proportionately represented 
(comprising 6 of 19 states, or 32%) in the second highest performance bracket 
(0.299/0.200), and accounted for 9 of the 47 (or 19%) countries in the 0.199/0.100 range.
ISC performance rates are shown in graph (b). Once again, the largest single block 
of countries (51 of 123) was found in the lowest rate increase bracket (0.099/0.000). The 
majority of democratic states (26) were located here, comprising a disproportionately high 
percentage (51%) of all the states in this range. There were only four countries which 
exhibited ISC performance rates of 0.399/0.300 - Portugal (1-2*), Indonesia (3-5*), Egypt 
(6-7) and Jordan (6-7). Spain (1-2*) was one of five countries in the 0.299/0.200 
performance range (the improved social conditions experienced by both Spain and Portugal 
were partly attributable to the dramatic increases in their respective LIB index values 
following the establishment of democratic rule in the 1970s.) In the next performance 
bracket, 4 of the 17 states with ISC increases between 0.199/0.100 were democracies. 
Although 11 of the 43 democratic states in the sample displayed negative ISC rates (i.e., 
their ISC values in 1990 were lower than their ISC values for 1970), none joined the likes of 
Nicaragua, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Angola in the -0.299/-0.200 bracket 
Hence, while non-democratic states were better represented in the top three ISC increase 
ranges, they comprised a much higher proportion of poor performers: 80% (-0.001/-0.099); 
58% (-0.100/-0.199); and 100% (-0.200/-0.299).
The overall improvements in I-HDI conditions are noted in graph (c). Most 
countries in the sample (71 of 123) displayed very slight I-HDI increases (0.000/0.099) 
during the period. Just under half of these states (31) were democracies; the vast majority of 
all democracies (72%) were located in this performance bracket No democracy showed an 
improvement in the magnitude of 0.399/0.300; indeed, Indonesia and Egypt were the only
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states in the sample with such increases (to be analyzed in Chapter 7). Principally due to its 
vastly improved ISC rate, Portugal was the only democracy (of 9 countries) in the next 
highest performance group (0.299/0.200). The three levels of democracy were fairly evenly 
represented at both the 0.199/0.100 and -0.001/-0.100 ranges; only three democracies 
(Iceland, El Salvador, and Peru) showed deteriorating conditions (negative I-HDI rates).
Three observations may be made on the basis of these results. First, regardless of 
index, a large majority of democracies tended to produce only ‘modest’ performance rates 
(0.099/0.000): 63% of all democratic states (43 for the period) displayed modest HDI rates, 
60% displayed modest ISC rates, and 72% displayed modest I-HDI rates. Second, most 
countries - 73% for the HDI, 75% for the ISC, 90% for the I-HDI - in the top two 
performance brackets (0.399/0.300 and 0.299/0.200) had non-democratic LoD values. 
Third, and as a counterweight to the point just made, the vast majority of countries with 
negative performance rates - 36 of 47 (77%) for the ISC, 9 of 12 (75%) for the I-HDI - had 
non-democratic LoD values. In effect, over the course of this period, non-democratic states 
clustered at the two extremes - producing some very good, and some very poor, results - 
while democracies appeared to muddle through.
These distributional fluctuations are concealed by the average performance rates 
produced by each level of democracy. The advantage in employing this method is that more 
direct comparisons may be made on the basis of the relative performances of democratic 
and non-democratic states. Figure 5.3 (overleaf) illustrates the findings by index and period.
It would seem that democratic states, on the whole, did not fare well in terms of HDI 
performance rates (graph a). During the 1970-80 period, they displayed the lowest average 
HDI increase (0.047); a rate almost half that of the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.083). 
During the next period (1980-90), they posted a lower average rate (0.065) than the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states (0.085). Over the course of the two decades, democratic states 
recorded the lowest average HDI increase (0.110, compared to 0.164 for non-democratic (3- 
5*) states and 0.147 for non-democratic (6-7) states).
The picture looked better for the democratic states in terms of ISC rates (graph b). 
They performed (largely) on par with the non-democratic (3-5*) states (non-democratic (6- 
7) states displayed the worst rates). Given the volatile nature of ISC rates, where wild 
fluctuations in Security and Liberty values are common (especially among developing 
states), social improvements (positive rates) are sometimes immediately followed by social 
deteriorations (negative rates), thereby producing very incremental changes when averages 
are computed. Hence, while the democratic states produced a negative ISC rate (-0.012) in 
the 1970-80 period, the change was slight and roughly similar to the ISC decrease (-0.003) 
for the non-democratic (6-7) states (the non-democratic (3-5*) states posted a slight ISC 
increase of 0.033). In the other two periods, the democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) 
states exhibited identical average ISC increases: 0.030 in 1980-90 and 0.029 in 1970-90 
(the rates for the non-democratic (6-7) states were 0.006 and 0.011).
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Fig. 5.3 Average Index Performance Rates Per Level Of Democracy, 1970-90
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The results for the democratic states were not very favourable in terms of I-HDI 
performance rates (graph c). In the first period (1970-80), their average increase (0.017) 
was somewhat less than the increases for the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.060) and non- 
democratic (6-7) states (0.041). Democratic states did display the highest I-HDI increase in 
1980-90 (0.047), though just fractionally ahead of the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.041) 
and the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.031). Over the entire 1970-90 period, however, 
democratic states did a slightly poorer job of improving I-HDI values (with an average rate 
increase of 0.070, compared to 0.096 for the non-democratic (3-5*) states and 0.079 for the 
non-democratic (6-7) states).
Democratic states did not, on average, appear to improve human development 
conditions as well the non-democratic states during the period. In only one of the nine 
comparative cases did they display the highest index performance rate (I-HDI 1980-90); 
while, on the other hand, they produced the lowest average rate increases in five cases (HDI 
1970-80, HDI 1970-90, ISC 1970-80, I-HDI 1970-80, I-HDI 1970-90). Another 
observation worth making is that the most authoritarian (LoD 6-7) states virtually never 
exhibited the highest performance rates. Comprised primarily of sub-Saharan countries, 
Middle Eastern autocracies, and Communist states, the non-democratic (6-7) states 
produced the highest average increase on only one occasion (HDI 1970-80). The non- 
democratic (3-5*) states displayed the highest average performance rates in five of the nine 
cases (HDI 1980-90, HDI 1970-90, ISC 1970-80, I-HDI 1970-80, I-HDI 1970-90) and 
shared the highest rate on two other occasions (ISC 1980-90, ISC 1970-90).
Furthermore, focusing specifically on the developing world, Table 5.2 shows that, on 
a fairly consistent basis, a greater proportion of non-democratic (3-5*) states surpassed the 
average performance rates for all developing states (N=88). The only exception applies to 
HDI rates, where the non-democratic (3-5*) and democratic states displayed similar 
records: 55% of non-democratic (3-5*) states performed above the developing average in 
1970-80 (compared to 44% of democratic states); 40% produced above average rates in 
1980-90 (62% for democratic states); and 41% produced above average rates in 1970-90 
(47% for democratic states). However, a much larger proportion of non-democratic (3-5*) 
states surpassed the developing average for ISC rates: 60% in 1970-80; 72% in 1980-90; 
and 53% in 1970-90 (democratic states exhibited the lowest percentages for all three 
periods - 38%, 50% and 35%). Most significantly, the non-democratic (3-5*) states 
produced the highest proportion of above average I-HDI performers for all three dates 
(55%, 60% and 59%); whereas, for two of the three dates, democratic states had fewer above 
average performers, proportionally, than did the non-democratic (6-7) states.
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Table 5.2 Percentage of ‘Above Average’ Performing Developing States
By Level Of Democracy, Developing Threshold 1970-90
LoD
HDI
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
ISC
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
I-HDI
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
1-2*
3-5*
6-7
44% 62 47 
55 40 41 
40 22 35
38 50 35 
60 72 53 
52 59 49
25 50 35 
55 60 59 
44 41 41
Note. The average performance rates for all developing states were, by period (1970-80, 1980-90, 1970- 
1990): 0.075, 0.079 and 0.155 for the HDI; -0.009, 0.022, and 0.013 for the ISC; and 0.033, 0.051 
and 0.084 for the I-HDI.
The evidence presented in this section contradicts the argument that democracies are 
vital to human development performance. But these general comparisons are still premature, 
for as the next section will demonstrate, one crucial factor must be taken into account before 
more definitive conclusions can be drawn.
5.2 Controlling For Levels of Human Development 
Levels and Rates of Human Development: An Overview
The fundamental problem with studying general performance rates in isolation, as 
was done above, is that countries are compared without regard to their levels of development 
at the beginning of the period in question. Hence, the rate increases for developed states are 
indiscriminately compared to those for developing states, although they are starting from 
altogether dissimilar developmental plateaus. Developing states have more room to improve, 
in absolute terms, on the fixed index scales than developed, typically democratic, states. It is 
more useful, and conceptually valid, to therefore compare the performance rates of countries 
starting from similar levels of human development. If index levels are not first controlled 
for, democratic states are at a distinct and unfair disadvantage.
Figure 5.4 depicts the relationship between the levels and rates of human 
development by tracing the average performance rates (1970-90) for countries beginning the 
period at similar index levels. Noted in parenthesis are the average LoD values found at the 
highest and lowest index levels, and at the index levels showing the greatest rate increases.
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Fig. 5.4 Levels and Rates of Human Development In Perspective, 1970-90
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The line charting the course of HDI performance rates almost resembles an inverted 
‘U \  rising steadily from its lowest point at the 0.800+ level up to the middle range of HDI 
values (peaking at the 0.400/0.499 level),and then gradually declining thereafter. This basic 
pattern is mirrored by I-HDI rates. In both cases, countries located at the mid-index levels 
produced the highest average rate increases over the period: 0.230 (0.400/0.499) and 0.200 
(0.500/0.599) for the HDI; 0.121 (0.400/0.499) and 0.104 (0.500/0.599) for the I-HDI. As 
shown in Chapter 4, democratic states are more o f a rarity at these index levels, a point 
confirmed by the non-democratic LoD averages (4.6 and 5.7) at the peak performance 
levels.
Largely concentrated at the 0.800+ levels (LoD averages of 1.1 for both indices), 
where rate increases tended to be comparatively small (0.056 for the HDI and 0.045 for the 
I-HDI), most democratic states displayed modest performance rates over this period 
because they were already ‘developed’ to begin with. For this reason, when aggregate rates 
are compared without any reference to levels of human development (as was done earlier in 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3), the illusion is created that democratic states display ‘poor’ results.
Relatively low performance rates were also found at the other extreme of the index 
scales, where the most underdeveloped (largely sub-Saharan) states resided. These societies 
lacked the means and resources, material and otherwise, to develop at sufficiently higher
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rates (the HDI and I-HDI performance rates for the 0.000/0.299 levels were 0.118 and 
0.047). Strongly authoritarian LoD averages were observed at these levels (5.9 and 6.3).
The patterns are considerably more erratic for the ISC. The line representing ISC 
performance rates dips into the negative range at two levels (0.600/0.699 and 0.300/0.399), 
indicating that many countries had experienced deteriorating social conditions by 1990 
(with average ISC decreases of -0.003 and -0.016, respectively). The line proceeds well 
beyond the limits of the scale at the 0.000/0.299 level because of the extraordinary ISC 
increase of Indonesia (0.382), the only country found here (the ISC rates observed at this 
level during the other periods were inconsistent: 0.150 for 1970-80 and -0.070 for 1980- 
90). At the highest ISC level (0.800+), where democracies were largely concentrated (avg. 
LoD of 1.2 for the period), the average ISC rate increase was predictably modest (0.022).
To summarize, setting aside the findings for the ISC (which, given the nature of its 
composition, is bound to be entirely unpredictable),2 the highest average performance rates 
are typically produced by countries at mid-index levels, while the lowest rates are produced 
by countries at either end of the index scales (albeit for different reasons). Given that 
democracies are overwhelmingly found at higher index levels, they are therefore much more 
likely to improve their index values in smaller increments. These findings were confirmed 
for the two shorter periods as well.3
Controlling For Levels of Human Development: The Evidence, 1970-90
When index levels are controlled for, little separates the levels of democracy in terms 
of human development performance. In the analysis to follow, countries have been divided 
into three broad levels - High (0.800+), Medium (0.799/0.500), and Low (0.499/0.000) - 
according to how developed they were at the beginning of the performance period, and 
grouped according to their respective LoD values. The average rate increase for each level of 
democracy was then calculated.
2As previously mentioned, the seemingly ad hoc pattern of ISC performance rates reflects the reality cf 
social conditions, as defined by my chosen measure. ISC rates represent not necessarily ‘development’, in 
the traditional understanding of the term as more or less steady progress, but ‘shifts’, highly volatile and 
reversible trends. Huctuations in the ISC’s constituent indices may change a country’s ISC level literally 
overnight: a sudden outbreak of war may plunge a country’s SEC value (and with it, its ISC value), just as 
the decision of a ruling regime to either restore or withdraw basic civil liberties will dramatically affect that 
country’s LIB (and therefore ISC) value. This volatility is primarily confined to developing states, although 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia serves as a vivid reminder that even more developed states are not immune.
3In the 1970-80 and 1980-90 periods, the highest average HDI and I-HDI performance rates were produced at 
the mid-range of index values (0.400-0.699). Specifically, for both periods, the highest HDI rates (0.127 
and 0.128) were found at the 0.400-0.499 levels, while the highest I-HDI rates (0.068 and 0.081) were 
found at the 0.600-0.699 levels (although there was very little separating the three mid-range levels). For 
both periods, the lowest average HDI and I-HDI rates were recorded for countries at either end of the two 
scales (i.e., for the most developed (democratic) states and the least developed(authoritarian) states).
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Figure 5.5 (overleaf) illustrates the average HDI performance rates by level of 
democracy, controlling for similar HDI levels. At the High HDI Level, as was noted in the 
previous chapter, the vast majority of states were OECD democracies. In the 1970/80 
period, the 22 democracies exhibited a slightly lower average HDI increase (0.024) than the 
sole non-democratic (3-5*) state, Spain (0.031). In the next period, the 28 democracies 
produced a lower average HDI increase (0.032) than the sole non-democratic (3-5*) state, 
Hong Kong (0.045); the six Communist states (Hungary, Poland, USSR, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria and GDR) had a paltry average rate (0.013). With Spain becoming a democracy, 
all 23 countries found at the High HDI Level in 1970 displayed democratic LoD values over 
the entire 1970/90 period; the average HDI rate increase was predictably modest (0.057).
The fairly even distribution of countries at the Medium HDI Level allows for more 
satisfactory comparisons. With an average HDI increase of 0.112 in the 1970/80 period, the 
non-democratic (6-7) states slightly edged out the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.109), but 
greatly surpassed the democratic states (0.076). In the 1980/90 period, however, this pattern 
was reversed: the democratic states produced the highest average rate (0.103), followed by 
the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.090) and the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.050). Over 
the 1970-90 period, there was very little to separate the levels of democracy: the democratic 
states and the non-democratic (3-5*) states produced virtually the same average increases 
(0.167 and 0.169), with the non-democratic (6-7) states not far behind (0.154).
The Low HDI Level contained a disproportionately high number of strongly 
authoritarian (6-7) states (primarily from the sub-Saharan group). Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that the democratic states exhibited the highest performance rate for all 
three periods. In the 1970/80 period, the average increase for the democratic states (0.079) 
was slightly above the rates for the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states 
(0.074 and 0.066, respectively). The gap in performance rates widened in the next period 
(1980/90): the seven democratic states produced by far the highest average rate (0.105, 
compared to 0.085 for the non-democratic (3-5*) states and 0.067 for the non-democratic 
(6-7) states). The average HDI increase for the democratic states (0.177) over the entire 
1970/90 period was greater than the increases for the non-democratic (3-5*) and non- 
democratic (6-7) states (0.162 and 0.145).
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In effect, when HDI Levels were controlled for, no level of democracy consistently 
produced the highest average performance rates; the rate gaps tended to be very modest, 
especially over the entire 1970-90 period. Democratic states performed basically as well at 
the High and Medium HDI Levels as the non-democratic states, and slightly better at the 
Low HDI Level (although even here the differences were not pronounced).
Figure 5.6 (overleaf) presents the findings relating to ISC performance rates and 
levels of democracy, controlling for ISC levels. At the High ISC Level, there was an acute 
distributional imbalance for all three periods: the only non-democratic case was Hong Kong 
(3-5*). In the 1970-80 period, slightly deteriorating social conditions were observed for the 
(largely OECD) democracies (-0.010) and for Hong Kong (-0.004). Social conditions 
improved during the 1980/90 period, with the democratic states exhibiting an average ISC 
increase of 0.034, compared to Hong Kong’s increase of 0.022. The very modest average 
ISC increases were indistinguishable over the 1970/90 period (0.022 and 0.018).
There was a more even distribution at the Medium ISC Level, where more than half 
of the total number of countries in the sample were concentrated. In the 1970-80 period, the 
democratic states experienced the largest average ISC decrease (-0.024), whereas the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states displayed a negligible rate increase (0.008) and the non-democratic 
(6-7) states had a slight decrease (-0.008). The non-democratic (3-5*) states also exhibited 
the largest average ISC increase during 1980/90 (0.035, compared to 0.019 for the 
democratic states and 0.007 for the non-democratic (6-7) states). Despite showing better 
rates in the two shorter periods, the non-democratic (3-5*) states actually produced the 
lowest average ISC increase (0.007) over the entire 1970/90 period (the democratic and 
non-democratic (6-7) states had similar increases, 0.018 and 0.013). All three average rate 
increases were, however, very slight.
There were fewer countries in general, and democracies in particular, at the Low ISC 
Level. The ISC increase (0.099) for the single democratic state (India) found at this level in 
the 1970/80 period was less than the average increase (0.129) for the five non-democratic 
(3-5*) states; the average increase for the non-democratic (6-7) states was negligible 
(0.013). During the 1980/90 period, the single democratic state (Argentina) produced an 
extraordinary ISC increase (0.222) - principally due to its increased LIB value (with the 
restoration of civil liberties upon its return to democratic rule) - which dwarfed the average 
increases for the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states (0.015 and 0.007, 
respectively). Over the 1970-90 period, the dramatic ISC increase shown by Portugal 
(0.329) - also due in part to its increased LIB value following the establishment of 
democratic rule - coupled with the modest increase for India (0.091), ensured that the 
average ISC rate increase for the two democratic states (0.210) was considerably greater 
than the rate increases for the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states 
(0.111 and 0.006, respectively).
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The lack of non-democratic states at the High ISC Level, and the extremely few 
democratic states at the Low ISC Level, suggests that the findings for these two ISC levels 
should be kept in perspective. The distribution of countries may have been more even at the 
Medium ISC Level,but the results were also inconclusive: while the non-democratic (3-5*) 
states showed the greatest average ISC increases in the shorter periods, the rate differences 
were not large, and were offset by the greater ISC increase over the longer 1970/90 period 
for the democratic states (again, the differences here were not great).
The illustrations in Figure 5.7 (overleaf) depict the relationship between levels of 
democracy and I-HDI performance rates, controlling for I-HDI Levels. Only democratic 
states were observed at the High I-HDI Level during the 1970/80 and 1970/90 periods. 
They displayed an average I-HDI performance rate of 0.013 in the 1970/80 period, 
indicating a somewhat modest improvement in overall human development conditions. In 
the 1980-90 period, the average I-HDI increase for the 26 democracies (0.036) was slightly 
greater than that for Hong Kong (0.033); the three Communist states (Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and GDR) located at this level in 1980 witnessed an almost negligible 
decline (-0.005) in their collective fortunes by 1990. The 21 democracies which began the 
1970/90 period at this level showed a modest average I-HDI increase of 0.045.
At the Medium I-HDI Level, the democratic states exhibited the second highest 
average increase for two periods, and the lowest increase for the other. The gaps between the 
democratic and non-democratic states were fairly pronounced in the 1970/80 period: the 
average I-HDI increase for the democratic states (0.020) was well below the average rates 
for the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states (0.068 and 0.051, 
respectively). But in the 1980/90 period, the democratic states posted a fractionally smaller 
average increase (0.061) than the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.064), with the non- 
democratic (6-7) states well behind (0.037). The non-democratic (3-5*) states showed the 
highest I-HDI increase (0.097) over the 1970-90 period, just slightly ahead of the 
democratic states (0.092) and the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.084).
At the Low I-HDI Level, the patterns for the two shorter periods were consistent 
During 1970-80, the average I-HDI increase for the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.050) 
was greater than the average increases for the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.035) and the 
three (India, Gambia, and Guatemala) democratic states (0.031). The non-democratic (3-5*) 
states also produced the highest average I-HDI increase in the 1980/90 period (0.056, 
compared to 0.038 for the democratic states and 0.032 for the non-democratic (6-7) states). 
Over the entire 1970/90 period, the average rate increases for the democratic and non- 
democratic (3-5*) states were identical (0.096); the non-democratic (6-7) states showed the 
smallest period increase (0.077).
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Fig. 5.7 Levels of Democracy and I-HDI Performance Rates, 
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These findings are therefore ambiguous. The results for the High I-HDI Level are 
of no comparative value given the almost exclusive presence of democratic states. At the 
Medium I-HDI Level,the non-democratic (3-5*) states exhibited the highest rate increases 
for all three periods. But since their average rates exceeded those for the democratic states 
by only 0.003 (1980/90) and 0.005 (1970/90), it would be closer to the truth to declare a 
‘tie* between the two. Likewise, one should be wary of any generalizations at the Low I- 
HDI Level: the non-democratic (3-5*) and democratic states had almost identical average I- 
HDI increases over the 1970/90 period (although the non-democratic (3-5*) states had 
larger increases over the two shorter periods).
Across the three indices, it is only at the Medium levels (0.500-0.799) where 
meaningful comparisons can be made, given the fairly even distribution of countries by level 
of democracy. It has been shown that the results here have tended to favour the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states, but only barely. They produced the highest average rate increases 
in six of the nine cases: HDI 1970-90; ISC 1970-80; ISC 1980-90; I-HDI 1970-80; I-HDI 
1980-90; and I-HDI 1970-90. It will be recalled, however, that the non-democratic (3-5*) 
states and the democratic states effectively ‘tied’ in three of these cases - HDI 1970-90,I- 
HDI 1980-90 and I-HDI 1970-90; in one other case (HDI 1970-80), the non-democratic 
(3-5*) states were barely surpassed by the non-democratic (6-7) states.
The performance of democratic states, on the other hand, varied distinctively by 
period. They produced by far the worst average HDI, ISC and I-HDI rates over the 1970/80 
period. The situation changed in 1980-90, when they produced the highest average HDI 
increase and the second highest ISC and I-HDI increases (behind the non-democratic (3- 
5*) states, though barely so in the latter case). Over the course of the 1970-90 period, the 
democratic states fell only slightly short of the average HDI and I-HDI increases produced 
by the non-democratic (3-5*) states, but displayed the highest ISC increase (although the 
differences between all three levels of democracy were small). Examining the corresponding 
average percentage increases over the entire period (Table 5.3), it becomes evident just how 
little separated the LoD groups.4
Table 5.3 Percentage Increases (1970-90) By Level Of Democracy,
Medium Index Levels
LoD
Average Percentage Increases, 1970-90 
Med HDI Med ISC Med I-HDI
1-2*
3-5*
6-7
26.3% 2.7% 14.1% 
27.0% 1.2% 15.9% 
23.2% 2.1% 12.8%
N( 1-2*,3-5*.6-7)= 12,11,12 for HDI; 17,26,33 for ISC; 19, 16, 13 for I-HDI.
4Avg.% Increase (1970-90) = Avg. Absolute Increase (1970-90) I Avg. Level (1970). 
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Democratic states produced average HDI increases of 26.3% above their 1970 
levels, meaning that the average level of individual capabilities rose by just over one-quarter 
by 1990. This percentage increase was barely surpassed by the non-democratic (3-5*) 
states (27.0%), with the non-democratic (6-7) states not far behind (23.2%). The average 
ISC percentage increases were miniscule for all three levels of democracy (1.2-2.7%), a 
phenomenon attributable to the unpredictable rate fluctuations of this index. The I-HDI 
percentage increases also fell within a narrow range, with overall human development 
conditions improving by an average of 12.8-15.9% by 1990.
There is another key point to consider. It was shown earlier that, in the absence of 
controlling variables, the average levels of democracy associated with the various 
performance-rank groups were largely indistinguishable (Figure 5.1); in other words, no 
single level of democracy was predominant among either the best or worst sets of 
performers. The same may be observed specifically at the Medium index levels. The average 
levels of democracy for the top 10 and bottom 10 performing states over the 1970-90 period 
were virtually identical. These averages hovered around the mid-point of the LoD scale (3.0-
4.0), confirming that democratic and non-democratic states were present in (largely) equal 
measure (Table 5.4).
Table 5.4 The Best/Worst Performing States (1970-90) Beginning From Medium
Index Levels (1970)
(a) HDI
Lev Country 
Rank
Increase LoD 
1970-90 70-90
(b) ISC
Lev Country 
Rank
Increase LoD 
1970-9070-90
(c) I-HDI
Lev Country 
Rank
Increase LoD 
1970-90 70-90
1. S. Korea 0.336 4.1 1. S. Korea 0.237 4.1 1. Portugal 0.290 1.6
2. Yugoslavia 0.280 6.4 2. Spain 0.224 1.6 2. S. Korea 0.287 4.1
3. Colombia 0.259 2.1 3. UAE 0.203 5.4 3. Thailand 0.223 4.4
4. Mauritius 0.254 2.2 4. Chile 0.199 6.3 4. UAE 0.186 5.4
5. Portugal 0.250 1.6 5. Greece 0.190 1.8 5. Chile 0.183 6.3
6. Brazil 0.249 4.2 6. Cyprus 0.158 1.9 6. Greece 0.171 1.8
7. Saudi Arab 0.231 6.6 7. Czech. 0.143 6.8 7. Malaysia 0.163 2.6
8. Malta 0.228 1.5 8. USA 0.126 1.0 8. Cyprus 0.149 1.9
9. Panama 0.224 5.3 9. Egypt 0.125 6.0 9. Spain 0.146 1.6
10. Costa Rica 0.201 1.0 10. Thailand 0.114 4.4 10. Albania 0.142 7.0
Avg LoD 3.5 Avg LoD 3.9 Avg LoD 3.5
26. Czech. 0.126 6.8 67. Colombia -0.101 2.1 39. Sri Lanka 0.024 1.8
27. Kuwait 0.125 6.1 68. Myanmar -0.105 7.0 40. USSR 0.021 6.7
28. Peru 0.114 2.8 69. Sri Lanka -0.111 1.8 41. Yugoslavia 0.017 6.4
29. Argentina 0.105 3.2 70. Mexico -0.145 3.3 42. Venezuela 0.013 1.1
30. Uruguay 0.097 3.0 71. Peru -0.147 2.8 43. South Africa0.013 5.3
31. Venezuela 0.092 1.1 72. Iran -0.148 5.7 44. Kuwait 0.012 6.1
32. Jamaica 0.087 1.9 73. Sierra L. -0.155 5.6 45. Mexico 0.009 3.3
33. Cuba 0.084 6.8 74. El Salvador -0.162 2.6 46. Peru -0.016 2.6
34. Trinidad&T. 0.066 1.8 75. Nicaragua -0.204 4.0 47. El Salvador -0.021 2.6
35. South Africa 0.059 5.3 76. Yugoslavia -0.247 6.4 48 Nicaragua -0.041 4.0
Avg LoD 3.9 Avg LoD 4.1 Avg LoD 3.9
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The top 10 HDI performers displayed an average LoD value of 3.5 for the period, 
compared to an almost identical average of 3.9 for the bottom 10 performers. There were 
five democratic states (Colombia, Mauritius, Portugal, Malta and Costa Rica) among the top 
10 performers, counterbalanced by four democratic states (Peru, Venezuela, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago) among the bottom 10 performers. The differences between the top 
and bottom ISC performance groups were even more miniscule (LoD averages of 3.9 and
4.1). There were four democratic states (Spain, Greece, Cyprus and the USA) among the 
top 10 performers and four democratic states (Colombia, Sri Lanka, Peru and El Salvador) 
among the bottom 10 performers. Such parity was also observed for the I-HDI performance 
groups, where the average LoD values were 3.7 (top 10) and 4.0 (bottom 10). There were 
five democratic states (Portugal, Greece, Malaysia, Cyprus and Spain) among the top 10 I- 
HDI performers and four democratic states (Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador) 
among the bottom 10 performers. Quite clearly, the best and worst performers could not, on 
average, be distinguished by levels of democracy.
There is one final basis of comparison to be established. Specifically regarding the 
developing world, how do states within each level of democracy fare against the ‘index level 
threshold’, the average rate increase for all states at similar levels of human development? 
To answer this question, states were initially evaluated according to whether or not they 
surpassed their respective threshold averages.5 The number of states with ‘above average’ 
rates within each level of democracy was then added up and calculated as a percentage of the 
total. The findings are presented in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 Percentage of ‘Above Average’ Performing Developing States 
By Level Of Democracy, Index Level Threshold (1970-90)
LoD
HDI
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
ISC
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
I-HDI
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
1-2*
3-5*
6-7
19% 58 41 
45 56 47 
44 46 39
25 46 35 
50 60 50 
44 54 49
31 50 41 
50 60 47 
42 43 35
Note. The average HDI rates for each index level (TP1 to TP7, see footnote 5 for details) were: 0.025, 
0.088, 0.106, 0.112, 0.127, 0.082 and 0.049 for 1970/80; 0.029, 0.048, 0.103, 0.102, 0.128, 0.085 
and0.054 for 1980/90; and0.056, 0.123, 0.156, 0.200, 0.230, 0.176 andO.118 for 1970/90. The ISC 
averages per level were: -0.010, 0.011, -0.016, -0.006, 0.060, -0.005 and 0.150 for 1970/80; 0.033, 
0.007, 0.012, 0.026, 0.055, 0.023 and-0.070 for 1980/90; and0.022, 0.011, -0.003, 0.031, 0.072, 
-0.016 and 0.382 for 1970/90. The I-HDI avgs per level were: 0.013, 0.033, 0.068, 0.042, 0.056, 
0.025 and 0.022 for 1970/80; 0.032, 0.005, 0.081, 0.069, 0.060, 0.032 and -0.013 for 1980/90; 
0.045, 0.078, 0.089, 0.104, 0.121, 0.062 and 0.047 for 1970/90.
5The index levels have been divided into a series of very specific ‘take-off points’ (TPs). Instead of three 
levels (High 0.800+, Med 0.500/0.799, and Low 0.000/0.499), seven are used here: 0.800+ (TP1); 
0.700/0.799 (TP2); 0.600/0.699 (TP3); 0.500/0.599 (TP4); 0.400/0.499 (TP5); 0.300/0.399 (TP6); and 
0.000/0.299 (TP7). The averages per level and index are given in Table 5.5 (‘Note’).
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Only 19% (3 of 16) of developing democracies produced HDI increases over the 
1970-80 period greater than their respective threshold averages (i.e., the average increases 
produced by all states starting from similar HDI levels in 1970); in contrast, 45% of all 
non-democratic (3-5*) states and 44% of all non-democratic (6-7) states produced ‘above 
average’ HDI increases for the period. On the whole, democratic states performed as well as 
the non-democratic (6-7) states, but not the non-democratic (3-5*) states. In only one of the 
nine cases (HDI 1980-90) did the democratic group contain the highest percentage of above 
average states (surpassing the figure for the non-democratic (3-5*) states by just 2%); this, 
incidentally, was the only case where the non-democratic (3-5*) states did not produce the 
highest percentage. Moreover, on just one other occasion (I-HDI 1980-90) did the majority 
of democratic states exceed their respective threshold averages; the majority of non- 
democratic (3-5*) states did so on six occasions. In five cases, the democratic group 
actually contained the fewest states, proportionally, with above average rate increases: once 
for the HDI (1970-80), all three periods for the ISC, and once for the I-HDI (1970-80).
These records may be analyzed by period. In the 1970-80 period, democratic states 
did not compare favourably against either of the two non-democratic LoD groups. In the 
1980-90 period, democratic states fared well in terms of HDI increases, but less so on the 
basis of ISC and I-HDI increases (although, it should be noted, the differences between the 
levels of democracy were not pronounced). Significantly, democratic and non-democratic 
(3-5*) states had virtually identical records over the longer 1970-90 period for both the 
HDI and I-HDI.
The findings in this section suggest that when human development levels are 
controlled for, generalizations regarding levels of democracy and human development 
performance cannot be substantiated. Over the 1970-90 period, no level of democracy 
consistently displayed the highest average increases for all three indices and across all three 
index levels (High, Medium and Low). At most, it could be argued that the non-democratic 
(3-5*) states produced (marginally) better average increases at the only range of index 
values where meaningful comparisons could be made (the Medium Level), although the 
average LoD values between the best and worst performers were indistinguishable. Non- 
democratic (3-5*) states did produce better records against their respective threshold 
averages, but not by much over the entire period.
5.3 Controlling For Levels of Economic Development
This section will examine whether a clearer picture emerges if levels of economic 
development (national income) are controlled for. As was done in Chapter 4, the GDP/C 
variable is used to divide states into one of four income categories, from the richest (INC 1) 
to the poorest (INC 4) group, according to their respective GDP/C rankings at the 
 1 6 6 .....................................................................
beginning of the performance period in question: R l-30  (INC 1), R31-60 (INC 2), R61-90 
(INC 3), R91-123 (INC 4).6
It is interesting to note that, as with index levels, average performance rates tend to 
vary from one income level to the next. In other words, where a country sits along the 
income scale may provide a clue as to the potential magnitude of its rate increase. This is not 
surprising since there is a strong relationship between levels of economic development and 
human development (section 4.2 in Chapter 4), and given the results o f the previous section. 
In fact, the patterns produced when human development increases are traced across levels of 
economic development (Figure 5.8) mirror, to a remarkable extent, those produced across 
levels of human development (Figure 5.4 above).
Fig. 5.8 Human Development Performance and Levels Of 
Economic Development, 1970-90
0.250 n
HDI
ISC
I-HDI
0.200  -
0.150 ■
0.100  -
0.050 -
0.000
INC 1 INC 3INC 2 INC 4
Income Category
Notes. The actual performance rates from INC 1 to INC 4 are: 
for the HDI, 0.084, 0.150, 0.200, 0.122; for the ISC, 0.034, 0.033, 
0.020, 0.005; and for the I-HDI, 0.059, 0.092, 0.110, 0.064.
Inverted ‘U ’ patterns were found for HDI and I-HDI performance rates over the 
1970-90 period. On average, countries located in the middle income categories (INC 2 and 
INC 3) produced the highest HDI and I-HDI performance rates, while the lowest rates were 
produced by countries at either end of the income scale (INC 1 and INC 4). The pattern for 
ISC performance rates was, once again, altogether different. But rather than the erratic, 
zigzag pattern observed in Figure 5.4, the line here follows a more definitive route: the
^The range of GDP 1C values for each income category was given in Chapter 4 (footnote 11).
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highest average ISC rate was produced by the INC 1 category, with steadily declining rates 
thereafter. Hence, on average, the richest countries tended to improve social conditions the 
most, while the poorest countries improved the least
Controlling For Levels of Economic Development: The Evidence, 1970-90
Does the level of democracy have any direct impact on human development 
performance rates for countries at similar levels of economic development? Table 5.6 
presents the average HDI, ISC and I-HDI performance rates by level of democracy for three 
periods, after controlling for economic development Upon initial inspection, it certainly 
might appear that democratic states do not fare well when economic development is 
employed as the discriminating variable. Of the 36 comparative cases listed, democratic 
states produced the highest average performance rate on only four occasions. In particular, 
they displayed the highest average HDI rates twice (INC 3 1980/90, INC 4 1980/90), the 
highest average ISC rate once (INC 2 1970/90), and the highest average I-HDI rate once 
(INC 2 1970/90).
Table 5.6 Average Human Development Rates By Level Of Democracy, 
Controlling For Economic Development
Inc Cat LoD
HDI Rates
1970/80 1980/90 1970/90
ISC Rates
1970/80 1980/90 1970/90
I-HDI Rates 
1970/80 1980/90 1970/90
INC 1 1-2*
3-5*
6-7
0.025
0.114
0.140
0.033
0.048
0.055
0.060
0.170
0.161
0.004
0.101
0.006
0.043
0.045
0.005
0.035
0.203
-0.001
0.015
0.108
0.073
0.038
0.047
0.030
0.048
0.186
0.080
INC 2 1-2*
3-5*
6-7
0.067
0.090
0.104
0.070
0.086
0.023
0.137
0.149
0.164
-0.024
0.054
-0.017
0.039
0.051
0.004
0.080
0.002
0.024
0.022
0.072
0.046
0.054
0.068
0.013
0.109
0.075
0.094
INC 3 1-2*
3-5*
6-7
0.089
0.093
0.096
0.115
0.106
0.113
0.206
0.182
0.222
-0.055
-0.033
0.026
0.012
0.026
0.078
-0.036
0.005
0.107
0.017
0.030
0.061
0.064
0.066
0.096
0.085
0.093
0.164
INC 4 1-2*
3-5*
6-7
0.042
0.063
0.049
0.089
0.065
0.056
0.118
0.157
0.108
0.034
0.042
-0.014
-0.038
0.015
-0.013
0.028
0.078
-0.027
0.038
0.053
0.018
0.025
0.040
0.021
0.073
0.118
0.041
On the other hand, democratic states produced the lowest average performance rate 
in just over half of all the comparative cases listed (19 of 36). This dubious record was 
spread across all levels: they produced the lowest average HDI rate increase for all income 
categories in the 1970/80 period, for the INC 1 category in 1980/90, and for two income 
categories in the 1970/90 period (INC 1 and INC 2); they produced the lowest average ISC
168
rate for three of the four income categories in the 1970/80 period (save for INC 4), for two 
categories in 1980/90 (INC 3 and INC 4), and for one category in 1970/90 (INC 3); and 
they produced the lowest average I-HDI rate increases for three income categories in 
1970/80 (save for INC 4), for one category in 1980/90 (INC 3), and for two categories in 
1970/90 (INC land INC 3).
For the most part, the Findings for each index were consistent. For two of the three 
periods, the non-democratic (6-7) states produced the highest average HDI increases for the 
INC 1, INC 2 and INC 3 categories (in the INC 4 category, the non-democratic (3-5*) 
states produced the highest HDI rate for both the 1970/80 and 1970/90 periods). The non- 
democratic (3-5*) states regularly showed the highest average ISC and I-HDI rates: for all 
three periods in the INC 1 and INC 4 categories, and for two periods in the INC 2 category 
(the non-democratic (6-7) states displayed the highest ISC rate for all three periods in the 
INC 3 category). In all, the non-democratic (3-5*) states displayed the highest average 
increase in over half of the comparative cases (20 of 36); the non-democratic (6-7) states 
displayed the highest average increase in twelve cases.
The problem with studying average increases in isolation, however, is that one 
neglects to consider the human development levels from which the increases emerge (an 
important omission given the findings in section 5.2). Thus, even when levels of economic 
development are controlled for, the actual rate increases are, to some extent, taken out of 
context, thereby allowing for a possible misreading of the data (especially in the case of 
wealthy states, as will be seen shortly). In order to further clarify the relationships between 
the variables, Figure 5.9 (overleaf) interprets the results from the perspective of each income 
category, with the rates and levels of human development portrayed together. Hence, one is 
able to trace the levels at which states began the period, the size of the rate increases and, 
therefore, the levels at which they ended the period.
Predictably, the distribution of countries was uneven at the INC 1 level (graph a): 
23 (predominantly OECD) democratic states, one non-democratic (3-5*) state (the UAE), 
and six non-democratic (6-7) states (four Communist states - Poland, the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia, and the GDR - plus two oil-rich autocracies, Libya and Kuwait). The 
democratic states began the period at much higher HDI (0.850), ISC (0.857) and I-HDI 
(0.854) levels than the non-democratic states; they were already at the High index levels in 
1970. It was inevitable, then, that they would also develop in smaller increments over the 
period, and thus their considerably lower average rates in Table 5.6 (0.060 for the HDI, 
0.035 for the ISC, and 0.048 for the I-HDI); in percentage terms, the democratic states 
improved their HDI values by an average of 7.1%, their ISC values by 4.1%, and their I- 
HDI values by 5.6%. By comparison, the UAE and the non-democratic (6-7) states were 
still at the Medium index levels in 1970. Although the rate increases for the UAE (0.170 or 
28.3% for the HDI, 0.203 or 36.5% for the ISC, 0.186 or 32.2% for the I-HDI) dwarfed 
the average rate increases produced by the democratic states, the UAE still fell well short of 
their average HDI, ISC and I-HDI levels by 1990. Hence, the UAE’s high income rank
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masked its relatively lower HDI, ISC and I-HDI values in 1970, thereby ensuring a 
‘competitive edge’. The same treatment may be given to the non-democratic (6-7) states: 
they started the period at much lower average index levels (0.665, 0.681 and 0.673) and, 
despite their comparatively better rate increases (save for the ISC), they ended the period at 
lower levels.
There was a more even distribution of countries at the INC 2 level (graph b): nine 
democratic states, eleven non-democratic (3-5*) states and ten non-democratic (6-7) states. 
The democratic states began and ended the period at higher average HDI, ISC and I-HDI 
levels than the non-democratic states, and performed quite well in between. They produced a 
lower average HDI increase (0.137) than both the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.149) and 
the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.164), but displayed the largest improvement in social 
conditions over this period (0.080, compared to the very modest average ISC increases for 
the non-democratic states , 0.002 and 0.024). Consequently, the democratic states had the 
highest I-HDI increase (0.109) for the period, with the non-democratic (6-7) states slightly 
behind (0.094); the non-democratic (3-5*) states produced the lowest average rate (0.075). 
This generally favourable picture for the democratic states in the upper-middle income 
category was not, however, mirrored during the two shorter periods: they had the lowest 
average HDI, ISC and I-HDI rates in 1970/80, and came out second best for all three 
indices in 1980/90 (recall Table 5.6).
The distribution of countries was also fairly even at the INC 3 level (graph c): nine 
democratic states, thirteen non-democratic (3-5*) states and eight non-democratic (6-7) 
states. Although the democratic states began and ended the period at the highest average
HDI, ISC and I-HDI levels, the most authoritarian states performed the best over the period, 
producing the highest average HDI, ISC and I-HDI increases. The average HDI rate 
increase (0.222) for the non-democratic (6-7) states, though considerable, was only slightly 
higher than the increase for the democratic states (0.206); the non-democratic (3-5*) states 
had the smallest average HDI increase (0.182). The deterioration in social conditions among 
the democratic states (-0.036) compared unfavourably against the negligible average ISC 
increase for the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.005) and the substantial ISC increase for 
the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.107). Overall, human development conditions for the 
most authoritarian states improved by almost twice as much as for democratic states, as 
suggested by the average I-HDI increases (0.164 and 0.085, respectively). These findings 
for the lower-middle income level were largely confirmed for the other periods: the non- 
democratic (6-7) states produced the highest average rates for all three indices in the 
1970/80 period, and produced the highest ISC and I-HDI rates in the 1980/90 period (the 
democratic states surpassed their average HDI rate by a mere 0.002).
The distributional imbalance among the poorest countries at the INC 4 level (graph 
d) - only two democratic states (India and Gambia), nine non-democratic (3-5*) states and 
twenty-two non-democratic (6-7) states - requires that the average rates be treated with 
caution (recall the similar dilemma regarding Low index levels in section 5.2). All three 
groups of states began the period at roughly similar HDI, ISC and I-HDI levels. 
Nevertheless, the resulting rate increases were altogether dissimilar the non-democratic (3- 
5*) states produced the highest average HDI, ISC, and I-HDI increases, while the 
democratic states came a very distant second in every case. The rates by level of democracy 
(1-2*, 3-5*, 6-7) were: 0.118,0.157 and 0.108 for the HDI; 0.028,0.078 and -0.027 for the 
ISC; and 0.073, 0.118, and 0.041 for the I-HDI. The superior performance of the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states at this income level was further underlined by their higher average 
rates for all three indices in the 1970/80 period, and for two of the three indices in the 
1980/90 period (the democratic states produced the highest HDI rate increase).
It was only, therefore, at the middle income levels (INC 2 and INC 3) where the 
fairly even distribution of states by LoD values allowed for more balanced comparisons 
(Table 5.7 summarizes the average absolute and percentage increases over the entire 1970- 
90 period). In the upper-middle category (INC 2), democratic states had a mixed record: 
they did not perform as well in terms of HDI increases; they performed well in terms of 
ISC increases; and they performed as well in terms of I-HDI increases (posting the highest 
absolute increase but the second-highest percentage increase). In the lower-middle category 
(INC 3), democratic states performed as well in terms of absolute (though not percentage) 
HDI increases, but did not perform as well in terms of ISC and I-HDI increases.
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Table 5.7 Average Rate Increases (1970-90) By Level Of Democracy,
Middle-Income Categories (INC 2 & INC 3)
Inc Cat LoD (N) HDI 
Abslncr %Incr
ISC 
Abslncr %Incr
I-HDI 
Abslncr %Incr
INC 2 1-2* (9) 0.137 19.9% 0.080 11.0% 0.109 15.3%
3-5* (11) 0.149 25.8% 0.002 0.2% 0.075 12.3%
6-7 (10) 0.164 30.3% 0.024 4.0% 0.094 16.5%
INC 3 1-2* (9) 0.206 45.8% -0.036 -5.1% 0.085 14.9%
3-5* (13) 0.182 48.0% 0.005 0.8% 0.093 19.4%
6-7 (8) 0.222 68.5% 0.107 19.8% 0.164 38.0%
The average levels of democracy observed for the best and worst performance 
groups in each of these income categories reflect, to some extent, these discrepancies (Table 
5.8). In the upper-middle income category (INC 2), the average levels of democracy, falling 
marginally above the mid-point on the LoD scale, were largely indistinguishable when all 
three indices were considered: the average LoD value for the top 10 HDI performers (4.6) 
was slightly higher (less democratic) than the average for the bottom 10 HDI performers 
(3.7); the average LoD value for the top 10 ISC performers (3.9) was slightly lower (more 
democratic) than the average for the bottom 10 performers (4.5); and the average LoD 
values for the top and bottom I-HDI performers were virtually identical (4.1 and 4.8). These 
averages indicate the relative placement of democratic states: three (Portugal, Malta and 
Costa Rica) among the top 10 HDI performers and four (Jamaica, Barbados, Spain, 
Trinidad and Tobago) among the bottom 10 performers; four (Portugal, Spain, Greece, 
Trinidad and Tobago) among the top 10 ISC performers and three (Jamaica, Costa Rica, 
Peru) among the bottom 10 performers; four (Portugal, Greece, Spain, Malta) among the 
top 10 I-HDI performers and two (Jamaica and Peru) among the bottom 10 performers. It 
should be noted, however, that the placement of some of these democratic states among the 
bottom 10 performers owed more to their already high index values by 1970 (and thus to 
their propensity for slower incremental growth).7
'This is particularly true for Barbados, Spain and Trinidad and Tobago for the HDI, and Costa Rica for the 
ISC.
Table 5.8 The Best/Worst Performing States (1970-90) Beginning From
Middle-Income Categories (1970)
(a) HDI (b) ISC (c) I-HDI
Lev Country Increase LoD Lev Country Increase LoD Lev Country Increase LoD
Rank 1970-90 1970-90 Rank 1970-90 1970-90 Rank 1970-90 1970-90
INC 2 INC 2 INC 2
1. Yugoslavia 0.280 6.4 1. Portugal 0.329 1.6 1. Portugal 0.290 1.6
2. Iran 0.266 5.7 2. Spain 0.224 1.6 2. Chile 0.183 6.3
3. Portugal 0.250 1.6 3. Chile 0.199 63 3. Brazil 0.180 4.2
4. Brazil 0.249 4.2 4. Greece 0.190 1.8 4. Greece 0.171 1.8
5. Saudi Arab 0.231 6.6 5. Uruguay 0.110 3.0 5. Spain 0.146 1.6
6. Malta 0.228 1.5 6. Brazil 0.110 4.2 6. Albania 0.142 7.0
7. Panama 0.224 5.3 7. Hungary 0.102 6.2 7. Panama 0.142 5.3
8. Albania 0.217 7.0 8. Trinid.&To. 0.093 1.8 8. Malta 0.137 1.5
9. Costa Rica 0.201 1.0 9. Cuba 0.084 6.8 9. Hungary 0.130 6.2
10. Chile 0.166 6.3 10. Gabon 0.081 5.9 10. Gabon 0.114 5.9
Avg LoD 4.6 Avg LoD 3.9 Avg LoD 4.1
21. Argentina 0.105 3.2 21. Saudi Arab -0.009 6.6 21. Iran 0.059 5.7
22. Uruguay 0.097 3.0 22. South Afr -0.033 5.3 22. .Argentina 0.057 3.2
23. Jamaica 0.087 1.9 23. Romania -0.034 7.0 23. Romania 0.049 7.0
24. Cuba 0.084 6.8 24. Jamaica -0.034 1.9 24. Guinea 0.036 7.0
25. Guinea 0.080 7.0 25. Costa Rica -0.035 1.0 25. Jamaica 0.026 1.9
26. Barbados 0.070 1.0 26. Zambia -0.091 5.1 26. Yugoslavia 0.017 6.4
27. Spain 0.068 1.6 27. Mexico -0.145 3.3 27. South Afr 0.013 5.3
28. TrinicL&To. 0.066 1.8 28. Peru -0.147 2.8 28. Mexico 0.009 3.3
29. South Afr 0.059 5.3 29. Iran -0.148 5.7 29. Peru -0.016 2.8
30. Zambia 0.037 5.3 30. Yugoslavia -0.247 6.4 30. Zambia -0.027 5.1
Avg LoD 3.7 Avg LoD 4.5 Avg LoD 4.8
INC 3 INC 3 INC 3
1. Tunisia 0.350 6.3 1. Egypt 0.329 6.0 1. Egypt 0.304 6.0
2. S. Korea 0.336 4.1 2. Jordan 0.318 6.3 2. S. Korea 0.287 4.1
3. Thailand 0.333 4.4 3. S. Korea 0.237 4.1 3. Jordan 0.270 6.3
4. Malaysia 0.323 2.6 4. Syria 0.168 6.4 4. Syria 0.238 6.4
5. Syria 0.308 6.4 5. Thailand 0.114 4.4 5. Tunisia 0.231 6.3
6. Turkey 0.298 2.4 6. Tunisia 0.112 6.3 6. Thailand 0.223 4.4
7. Egypt 0.282 6.0 7. Honduras 0.108 2.9 7. Malaysia 0.163 2.6
8. Morocco 0.267 5.6 8. Philippines 0.103 4.1 8. Algeria 0.145 6.5
9. Colombia 0.259 2.1 9. Senegal 0.095 5.1 9. Honduras 0.141 2.9
10. Mauritius 0.254 2.2 10. Congo 0.079 6.8 10. Mauritius 0.141 2.2
Avg LoD 4.2 Avg LoD 5.3 Avg LoD 4.8
21. Zimbabwe 0.148 4.9 21. Morocco -0.040 5.6 21. Dom. Rep 0.085 2.0
22. Senegal 0.146 5.1 22. Liberia -0.062 5.9 22. Colombia 0.079 2.1
23. Philippines 0.132 4.1 23. Ghana -0.080 6.5 23. PapuaNG 0.057 2.1
24. Ivory Coast 0.127 6.4 24. Uganda -0.084 4.9 24. Bolivia 0.031 3.4
25. El Salvador 0.121 2.6 25 Bolivia -0.100 3.4 25. Sri Tanka 0.024 1.8
26. Nicaragua 0.121 4.0 26. Turkey -0.101 2.4 26. Liberia 0.013 5.9
27. Ghana 0.099 6.5 27. Colombia -0.101 2.1 27. Ghana 0.010 6.5
28. Liberia 0.088 5.9 28. Sri Tanka -0.111 1.8 28. Uganda -0.012 4.9
29. PapuaNG 0.083 2.1 29. El Salvador -0.162 2.6 29. El Salvador -0.021 2.6
30. Uganda 0.059 4.9 30. Nicaragua -0.204 4.0 30. Nicaragua -0.041 4.0
Avg LoD 3.7 Avg LoD 3.9 Avg LoD 3.5
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In the lower-middle income category (INC 3), the top 10 performers across each 
index were, on average, less democratic than the bottom 10 performers: the average LoD 
value for the top 10 HDI performers (4.2) was quite similar to the average for the bottom 10 
performers (3.7); but the average LoD values for the top 10 ISC and I-HDI performers (5.3 
and 4.8) were much less democratic than the averages for the bottom 10 performers in each 
index (3.9 and 3.5). Hence, with the exception of the HDI, the democratic states were more 
often found among the bottom performers; specifically: there were four (Malaysia, Turkey, 
Colombia and Mauritius) among the top 10 HDI performers and two (El Salvador and 
Papua New Guinea) among the bottom performers; there was only one (Honduras) among 
the top 10 ISC performers and four (Turkey, Colombia, Sri Lanka and El Salvador) among 
the bottom performers; there were three (Malaysia, Honduras and Mauritius) among the top 
10 I-HDI performers and five (Dominican Republic, Colombia, Papua New Guinea, Sri 
Lanka and El Salvador) among the bottom performers. The poor ISC and I-HDI records of 
several democratic states (El Salvador, Turkey, Colombia, Sri Lanka) were primarily due to 
conflicts which plagued them during the period. In brief, democratic states fared as well in 
the upper-middle income category, but not in the lower-middle income category.
Further insight into the relative performance of each level of democracy is gained by 
examining how developing states compared against another standard ‘threshold’, the 
average rate increase for all states at similar levels of economic development After first 
computing the average rate increase by income category, the number of states with ‘above 
average’ rates within each level of democracy was then added up and calculated as a 
percentage of the total (Table 5.9).
Table 5.9 Percentage of ‘Above Average’ Performing Developing States 
By Level Of Democracy, Economic Development Threshold (1970-90)
LoD
HDI
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
ISC
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
I-HDI
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
1-2*
3-5*
6-7
31% 50 41 
45 52 41 
42 38 43
31 50 35 
45 68 50 
48 65 49
19 54 24 
40 60 50 
48 51 46
Note. The average HDI rates for each income category were, from INC 1 to INC 4: 0.054, 0.093, 
0.093 and0.052 for 1970/80; 0.037, 0.054, 0.111 and0.061 for 1980/90; and0.084, 0.150, 0.200 aid 
0.122 for 1970/90. The ISC averages per income category were: 0.011, 0.006, -0.010 and -0.001 for 
1970/80; 0.038, 0.027, 0.032 and-0.010 for 1980/90; and 0.034, 0.033, 0.020 and0.005 for 1970/90. 
The I-HDI averages per income category were: 0.033, 0.051, 0.041 and 0.025 for 1970/80; 0.037, 
0.041, 0.072 and0.026 for 1980/90; and0.059, 0.092, 0.110 and0.064 for 1970/90.
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The table reveals that the non-democratic (3-5*) states produced the best overall 
record, with the highest percentage of above average performers in six of the nine cases; the 
non-democratic (6-7) states were very close behind (between 1-9%) in five of these cases. 
This achievement was not confined to any specific period or index: the non-democratic (3- 
5*) states produced the highest percentage of above average HDI, ISC and I-HDI 
performers for two of the three periods. Equally as impressive is that a majority of non- 
democratic (3-5*) states displayed above average performance rates in five of the nine 
cases.
Just under one-third of developing democracies (31%, or 5 of 16) produced HDI 
increases greater than their respective threshold averages for 1970-80; 45% of all non- 
democratic (3-5*) states and 42% of all non-democratic (6-7) states produced above 
average HDI increases for the period. But given the closeness of the results for the 1980-90 
and 1970-90 periods, the LoD groups cannot really be distinguished in terms of HDI 
performance. Democratic states compared slightly less favourably in terms of ISC rate 
increases: both groups of non-democratic states displayed a higher proportion of above 
average performers for all three periods. The results for democratic states were also less 
impressive regarding I-HDI rate increases. Despite comparing well in the 1980-90 period, 
less than one-fifth (19%) of all developing democracies during the 1970-80 period, and less 
than one-quarter (24%) during the 1970-90 period, displayed above average I-HDI rate 
increases relative to their income thresholds. This latter figure is particularly striking, 
suggesting that, proportionally, roughly twice as many non-democratic (3-5*) and non- 
democratic (6-7) states (50% and 46%) produced above average I-HDI increases.
Developing democracies did not display the highest percentage of above average 
performers in any of the nine comparative cases; in six cases, they actually showed the 
lowest percentage. Moreover, in only three cases did a majority of democratic states display 
performance rates above their respective income thresholds, and all during one period 
(1980/90). Observing the findings by period, the record of democratic states may be 
summarized as follows: they compared relatively poorly during 1970-80; they performed as 
well during 1980-90; and, though comparing well in terms of HDI increases, their relatively 
poor ISC rates were translated into less than impressive I-HDI increases during 1970-90.
Overall, when levels of economic development were controlled for, democratic states 
performed as well in certain cases as non-democratic states, but worse in others. No level of 
democracy consistently (and decisively) produced the highest average increases across all 
three indices and for all three periods; although, more often than not, the non-democratic (3- 
5*) states displayed the highest average rate increases. In the two income categories where 
direct comparisons were meaningful, democratic states fared as well at the upper-middle 
income level, but not at the lower-middle income level. When evaluated against their 
respective income thresholds, democratic states did not compare as well as the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states.
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5.4 Levels of Democracy and Human Development Performance By Region
Overview o f  Regional Variations
The results o f the previous sections will now be considered from the perspectives of 
the four developing regions: Asia (ASI, N=16), Latin America (LAT, N=23), the Middle 
East and North Africa (MID, N=13), and sub-Saharan Africa (AFR, N=36).8 The objective 
is to evaluate how developing democracies fared against the records of non-democratic 
states in the same regional group over the 1970-90 period. Following a brief overview of the 
general trends, the relationship between levels of democracy and human development 
performance within each region will be considered in detail.
By way of introduction, Figure 5.10 depicts the levels and rates o f human 
development by region. Unquestionably, the MID region displayed the most impressive 
results overall, producing the highest average HDI increase (0.247 or 58%), the highest I- 
HDI increase (0.151 or 31%), and the second highest ISC rate increase (0.055 or 10%). 
Hence, despite beginning the period at considerably lower average index levels, the MID 
region almost reached the LAT region’s index levels by 1990. Beginning at roughly similar 
levels as the MID region, the ASI region also fared comparatively well, producing the 
second highest HDI, ISC and I-HDI rates (in absolute terms); the actual numbers for each 
index were: 0.181 (47%) ; 0.065 (12%) and 0.123 (26%). Already at relatively high index
Fig. 5.10 Levels and Rates of Human Development By Region, 1970-90
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8The countries in each regional sample were given in Chapter 4 (footnote 12).
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levels in 1970, the LAT region developed more incrementally. In particular, the LAT region 
displayed a decent average HDI rate increase (0.150 or 27%), a slight average ISC decrease 
(-0.006 or -1%), and a modest average I-HDI increase (0.072 or 12%). The results for the 
AFR region were unimpressive: the misleadingly high HDI percentage increase (49%) can 
be attributed to its very low average HDI value in 1970 (0.232); it showed an average ISC 
decrease (-0.013 or -3%); and its overall human development (I-HDI) conditions barely 
improved (0.050 or 13%). Clearly, levels of democracy have little to do with average 
regional performance rates: although the MID and AFR regions shared the same period 
LoD average (a staunchly authoritarian value of 5.9), their respective HDI, ISC and I-HDI 
performance rates differed enormously. The most democratic region (LAT, LoD=3.3) was 
also the most developed to begin with.
Judging by the average rate increases produced by the levels of democracy across 
the four regions (Table 5.10), it would appear that democratic states did not fare well. While 
no level of democracy consistently produced the highest average increases, irrespective of 
period and region, of the 36 comparative regional cases cited, the non-democratic (6-7) 
states produced the highest increases most frequently (15), followed by the non-democratic 
(3-5*) states (12) and the democratic states (9); it will be noted, however, that in many of 
these cases the average rate differences were, for all intents and purposes, negligible.
Table 5.10 Average Performance Rates By Level Of Democracy And Region
1970/80 1980/90 1970/90
Index Reg
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
HDI ASI
LAT
MID
AFR
0.082
0.057
0.108
0.072
0.087
0.103
0.103
0.052
0.060
0.081
0.155
0.049
0.104
0.076
0.190
0.158
0.101
0.086
0.132
0.051
0.112
0.034
0.078
0.054
0.173
0.137
0.298
0.181
0.195
0.169
0.234
0.120
0.146
0.129
0.246
0.103
ISC ASI
LAT
MID
AFR
0.016
-0.048
-0.079
-0.054
0.050
-0.032
0.033
-0.018
-0.022
-0.004
0.005
-0.010
0.044
0.013
-0.022
0.058
0.052
0.004
0.065
0.010
0.060
0.087
0.048
-0.012
0.003
-0.030
-0.101
-0.004
0.137
-0.018
0.005
-0.007
-0.067
0.118
0.088
-0.018
I-HDI ASI
LAT
MID
AFR
0.049
0.005
0.014
0.009
0.069
0.035
0.068
0.017
0.019
0.041
0.080
0.020
0.074
0.044
0.084
0.108
0.077
0.045
0.099
0.031
0.086
0.060
0.063
0.021
0.088
0.053
0.099
0.089
0.166
0.075
0.120
0.056
0.039
0.123
0.167
0.043
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Democratic states showed the highest regional rate in only one case for the 1970/80 
period (HDI AFR), in four cases for the 1980/90 period (HDI MID, HDI AFR, ISC AFR, 
I-HDI AFR), and in four cases (HDI MID, HDI AFR, ISC AFR, I-HDI AFR) for the 
1970/90 period. In contrast, the non-democratic (6-7) states produced the highest average 
increase in six cases for 1970/80, in five cases for 1980/90, and in four cases for 1970/90 
(the corresponding numbers for the non-democratic (3-5*) states were five, three and four 
cases). The record of democratic states also varied by index: they displayed the highest 
average HDI increase in five of the twelve of the regional cases (AFR 1970/80, MID and 
AFR 1980/90, MID and AFR 1970/90); and the highest ISC rate in only two cases (AFR 
1980/90, AFR 1970/90). The democratic states did not produce the highest average I-HDI 
rate for any region in 1970/80, and produced the highest average for only the AFR region in 
both the 1980/90 and 1970/90 periods. The non-democratic (6-7) states had the highest I- 
HDI increase in over half the cases: for three regions in 1970/80 (LAT, MID, AFR); for two 
regions in 1980/90 (ASI, LAT);and for two regions in the 1970/90 period (LAT,MID).
General comparisons may also be made by evaluating states against their respective 
regional ‘thresholds’ (average regional rate increases). After first determining the average 
regional rate increases for each period, the number of states with ‘above average’ rates 
within each level of democracy was then added up and calculated as a percentage of the 
total. The findings are presented in Table 5.11.
Table 5.11 Percentage of Above Average’ Performing Developing States 
By Level of Democracy, Regional Threshold (1970-90)
LoD
HDI
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
ISC
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
I-HDI
1970- 1980- 1970- 
1980 1990 1990
1-2*
3-5*
6-7
38% 62 41 
45 40 50 
48 30 35
38 42 29 
45 56 50 
54 59 59
25 50 41 
50 52 47 
56 46 54
Note. The average HDI rates for each region (ASI, LAT, MID, AFR) were: 0.076, 0.076, 0.139 and 
0.051 for 1970/80; 0.105, 0.072, 0.108 and0.062 for 1980/90; and0.181, 0.150, 0.247 and 0.113 for 
1970/90. The ISC averages per region were: 0.014, -0.027, 0.005 and -0.013 for 1970/80; 0.051, 
0.021, 0.049 and 0.000 for 1980/90; and 0.065, -0.006, 0.055 and -0.013 for 1970/90. The I-HDI 
averages per region were: 0.045, 0.025, 0.072 and 0.019 for 1970/80; 0.078, 0.047, 0.078 and 0.031 
for 1980/90; andO. 123, 0.072, 0.151 and 0.050 for 1970/90.
Any strict interpretation of the data would suggest that democratic states did not 
compare favourably: they displayed the largest percentage of ‘above average’ performers 
only once (HDI 1980/90); they had the lowest percentage in six of the nine cases; and there
179
were only two cases where a majority of democratic states surpassed their respective 
regional thresholds (HDI 1980/90 and I-HDI 1980/90). The non-democratic (6-7) states 
produced the highest percentage of above average performers in six of the nine cases (in 
one period for the HDI, all three periods for the ISC, and in two of the three periods for the 
I-HDI).
On closer inspection, however, the actual percentage differences were only 
substantial for two cases (ISC 1970/90, I-HDI 1970/80). For the other seven cases, 
democratic states performed largely on par with the non-democratic states. Though slightly 
outperformed during the 1970/80 period in terms of the HDI, democratic states produced 
by far the highest proportion of above average states in the following period (1980/90); over 
the entire period, democratic states produced a fractionally lower percentage (41%) than the 
non-democratic (6-7) states (50%). Democratic states did fare worse in terms of the ISC, 
but the only truly sizeable gap between the three LoD groups was found for the 1970/90 
period. Despite their relatively poor showing in terms of the I-HDI for the 1970/80 period, 
democratic states were on equal terms during the 1980/90 period; over the 1970/90 period, 
they produced marginally fewer above average performers.
The general trends across regions indicate that developing democracies performed 
slightly worse over the period. It remains to be seen why such patterns emerged from the 
perspective of each region.
Levels of Democracy and Human Development Performance in Asia, 1970-90
Figure 5.11 depicts the levels and rates of human development for countries in the 
ASI region (organized, left to right, from the most to the least democratic states). Across all 
three indices, Hong Kong and Singapore were by far the most developed states in 1970 and, 
consequently, they developed more incrementally over the period. By 1990, owing to their 
extraordinary performance rates, South Korea and (to a lesser extent) Thailand had almost 
reached their index levels; Malaysia was close behind. Of the least developed states in 1970, 
Indonesia and China performed extremely well, followed at some distance by Pakistan. Five 
states - India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan and Myanmar - began and ended the period 
at relatively low index levels.
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More direct comparisons may be made between democratic and non-democratic 
states. India (LoD 1.5) and Pakistan (4.9) started from very similar HDI, ISC and I-HDI 
levels, but the rate increases for Pakistan were much better across all three indices. Sri 
Lanka (LoD 1.8) started from very similar index levels as Thailand (4.4) and yet produced 
much smaller rate increases. No country was found at similar index levels as Papua New 
Guinea (LoD 2.1) across all three indices: it started from similar HDI levels as Indonesia 
(5.5), China (6.7) and Myanmar (7.0), and was surpassed by all three over the period (less 
so by Myanmar); it started from similar ISC levels as its two democratic counterparts, Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia, and produced better rate increases; and it started at almost the same I- 
HDI level as the Philippines (4.1), but displayed less than half its rate increase. The country 
which most closely resembled Malaysia (LoD 2.6) in terms of all three indices was 
Thailand (4.4): both had similar HDI increases; Thailand displayed better ISC and I-HDI 
rate increases.
In terms of average rate increases, democratic states performed better overall than the 
non-democratic (6-7) states, but not as well as the non-democratic (3-5*) states (Table 
5.12). Led chiefly by three countries which placed among the top five ranks for every index 
(South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia), the non-democratic (3-5*) states produced the 
highest average HDI, ISC and I-HDI rate increases. Among democratic states, Malaysia 
stood out as the only consistently strong performer, as did China among the non-democratic 
(6-7) states. To place these regional performances into perspective, it will be recalled that 
among all states starting the period from Medium index levels (Table 5.4), South Korea was 
ranked first in terms of HDI and ISC increases, and second in terms of I-HDI increases, 
Thailand was ranked third and tenth in terms of I-HDI and ISC increases, and Malaysia was 
ranked seventh in terms of I-HDI increases. Furthermore, among all states starting from the 
lower-middle income range (Table 5.8), South Korea was ranked first in terms of I-HDI 
increases and second for HDI and ISC increases, Thailand was ranked third for HDI 
increases and fifth for ISC and I-HDI increases, and Malaysia was ranked fourth for HDI 
increases and seventh for I-HDI increases. The ASI region was well represented among the 
top performers.9
9Among all countries beginning at the Low index levels: Indonesia ranked first in terms of ISC and I-HDI 
increases and ninth for HDI increases; China rankedsixth for ISC and I-HDI increases; Pakistan ranked fifth 
for ISC increases and eighth for I-HDI increases; Thailand and Malaysia were ranked third and fourth for HDI 
increases. Furthermore, among all countries beginning at the poorest income level (INC 4): Indonesia 
ranked first for ISC and I-HDI increases, and second for HDI increases; China ranked third for HDI and I-HDI 
increases, and fourth for ISC increases; and Pakistan ranked third for ISC increases, fourth for I-HDI 
increases, and seventh for HDI increases.
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Table 5.12 Performance Rates (1970-90) By Level of Democracy,
ASI Region
Country LoD
HDI INCREASE 
Absol Perc Ra
ISC INCREASE 
Absol Perc Ra
I-HDI INCREASE 
Absol Perc Ra
India 1.5 0.128 50% 11 0.091 20% 1 0.109 31% 8
Sri Lanka 1.8 0.159 31% 6 -0.111 -16% 15 0.024 4% 14
Papua NG. 2.1 0.083 26% 15 0.031 4% 11 0.057 11% 13
Malaysia 2.6 0.323 69% 3 0.002 0% 13 0.163 27% 6
Avg(l-2*) 0.173 44% 0.003 2% 0.088 18%
Hong Kong 4.0 0.138 19% 9 0.018 2% 12 0.078 10% 12
Korea, S. 4.1 0.336 64% 1 0.237 39% 2 0.287 51% 2
Philippines 4.1 0.132 27% 10 0.103 20% 6 0.118 23% 7
Thailand 4.4 0.333 72% 2 0.114 18% 5 0.223 41% 3
Bangladesh 4.5 0.110 55% 13 0.051 12% 8 0.080 26% 11
Singapore 4.5 0.154 23% 7 0.045 6% 10 0.099 14% 9
Pakistan 4.9 0.149 61% 8 0.233 58% 3 . 0.191 59% 5
Indonesia 5.5 0.280 92% 4 0.382 163% 1 0.331 122% 1
Nepal 5.6 0.127 78% 12 0.047 9% 9 0.087 24% 10
Avg(3-5*) 0.195 54% 0.137 36% 0.166 41%
China 6.7 0.272 73% 5 0.175 43% 4 0.223 57% 4
Afghanistan 6.9 0.077 59% 16 -0.271 -55% 16 -0.097 -31% 16
Myanmar 7.0 0.088 28% 14 -0.105 -18% 14 -0.009 -2% 15
Avg(6-7) 0.146 53% -0.167 -10% 0.039 8%
Notes. Absol=Absolute Increase; Perc=Percentage Increase; Ra=Rank (regional, Absolute Increase)
At the opposite end of the scale, two democratic states (Sri Lanka and Papua New 
Guinea) and two non-democratic (6-7) states (Afghanistan and Myanmar) consistently 
placed among the poorest performing ranks. The worst non-democratic (3-5*) performer, 
as determined by its ranks, was Bangladesh (although Hong Kong had lower regional ranks 
for the ISC and I-HDI, this was due to its already developed status). The internal conflict 
(with the Tamil Tigers) which engulfed Sri Lanka over the period was translated into 
relatively poor ISC (and thus I-HDI) values: it placed among the bottom 10 ISC and I-HDI 
performers at both the Medium index levels (Table 5.4) and the lower-middle income range 
(Table 5.8).
A good indication of how ASI states fared in the broader context is given in Table 
5.13 (overleaf), where their performance rates are evaluated against the three standard 
thresholds employed in this chapter - the average increase for all developing states (Dev), 
and the average increases for all states starting from similar index levels (Lev) and income 
levels (Inc) in 1970.
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Table 5.13 Evaluating Human Development Performance (1970-90)
Against Threshold Standards, ASI Region
Country LoD
HDI Increase 
Dev Lev Inc
ISC Increase 
Dev Lev Inc
I-HDI Increase 
Dev Lev Inc
India 1.5 + + + + + + + +
Sri Lanka 1.8 + - - - - - - - -
Papua NG. 2.1 - - - + + + - - -
Malaysia 2.6 + + + - - - + + +
Hong Kong 4.0 - + - + - - - + -
Korea, S. 4.1 + + + + + + + + +
Philippines 4.1 - - - + + + + + +
Thailand 4.4 + + + + + + + + +
Bangladesh 4.5 - - - + - + - + +
Singapore 4.5 - - + + + + + + +
Pakistan 4.9 - + + + +' + + + +
Indonesia 5.5 + + + + + + + + +
Nepal 5.6 - + + + + + + + +
China 6.7 + + + + + + + + +
Afghanistan 6.9 - - - - - - - - -
Myanmar 7.0 - - “ - - - - - -
Notes. The actua 
(+) above
1970-90 averages were given in Table 5.2 (Dev), Table 5.5 (Lev), Table 5.9 (Inc), 
threshold average; (-) below threshold average.
Across the indices and their corresponding thresholds, the patterns for the 
democratic states were quite uniform: two of the four states displayed above average rates in 
every case (e.g. Sri Lanka and Malaysia surpassed the HDI developing average, India and 
Malaysia surpassed their respective HDI Lev thresholds, etc). India surpassed every one of 
its respective thresholds except the HDI developing average (not surprisingly, given that it 
typically belonged the same threshold groups as the sub-Saharan African states). On the 
other hand, Sri Lanka managed to surpass only the HDI developing average. Papua New 
Guinea did not surpass any HDI or I-HDI thresholds, but did exceed all three ISC 
thresholds (Dev, Lev and Inc). In contrast, Malaysia surpassed all HDI and I-HDI 
thresholds, but no ISC threshold (recall its miniscule ISC increase, 0.002).
The non-democratic (3-5*) states, on the whole, performed well across the 
thresholds (though fractionally less so for the HDI thresholds). Against the Dev threshold, 
the records were mixed: only three countries (South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia) 
produced better HDI increases than the developing average; all nine countries produced 
better ISC increases; and all but Hong Kong (because of its already high value) and 
Bangladesh exceeded the I-HDI developing average. Compared to other countries at similar 
index levels (Lev), the results were fairly impressive: all but the Philippines, Bangladesh and
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Singapore crossed their respective HDI thresholds; all but Hong Kong and Bangladesh 
crossed their respective ISC thresholds; and all nine non-democratic (3-5*) states crossed 
their respective I-HDI thresholds. Similar observations may be made with regard to the 
income threshold (Inc): all but Hong Kong, Philippines and Bangladesh surpassed their 
respective HDI averages; and all but Hong Kong managed to surpass their respective ISC 
and I-HDI thresholds.
Of the three non-democratic (6-7) states, only China managed to surpass any index 
threshold. In fact, China joined South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia as the four ASI states 
which exceeded every index threshold.
Levels of Democracy and Human Development Performance in Latin America, 1970-90
The fairly even distribution of countries by level of democracy in the LAT region 
allows for a wealth of comparative opportunities. There is, moreover, a great variation in 
index levels and rates of change within each of the three levels of democracy (Figure 5.12). 
Irrespective of the range of index values in 1970, there were good and poor performers 
throughout the region. The high number of states with negative ISC rates over the period 
(signaling a deterioration in social conditions), including seven of the ten LAT democracies, 
was attributed to the poor Security Index values (as will be shown in Chapter 6, this was 
principally due to the runaway inflation which plagued these states, although in several cases 
the problem was compounded by civil war and general socio-political instability).
No non-democratic state began the period at ISC and I-HDI levels as high as 
Barbados (LoD 1.0) and Trinidad and Tobago (1.8), prompting comparisons for only the 
HDI: Argentina (3.2) and Uruguay (3.0) started from marginally lower HDI levels but 
produced better rate increases. Three other democracies (Costa Rica, Venezuela and 
Jamaica) started from levels comparable to Argentina and Uruguay: only Costa Rica 
produced a higher HDI and I-HDI increase; and all three displayed negative ISC rates (like 
Argentina, although Uruguay had a negligible increase). Of the five remaining democratic 
states (the Dominican Republic, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, and Honduras), only 
Colombia (HDI) and Honduras (I-HDI) compared somewhat favourably against the rates 
produced by some of the better non-democratic performers (Brazil, Panama and Chile).
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Fig. 5.12 Human Development Profile By Level of Democracy, LAT Region
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On average, democratic states did not fare as well as non-democratic states over the 
period (Table 5.14): they produced the lowest average HDI increase (percentage-wise, but 
not in absolute terms, where they came out second best); they produced the worst average 
ISC rate (-0.030 or -4%); and they produced the lowest average I-HDI increase (0.053 or 
8%). This record was influenced by the democracies at either extreme: those which were 
more developed to begin with, and thus more inclined to grow in smaller increments 
(Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago), and those which began the period at much lower index 
levels and actually saw their overall fortunes deteriorate (El Salvador, Peru). In terms of 
regional HDI performance, Colombia was ranked first, Costa Rica was ranked fifth, the 
Dominican Republic was ranked sixth, and Honduras was ranked seventh. Only Honduras 
(ranked fourth) and Trinidad and Tobago (fifth) performed well in terms of ISC increases. 
Regarding overall I-HDI rate increases, Honduras (fourth) stood alone among the 
democratic states (with an increase of 0.141, or 29% above its 1970 level).
Table 5.14 Performance Rates (1970-90) By Level of Democracy,
LAT Region
HDI INCREASE ISC INCREASE I-HDI INCREASE
Country LoD Absol Perc Ra Absol Perc Ra Absol Perc Ra
Barbados 1.0 0.070 8% 22 0.053 6% 9 0.062 7% 15
Costa Rica 1.0 0.201 31% 5 -0.035 -4% 16 0.083 11% 12
Venezuela 1.1 0.092 13% 19 -0.065 -8% 17 0.013 2% 19
Trinidad&T 1.8 0.066 8% 23 0.093 12% 5 0.080 10% 13
Jamaica 1.9 0.087 13% 20 -0.034 -4% 15 0.026 4% 18
Domin. Rep. 2.0 0.183 40% 6 -0.014 -2% 13 0.085 15% 10
Colombia 2.1 0.259 47% 1 -0.101 -14% 19 0.079 12% 14
El Salvador 2.6 0.121 29% 14 -0.162 -25% 22 -0.021 -4% 22
Peru 2.8 0.114 22% 16 -0.147 -24% 21 -0.016 -3% 21
Honduras 2.9 0.174 50% 7 0.108 17% 4 0.141 29% 4
Avg (1-2*) 0.137 26% -0.030 -4% 0.053 8%
Uruguay 3.0 0.097 13% 18 0.110 19% 2 0.104 15% 5
Argentina 3.2 0.105 14% 17 0.009 1% 10 0.057 8% 16
Ecuador 3.3 0.233 48% 3 -0.033 -5% 14 0.100 17% 7
Mexico 3.3 0.162 25% 11 -0.145 -20% 20 0.009 1% 20
Bolivia 3.4 0.161 44% 12 -0.100 -15% 18 0.031 6% 17
Guatemala 3.4 0.172 44% 8 0.005 1% 11 0.088 18% 8
Paraguay 4.0 0.168 33% 9 0.003 0% 12 0.086 15% 9
Nicaragua 4.0 0.121 26% 15 -0.204 -31% 23 -0.041 -7% 23
Brazil 4.2 0.249 49% 2 0.110 22% 3 0.180 36% 2
Panama 5.3 0.224 38% 4 0.060 9% 8 0.142 22% 3
Avg(3-5*) 0.169 33% -0.018 -2% 0.075 13%
Chile 6.3 0.166 24% 10 0.199 36% 1 0.183 29% 1
Haiti 6.7 0.136 62% 13 0.071 12% 7 0.104 26% 6
Cuba 6.8 0.084 14% 21 0.084 13% 6 0.084 14% 11
Avg(6-7) 0.129 34% 0.118 20% 0.123 23%
Notes. Absol=Absolute Increase; Perc=Percentage Increase; Ra=Rank (regional, Absolute Increase)
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The non-democratic (3-5*) states exhibited the best average HDI increase (0.169), 
the second best average ISC rate (a slight decline of -0.018 or -2%), and the second highest 
average I-HDI increase (0.075 or 13%). Specifically, Brazil (ranked second), Ecuador 
(third), and Panama (fourth) displayed excellent HDI records over the period. Uruguay 
(second), Brazil (third) and Panama (eighth) placed among the best ISC performers. Six of 
the top ten regional I-HDI performers were found within this group, including Brazil 
(second), Panama (third), Uruguay (fifth), Ecuador (seventh), Guatemala (eighth), and 
Paraguay (ninth). Conversely, Mexico (20th for ISC and I-HDI), Bolivia (18th for ISC, 
17th for I-HDI) and Nicaragua (15th for HDI, 23rd for ISC, 23rd for I-HDI) did not 
perform well.
Of the three non-democratic (6-7) states, Cuba performed moderately well overall 
(especially in terms of the ISC and I-HDI), Haiti had modest increases (relative to its low 
starting levels), while Chile was arguably (along with perhaps Brazil and Panama) the 
region’s top performer, ranked first for ISC and I-HDI increases, and tenth for HDI 
increases. Returning back to Figure 5.12, one may trace the impact of Chile’s high rate 
increases. Despite beginning the period at HDI levels well below the three most developed 
democracies (Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela), Chile had managed to surpass 
Venezuela’s HDI value by 1990, and fell just shy of the HDI values for the other two. The 
comparison with Costa Rica is particularly interesting. Chile had a marginally higher HDI 
value (0.682) in 1970 but, owing to a slightly lower rate increase (0.166), ended the period 
at exactly the same HDI level (0.848) as Costa Rica. The situation was different, however, 
with respect to the ISC: Chile’s high rate increase (0.199) coupled with Costa Rica’s slight 
decrease (-0.035) meant that, over the period, Chile’s ISC value as a percentage of Costa 
Rica’s rose from only 67% in 1970 to 95% in 1990. The net effect of the changes in HDI 
and ISC values was that, despite beginning with a considerably lower I-HDI value in 1970 
(0.621, compared to 0.742 for Costa Rica), Chile had almost reached Costa Rica’s I-HDI 
level by 1990 (the values were 0.804 and 0.825, respectively).
That Latin America contained some very good and some very poor performers, in 
comparison with other regions, could be observed in the earlier samples of Medium index 
level countries (Table 5.4) and middle-income countries (Table 5.8). Among all of the states 
starting from Medium index levels in 1970, Chile ranked fourth and fifth in terms of ISC 
and I-HDI increases. Four LAT states placed among the top 10 HDI performers: Colombia 
(third), Brazil (sixth), Panama (ninth) and Costa Rica (tenth). On the other hand, this region 
provided seven of the bottom 10 HDI performers, and five of bottom 10 ISC and I-HDI 
performers (including, in both cases, Mexico, Peru, El Salvador and Nicaragua). The LAT 
region’s record for the middle-income categories varied. Among those states starting from 
the upper-middle income level (INC 2) in 1970, Chile ranked second for I-HDI increases, 
third for ISC increases, and tenth for HDI increases. Brazil also did well, ranking third for 
the I-HDI, fourth for the HDI and sixth for the ISC. Panama (seventh) and Costa Rica 
(ninth) appeared among the top 10 HDI performers, as did Uruguay (fifth), Trinidad and 
 188.....................................................................
Tobago (eighth) and Cuba (ninth) among the top 10 ISC performers. At the other extreme, 
LAT states were once again found among the poorest performers, comprising six of the 
bottom 10 HDI performers and four of the bottom 10 ISC and I-HDI performers. Among 
those states beginning at the lower-middle income level (INC 3), Honduras was ranked 
seventh and ninth for ISC and I-HDI increases, and Colombia was ranked ninth for HDI 
increases. El Salvador and Nicaragua were located among the worst HDI, ISC and I-HDI 
performers at this income level, joined by Bolivia (ISC and I-HDI), Colombia (ISC and I- 
HDI), and the Dominican Republic (I-HDI).
The rather mixed performance records of LAT states also become evident when 
evaluated against the three separate threshold standards (Table 5.15). The vast majority of 
democratic states did not exceed any one of the individual thresholds. Indicatively, only four 
(Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Honduras) surpassed the HDI 
developing average, three (Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras) surpassed the ISC 
developing average,and two (the Dominican Republic and Honduras) surpassed the I-HDI 
developing average. The results for the Lev and Inc thresholds were equally dismal (note
Table 5.15 Evaluating Human Development Performance (1970-90) Against 
Threshold Standards, LAT Region
Country LoD
HDI Increase 
Dev Lev Inc
ISC Increase 
Dev Lev Inc
I-HDI Increase 
Dev Lev Inc
Barbados 1.0 + + + + _ + _
Costa Rica 1.0 + + + - - - - + -
Venezuela 1.1 - - + - - - - - -
Trinidad & T. 1.8 - - - + + + - + -
Jamaica 1.9 - - - - - - - - -
Domin. Rep. 2.0 + - - - - - + -
Colombia 2.1 + + + - - - - - -
El Salvador 2.6 - - - - - - - - -
Peru 2.8 - - - - - - - - -
Honduras 2.9 + - - + + + + + +
Uruguay 3.0 - - - + + + + + +
Argentina 3.2 - - - - + - - - -
Ecuador 3.3 + + + - - - + - -
Mexico 3.3 + + + - - - - - -
Bolivia 3.4 + - - - - - - - -
Guatemala 3.4 + - - - - - + - -
Paraguay 4.0 + - - - + - + - -
Nicaragua 4.0 - - - - - - - - -
Brazil 4.2 + + + + + + + + +
Panama 5.3 + + + + + + + + +
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M . i . m . H r n i M i H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chile 6.3 + + + + + + + + +
Haiti 6.7 - + + + + + + + +
Cuba 6.8 - - - + + + + - -
Notes. The actual 1970-90 averages were given in Table 5.2 (Dev), Table 5.5 (Lev), Table 5.9 (Inc). 
(+) above threshold average; (-) below threshold average.
189
that only Honduras exceeded the average I-HDI rate increase produced by all states at its 
respective income level). Two states (Costa Rica and Colombia) surpassed all three HDI 
thresholds, three states (Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras) surpassed all three ISC 
thresholds, and only Honduras surpassed all three I-HDI thresholds.
A higher proportion of non-democratic (3-5*) states exceeded the HDI developing 
average and the I-HDI developing average (but only three surpassed the ISC developing 
average). The majority, however, failed to cross their respective Lev or Inc thresholds for 
any index (five of the ten managed to do so for the ISC Lev threshold). Across the indices, 
four states (Ecuador, Mexico, Brazil, Panama) exceeded all three HDI thresholds, &nd three 
states (Uruguay, Brazil and Panama) exceeded all three ISC and I-HDI thresholds. Only 
Brazil and Panama exceeded every index threshold.
Among the non-democratic (6-7) states, Chile had a higher HDI increase than the 
developing average, although all three states surpassed the ISC and I-HDI developing 
averages. Furthermore, Chile managed to exceed every index threshold, whereas Heiti failed 
to surpass only one, the HDI developing average (Haiti’s apparently favourable record was 
due to the fact that its respective sample groups principally consisted of the sub-Saharan 
African states). Cuba surpassed all three ISC thresholds, none of the HDI thresholds, and 
only the I-HDI developing average.
Levels o f Democracy and Human Development Performance in the Middle $ a st and 
North Africa, 1970-90
Despite the occasional intervention by the military, Turkey (LoD of 24) was the 
only country in the MID region which satisfied the statistical definition of a dem<jcnatic state 
over the period. Three MID states (UAE, Morocco and Iran) had LoD values in ithe non- 
democratic (3-5*) range, while the remaining nine states had firmly authori!ariian LoD 
values (6-7). With the exception of Kuwait, which was already highly developed £>y 1970, 
all MID states began the period from roughly similar levels (Figure 5.13).
Five states began from almost identical HDI levels as Turkey (0.441 J. With an 
increase of 0.298 (68%), Turkey outperformed three of these states - Iran (0.266)', Jordan 
(0.223) and Iraq (0.162) - and essentially equaled the rate increases for Libya (3.3500) and 
Syria (0.308). Of the six states which started the period around Turkey’s ISC le>el (0.592), 
only Iran produced a poorer ISC rate (-0.148) than Turkey (-0.101); Saudi Arabii slhowed a 
very slight decrease (-0.009), whereas Algeria (0.059), Tunisia (0.112) and Egjpt (0.325) 
produced ISC increases. Although starting from a lower ISC level than Turkey iin 1970, 
Jordan’s high increase (0.318 or 73%), coupled with Turkey’s ISC decrease, m^ant that 
Jordan ended up with a substantially higher ISC value by 1990 (0.751, conjpared to 
Turkey’s 0.490). Five states began the period near Turkey’s I-HDI level (0.516), four of 
which - the UAE (0.186), Tunisia (0.231), Libya (0.190) and Saudi Arabia (C). 111) - 
surpassed Turkey’s I-HDI rate increase (0.099); only Iran (0.059) failed to do so 
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Turkey produced a higher HDI increase (0.298) than all three of the non-democratic 
(3-5*) states (average increase of 0.234), and for all but three of the non-democratic (6-7) 
states (which together had an average rate of 0.246): Tunisia (0.350), Syria (0.308) and 
Libya (0.300). Turkey was one of five MID states to display a negative ISC rate for the 
period (largely because of its conflict with the Kurds), but the actual magnitude of its 
decrease (-0.101) was surpassed only by an even worse rate for Iran (-0.148); the average 
ISC rates were 0.005 for the non-democratic (3-5*) states and 0.088 for the non-democratic 
(6-7) states. Its I-HDI increase (0.099 or 19%) was lower than the average increases for the 
non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.120 or 23%) and the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.167 or 
38%). On the whole, Turkey did well in terms of HDI rates (ranked fourth in the region), 
but not in terms of ISC or I-HDI rates (ranked 12th and 11th).
Several states in this region performed particularly well for all three indices (Table 
5.16), all of which had strongly authoritarian LoD values. Egypt displayed the best ISC and 
I-HDI increases, and was ranked fifth in terms of the HDI. Jordan had the second best ISC 
and I-HDI increases, but was ranked tenth for the HDI. Syria had the second best HDI 
increase, the fourth best ISC increase, and the third best I-HDI increase. Tunisia had the 
highest HDI increase and was ranked fourth and fifth for I-HDI and ISC increases. Libya 
was ranked third for the HDI, sixth for the ISC, and fifth for the I-HDI. Even the remaining 
four states from this LoD group produced some impressive absolute and percentage 
increases (and thus the high average rate increases). In fact, the MID non-democratic (6-7) 
states produced a much higher average HDI increase (0.246 or 65%) than the ASI non- 
democratic (3-5*) states (0.195 or 54%), the LAT non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.169 or 
33%) and the LAT non-democratic (6-7) states (0.129 or 34%). Their average ISC rate 
(0.088 or 20%), however, was better than the average for the LAT non-democratic (3-5*) 
states (-0.018 or -2%), but worse than the rates for the ASI non-democratic (3-5*) states 
(0.137 or 36%) and the LAT non-democratic (6-7) states (0.118 or 20%). In terms of 
overall human development performance, the MID non-democratic (6-7) states and ASI 
non-democratic (3-5*) states displayed virtually identical records - I-HDI increases of 
0.167 (38%) and 0.166 (41%) - followed by the LAT non-democratic (6-7) states (0.123 or 
23%) and the LAT non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.075 or 13%). The record of the MID 
non-democratic (6-7) states was largely the reason why the MID region as a whole did quite 
well compared to the other regions (recall Figure 5.10 above).
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Table 5.16 Performance Rates (1970-90) By Level of Democracy,
MID Region
HDI INCREASE ISC INCREASE I-HDI INCREASE
Countrv LoD Absol Perc Ra Absol Perc Ra Absol Perc Ra
Turkey 2.4 0.298 68% 4 -0.101 -17% 12 0.099 19% 11
UAE 5.4 0.170 28% 11 0.203 36% 3 0.186 32% 6
Morocco 5.6 0.267 95% 6 -0.040 -6% 10 0.114 24% 8
Iran 5.7 0.266 66% 7 -0.148 -24% 13 0.059 12% 12
Avg(3-5*) 0.234 63% 0.005 2% 0.120 23%
Egypt 6.0 0.282 105% 5 0.325 86% 1 0.304 94% 1
Kuwait 6.1 0.125 18% 13 -0.095 -12% 11 0.012 2% 13
Tunisia 6.3 0.350 103% 1 0.112 18% 5 0.231 48% 4
Jordan 6.3 0.223 55% 10 0.318 73% 2 0.270 65% 2
Syria 6.4 0.308 74% 2 0.168 43% 4 0.238 59% 3
Algeria 6.5 0.230 71% 9 0.059 10% 7 0.145 32% 7
Saudi Arabia 6.6 0.231 45% 8 -0.009 -2% 9 0.111 21% 9
Libya 6.7 0.300 74% 3 0.079 15% 6 0.190 41% 5
Iraq 6.9 0.162 36% 12 0.037 9% 8 0.099 24% 10
Avg(6-7) 0.246 65% 0.110 27% 0.178 43%
Notes. Absol=Absolute Increase; Perc=Percentage Increase; Ra= Rank (regional, Absolute Increase)
Individually, the MID states excelled when human development levels and income 
levels were controlled for. The overwhelming majority of MID states began the period at 
Low index levels. Five of the top 10 HDI performers found at this level came from this 
region - Tunisia (third), Syria (fifth), Libya (sixth), Turkey (seventh), Egypt (eighth) - as did 
three of the top 10 ISC performers - Egypt (second), Jordan (fourth), Syria (eighth) - and 
five of the top 10 I-HDI performers - Egypt (second), Jordan (third), Syria (fifth), Tunisia 
(sixth), and Libya (tenth). Most of the MID states also began from the lower-middle income 
level (INC 3) in 1970 (Table 5.8 above). The record here was even more impressive, with 
the MID region producing five of the top 10 HDI performers, four of the top 10 ISC 
performers, and five of the top 10 I-HDI performers. More specifically: Egypt was ranked 
first for ISC and I-HDI increases and seventh for HDI increases; Jordan was ranked 
second and third for ISC and I-HDI increases; Tunisia was ranked first for HDI increases, 
sixth for ISC increases, and fifth for I-HDI increases; Syria was ranked fourth for ISC and 
I-HDI increases and fifth for HDI increases; Morocco was ranked eighth for HDI 
increases; and Algeria was ranked eighth for I-HDI increases.
The excellent performance of MID states is also evident in their records against the 
three threshold standards for each index (Table 5.17). All MID states (save for Kuwait) 
surpassed the developing averages for the HDI and I-HDI, and eight of the thirteen states 
surpassed the ISC developing average. Ten of the thirteen states exceeded their respective 
HDI Lev thresholds, and eight exceeded their respective ISC and I-HDI Lev thresholds. All
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Table 5.17 Evaluating Human Development Performance (1970-90) Against
Threshold Standards, MID Region
HDI Increase ISC Increase I-HDI Increase
Countrv LoD Dev Lev Inc Dev Lev Inc Dev Lev Inc
Turkey 2.4 + + + - - - + - -
UAE 5.4 + + + + + + + + +
Morocco 5.6 + + + - - - + - +
Iran 5.7 + + + - - - - - -
-------------------- . . . . — ..— ----------- --------- — ...... ..— .. . .— ...... --------- -----------
Egypt 6.0 + + + + + + + + +
Kuwait 6.1 - - + - - - - - -
Tunisia 6.3 + + + + + + + + +
Jordan 6.3 + - + + + + + + +
Syria 6.4 + + + + + + + + +
Algeria 6.5 + + + + + + + + +
Saudi Arabia 6.6 + + + - - - + + +
Libya 6.7 + + + + + + + + +
Iraq 6.9 + “ + + + + + - +
Notes. The actua 
(+) above
1970-90 averages were given in Table 5.2 (Dev), Table 5.5 (Lev), Table 5.9 (Inc), 
threshold average; (-) below threshold average.
thirteen states produced HDI increases above their respective Inc thresholds, whereas eight 
crossed their ISC Inc thresholds and ten crossed their respective I-HDI Inc thresholds. 
Most impressively, ten of the thirteen MID states managed to surpass all three HDI 
thresholds, eight surpassed all three ISC thresholds, and eight surpassed all three I-HDI 
thresholds.
Turkey’s own performance was, by comparison, mediocre: although it exceeded all 
three HDI thresholds, it did not exceed any ISC threshold and could only exceed the 
developing average among the I-HDI thresholds. Six states in this region succeeded in 
surpassing every threshold - the UAE, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Algeria and Libya - and one 
state (Jordan) surpassed all but one threshold.
Levels o f Democracy and Human Development Performance in sub-Saharan Africa, 
1970-90
There were only two AFR states which met the statistical definition of a democracy 
over this period, Mauritius (LoD of 2.2) and Gambia (2.5). Botswana fell just outside the 
LoD 1-2* range (3.0), a reflection of its status as more of a de facto ‘dominant-party’ state 
(Chapter 7). Of the 34 non-democratic states, 12 had period LoD values in the 3-5* range 
and 22 had LoD values of 6-7.
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The generally poor record for this region as a whole has previously been 
acknowledged (Figure 5.10 above). With the notable exceptions of Mauritius and 
Botswana, very few of these states performed at or near the rates of other developing states. 
Most AFR states began the period from quite low index levels and came from the poorest 
income groups. A selection of AFR states and their respective records over this period is 
presented in Figure 5.14.
The record of Mauritius was impressive. Despite starting with an HDI value of 
0.524 in 1970, placing it barely within the Medium level, its increase of 0.254 meant that 
Mauritius fell just shy of the High Level mark by 1990 (0.778). In contrast, South Africa 
(LoD 5.3) began from a slightly higher level (0.591) but produced an HDI increase of only 
0.059. Mauritius’ incremental ISC increase (0.028) should be evaluated against its already 
high ISC level in 1970 (0.787); it had crossed into the High index level (0.800+) by 1990. 
As a result of its HDI and ISC increases, Mauritius’ I-HDI value rose from 0.656 in 1970 
to 0.797 in 1990 (almost at the High index level), an increase of 0.141 or 21%. South 
Africa, which began from a slightly lower I-HDI level (0.606) but also from one income 
level above (INC 2), could only improve its I-HDI value by 0.013 (2%).
The other democratic state, Gambia, could hardly provide a starker contrast. Its HDI 
value for 1970 (0.107) placed it among the least developed states; only Mali had a lower 
value (0.102). Although Gambia essentially doubled its HDI value by 1990 (0.215), its 
woefully low value still placed it (barely) above only Sierra Leone (0.209), Burkina Faso 
(0.203), Chad (0.214), Niger (0.209), Mali (0.214) and Guinea (0.191). Gambia’s ISC 
value in 1970 (0.655) placed it among most of the AFR states; moreover, like the majority 
(23 of 36) of these states, Gambia showed a negative ISC rate (-0.035 or -5%) over the 
period. Gambia’s I-HDI value in 1970 (0.381), though quite low, was higher than half the 
AFR countries’ I-HDI values. Despite a meager I-HDI increase (0.036 or 10%) over the 
period, Gambia’s 1990 value (0.417) was still greater than the I-HDI values for 17 AFR 
states.
Botswana was the stellar performer in this region. The ruling Botswana Democratic 
Party managed to transform the country dramatically in just two decades. With an HDI 
value of only 0.284 in 1970, Botswana had become a Medium level state by 1990 (0.670) 
because of its phenomenal rate increase (0.386 or 136%). Its steady ISC increase (0.102 or 
16%) raised Botswana’s ISC value from 0.652 in 1970 to 0.754 in 1990. On the strength 
of these rates, Botswana produced an overall I-HDI increase of 0.244 (52%), from 0.468 to 
0.712, thereby achieving the status of ‘upper-middle level’ state (to fully appreciate this 
accomplishment, one may observe in these graphs the very different fortunes of six other 
AFR states which began the period from similar index levels - Zimbabwe, Gabon, Kenya, 
Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Congo). Furthermore, despite starting from considerably lower 
levels,Botswana almost reached Mauritius’ high index values by 1990.
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Fig. 5.14 Human Development Profile By Level of Democracy, 
AFR Region (Selected Countries)
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On the strength of Mauritius’ performance, the two democratic states produced 
better average increases than the non-democratic groups (Table 5.18). This observation is, 
however, largely undermined by the uneven distribution of states by level of democracy in 
this region, and by the altogether dissimilar records of Mauritius and Gambia. Botswana 
was ranked first for HDI and I-HDI increases and third for ISC increases. Mauritius was 
ranked second in the region for HDI increases, thirteenth for ISC increases, and third for I- 
HDI increases. Despite its (misleadingly) impressive record - ranked first for ISC increases 
and second for I-HDI increases (twelfth for HDI increases) - Burundi remained at relatively 
low index levels by 1990.10 Other countries which performed comparatively well (in 
regional terms) for all three indices include Nigeria, Senegal, Gabon, Ivory Coast and 
Congo.
Table 5.18 Performance Rates (1970-90) By Level of Democracy,
AFR Region
Country LoD
HDI INCREASE 
Absol Perc Ra
ISC INCREASE 
Absol Perc Ra
I-HDI INCREASE 
Absol Perc Ra
Mauritius 2.2 0.254 48% 2 0.028 4% 13 0.141 21% 3
Gambia 2.5 0.108 101% 15 -0.035 -5% 23 0.036 10% 19
Avg(l-2*) 0.181 75% -0.004 -1% 0.089 16%
Botswana 3.0 0.386 136% 1 0.102 16% 3 0.244 52% 1
Madagascar 4.6 0.105 36% 17 -0.045 -7% 24 0.030 7% 23
Uganda 4.9 0.059 28% 30 -0.084 -25% 31 -0.012 -5% 31
Zimbabwe 4.9 0.148 45% 7 0.028 5% 12 0.088 19% 9
Nigeria 5.0 0.118 51% 13 0.164 38% 2 0.141 43% 4
Zambia 5.1 0.037 12% 35 -0.091 -15% 32 -0.027 -6% 32
Senegal 5.1 0.146 83% 9 0.095 17% 4 0.120 33% 5
South Africa 5.3 0.059 10% 32 -0.033 -5% 22 0.013 2% 28
Sierra Leone 5.6 0.054 35% 33 -0.155 -28% 33 -0.050 -14% 33
Sudan 5.7 0.088 47% 22 -0.081 -24% 30 0.004 1% 30
Liberia 5.9 0.088 38% 23 -0.062 -12% 26 0.013 3% 27
Gabon 5.9 0.147 39% 8 0.081 14% 6 0.114 24% 7
Avg(3-5*) 0.120 47% -0.007 -2% 0.056 16%
Tanzania 6.0 0.095 45% 20 -0.065 -11% 27 0.015 4% 26
Lesotho 6.2 0.169 55% 5 -0.009 -1% 18 0.080 17% 12
Kenya 6.2 0.180 71% 4 -0.068 -10% 28 0.056 12% 16
Burkina F. 6.2 0.087 75% 24 -0.022 -4% 20 0.032 9% 22
(cont’d)
1^ These figures should be placed in context. Burundi's high ISC increase (and, consequently, its high I-HDI 
increase) was solely determined by changes in its peace/stability values (and, consequently, in its Security 
Index values). The Tutsi-Hutu conflicts which claimed an estimated 200,000 lives in 1972 ensured that 
Burundi’s peace/stability value circa 1970 was 0.000. By 1990, however, the relative peace which existed 
produceda value of 1.000 - a period differenceof +1.000. Accordingly, Burundi's Security Index value rose 
from 0.472 in 1970 to 0.957 in 1990, and its ISC value rose from 0.319 to 0.563. In short, Burundi's 
transition from conflict to peace shaped its ISC and I-HDI rates for the period.
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(Table 5.18cont’d)
HDI INCREASE ISC INCREASE I-HDI INCREASE
Country LoD Absol Perc Ra Absol Perc Ra Absol Perc Ra
Ivory Coast 6.4 0.127 52% 11 0.073 13% 8 0.100 25% 8
Mozambiq. 6.5 0.004 2% 36 -0.172 -50% 34 -0.084 -28% 35
Ghana 6.5 0.099 35% 18 -0.080 -14% 29 0.010 2% 29
Cameroon 6.5 0.194 77% 3 -0.031 -5% 21 0.082 19% 11
Rwanda 6.7 0.059 27% 31 -0.003 -1% 15 0.028 8% 25
Malawi 6.7 0.084 48% 25 -0.016 -3% 19 0.034 10% 21
Zaire 6.8 0.106 45% 16 -0.049 -11% 25 0.028 8% 24
Congo 6.8 0.154 50% 6 0.079 14% 7 0.116 26% 6
Chad 6.8 0.077 57% 27 0.088 22% 5 0.082 31% 10
Togo 6.8 0.128 70% 10 -0.007 -1% 16 0.060 15% 14
Angola 6.8 0.076 39% 28 -0.222 -65% 35 -0.073 -27% 34
Cen.Afr.R 6.9 0.053 27% 34 0.056 11% 9 0.054 15% 17
Niger 6.9 0.075 56% 29 0.042 8% 11 0.058 18% 15
Mali 6.9 0.112 110% 14 0.046 9% 10 0.079 27% 13
Burundi 6.9 0.119 76% 12 0.244 76% 1 0.181 76% 2
Benin 7.0 0.099 61% 19 -0.001 -0% 14 0.049 13% 18
Guinea 7.0 0.080 72% 26 -0.008 -2% 17 0.036 12% 20
Somalia 7.0 0.093 75% 21 -0.270 -65% 36 -0.089 -33% 36
Avg(6-7) 0.103 56% -0.018 -4% 0.043 12%
Notes. Absd=Absolute Increase; Perc= Percentage Increase; Ra= Rank (regional, Absolute Increase)
Table 5.19 below shows just how poorly most states in this region fared against the 
records for all developing states (Dev), and against those states beginning the period from 
similar human development levels (Lev) and income levels (Inc). Only five AFR states 
(Mauritius, Botswana, Lesotho, Kenya and Cameroon) produced HDI increases above the 
developing average. A higher proportion (13 of 36, or just over one-third) surpassed the 
ISC developing average, while only one-quarter (9) surpassed the I-HDI developing average 
for the period. One-quarter (9) of AFR states crossed their respective HDI Lev thresholds, 
one-third (12) crossed their respective ISC Lev thresholds, and around one-sixth (7) 
crossed their I-HDI Lev thresholds. Broadly similar patterns are observed for the Inc 
thresholds.
Only four states - Mauritius, Botswana, Kenya and Cameroon - surpassed all three 
of their respective HDI thresholds, eleven states surpassed all three ISC thresholds, and five 
states (Mauritius, Botswana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Burundi) surpassed all three of their 
respective I-HDI thresholds. Remarkably, exactly half of all AFR states failed to surpass 
even one threshold (including, it should be noted, democratic Gambia). Two states, 
Mauritius and Botswana, succeeded in surpassing every threshold.
Only the records of Mauritius and Botswana stand out in this region, and both 
compare favourably against the top performers from the other regions. Mauritius produced 
the fourth highest HDI increase among all the states beginning from the Medium HDI level
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Table 5.19 Evaluating Human Development Performance (1970-90) Against
Threshold Standards, AFR Region
HDI Increase ISC Increase I-HDI Increase
Country LoD Dev Lev Inc Dev Lev Inc Dev Lev Inc
Mauritius 2.2 + + + + + + + + +
Gambia 2.5 - - - - - - - - -
Botswana 3.0 + + + + + + + + +
Madagascar 4.6 - - - - - - - - -
Uganda 4.9 - - - - - - - - -
Zimbabwe 4.9 - - - + - + + - -
Nigeria 5.0 - + - + + + + + +
Zambia 5.1 - - - - - - - - -
Senegal 5.1 - + - + + + + + +
South Africa 5.3
Sierra Leone 5.6 - - - - - - - - -
Sudan 5.7 - - - - - - - - -
Liberia 5.9 - - - - - - - - -
Gabon 5.9 - - - + + + + - +
Tanzania 6.0 - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
Lesotho 6.2 + - + - - - - - +
Kenya 6.2 + + + - - - - - -
Burkina F. 6.2 - - - - - - - - -
Ivory Coast 6.4 - + - + + + + - -
Mozambique 6.5 - - - - - - - - -
Ghana 6.5 - - - - - - - - -
Cameroon 6.5 + + + - - - - - +
Rwanda 6.7 - - - - - - - - -
Malawi 6.7 - - - - - - - - -
Zaire 6.8 - - - - - - - - -
Congo 6.8 - - - + + + + - +
Chad 6.8 - - - + + + - + +
Togo 6.8 - + + - - - - - -
Angola 6.8 - - - - - - - - -
Cen. Afr. R. 6.9 - - - + + + - - -
Niger 6.9 - - - + + + - - -
Mali 6.9 - - - + - + - + +
Burundi 6.9 - + - + + + + + +
Benin 7.0 - - - - + - - - -
Guinea 7.0 - - - - - - - - -
Somalia 7.0 - - - - - - - - -
Notes. The actua 1970-90 averages were given in Table 5.2 (Dev), Table 5.5 (Lev), Table 5.9 (Inc).
(+) above threshold average; (-) below threshold average.
in 1970 (Table 5.4), and produced the tenth highest HDI and I-HDI increases among all 
states beginning from the lower-middle income (INC 3) level (Table 5.8). Botswana, on the 
other hand, produced the highest HDI increase and the third highest I-HDI increase (behind 
only Indonesia and Jordan) among all states found at the Low index levels in 1970. Among 
all states found at the poorest income (INC 4) level in 1970, Botswana produced the highest 
HDI increase, the second highest I-HDI increase (behind Indonesia), and the sixth highest 
ISC increase.
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The Records of Developing Democracies In Perspective
From the foregoing regional accounts, it has become apparent that some democratic 
states have performed quite well over the 1970-90 period while some have not It is perhaps 
prudent to briefly consider some of the more salient findings specifically relating to the 
records of developing democracies.
Table 5.20 presents the performance rate increases, in absolute and percentage 
terms, along with the corresponding regional ranks, for the seventeen democratic states in 
the sample (listed by region). Five states did particularly well in terms of HDI increases, 
placing among the top five ranks in their respective regions: Malaysia (0.323 or 69%), 
Turkey (0.298 or 68%), Colombia (0.259 or 47%), Mauritius (0.254 or 68%), and Costa 
Rica (0.201 or 31%). Four largely developed LAT democracies (Barbados, Venezuela, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica) produced lower incremental increases. Of the remaining 
eight states, three (Sri Lanka, the Dominican Republic and Honduras) produced what may 
be termed ‘satisfactory’ HDI increases (above the developing average of 0.155), while five 
(India, Papua New Guinea, El Salvador, Peru and Gambia) states produced unsatisfactory 
results.
Table 5.20 The Performance Rates (1970-90) of Developing Democracies
In Perspective
HDI INCREASE ISC INCREASE I-HDI INCREASE
Country LoD Absol Perc Ra Absol Perc Ra Absol Perc Ra
India 1.5 0.128 50% 11 0.091 20% 7 0.109 31% 8
Sri Lanka 1.8 0.159 31% 6 -0.111 -16% 15 0.024 4% 14
Papua NG. 2.1 0.083 26% 15 0.031 4% 11 0.057 11% 13
Malavsia 2.6 0.323 69% 3 0.002 0% 13 0.163 27% 6
Avg(ASI) 0.173 44% 0.003 2% 0.088 18%
Barbados 1.0 0.070 8% 22 0.053 6% 9 0.062 1% 15
Costa Rica 1.0 0.201 31% 5 -0.035 -4% 16 0.083 11% 12
Venezuela 1.1 0.092 13% 19 -0.065 -8% 17 0.013 2% 19
Trinidad&T 1.8 0.066 8% 23 0.093 12% 5 0.080 10% 13
Jamaica 1.9 0.087 13% 20 -0.034 -4% 15 0.026 4% 18
Domin. Rep. 2.0 0.183 40% 6 -0.014 -2% 13 0.085 15% 10
Colombia 2.1 0.259 47% 1 -0.101 -14% 19 0.079 12% 14
El Salvador 2.6 0.121 29% 14 -0.162 -25% 22 -0.021 -4% 22
Peru 2.8 0.114 22% 16 -0.147 -24% 21 -0.016 -3% 21
Honduras 2.9 0.174 50% 7 0.108 17% 4 0.141 29% 4
Avg(LAT) HMHHimil 0.137 26% -0.030 -4% ............ 0.053 8%
Turkey 2.4 0.298 68% 4 -0.101 -17% 12 0.099 19% 11
Mauritius 2.2 0.254 48% 2 0.028 4% 13 0.141 21% 3
Gambia 2.5 0.108 101% 15 -0.035 -5% 23 0.036 10% 19
Avg(AFR) 0.181 75% -0.004 -1% 0.089 16%
Notes. Absd=Absolute Increase; Perc=Percentage Increase; Ra=Rank (regional, Absolute Increase)
200
The picture was less favourable for ISC rates. Only Honduras (0.108 or 17%) and 
Trinidad and Tobago (0.093 or 12%) could be found among the top five regional ranks. 
Four states (India, Papua New Guinea, Barbados and Mauritius) produced satisfactory 
increases (i.e., above the developing average of 0.013), while Malaysia (0.002) essentially 
remained at the same ISC level by 1990. The ten remaining democracies displayed negative 
ISC rates over the period, ranging from -0.014 (-2%) for the Dominican Republic to -0.162 
(-25%) for El Salvador. The deterioration in social conditions could primarily be blamed on 
the greater collective insecurity observed by 1990 (due to runaway inflation, socio-political 
conflict,or both).
Only two states (Honduras and Mauritius) were ranked among the top five for I- 
HDI increases in their regions. Malaysia actually had a higher absolute I-HDI increase 
(0.163) but was ranked sixth in Asia. The more incremental increases for Barbados, Costa 
Rica, Venezuela and Jamaica could be partly explained by their already high I-HDI values in 
1970. Of the remaining ten states, three (India, the Dominican Republic and Turkey) 
produced I-HDI increases above the developing average (0.084), while four (Sri Lanka, 
Papua New Guinea, Colombia and Gambia) produced relatively modest I-HDI increases. 
Two conflict-ridden states, El Salvador and Peru, saw their overall human development 
conditions deteriorate over the period (by -4% and -3%, respectively).
Just how the developing democracies performed against the three threshold 
standards (Dev, Lev and Inc) may be seen in Table 5.21 (overleaf). Looking across the 
indices: only Mauritius and Honduras managed to surpass the developing averages for the 
HDI, ISC and I-HDI; only Mauritius, Barbados and India surpassed their respective HDI, 
ISC and I-HDI Lev thresholds; and only Mauritius and India surpassed their respective 
HDI, ISC and I-HDI Inc thresholds. The results were slightly more encouraging when 
viewed by index: five states (Malaysia, Costa Rica, Colombia, Turkey and Mauritius) 
exceeded all three of their respective HDI thresholds; six states (India, Papua New Guinea, 
Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras and Mauritius) exceeded all three of their 
respective ISC thresholds; and four states (India, Malaysia, Honduras and Mauritius) 
exceeded all three of their respective I-HDI thresholds. Perhaps most tellingly of all, only 
Mauritius managed to exceed every index threshold; it will be recalled that this feat was 
accomplished by six non-democratic (3-5*) states (South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Panama, Brazil and the UAE) and seven non-democratic (6-7) states (China, Chile, Egypt, 
Tunisia, Syria, Algeria and Libya).
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Table 5.21 Evaluating Human Development Performance (1970-90) of Developing
Democracies Against Threshold Standards
Country LoD
HDI Increase 
Dev Lev Inc
ISC Increase 
Dev Lev Inc
I-HDI Increase 
Dev Lev Inc
India 1.5 _ + + + + + + + +
Sri Lanka 1.8 + - - - - - - - -
Papua NG. 2.1 - - - + + + - - -
Malaysia 2.6 + + + - - - + + +
. . .— — ....... — . . . . . .— . . . . . .— .— ------------ --------------------- — .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. ----------. . . . . ------------ .....
Barbados 1.0 - + - + + + - + -
Costa Rica 1.0 + + + - - - - + -
Venezuela 1.1 - - + - - - - - -
Trinidad & T. 1.8 - - - + + + - + -
Jamaica 1.9 - - - - - - - - -
Domin. Rep. 2.0 + - - - - - + - -
Colombia 2.1 + + + - - - - - -
El Salvador 2.6 - - - - - - - - -
Peru 2.8 - - - - - - - - -
Honduras 2.9 + - - + + + + + +
Turkey 2.4 + + + - - - + - -
Mauritius 2.2 + + + + + + + + +
Gambia 2.5 - - - - - - - - -
Notes. The actual 1970-90 averages were given in Table 5.2  (Dev), Table 5.5 (Lev), Table 5 .9  (Inc). 
(+) above threshold average; (-) below threshold average.
5.5 Summary of Chapter Findings
The findings in this chapter confirm that there is no general relationship between 
levels of democracy and human development performance. Specifically, it has been shown 
that the correlations between levels of democracy and improvements in human development 
conditions were extremely weak, particularly among developing states (Table 5.1). To 
further demonstrate the lack of any general patterns between the variables, it was shown that 
the average level of democracy consistently remained within a narrow range across rank 
performance groups (Figure 5.1).
In the absence of controlling variables, democratic states produced modest rate 
increases, whereas non-democratic states produced either very high or very low - and 
sometimes negative - rates (Figure 5.2). When the average performance rates of the three 
LoD groups were directly compared, democratic states displayed slightly worse records
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than the non-democratic (3-5*) states and, less often, the non-democratic (6-7) states 
(Figure 5.3). Moreover, in the absence of controlling variables, democracies in the 
developing world performed no differently than their non-democratic counterparts in terms 
of HDI rates, but performed worse in terms of ISC and, most importantly, I-HDI rates 
(Table 5.2).
There is a general relationship between the levels and rates of human development: 
for the HDI and I-HDI (but not for the unpredictable ISC), inverted ‘U’ patterns suggest 
that the highest average performance rates are to be found at the lower-middle range of 
index values, while the lowest rates are to be found at either end of the index scales (Figure 
5.4). There is, therefore, a need to control for index levels. Accordingly, when similar index 
levels were controlled for, the non-democratic (3-5*) states performed only marginally 
better than democratic states at the one index level (Medium) where comparisons were 
meaningful (Figures 5.5,5.6,5.7, and Tables 5.3 and 5.4). On a proportional basis, the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states also produced slightly more ‘above average’ performers in the 
developing world in terms of HDI, ISC and I-HDI rates (Table 5.5).
There is also a general relationship between human development performance and 
levels of economic development: the highest rate increases are usually produced by middle- 
income states (Figure 5.8). Taking this into account, when levels of economic development 
were controlled for, democratic states did not, on average, appear to perform as well as non- 
democratic (3-5*) states (Table 5.6). However, when index levels were factored into the 
analysis, meaningful comparisons could only be made at two income levels (Figure 5.9). 
Here, democratic and non-democratic states displayed broadly similar performance rates at 
the upper-middle income level, but democratic states displayed worse records at the lower- 
middle income level (Tables 5.7 and 5.8). On a proportional basis, developing democracies 
displayed fewer ‘above average’ rate increases, relative to their income levels, than the two 
non-democratic groups of states (Table 5.9).
Human development performance varied greatly by region: the highest average 
performance rates were produced by the MID region, the lowest were produced by the AFR 
region (Figure 5.10). Across the regions, no LoD group consistently produced the highest 
average increases irrespective of index and period, although the most authoritarian (6-7) 
states appeared to display the best overall record (Table 5.10). More non-democratic (6-7) 
states, proportionally, displayed higher increases, relative to the regional averages, than did 
the democratic states, although the differences were not great and varied by index (Table 
5.11). Judging from the more detailed regional overviews (Figures 5.11-5.14, Tables 5.12- 
5.20), one could argue that, to varying degrees, democratic states did not perform as well as 
non-democratic states in the ASI, LAT and MID regions; the record of the democratic states 
in the AFR region was mixed. Few developing democratic states consistently displayed 
‘above average’ performance records when compared against the various threshold averages 
(Table 5.21).
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CHAPTER 6 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DEVELOPING WORLD: 
DEMOCRACY AND SELECTED SOCIAL INDICATORS, 1970-1990
Thus far, the democracy-development relationship has been explored using three 
composite measures, the HDI, ISC and I-HDI. This chapter will present data pertaining to 
‘basic’ indicators such as literacy rates, life expectancy rates, gender equity rates, etc, 
which have been subsumed by their respective composite measures,1 focusing on the 
developing world over the 1970-90 period. Continuing the investigation into the dual 
nature of the relationships explored in Chapters 4 and 5, the first part of the chapter will 
examine the findings concerning democracy and social indicator levels, whereas the 
second part will consider the findings on democracy and selected indicator performance 
rates.
6.1 Democracy and Selected Indicator Levels
In the sections to follow it will be shown that, by and large, the observations made 
in Chapter 4 regarding the composite indices also hold for the individual indicators. 
Specifically, it will be argued that: (1) while there is a general relationship between 
democracy and higher indicator levels, this relationship is not automatic and varies by 
indicator; (2) the level of economic development serves as the crucial intervening 
variable, although democratic states, whether wealthy or poor, still display the highest 
average indicator rates; and (3) regional variations matter - democratic states do not 
always display the highest average indicator rates within every developing region.
General Patterns
It will be recalled that, regarding the sample of developing states, democracy is 
moderately correlated with higher individual capabilities (HDI), better social conditions 
(ISC), and higher overall human development (I-HDI) values (r2 values explain 16-30% - 
see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). It will also be remembered that, whereas there is no 
observable relationship between democracy and levels of economic development in the 
developing world, a moderate relationship does exist between levels of economic
^The rationale behind the construction of the composite indices was described in Chapter 3 (refer also to
the Technical Notes). The two key measures of individual capabilities which feature in die UNDPs Human 
Development Index and in Morris’ Physical Quality of life Index, adult literacy and life expectancy, will 
be considered, along with the three sub-indices - Liberty Index, Security Index, Mobility Index, and their 
respective constituent indicators (civil liberties and child survival rates for the LIB Index, peace/stability 
and inflation rates for the SEC Index, and tertiary enrollment, gender equity and % of non-agricultural 
employment rates for the MOB Index) - which together comprise the Index of Social Conditions (ISC).
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development and human development (Table 4.5). In order to properly distinguish which 
of these, democracy or economic development, explains more of the variation in indicator 
levels, Table 6.1 presents the correlations (N=88 developing states) between the 
individual indicators and democracy (left panel), and between the indicators and 
economic development (right panel).
Table 6.1 Correlations Involving Selected Indicators and Levels of 
Democracy, Economic Development (1970 and 1990)
Indicator
Level of Dem (LoD) 
1970 1990
Econ Dev (GDP/C) 
1970 1990
literacy -0.534 -0.558 0.251 0.361
*yr= 0.285 0312 0.063 0.131
Life Expectancy p= -0.445 -0.509 0.496 0.516
i*= 0.198 0.259 0.246 0.266
Child Survival r= -0.428 -0.475 0.456 0.475
(SURV) ' yr= 0.183 0.225 0.208 0.226
Civil Liberties r= 0.755 0.885 -0.159 -0.166
■>r= 0.570 0.783 0.025 0.028
LIB Index r= -0.748 -0.836 0.324 0.320
•yr= 0.559 0.699 0.105 0.102
Peace/Stability r= -0.068 -0.091 0.184 0.089
(CONF) i*= 0.005 0.008 0.034 0.008
Inflation r= -0.068 -0.156 0.162 -0.074
•yr= 0.005 0.024 0.026 0.006
SEC Index r= -0.023 0.105 0.074 0.205
i*= 0.001 0.011 0.006 0.042
Tertiary Enrol. r= -0.431 -0.502 0.237 0.302
r*= 0.186 0.252 0.056 0.091
Gender Equity r= -0.459 -0.417 0.160 0.480
i*= 0.211 0.174 0.026 0.231
%NAgr r= -0343 -0.431 0.645 0.584
P= 0.118 0.186 0.416 0.341
MOB Index r= -0.462 -0.496 0.541 0.553
i*= 0.214 0.246 0.293 0.306
The level of democracy is strongly correlated with only two of the twelve 
indicators, the civil liberties measure (the positive signs arise because, like LoD values, 
CL values use an inverted scale) and the Liberty Index (the negative signs indicate that 
higher LIB values correspond to lower, i.e. more democratic, LoD values). Moderate and 
negative correlations are found for seven indicators: adult literacy, life expectancy, child
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survival, tertiary enrollment, gender equity, % non-agriculture employment, and the 
Mobility Index. The only broad area of human development where levels of democracy 
have no observable impact is ‘security’: the correlations are extremely weak between 
democracy and the Security Index, and between democracy and its two constituent 
indicators, inflation and peace/stability.
Democracy is thus associated, albeit to different degrees, with higher levels of 
‘individual capabilities’ (adult literacy and life expectancy), ‘liberty’ (civil liberties, child 
survival, and the Liberty Index), and ‘social mobility’ (tertiary enrollment, gender equity, 
% non-agricultural employment, and the Mobility Index), but there is no relationship 
between democracy and levels of ‘security’ (inflation, peace/stability, and the Security 
Index). Furthermore, it is apparent that, aside from the predictable cases of civil liberties 
and the Liberty Index, the explanatory potential of democracy is not great: when averaged 
out for both dates, the r-squared values range from a high of 30% (adult literacy) to a low 
of 0.06% (Security Index). This modest explanatory potential also suggests, of course, 
that there were tremendous variations in indicator rates within and across each level of 
democracy for both dates (Table 6.2 overleaf).2
The level of economic development, by contrast, shows moderately-strong 
positive correlations with one indicator, % non-agricultural employment, and moderate 
correlations with three indicators, life expectancy, child survival, and the Mobility Index. 
The relationship between economic development and gender equity is unclear: very weak 
correlations are found for 1970 and moderate correlations are found for 1990. Somewhat 
surprisingly, economic development has very little impact on the remaining seven 
indicators: literacy, civil liberties, the Liberty Index, peace/stability, inflation, the 
Security Index, and tertiary enrollment.
Looking down the table, it is fairly apparent that the level of democracy and the 
level of economic development have similar explanatory potential in the developing 
world. In fact, the two variables may explain roughly the same amount of variation in six 
of the twelve indicators: life expectancy, child survival, peace/stability, inflation, the 
Security Index and the Mobility Index. The two variables also explain as much of the 
variation in gender equity rates for 1990, although the level of democracy explains more
^Undoubtedly, there were states with good and bad records within each LoD group: a wide gulf in adult 
literacy rates in 1970 separated the two democratic states, Barbados (99%) and Gambia (6%), just as one 
separated the two non-democratic (3-5*) states, Argentina (93%) and Somalia (3%), and the two non- 
democratic (6-7) states, Cuba (87%) and Niger (4%). Very little also separated the best/worst states across 
the levels of democracy: in terms of life expectancy in 1990, democratic Costa Rica and non-democratic 
Cuba shared the same rate (76 years), while the worst records in their respective LoD groups were separated 
by only 2 years (Gambia at 44 years, Sierra Leone at 42 years). The obvious example provided by the 
peace/stability (CONF) index captures both phenomena to an extreme degree: the values ranged from the 
absolute maximum of 1.000 (complete peace/stability) to the absolute minimum of 0.000 (complete 
instability) for each level of democracy in 1970 and 1990. Notions of ‘stability’ and ‘instability’ are no 
more the exclusive domains of any particular level of democracy than are ‘literacy’ and ‘illiteracy’.
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Table 6.2 Variations In Indicator Rates By Level of Democracy, 1970 and 1990
Indicator Status
1970
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
1990
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Literacy
W
Highest
Lowest
99 (Barbad) 93 (Argent) 87 (Cuba) 
6 (Gambia) 3 (Somal.) 4 (Mger)
100 (Barb) 94 (Chile) 95 (Cuba) 
36 (Gamb) 27 (Nepal) 20 (BurkF)
Life Expect 
(years)
Highest
Lowest
69 (2 dif) 70 (HongK) 71 (Cuba) 
35 (Gamb.) 34(Sierr.L) 36(2dif)
76 (CostaR) 77 (HongK) 76 (Cuba) 
44 (Gamb) 43 (Ugand) 42 (SierrL)
ChildSurv.
(%)
Highest
Lowest
96 (Trinid) 98 (HongK) 95 (Cuba) 
68 (Gamb) 65 (Afghan) 64 (Mali)
99 (Barbad) 99 (HongK) 99 (Cuba) 
76 (Gamb) 79 (Liberia) 70 (Mozam)
Civil Lib 
(1.0-7.0)*
Best
Worst
1.0 (2 dif) 2.0 (HongK) 3.0 (2dif)
4.0 (3 dif) 6.0 (5 dif) 7.0 (10 dif)
1.0 (3 dif) 2.0 (HongK) 3.7 (Tunis.) 
4.7 (SriLa) 6.3 (Sudan) 7.0 (3 dif)
LIB Index 
(1.0-0.0)**
Highest
Lowest
0.946(Barb) 0.893(Hong) 0.691(Ecua) 
0.527(Bang) 0.315(Soma) 0.191(Guin)
0.985(Barb) 0.909(Hong) 0.709(Tun.) 
0.651(Gam) 0.383(Suda) 0.208(Ang)
CONF
(1.0-0.0)**
Highest
Lowest
1.000(8dif) 1.000(19dif) 1.000(29dif) 
0.000(2dif) 0.000(2dif) 0.000(1 ldif)
1.000(18dif) 1.000(10dif) 1.000(24dif) 
0.000(2dif) 0.000(3dif) 0.000(5dif)
Inflation
(%)
Best
Worst
-03 (Malay) 0.3 (Guat) -1.0 (China) 
51.0 (Urug) 46.1 (Braz) 63.0(Indon)
5.2 (2diff) 1.1 (UAE) -2.7 (Kuw) 
416.9 (Arg) 583.7 (Nic) 707.0(Ang)
SEC Index 
(1.0-0.0)**
Highest
Lowest
0.987(Vene) 0.994(Kuw) 1.000(Iran) 
0.370(Chile) 0.460(Nig.) 0.000(lndo)
0.948(2dif) 0.989(UAE) 0.996(Cong) 
0.262(Peru) 0.165(Suda) 0.000(Ang)
Tert Enrol. 
(Rates %)
Highest
Lowest
11.3 (Urug) 19.8 (Phil) 9.8 (Syria) 
0.1 (Gamb) 0.0(BurkF) 0.0 (Chad)
39.9 (Arge) 20.9 (Pana) 21.7 (Jorda) 
0.7 (Gamb) l.l(Ugan) 0.2(Moza)
GEND
(1.0-0.0)**
Highest
Lowest
0.728(Barb) 0.474<Fhil) 0.488(China 
0.110(Bang) 0.052(Afgh) 0.062(Saudi]
0.900(Barb) 0.724(Hong) 0.854<Cuba) 
0.261(PNG) 0.121(Bang) 0.091(Afgh)
NAgr
(%)
Highest
Lowest
85 (Urug) 98 (Kuw) 66 (Jord) 
14 (Bang) 10 (2dif) 6 (Nepal)
95 (Urug) 100 (Sing) 99 (Kuw) 
16 (Gamb) 7 (Nepal) 8 (Bum)
MOB Index 
(1.0-0.0)**
Highest
Lowest
0.532(Urug) 0.506(Sing) 0.339(Cuba) 
0.093(Bang) 0.081(Afgh) 0.066(Mali)
0.704<SKor) 0.650(Hong) 0.630(Cuba) 
0.160(Gamb) 0.142(Nepal) 0.092(Mali)
Notes: *Civil Liberties range from 1.0 (most rights) to 7.0 (fewest/no) rights 
**ScaIe ranges from 1.000 (highest) to 0.000 (lowest) 
dif=different states
of the variation for 1970. The only indicator which is more strongly associated with 
economic development is the % of non-agricultural employment. Democracy is more 
strongly associated with adult literacy, civil liberties and the Liberty Index.
Comparing Average Indicator Rates: Controlling For Economic Development
On the basis of the correlations, and recalling that democratic states displayed the 
highest average HDI, ISC and I-HDI values (Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4), even after
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controlling for similar levels of economic development (Table 4.8, Figure 4.7), one would 
expect that the developing democracies would exhibit the highest average indicator rates. 
Using data for two separate dates (1970 and 1990), Table 6.3 (overleaf) confirms that this 
is the case. Developing states were first divided into the wealthiest (INC 1 and 2) and 
poorest (INC 3 and 4) samples for the date in question, and then further separated 
according to their LoD values.3
In the vast majority of cases, democratic states displayed the highest indicator 
averages for both dates and across both samples (wealthy and poor), with the notable 
exception of the security indicators. A further general point worth making concerns the 
impact of economic development: the evidence suggests that, irrespective o f the level o f 
democracy, wealthy developing states consistently displayed higher indicator averages 
than poor developing states. A more detailed examination of each set of indicators will 
now ensue.
•Individual Capabilities Measures: Adult Literacy, Life Expectancy
Among wealthy and poor states alike, developing democracies consistently 
showed the highest average literacy rates, although the gaps were especially pronounced 
within the wealthy group. In both 1970 and 1990, the wealthy democracies contained 
almost universally literate populations: four of the seven states showed literacy rates of 
90% or more in 1970 (with Chile and Costa Rica just slightly below at 89% and 88%), 
down to a low of 75% for Venezuela; and six of the eleven democracies in 1990 
surpassed the 90% plateau (with Mexico and Venezuela at 89%), down to 82% for Brazil, 
80% for Mauritius and 75% for Botswana. Taking the low democratic figure of 75%
^The exact breakdown of developing states (N=88) is as follows:
1970 INC 1&2 (GDP/C $388-4922)
LoD 1.0-2.9 (N= 7): Barbados, Jamaica, Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay 
LoD 3.0-5.9 (N=9): Argentina, Hong Kong, Panama, South Africa, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, Kuwait, Brazil 
LoD 6.0-7.0 (N=9): Gabon, Iran, Zambia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, UAE, Cuba, Guinea, Iraq 
INC 3& 4 (GDP/C $54-378)
LoD 1.0-2.9(N=7): Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Gambia, India, Colombia, Turkey
LoD 3.0-5.9 (N=20): Dom.Rep., Guatemala, Mauritius, Philippines, Botswana, Sierra Leone, S. Korea, Paraguay, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Papua NG, Lesotho, Bolivia, Cameroon, Somalia, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Afghanistan
LoD 6.0-7.0 (N=36): Ecuador, Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Chad, Indonesia, Kenya, Algeria, Congo, Egypt, 
Ivory Coast, Jordan, Liberia, Tunisia, Uganda, Benin, Nepal, Niger, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire, Honduras, Syria,
Thailand, Angola, Burundi, Central Afr.Rep.,China, Haiti, Malawi, Mozambique, Myanmar, Rwanda, Togo.
1990 INC lft2 fG D P /C  $1807-26894)
LoD 1.0-2.9 (N = ll): Barb., Venez., C.Rica, Trin&Tob., Argent., Uruguay, S.Korea, Mauritius, Botsw., Brazil, Mexico 
LoD 3.0-5.9 (N=10): Malaysia, Panama, RKong, Singapore, Chile, Iran, UAE Gabon, Algeria, S.Africa 
LoD 6.0-7.0 (N-5): Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Cuba, Iraq 
INC 3& 4 (GDP1C $84-1600)
LoD 1.0-2.9 (N=14): Dominican Rep., India, Bolivia, Ecuador., Honduras, Jamaica., PapuaN.G, Turkey, Peru, 
Philippines., Colombia., Sri Lanka., El Salvador, Gambia 
LoD 3.0-5.9 (N=15): Guatemala, Uganda, Nigeria, Senegal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Nepal, 
Liberia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Thailand, Madagascar 
LoD 6.0-7.0 (N=33): Ghana, Chad, Indon., Kenya, Congo, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Liberia, Tunisia, Benin, Niger, 
Cameroon, Tanzania, Zaire, Syria, Angola, Burundi, Central Afr.Rep., China, Haiti, Malawi, Mozambique.,
Myanmar, Rwanda, Togo, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Burkina Faso, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali.
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Table 63  Average Indicator Rates By Level of Democracy,
Controlling For Economic Development
Indicator Year
WEALTHY (INC 1&2)
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
POOR (INC 3&4)
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Literacy 1970 90 70 35 47 44 31
(%) 1990 90 78 72 77 55 52
Life Expect 1970 66 62 53 53 49 46
(years) 1990 70 68 70 64 57 52
ChildSurv. 1970 94 92 83 83 80 78
(%) 1990 96 95 93 90 86 83
Civil Lib 1970 2.1 4.2 6.1 3.0 4.1 5.7
(1.0-7.0)* 1990 2.1 4.3 6.3 3.1 4.3 5.8
LIB Index 1970 0.842 0.647 0.400 0.662 0.549 0.393
(1.0-0.0)** 1990 0.866 0.671 0.488 0.728 0.585 0.433
..CONF........""1970“" 0.914 G."943 1X863 “ "07591" 0:754''"“"'o:7io..
(1.0-0.0)** 1990 1.000 0.778 0.560 0.703 0.655 0.829
Inflation 1970 14 10 7 5 4 6
(%) 1990 87 7 1 56 57 37
SEC Index 1970 0.814 0.872 0.861 0.748 0.840 0.800
(1.0-0.0)** 1990 0.743 0.814 0.758 0.613 0.647 0.749
Tert Enrol. 1970 8 7 2 3 4 2
(Rates %) 1990 20 12 15 13 6 4
GEND 1970 0.489 0.371 0.182 0.287 0.243 0.243
(1.0-0.0)** 1990 0.611 0.572 0.533 0.457 0.315 0.324
NAgr 1970 74 74 47 35 32 28
(%) 1990 83 79 79 56 35 33
MOB Index 1970 0.445 0.401 0.228 0.225 0.204 0.182
(1.0-0.0)** 1990 0.568 0.506 0.508 0.400 0.248 0.236
Notes: ♦Civil Libe 
♦♦Scale rai
Tties range from 1.0 (most rights) to 7. 
iges from 1.000 (highest) to 0.000 (low
0 (fewest/no) rights 
rest)
(Venezuela) for 1970 as a basis of comparison, it is interesting to note that six of the nine 
wealthy non-democratic (3-5*) states displayed lower literacy rates, from Mexico (74%) 
to South Africa (46%). The deplorably low average literacy rate (35%) for the wealthy 
non-democratic (6-7) states in 1970 can be explained by the fact that eight of the nine 
states had literacy rates well below the 75% mark, from Zambia (52%) down to Saudi 
Arabia (9%); the sole exception was Cuba (87%).
..................................................................209......................................................................
The democracies in the sample of poor states also displayed the highest average 
literacy rates for both dates. However, the average figure of 47% in 1970 meant that the 
majority of inhabitants in the poor democracies were illiterate. Only two democracies 
had somewhat decent literacy rates at this date, Colombia (78%) and Sri Lanka (77%), 
and three states had woefully low literacy rates - India (34%), Bangladesh (24%) and 
Gambia (6%). A different picture had emerged by 1990, with some literate non- 
democratic states becoming democratic (e.g. Ecuador) and some formerly wealthy 
democracies (e.g. Jamaica) falling into the lower income categories: eight of the fourteen 
poor democracies had literacy rates above 80% (from Jamaica at 99% to Turkey at 82%); 
only three democracies continued to have unsatisfactory rates - Papua New Guinea 
(65%), India (50%) and Gambia (36%).
On the basis of the average life expectancy rates, it is valid to claim that, 
irrespective of level of economic development, people in democracies could expect to 
live longer than those in non-democratic states. Among the richest developing states in 
1970, the average rates were 66 years (LoD 1-2*), 62 years (LoD 3-5*) and 53 years 
(LoD 6-7). The variations in life expectancy rates were considerable: whereas only eight 
years separated the top (Barbados and Uruguay at 69) and bottom democracies (Chile at 
61), 18 years separated the top and bottom non-democratic (3-5*) states (Hong Kong at 
70, Peru and South Africa at 52) and 35 years separated the top and bottom non- 
democratic (6-7) states (Cuba at 71, Guinea at 36). In 1990, however, the gap in life 
expectancy rates among democratic states stood at 16 years (Costa Rica at 76, Botswana 
at 60), a reflection of the changing composition of the group; the gaps were 24 years 
among non-democratic (3-5*) states (Hong Kong at 77, Gabon at 53) and 14 years among 
non-democratic (6-7) states (Cuba at 76, Libya at 62). The almost identical average rates 
for 1990 - 70 years for both the democratic and non-democratic (6-7) states, 68 years for 
the non-democratic (3-5*) states - concealed the distributional imbalances among the 
LoD groups: nine of the eleven wealthy democracies (excluding only Brazil and 
Botswana) surpassed the benchmark of 70 years, compared to six of the ten non- 
democratic (3-5*) states (Hong Kong, Singapore, Panama, Chile, UAE and Malaysia) and 
two of the five non-democratic (6-7) states (Cuba and Kuwait).
Democratic states in the poor sample also produced the highest average life 
expectancy rates: 53 years in 1970, compared to 49 years for the non-democratic (3-5*) 
states and 46 years for the non-democratic (6-7) states; and 64 years in 1990, compared to 
57 years for non-democratic (3-5*) states and 52 years for non-democratic (6-7) states. 
Once again, there were sizeable discrepancies within each LoD group: among 
democracies, from 65 years (Sri Lanka) to 35 years (Gambia) in 1970, and 73 years 
(Jamaica) to 44 years (Gambia) in 1990; among non-democratic (3-5*) states, from 65 
years (Paraguay) to 34 years (Sierra Leone) in 1970, and 69 years (Thailand) to 43 years 
(Uganda) in 1990; among non-democratic (6-7) states, from 60 years (China) to 36 years
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(Angola) in 1970, and 71 years (China) to 42 years (Sierra Leone) in 1990. As testimony 
to the influence of economic development, a person in a poorer democracy could have 
expected to live an average of 13 fewer years (53) than a person in a wealthier democracy 
(66) in 1970 (this gap stood at 6 years in 1990); similar observations may be made for the 
non-democratic states.
• ‘Liberty’ Indicators: Child Survival, Civil Liberties, The Liberty Index
The measure of social deprivation, the child survival rate, showed that, on 
average, a larger percentage of children reached the age of five in developing 
democracies, a fact confirmed for both dates and for both samples. In the wealthiest 
group, 94% of children in democratic states could be expected to reach the age of five in 
1970, compared to 92% in non-democratic (3-5*) states and only 83% in non-democratic 
(6-7) states. The rates were better for all three LoD groups in 1990: 96% in democratic 
states, 95% in non-democratic (3-5*) states and 93% in non-democratic (6-7) states. The 
range of child survival rates was narrowest for democratic states: from 95.8% (Trinidad 
and Tobago) to 89.5% (Chile) in 1970, and from 98.5% (Barbados) to 91.3% (Botswana) 
in 1990; differences of 6.3% (1970) and 7.2% (1990). Conversely, the larger rate 
fluctuations among non-democratic states underlined the inconsistency of their records: 
among non-democratic (3-5*) states, the differences were 14.2% in 1970 (Hong Kong at 
97.6%, Peru at 83.4%) and 15.9% in 1990 (Hong Kong at 99.2%, Gabon at 83.3%); 
among non-democratic (6-7) states, the differences were 25.5% in 1970 (Cuba at 94.6%, 
Guinea at 69.1%) and 10.2% in 1990 (Cuba at 98.6%, Libya at 88.4%).
A greater percentage of children living in the poor democracies reached the age of 
five, although the survival rates (83% in 1970 and 90% in 1990) were considerably lower 
than the rates for the wealthy democracies (94% and 96%). Two (Malaysia and Sri 
Lanka) of the seven poor democracies crossed the benchmark survival rate of 90% in 
1970, compared to three (South Korea, Mauritius, Paraguay) non-democratic (3-5*) states 
(of a total of 20), and two (Thailand and China) non-democratic (6-7) states (of a total of 
36). More democracies (9 of 14), proportionately, also displayed rates of 90%+ in 1990; 
one-third (5 of 15) of non-democratic (3-5*) states and roughly one-fifth (7 of 33) of non- 
democratic (6-7) states surpassed the 90% mark. However, the rate fluctuations within all 
three LoD groups were quite similar among democratic states, 25.9% in 1970 (Malaysia 
at 93.7%, Gambia at 67.8%) and 22.0% in 1990 (Jamaica at 97.9%, Gambia at 75.9%); 
among non-democratic (3-5*) states, 27.8% in 1970 (South Korea at 92.9%, Afghanistan 
at 65.1%) and 17.1% in 1990 (Thailand at 96.5%, Liberia at 79.1%); among non- 
democratic (6-7) states, 26.1% in 1970 (Thailand at 90.3%, Mali at 64.2%) and 25.4% in 
1990 (China at 95.7%, Mozambique at 70.3%).
211
Predictably, the patterns were much more clear-cut with respect to civil liberties 
(CL): democracies produced by far the highest average CL rates in both samples. Perhaps 
the most interesting point worth noting here is that, as the median point of the CL scale is
3.5 (from the best value of 1.0 to the worst value of 7.0), one could argue that civil 
liberties among the poor democracies were, on average, ‘not bad* (3.0-3.1), as opposed to 
‘fairly good’ (2.0) for wealthy democracies. For example, there were only two wealthy 
democracies in 1970 with CL rates worse than one might expect given their LoD values - 
Trinidad and Tobago (LoD 1.5, CL 3.0) and Uruguay (LoD 2.0, CL 4.0) - compared to 
five poor democracies where this was the case - Sri Lanka (LoD 1.5, CL 3.0), Malaysia 
(LoD 2.0, CL 3.0), Bangladesh (LoD 2.0, CL 4.0), India (LoD 2.0, CL 3.0) and Turkey 
(LoD 2.5, CL 4.0). Only 2 of the 11 wealthy democracies (South Korea and Mexico) 
exhibited worse-than-expected CL values (3.0 or more) in 1990, compared to 9 of the 14 
poor democracies (the worst of these offenders were embroiled in domestic conflicts, 
especially Turkey, Peru, Colombia, Sri Lanka and El Salvador).
Since child survival rates and CL values were, on average, higher for democratic 
states, it stood to reason that democracies would also display considerably higher average 
LIB values. There were, however, some discrepancies across and within the LoD groups. 
One wealthy non-democratic (3-5*) representative, Hong Kong, displayed a slightly 
below average CL value (4.0) in 1970, accompanied by an excellent child survival rate 
(97.6%). Its LIB value (0.893) for 1970 suggested that Hong Kong provided greater 
overall ‘freedom’ than five of the seven wealthy democracies (Jamaica at 0.861, 
Venezuela at 0.849, Chile at 0.812, Trinidad and Tobago at 0.791, and Uruguay at 0.697). 
Nor was this phenomenon confined to the sample of wealthy states: despite possessing an 
LoD value (3.0) which placed it only marginally outside the democratic group in 1970, 
Mauritius had a higher LIB value (0.840) than any poor democracy (ahead of Colombia at 
0.800 and Malaysia at 0.770). Likewise, there were noticeable variations in LIB values 
within each LoD group. Taking cl970 as the reference date, LIB values ranged from: 
0.946 (Barbados) to 0.527 (Bangladesh) among democratic states; 0.893 (Hong Kong) to 
0.315 (Somalia) among non-democratic (3-5*) states; and 0.579 (UAE) to 0.191 (Guinea) 
among non-democratic (6-7) states. Because of their superior child survival rates and CL 
values, wealthy democracies had higher average LIB values (0.842 and 0.866) than poor 
democracies (0.662 and 0.728) for both dates.
• ‘Security * Indicators: Peace/Stability, Inflation, The Security Index
The three measures of security do not permit any generalizations regarding levels 
of democracy (recall the extremely low r-squared values in Table 6.1). Indicatively, the 
highest average peace/stability (CONF) rate varied for each date and between the two 
samples. In the sample of wealthy states, democracies had a slightly lower average
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(0.914) than the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.943) in 1970, but a perfect score of 1.000 
(i.e., all eleven democracies were at complete ‘peace’) in 1990, compared to averages of 
0.778 for the non-democratic (3-5*) states and 0.560 for the non-democratic (6-7) states.
Conversely, the relatively worse average peace/stability rate for the poor 
democracies (0.560) circa 1970 was attributable to the hostilities which embroiled India 
and the new state of Bangladesh (rendering each a CONF value of 0.000); and, to a lesser 
degree, to the conflicts in Sri Lanka (0.640), Turkey (0.720), and Malaysia (0.780). The 
average rate for the poor democracies was better in 1990 (0.703), but still less than the 
average for the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.829). Of the fourteen poor democracies, 
seven experienced conflict of one sort or another Colombia (0.692), Turkey (0.651), Peru 
(0.524), Sri Lanka (0.361), the Philippines (0.347), India (0.264) and El Salvador (0.000). 
On the whole, the LoD groups contained similar percentages of largely peaceful/stable 
states (0.900/1.000); the numbers per LoD group (1-2*, 3-5*, 6-7) were: 57%, 66% and 
64% in 1970; and 72%, 40% and 63% in 1990. Moreover, the percentages of completely 
strife-torn/unstable states (0.000/0.299) from each LoD group were largely 
indistinguishable: 14%, 7% and 22% in 1970; and 8%, 12% and 13% in 1990.
Nor do the average inflation rates differentiate the LoD groups. Although wealthy 
democracies had the dubious distinction of exhibiting the highest rates, runaway inflation 
was a problem for a handful states only - primarily in Latin America,4 thereby suggesting 
a general regional malaise which raised overall averages to misleadingly high levels (e.g. 
87% among the wealthy democracies in 1990). The somewhat unstable cases of Chile 
(33.0%) and Uruguay (51.0%) skewed the 1970 average (14%), despite the fact that five 
of the seven wealthy democracies had rates under 10%. The non-democratic states also 
had their share of economic instability at this date: Argentina (21.4%) and Brazil (46.1%) 
among the non-democratic (3-5*) states, and the UAE (33.9%) among the non- 
democratic (6-7) states. More democracies struggled with runaway inflation by 1990: 
only four (Barbados, South Korea, Trinidad and Tobago and Mauritius) managed to keep 
their rates below 10%, while Uruguay (64.4%), Mexico (66.5%), Brazil (327.6%) and 
Argentina (416.9%) proved to be extremely unstable. The worst rates belonged to Chile 
(20.5%) among non-democratic (3-5*) states and to Iraq (103%) among non-democratic 
(6-7) states.
Inflation rates were largely kept in check by almost all states in the poor sample 
for 1970, as witnessed by the low and largely indistinguishable averages: 5% (LoD 1-2*), 
4% (LoD 3-5*), and 6% (LoD 6-7). Six of the seven poor democracies displayed rates 
below 10% (the exception being Colombia at 11.9%). By 1990, however, runaway
4Latin America had the worst regional inflation averages for both dates (especially in 1990). The averages 
for each region were: 8.3% (ASI), 9.6% (LAT), 5.5% (MID), and 4.3% (AFR) in 1970; and 9.0% (ASI), 
98.6% (LAT), 9.1% (MID), and 38.3% (AFR) in 1990 (this last figure, for sub-Saharan African states, was 
misleading in that it includes one uncharacteristically poor rate, 707.0% for Angola). To place the 1990 
figure for Latin America into further context, 15 of the 23 states had inflation rates of 20.0% or more, 
including five states with rates over 200%: Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and Nicaragua.
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inflation had plagued the poor developing states as well. Only 3 of the 14 poor 
democracies (Papua New Guinea, Honduras and India) had rates below 10%, while six 
had rates of 25% or higher (the worst being Bolivia at 263.4% and Peru at 287.3%). The 
worst rates among non-democratic states were produced by war-ravaged countries: 
Uganda (107.0%) and Nicaragua (583.7%) among non-democratic (3-5*) states; Angola 
(707.0%) among non-democratic (6-7) states.
One could therefore account for the marginally lower average Security Index 
(SEC) values for the democratic states (both samples) by pointing to the lower 
peace/stability averages produced by the poor democracies and the worse inflationary 
records of the wealthy democracies. In reality, the enormous range of SEC values within 
each LoD group renders any generalizations meaningless. Indeed, within the wealthy 
sample, SEC values ranged: among democratic states, from 0.987 (Venezuela) to 0.370 
(Chile) in 1970, and 0.948 (Barbados) to 0.500 (Mexico) in 1990; among non-democratic 
(3-5*) states, from 0.994 (Kuwait) to 0.539 (Brazil) in 1970, and 0.989 (UAE) to 0.362 
(Iran) in 1990; among non-democratic (6-7) states, from 1.000 (Iran) to 0.483 (Iraq) in 
1970, and 0.995 (Cuba) to 0.397 (Iraq) in 1990. Furthermore, looking specifically at the 
experiences of the wealthy democracies, the average level of security differed between 
the two dates: whereas five of the seven democracies (excepting Uruguay and Chile) had 
SEC values above 0.900 in 1970, only four (Barbados, South Korea, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Mauritius) of the eleven democracies crossed this threshold in 1990.
Within the poor sample, the non-democratic (3-5*) states posted the highest SEC 
average (0.840) in 1970, while the non-democratic (6-7) states showed the highest SEC 
average (0.749) in 1990 (democratic states produced the lowest averages for both dates, 
0.748 and 0.613). A larger proportion of non-democratic (6-7) states surpassed the 0.900 
SEC threshold in 1970 (56%) and in 1990 (42%); this threshold was crossed by only 14% 
of democratic states (1970 and 1990) and 50% of non-democratic (3-5*) states in 1970 
(13% in 1990). This phenomenon simply confirms that many of the most brutal sub- 
Saharan African regimes remained at (relative) peace and generally exhibited low 
inflation rates.5 The gaps in SEC values were considerable for all three LoD groups: 
0.539 separated the top (Gambia) and bottom (India) poor democracies in 1970, 
compared to 0.527 (Burkina Faso/Nigeria) for non-democratic (3-5*) states and 0.987 
(Togo/Indonesia) for non-democratic (6-7) states; and 0.686 separated the top (Papua 
New Guinea) and bottom (Peru) democracies in 1990, compared to 0.775 
(Senegal/Sudan) for non-democratic (3-5*) states and 0.996 (Congo/Angola) for non- 
democratic (6-7) states.
5One is reminded of the essence of Huntington’s ‘poverty thesis’: "...(it is) modernization (that) breeds 
instability...A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor, and stable" (Huntington 1970:319).
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• ‘Social Mobility ’ Indicators: Tertiary Enrollment, Gender Equity, %Non-Agricultural 
Employment, The Mobility Index
Developing democracies typically topped all measures of social mobility. 
However, the gaps between the LoD groups in 1970 were not large for either sample 
(save for the Gender Equity index among wealthy states): there was very little to 
distinguish in terms of tertiary enrollment (TERT) rates, gender equity (GEND) rates 
(among poor states), the % of non-agricultural employment (%NAgr), and Mobility Index 
(MOB) rates. The differences were more pronounced for the 1990 samples, principally 
because several former non-democratic states with comparatively higher mobility rates 
had become democratic (e.g. Argentina and the Philippines).
In the wealthy sample, democratic states displayed the highest average TERT 
rates in 1970 and 1990 (8% and 20%). Three wealthy democracies crossed the 10% mark 
in 1970 (Uruguay, Venezuela and Costa Rica), along with two non-democratic (3-5*) 
states (Argentina and Peru); no non-democratic (6-7) state managed to do so (Cuba had 
the highest rate, 5.2%). Five wealthy democracies (Argentina, South Korea, Uruguay, 
Venezuela and Costa Rica) crossed the 25% threshold in 1990 (no non-democratic state 
did so).
In the sample of poor states, the three LoD groups showed similar average TERT 
rates in 1970 (3%, 4%, 2%). As a reflection of the generally low rates, only the 
Philippines (LoD 3.0) crossed the 10% mark (at 19.8%); India had the highest TERT rate 
for a poor democracy (6.2%). By 1990, the average TERT rate for the poor democracies 
(13%) was considerably greater than the averages for the non-democratic (3-5*) and non- 
democratic (6-7) states (6% and 4%). The only poor country to surpass the 25% mark was 
newly democratized Peru (33.1%). Once again, there were some very large rate 
fluctuations within the three LoD groups.6
Irrespective of date and sample group, the status of women, as captured by the 
GEND index (measuring both secondary female enrollment rates and females as a 
percentage of the labour force), was highest in developing democracies. In the wealthy 
sample, three democracies (Barbados, Uruguay, and Jamaica) crossed the 0.500 threshold 
in 1970; no non-democratic state did so (the top non-democratic (3-5*) state was 
Singapore at 0.468, and the top non-democratic (6-7) state was Cuba at 0.297). Moreover, 
four wealthy democracies (Barbados, South Korea, Uruguay and Trinidad and Tobago)
^In the wealthy sample, TERT rates ranged: among democratic states, from 11.3% (Uruguay) to 2.8% 
(Trinidad and Tobago) in 1970, and 39.9% (Argentina) to 2.2% (Mauritius) in 1990; among non-democratic 
(3-5*) states, from 14.2% (Argentina) to 3.7% (Kuwait) in 1970, and 20.9% (Panama) to 3.7% (Gabon) in 
1990; among non-democratic (6-7) states, from 5.2% (Cuba) to 0.4% (Gabon and Zambia) in 1970, and 
20.8% (Cuba) to 15.5% (Saudi Arabia) in 1990. In the poor sample, TERT rates ranged: among democratic 
states, from 6.2% (India) to 0.1% (Gambia) in 1970, and 33.1% (Peru) to 0.7% (Gambia) in 1990; among 
non-democratic (3-5*) states, from 19.8% (the Philippines) to 0.0% (Burkina Faso) in 1970, and 15.7% 
(Thailand) to 1.1% (Uganda) in 1990; among non-democratic (6-7) states, from 9.2% (Syria) to 0.0% 
(Chad) in 1970, and 21.7% (Jordan) to 0.2% (Mozambique) in 1990.
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crossed the 0.700 threshold in 1990, compared to one non-democratic (3-5*) state (Hong 
Kong) and one non-democratic (6-7) state (Cuba). The average GEND rates reflected 
these disparities: 0.489 (LoD 1-2*), 0.371 (LoD 3-5*) and 0.182 (LoD 6-7) in 1970; 
0.611 (LoD 1-2*), 0.572 (LoD 3-5*) and 0.533 (LoD 6-7) in 1990.
The status of women in the poor sample was slightly more ambiguous, although 
democracies showed the highest average GEND rates for both dates (0.287 and 0.457). 
As an indication of the low level of female advancement, no state surpassed the 0.500 
mark in 1970. Less than half of the poor democracies (6 of 14) managed to cross this 
threshold by 1990 (one non-democratic (3-5*) state and three non-democratic (6-7) states 
did so). Furthermore, the top two states in terms of GEND rates in 1970 were not 
democratic (China at 0.488, the Philippines at 0.474), although the top two states in 1990 
were (with Jamaica falling into the poor sample by this date, and the Philippines returning 
to democratic rule). There were tremendous fluctuations in GEND rates,7 along with 
purely cultural attitudes to take into account.8
Democracies fared only marginally better in another aspect of social mobility, the 
percentage of people in non-agricultural employment (%NAgr), loosely interpreted here 
as the degree to which people are not ‘tied to the land’. In the wealthy sample, democratic 
and non-democratic (3-5*) states shared the same average %NAgr rate in 1970 (74%), 
and virtually the same rates in 1990 (83% and 79%). Likewise, in the poor sample, the 
three average rates were very similar in 1970 (35%, 32% and 28%), though the gaps 
widened by 1990 in favour of the democratic states (56%, 35% and 33%). Of course, the 
city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong topped the lists for both dates (96-100%), while
'In the wealthy developing sample, GEND values ranged: among democratic states, from 0.726 (Barbados) 
to 0.307 (Costa Rica) in 1970, and 0.900 (Barbados) to 0.421 (Costa Rica) in 1990; among non-democratic 
(3-5*) states, from 0.468 (Singapore) to 0.228 (Mexico) in 1970, and 0.724 (Hong Kong) to 0.356 (Gabon) 
in 1990; among non-democratic (6-7) states, from 0.297 (Cuba) to 0.062 (Saudi Arabia) in 1970, and 0.854 
(Cuba) to 0.331 (Saudi Arabia) in 1990. In the poor sample, GEND values ranged: among democratic 
states, from 0.472 (Sri Lanka) to 0.110 (Bangladesh) in 1970, and 0.713 (Jamaica) to 0.261 (Papua New 
Guinea) in 1990; among non-democratic (3-5*) states, from 0.474 (the Philippines) to 0.052 (Afghanistan) 
in 1970, and 0.507 (Zimbabwe) to 0.121 (Bangladesh) in 1990; among non-democratic (6-7) states, from 
0.488 (China) to 0.080 (Algeria) in 1970, and 0.552 (Egypt) to 0.091 (Afghanistan) in 1990.
®One could argue that some of the more ‘traditionally-minded’ societies are, to some extent, predisposed 
against the principles represented by the GEND variable, and are thus more likely to display lower GEND 
values. This appears to be true for the Islamic societies which comprise the MID region. The MID region 
had a much lower GEND average (0.176) than the other regions in 1970 (0.309 for ASI, 0.337 for LAT and 
0.251 for AFR). Furthermore, only one of the 13 MID states (Kuwait) had a GEND value (0.441) higher 
than the average found for all developing states (0.273), and five states (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, 
the UAE, Libya) had GEND values which were less than 0.137 (or half the developing average). A 
noticeable improvement had occurred by 1990. Though still falling behind the averages for the ASI (0.453) 
and LAT (0.531) regions, the MID region did at least display a higher average (0.437) than the AFR region 
(0.328). Of greater significance, however, is that six MID states (Iran, UAE, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait) managed to surpass the developing average (0.420). But given their relatively high levels of 
development, most MID states should have displayed far better GEND rates.
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sub-Saharan African states clustered at the bottom (only 11% of AFR states surpassed the 
50% mark in 1970, and only 17% did so in 1990).9
On the whole, developing democracies best captured the dimensions represented 
by all three variables - TERT, GEND and %NAgr - as reflected in their higher average 
Mobility Index (MOB) rates for both dates and samples. The differences in MOB 
averages were not, however, particularly pronounced: 0.044 (1970) and 0.060 (1990) in 
the wealthy sample; 0.021 (1970) and 0.152 (1990) in the poor sample. Only three 
wealthy states - two democracies, Uruguay and Barbados, and one non-democratic (3-5*) 
state, Singapore - surpassed the 0.500 mark in 1970, compared to ten states - seven 
democracies, one non-democratic (3-5*) state (Hong Kong) and two non-democratic (6- 
7) states (Cuba and Kuwait) - which did so in 1990. Whereas none of the states in the 
poor sample crossed the 0.500 threshold in 1970, five had succeeded in doing so by 1990: 
four democracies (Peru, Colombia, the Philippines, Jamaica) and one non-democratic (6- 
7) state (Jordan).
Comparing Indicator Averages: Controlling For Regional Variations
As well as having to account for the level of economic development (since, 
irrespective of the level of democracy, wealthier states are likely to display higher 
indicator rates than their poorer counterparts) there is also a ‘regional divide’ to be 
addressed. Because Latin America contained a larger proportion of democracies than the 
other developing regions (Chapter 4) - 8 of the 14 developing democracies in 1970 
(including all 7 democratic states in the wealthy sample), and 16 of the 25 democracies in 
1990 (including 8 of the 11 wealthy democracies) - one may question the wisdom of 
deriving any conclusions concerning the general relationship between democracy and 
higher indicator levels in the developing world. Moreover, as will become apparent 
shortly, democratic states in the other regions did not fare particularly well.
The average indicator rates produced by the three levels of democracy in each 
region are presented in Table 6.4. Quite clearly, there is not the same consistency as the 
earlier results. Excluding both the civil liberties measure and the Liberty Index (where, 
predictably, they scored highly), democratic states produced the highest indicator 
averages in only 10 of the 40 remaining regional cases in 1970: literacy (LAT); life
^Specifically, only four of the 36 AFR states crossed the 50% mark in 1970 - South Africa (69%), 
Mauritius (66%), Congo (58%) and Benin (50%) - and only five managed to surpass the mark in 1990 - 
South Africa (87%), Mauritius (84%), Lesotho (77%), Botswana (72%) and Zambia (62%). The regional 
average (AFR) was very low for both 1970 (23%) and 1990 (31%), especially when compared against the 
%NAgr averages for all developing states (40% and 51%).
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Table 6.4 Average Indicator Rates By Level of Democracy (1970 and 1990),
Controlling For Regional Variations
Indicator Region
1970
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Level
1-2*
1990
of Democracy 
3-5* 6-7
Literacy ASI 49 54 57 78 65 69
(%) LAT 89 68 59 88 79 75
MID 52 54 30 82 62 67
AFR 6 32 24 64 56 47
Life Expect ASI 55 55 51 64 65 69
(years) LAT 65 57 56 69 68 66
MID 58 67 54 67 67 67
AFR 35 45 42 58 53 49
ChildS urv. ASI 86 86 85 93 91 87
(%) LAT 93 86 85 94 94 93
MID 82 94 83 91 92 93
AFR 68 78 76 88 84 81
Civil lib ASI 3.3 4.4 5.4 3.2 3.7 6.3
(1.0-7.0)* LAT 2.1 3.9 4.8 2.5 3.7 5.7
MID 4.0 4.0 5.8 3.7 4.8 5.6
AFR 2.0 4.1 6.0 2.2 4.8 5.9
LIB Index ASI 0.668 0.576 0.479 0.743 0.686 0.428
(1.0-0.0)** LAT 0.873 0.620 0.540 0.811 0.711 0.535
MID 0.567 0.691 0.428 0.685 0.603 0.543
AFR 0.595 0.525 0.340 0.781 0.525 0.400
CONF ASI 0.355 0.764 0.507 0.594 0.809 0.570
(1.0-0.0)** LAT 0.925 0.846 0.932 0.888 0.761 1.000
MID 0.720 1.000 0.706 0.651 0.604 0.693
AFR 1.000 0.812 0.772 1.000 0.636 0.848
Inflation ASI 3 7 15 9 6 15
(%) LAT 14 9 3 101 130 4
MED 6 1 6 45 8 5
AFR 3 3 5 13 24 47
SEC Index ASI 0.646 0.817 0.629 0.708 0.847 0.639
(1.0-0.0)** LAT 0.823 0.837 0.932 0.640 0.653 0.962
MID 0.804 0.994 0.793 0.379 0.722 0.788
AFR 0.968 0.873 0.838 0.868 0.641 0.738
Tert Enrol. ASI 3 6 2 15 8 4
(Rates %) LAT 7 7 4 19 14 11
MID 6 4 4 13 10 15
AFR 0.1 1 2 2 4 2
Gend Equity ASI 0.304 0.297 0.328 0.558 0.433 0.358
(1.0-0.0)** LAT 0.464 0.275 0.256 0.543 0.458 0.612
MID 0.244 0.441 0.146 0.283 0.429 0.459
AFR 0.262 0.265 0.245 0.449 0.379 0.293
218
(cont’d)
(Table 6.4 cant’d)
Indicator Region
1970
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
1990
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
NanAgr ASI 32 52 23 50 58 35
(%) LAT 73 51 44 77 62 54
MID 33 98 55 53 75 77
AFR 18 29 22 57 33 26
MOB Index ASI 0.221 0.300 0.193 0.421 0.374 0.255
(1.0-0.0)** LAT 0.430 0.294 0.247 0.523 0.419 0.433
MID 0.218 0.490 0.247 0.328 0.439 0.478
AFR 0.148 0.186 0.157 0.350 0.255 0.192
Notes: *Civil liberties range from 1.0 (most rights) to 7.0 (fewest/no) rights 
**Scale ranges from 1.000 (highest) to 0.000 (lowest)
expectancy (LAT); child survival (LAT); peace/stability (AFR); inflation (ASI); the 
Security Index (AFR); tertiary enrollment (MID); gender equity (LAT); %non- 
agricultural employment (LAT); the Mobility Index (LAT). There were five other cases 
where democratic states shared the highest average with one of the two non-democratic 
groups: life expectancy (ASI); child survival (ASI); inflation (MID and AFR); tertiary 
enrollment (LAT). The non-democratic (3-5*) group of states produced the highest 
averages most often (19 cases).
The picture had changed by 1990. Again omitting the civil liberties measure and 
the Liberty Index, democratic states exhibited the highest averages in exactly half (20) of 
the regional cases: literacy (all four regions); life expectancy (LAT and AFR); child 
survival (ASI and AFR); peace/stability (AFR); inflation (AFR); the Security Index 
(AFR); tertiary enrollment (ASI and LAT); gender equity (ASI and AFR); % non- 
agricultural employment (LAT and AFR); and the Mobility Index (ASI, LAT and AFR). 
There were two cases where democratic states shared the highest average: life expectancy 
(MID) and child survival (LAT). The non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) 
states produced the highest averages in 5 and 13 cases, respectively.
These results varied by indicator. In 1970, for example, the non-democratic (6-7) 
states had the highest average literacy rate in the ASI region (57%), the democratic states 
had the highest average literacy rate in the LAT region (89%), and the non-democratic (3- 
5*) states had the highest rates in the MID (54%) and AFR (32%) regions. By 1990, 
however, the democratic states displayed the highest literacy averages in all four regions.
Looking at the other measure of individual capabilities, life expectancy, one finds 
similar patterns: in 1970, the democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) states shared the 
same average rate (55 years) in the ASI region, the democratic states had the highest rate
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(65 years) in the LAT region, and the non-democratic (3-5*) states showed the highest 
rates in the MID (67 years) and AFR (45 years) regions; in 1990, the non-democratic (6- 
7) states had the highest average life expectancy rate (69 years) in the ASI region, the 
democratic states had the highest average rates in the LAT (69 years) and AFR (58 years) 
regions, and all three LoD groups shared the same average (67 years) in the MID region.
Turning next to the liberty indicators, in only one region (LAT) did the 
democratic states produce the highest average child survival rate (93%) in 1970. 
Democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) states shared an identical average rate (86%) in 
the ASI region; the non-democratic (6-7) states were one percentage point behind (85%). 
In both the MID and AFR regions, the non-democratic (3-5*) states displayed the highest 
averages (67% and 45%, respectively). In 1990, the democratic states had the highest 
average child survival rates in the ASI and AFR regions (93% and 88%), and shared the 
same average rate as the non-democratic (3-5*) states in the LAT region (94%); in the 
MID region, the democratic representative (Turkey) fell two points shy of the non- 
democratic (6-7) states (93%).
Since the democratic states in each region produced by far the highest average 
civil liberties scores, whatever shortfalls may have existed in the average child survival 
rates were largely concealed by the averages for the Liberty Index: with the exception of 
the MID region in 1970, the democratic states produced the highest average LIB values 
across the regions and for both dates.
Democratic states did not fare well against the three security indicators. In both 
1970 and 1990, they had the highest peace/stability (CONF) average in only the AFR 
region (1.000). The non-democratic (3-5*) states had the highest rates in the ASI (0.764) 
and MID (1.000) regions in 1970, whereas the non-democratic (6-7) states had the highest 
average (0.932) in the LAT region. In 1990, the non-democratic (3-5*) states showed the 
highest CONF average (0.809) in the ASI region, and the non-democratic (6-7) states had 
the highest averages in the LAT (1.000) and MID (0.693) regions.
The situation regarding inflation rates was slightly better for 1970 than 1990. 
Although democratic states had the best inflation average (3%) in only one region in 1970 
(ASI), they equaled the average rates produced by the non-democratic (6-7) states in the 
MID region (6%) and by the non-democratic (3-5*) states in the AFR region (3%); in the 
LAT region, the non-democratic (6-7) states had the best average inflation rate (3%). The 
democratic states also displayed the best average (13%) in only one region (AFR) in 
1990. The non-democratic (3-5*) states showed the best rate (6%) in the ASI region, 
while the non-democratic (6-7) states had the best rates in the LAT (4%) and MID (5%) 
regions.
Translating these results into the Security Index, one finds that the democratic 
states had the highest average SEC rates (0.968 and 0.868) in only the AFR region in 
1970 and 1990. The non-democratic (3-5*) states had the highest SEC rates in the ASI
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(0.817) and MID (0.994) regions in 1970, and the non-democratic (6-7) states had the 
highest average (0.932) in the LAT region. Likewise, the non-democratic (3-5*) states 
exhibited the highest SEC average (0.847) in the ASI region in 1990, whereas the non- 
democratic (6-7) states had the highest averages in the LAT (0.962) and MID (0.788) 
regions.
The record of developing democracies in terms of social mobility was mixed. 
Regarding tertiary enrollment, democratic states produced the highest average rate (6%) 
in only one region (MID) in 1970, but shared the same rate (7%) as the non-democratic 
(3-5*) states in the LAT region. The non-democratic (3-5*) states had the highest rate 
(6%) in the ASI region, and the non-democratic (6-7) states had the highest rate (2%) in 
the AFR region. On the other hand, democratic states produced the highest average rates 
in the ASI (15%) and LAT (19%) regions in 1990, the non-democratic (6-7) states had 
the highest rate (15%) in the MID region, and the non-democratic (3-5*) states had the 
highest rate (4%) in the AFR region.
Democratic states produced the highest average gender equity (GEND) rate 
(0.464) in only one region (LAT) in 1970, while the non-democratic (6-7) states had the 
highest average rate (0.328) in the ASI region, and the non-democratic (3-5*) states had 
the highest GEND rates in the MID (0.441) and AFR (0.265) regions. Democratic states 
showed the highest gender equity rates in two regions in 1990, ASI (0.558) and AFR 
(0.449), while the non-democratic (6-7) states had the highest rates in the two other 
regions, LAT (0.612) and MID (0.459).
Virtually the same patterns were observed for non-agricultural employment rates. 
Democratic states displayed the highest rate (73%) in only one region (LAT) in 1970, 
whereas the non-democratic (3-5*) states had the highest average rates in the three other 
regions (52% for ASI, 98% for MID, and 29% for AFR). In 1990, democratic states 
produced the highest rates in two regions, LAT (77%) and AFR (57%), the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states showed the highest average (58%) in the ASI region, and the 
non-democratic (6-7) states had the highest average (77%) in the MID region.
The democratic record for the overall Mobility Index was better for 1990 than 
1970. Democratic states produced the highest MOB average (0.430) in only the LAT 
region in 1970, whereas the non-democratic (3-5*) states had the highest rates in the ASI 
(0.300), MID (0.490) and AFR (0.186) regions. In 1990, however, democratic states had 
the highest MOB rates in three regions - ASI (0.421), LAT (0.523) and AFR (0.350) - 
while the non-democratic (6-7) states had the highest average (0.478) in the MID region.
To summarize, democratic states displayed the highest averages in: five of the 
eight regional cases involving literacy rates; three of the eight cases involving life 
expectancy rates (and tied for two cases); three of the eight cases involving child survival 
rates (and tied for two cases); all eight cases involving civil liberties rates; seven of the
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eight cases involving LIB rates; two of the eight cases involving peace/stability (CONF) 
rates; two of the eight cases involving inflation rates (and tied for two cases); three of the 
eight cases involving tertiary enrollment rates (and tied for one case); three of the eight 
cases involving non-agricultural employment rates; and four of the eight cases involving 
Mobility Index rates. Thus, for only four of the twelve indicators (literacy, civil liberties, 
the Liberty Index, and the Mobility Index) did democratic states produce the highest 
averages in the majority of regional cases.
The findings may also be interpreted by region. In the ASI region, democracies 
displayed the best averages in ten of the twenty-four comparative cases (the twelve 
indicators multiplied by the two dates): literacy (1990); child survival (1990, and tied in 
1970); civil liberties (both dates); the Liberty Index (both dates); inflation (1970); tertiary 
enrollment (1990); gender equity (1990); and the Mobility Index (1990). In the LAT 
region, democracies displayed the best averages in fifteen cases: literacy (both dates); life 
expectancy (both dates); child survival (1970, and tied in 1990); civil liberties (both 
dates); the Liberty Index (both dates); tertiary enrollment (1990, and tied in 1970); gender 
equity (1970); non-agricultural employment (both dates); and the Mobility Index (both 
dates). In the MID region, Turkey displayed the best record in only five cases: literacy 
(1990); civil liberties (both dates); the Liberty Index (1990); and tertiary enrollment 
(1970). In the AFR region, democracies - only Gambia in 1970, joined by Mauritius and 
Botswana in 1990 - displayed the best averages in fifteen cases: literacy (1990); life 
expectancy (1990); child survival (1990); civil liberties (both dates); the Liberty Index 
(both dates); peace/stability (both dates); inflation (1990, and tied in 1970); the Security 
Index (both dates); gender equity (1990); non-agricultural employment (1990); and the 
Mobility Index (1990). In effect, democratic states compared favourably in only the LAT 
and AFR regions, although even here the findings are not entirely conclusive.
A Closer Look at the Developing Democracies
Whereas the preceding accounts provided different contexts in which to compare 
the three LoD groups, controlling for economic development and regional variations, this 
section will evaluate the records of the democratic states against the standards of the 
developing world in general. After initially demonstrating how democracies fared against 
the developing averages for the indicators, attention will turn to a more specific account 
of the record of each democratic state.
Figure 6.1 depicts the percentage of democracies surpassing the developing 
average (N=88) for each indicator. The results are presented for two dates, 1970 and 
1990, and the records of the wealthy and poor democracies are portrayed side by side (the 
percentage of all democratic states - wealthy and poor - above the developing average is 
given in parenthesis).
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(a) 1970
Fig. 6.1 Percentage of Democracies Above Developing Averages, 
Selected Indicators (1970 and 1990)
100
(79) (79) (71) (100) (100)
(71) (57)
■  Wealthy Dem. 
(71) (71) (71) Q  poor Dem.
(All Dem.)
■  Wealthy Dem.
Two facts become immediately apparent. First, a large majority of all democracies 
displayed rates above the developing averages for both dates. This was to be expected 
given that, as confirmed earlier, a very high percentage of democracies (between 72-86%) 
surpassed the average HDI, ISC and I-HDI values for all developing states (Table 4.4 in
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Chapter 4). As the correlations had suggested (Table 6.1), the highest percentages were 
found for the civil liberties measure and the Liberty Index (96-100%), while the lowest 
percentages were found for the three security indicators (48-72%); the other percentages, 
in decreasing order, were: 79-88% for literacy and life expectancy; 71-88% for the 
Mobility Index; 71-84% for child survival and the % of non-agricultural employment; 71- 
72% for gender equity; and 64% for tertiary enrollment.
The second point worth noting is that a far higher percentage of wealthy 
democracies surpassed the developing averages for virtually every indicator (save for 
civil liberties and the Liberty Index, where the two samples had almost identical records, 
and inflation, where the two samples had identical records in 1970, although the poor 
democracies had a better record in 1990). Indeed, the impact of economic development 
was considerable (as was noted in Table 6.3 above). For instance, in both 1970 and 1990, 
all wealthy democracies (100%) surpassed the developing averages for literacy, life 
expectancy, child survival, civil liberties, the Liberty Index, gender equity, the % of non- 
agricultural employment and the Mobility Index; the corresponding percentages for the 
poor democracies were: 57%-79% (literacy and life expectancy); 43-71% (child survival); 
93-100% (civil liberties and the Liberty Index); 43-50% (gender equity); 43-71% (% of 
non-agricultural employment); and 43-79% (the Mobility Index). Significant 
discrepancies were also found for the other indicators: 86-100% of wealthy democracies 
had above average peace/stability values, compared to 43-50% of poor democracies; 64- 
71% of wealthy democracies had above average Security Index values, compared to 33- 
43% of poor democracies; and 73-86% of wealthy democracies had above average 
tertiary enrollment rates, compared to 43-57% of poor democracies. The percentage of 
states from both samples with above average inflation rates was broadly similar: 64-71% 
(wealthy democracies) and 71-79% (poor democracies).
Table 6.5 breaks down these general findings by individual democracy. Looking 
down the columns, one may trace the record of each state against the developing average 
for a particular indicator, while, looking across the rows, one may assess a state’s overall 
record against all indicators. A positive (+) sign indicates that a democracy surpassed the 
developing average, a negative sign (-) indicates that it did not. There were fourteen states 
with (largely) democratic LoD values (1.0-2.9) in 1970, divided evenly (seven apiece) 
into the wealthy (INC 1&2) and poor (INC 3&4) samples. This number increased to 25 in 
1990, eleven in the wealthy sample and fourteen in the poor sample.
The seven Latin American states which comprised the wealthy sample in 1970 
exhibited very impressive results. Four states in particular (Barbados, Costa Rica, 
Jamaica and Venezuela) surpassed the developing average for all twelve indicators 
(Trinidad and Tobago failed to surpass only the tertiary enrollment average). Two states 
stumbled against the security indicators, Uruguay (inflation and the Security Index) and 
Chile (all three security indicators).
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Table 6.5 How Individual Democracies Fared Against Developing Averages For
Selected Indicators, 1970 and 1990
Yeai Sample Democracy
IND CAP 
Lit LEx
LIBERTY 
Surv CL LIB
SECURITY 
Conf Infl SEC
MOBILITY 
Tert Gend NAg MOB
197C Wealthy Barbados + + + + + + + + + + + +
Chile + + + + + - - - + + + +
Costa R. + + + + + + + + + + + +
Jamaica + + + + + + + + + + + +
Trin.&Tob. + + + + + + + + - + + +
Uruguay + + + + + + - - + + + +
Venezu. + + + + + + + + + + + +
Poor Banglad. - - - + + - + - - - - -
Colombia + + + + + + - + + + + +
Gambia - - - + + + + + - - - -
India - - - + + - - - + - - -
Malaysia + + + + + + + + - + + +
Sri Lanka + + + + + - + - - + + +
Turkey + + - + + - + - + - - -
199C Wealthy Argentina + + + + + + _ _ + + + +
Barbados + + + + + + + + + + + +
Botswana + + + + + + + + - + + + .
Brazil + + + + + + - - + + + +
Costa R. + + + + + + + + + + + +
Mauritius + + + + + + + + - + + +
Mexico + + + + + + - - + + + +
South Kor + + + + + + + + + + + +
Trin.&Tob. + + + + + + + + - + + +
Uruguay + + + + + + - - + + + +
Venezu. + + + + + + + + + + + +
Poor Bolivia + + _ + + + _ _ + _ + +
Colombia + + + + + - + - + + + +
Domin. R + + + + + + + + + + + +
Ecuador + + + + + + + - + + + +
El Salvad. + + + + + - + - + - + +
Gambia - - - + + + + + - - - -
Honduras + + + + + + + + - - + +
India - - - + + - + - - - - -
Jamaica + + + + + + + + - + + +
PapuaNG - - + + + + + + - - - -
Peru + + - + + - - - + + + +
Philippin. + + + + + - + - + + + +
Sri Lanka + + + - + - + - - + - +
Turkey + + + + + - - - + - + -
Notes: 1. (+) means above developing average, (-) means below developing average. 2. fhe
developing averages (1970 and 1990) were: 44% and 66% for Literacy (Lit); 51 years and 60 years for
life expectancy (LEx); 82.2% and 88.2% for child survival (Surv); 4.7 and 4.5 for civil liberties (CL);
0.512 and 0.590 for the Liberty Index (LIB); 0.769 and 0.780 for the peace/stability index (Conf); 6.6%
and 44.4% for inflation (Infl); 0.820 and 0.717 for the Security Index (SEC); 33% and 9.1% for tertiary
enrollment (Tert); 0.273 and 0.420 for the gender equity index (Gend); 40% and 51% for the % of non-
agiicultural employment (NAg); 0.238 and 0.352 for the Mobility Index (MOB).
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Six new states had joined the sample of wealthy democracies by 1990 - Argentina, 
Brazil, Botswana, Mauritius, Mexico (barely) and South Korea (barely) - while Jamaica 
had fallen into the poor sample and Chile had fallen out of the democratic LoD range 
altogether. Four of the eleven states surpassed the developing averages for all twelve 
indicators: Barbados, Costa Rica, South Korea and Venezuela. Three states (Botswana, 
Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago) failed to surpass the average for only one indicator, 
tertiary enrollment, while the four remaining states (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Uruguay) failed against the same two indicators, inflation and the Security Index.
There was considerable variation in the poor sample. Only three of the seven poor 
democracies had relatively good records in 1970: Colombia and Malaysia failed to 
surpass the developing average for only indicator (inflation and tertiary enrollment, 
respectively), while Sri Lanka failed to surpass three indicator averages (peace/stability, 
the Security Index and tertiary enrollment). Turkey produced a mixed record, surpassing 
the developing averages for exactly six of the twelve indicators. The only African 
representative, Gambia, displayed above average rates in just five cases: civil liberties and 
the Liberty Index (predictably); and all three security indicators. India and Bangladesh 
exhibited dismal records, managing to exceed the developing averages for only three 
indicators: civil liberties and the Liberty Index (predictably); inflation (Bangladesh) and 
tertiary enrollment (India).
The picture was noticeably better for the poor sample in 1990, primarily because 
of the inclusion of some recently democratized states. Six of the fourteen poor 
democracies displayed good records against the developing averages: the Dominican 
Republic exceeded all 12 indicator averages; Ecuador and Jamaica exceeded 11 averages; 
Colombia, Honduras and the Philippines exceeded 10 averages. At the other extreme, 
India and Gambia once again had poor records, surpassing the developing averages for 
three and five indicators, respectively.
The wealthy democracies therefore did well, the poor democracies less so, 
confirming the need to take levels of economic development into account before 
generalizations can be made. Moreover, the influence of the Latin American democracies, 
so prevalent in the wealthy sample, suggests that regional variations must also be 
acknowledged and evaluated.
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6.2 Democracy and Selected Indicator Performance Rates
The second part of the democracy-development relationship is concerned with 
performance, or rates of change. The results presented in Chapter 5 demonstrate that the 
level of democracy tells us very little about a state’s ability to improve HDI, ISC and I- 
HDI rates; although, arguably, democratic states have not performed as well, on average, 
as non-democratic states over the 1970-90 period when controlling variables were 
introduced. The following sections will explore these themes further by analyzing the 
performance rates for the individual indicators behind the composite measures. 
Performance rates will hereinafter denote changes (increases/decreases) in indicator 
levels between the start (1970) and end (1990) of the period.10
General Patterns
Given the extremely weak correlations found between LoD values and HDI, ISC 
and I-HDI performance rates for the developing samples during the 1970-90 period, 
showing that only around 1% of the rate variations could be explained by the level of 
democracy (Table 5.1), one would expect to find very weak correlations for each 
individual indicator as well. This is largely the case, as Table 6.6 confirms.
Table 6.6 Correlations Between Indicator Performance Rates 
and Levels of Democracy, 1970-90
Indicator Indicator
literacy r= 0.421 Inflation r= -0.092
r= 0.178 i*= 0.009
Life Exp. r= 0.029 SEC Index n= 0.140
0.001 r*= 0.019
Child Surv r= 0.204 Tert Enrol r= -0.304
(SURV) P= 0.042 r*= 0.093
Civil Lib r= 0.883 Gend Equity T= -0.192
P= 0.779 (GEND) I^ = 0.037
LIB Index r= 0.010 %NAgr r= -0.264
P= 0.000 i*= 0.070
Peace/Stab r= 0.043 MOB Index r= -0328
(CONF) P= 0.002 r= 0.107
^^There are two exceptions. Instead of showing how civil liberties changed between 1970 and 1990, the 
average civil liberties value is given for 1970-90, thereby indicating the level of civil liberties enjoyed 
throughout the period. The same approach was taken for inflation: the performance rates indicate the 
average level of inflation experienced throughout the 1970-90 period.
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The only strong correlation is (unsurprisingly) between democracy and civil 
liberties. The level of democracy apparently had some minor influence on changes in 
literacy rates over the period: the moderate positive correlation shows that higher (i.e. less 
democratic) LoD values were associated with larger increases in literacy rates (as will be 
demonstrated shortly, this can be explained by the fact that most developing democracies 
were relatively literate to begin with, and were thus likely to produce more incremental 
increases). The correlations for the other indicators were either fairly weak (child 
survival, tertiary enrollment, % non-agricultural employment, and the Mobility Index) or 
extremely weak (life expectancy, peace/conflict, inflation, gender equity, the Liberty 
Index, and the Security Index). Judging by the r-squared values (save for civil liberties 
and inflation, which are based on period averages), the level of democracy may at most 
explain, in decreasing order around 18% of the variation in literacy rates; 11% of the 
variation in Mobility Index rates; 9% of the variation in tertiary enrollment rates; 7% of 
the variation in %non-agricultural employment rates; 4% of the variation in child survival 
and gender equity rates; and between 0-2% of the variation in life expectancy rates, 
peace/stability rates, Liberty Index rates, and Security Index rates. There is clearly no 
general relationship between the level of democracy and changes in indicator levels.
As the weak correlations suggest, there were tremendous variations in indicator 
performance rates over the period (Table 6.7 below). Irrespective of the level of economic 
development to begin with, high and low increases were observed for states within each 
level of democracy. Moreover, these increases were fairly similar across all three LoD 
groups. Consider the increases in literacy rates in the sample of poor developing states: 
from 33% (Papua New Guinea) to 9% (Colombia) among the democratic states; from 
34% (Botswana) to 7% (Philippines) among the non-democratic (3-5*) states; and from 
44% (Malawi) to 9% (Benin) among the non-democratic (6-7) states.
Rate variations must be evaluated against the indicator levels at the beginning of 
the period. In the above examples, Papua New Guinea’s increase must be viewed in the 
context of its very low rate (32%) in 1970, whereas Colombia was considerably more 
literate (78%). Botswana also began the period from a comparatively lower level of 
literacy (41%) than the Philippines (83%). Only in the case of the two non-democratic (6- 
7) states can a proper comparison be made: both Malawi and Benin had dismally low 
rates in 1970 (10% and 16%), proving that the former’s record was much more 
impressive (although Malawi still had a low literacy rate in 1990, 54%). Furthermore, in 
the wealthy sample, when contrasted with the enormous increases in literacy rates for the 
UAE (57%) and Saudi Arabia (55%), the lower rate increase for (somewhat) democratic 
Peru (15%) appears to be quite modest. But taking into account Peru’s much higher 
literacy rate (71%) in 1970, both the UAE (21%) and Saudi Arabia (9%) had considerably 
more room to improve (especially given their national wealth).
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Table 6.7 Variations In Indicator Performance Rates By Level of Democracy,
Controlling for Economic Development (1970-90)
Indicator Increase
WEALTHY (INC I&2)
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
POOR (INC 3&4)
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Literacy
(%)
Highest
Lowest
15 (Peru) 57 (UAE) 55 (Saudi) 
1 (Barba) 3 (Argen) 5 (Chile)
33 (PapNG) 34 (Botsw) 44 (Malaw) 
9 (Colom) 7 (Philip) 9 (Benin)
Life Expect, 
(years)
Highest
Lowest
12 (Peru) 11 (Iran) 15 (Saudi) 
6 (Barbad) 1 (Zamb) 5 (Cuba)
14 (Hond) 16 (Indon) 15 (Tunis) 
6 (SriLa) -3 (Ugand) 3 (Rwand)
ChildSurv.
(%)
Highest
Lowest
5 (Peru) 13 (Iran) 9 (Saudi)
2 (Trinid) 2 (HongK) 4 (Kuwait)
9 (Turkey) ll(Mada.) 14 (Egypt) 
3 (Malay) 3 (Ugand) 0 (Mozam)
LIB Index 
(1.0-0.0)**
Highest
Lowest
0.191(Trini) 0.239(Braz) 0.176(Guin) 
-0.034(Ven) 0.001(Mexi) -0.069(Kuw)
0.118(Turk) 0.290(SKor) 0.3U(Egy) 
-0.098(SrL) -0.019(Ban) -0.112(Ken)
CONF 
(1.0-0.0)**
Highest
Lowest
0.000(5diff) 0.206(Arg) 0.600(Chile) 
-0.476(Feru) -l.OOO(Iran) -0.486(Kuw)
0.272(Hond) l.OOCXNige.) 1.000(2di0 
-0.728(BSa) -0.520(Ub.) -l.OOO(Afg)
SEC Index 
(1.0-0.0)**
Highest
Lowest
0.013(Barb) 0.328(UAE) 0.425(Chile) 
-0.634(Peru) -0.638(Iran) -0.237(Kuw)
0.121(1 ndia) 0.807(Indo) 0.511(Jor) 
-0.533(BSa) -0.556(Nic) -0.662(Soma)
Tert Enrol. 
(Rates %)
Highest
Lowest
22.1 (Pern) 25.7 (Arge) 17.1 (Cuba) 
0.4 (Jam) 1.2 (Sing) 0.8 (Girin)
123 (DomR) 29.8 (SKor) 19.5 (Jord) 
-0.7 (Maur) 0.3 (Pak) -0.1 (Moza)
GEND 
(1.0-0.0)**
Highest
Lowest
0.271(Trin) 0.443(UAE) 0.556(Cuba) 
0.082(Ven) 0.053(Zamb) -0.016(Guin)
0.300(DomR) 0.376(SKo) 0.352(Egy) 
0.040(Tur) O.Oll(Ban) -0.009(Moz)
NonAgr
m
Highest
Lowest
17 (CRica) 35 (Zamb) 28 (Iraq) 
4 (Jam) 3 (Hong) 1 (Kuw)
45 (ElSal) 59 (Botsw) 67 (Lesot) 
-2 (Gamb) -7 (Zimb) -20 (Benin)
MOB Index 
(1.0-0.0)**
Highest
Lowest
0.224(Peru) 0.243(UAE) 0.291(Cuba) 
0.070(Jam) 0.069(Gab) 0.021(Guin)
0.222(BSa) 0.290(Bot) 0.284(Leso) 
0.012(Gam) 0.013(Ugan) -0.050(Ben)
Notes: 1. **Scale ranges from 1.000 (highest) to 0.000 (lowest)
2. dif=different states
3. The civil liberties and inflation measures have been omitted from this table given that 
they represent averages over the entire period, not changes between two points in time 
(recall footnote 10).
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Comparing Average Indicator Performance Rates: Controlling For Economic
Development
Just how the three levels of democracy compared in terms of average performance 
rates over the period will now be examined for each set of indicators in turn. In order to 
control for similar levels of economic development in 1970, developing states have first 
been separated into ‘wealthy’ (INC 1&2) and ‘poor’ (INC 3&4) samples, and then by 
LoD group.11 To provide further context for the performance rate increases, the series of 
illustrations to follow also depict the average starting (‘take-off’) levels for each LoD 
group.
On the whole, the records of democracies with respect to improvements in the 
levels of individual capabilities must be judged to be satisfactory (Figure 6.2 overleaf). 
Beginning the period at a considerably higher average literacy level (graph a), the wealthy 
democracies were bound to produce the lowest average increase in literacy rates (7%). In 
fact, the best average increase that the wealthy democracies could have possibly achieved 
would have been only 13% (thereby taking the 1990 figure to 100% since the average 
literacy level in 1970 was already 87%); but even this maximum increase would have still 
been less than the increases for the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states 
(21% and 23%), which were starting from much lower average literacy levels (61% and 
46%). In the poor sample, democracies also began the period from the highest average 
literacy level (53%, compared to 44% for non-democratic (3-5*) states and only 26% for 
non-democratic (6-7) states). Hence, despite producing a lower average increase (20%) 
than the non-democratic (6-7) states (27%), the poor democracies still ended the period at 
a higher level (73%, compared to 53% for the non-democratic (6-7) states); the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states showed an increase of 18% (to 62% in 1990).
llrThe exact breakdown of developing states (N=88) over the 1970-90 period is as follows:
INC 1&2 11970 GDP/C $388^4922)
LoD 1.0-2.9 (N=6): Barbados, Jamaica, Venezuela, Peru, Costa Rica, Trinidad & Tob.,
LoD 3.0-5.9 (N=12): Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, Hong Kong, Brazil, Singapore, Zambia, South
Africa, Panama, UAE, Iran, Gabon 
LoD 6.0-7.0(N=7): Kuwait, Chile, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Cuba, Iraq, Guinea
INC 3&411970 GDP/C £54-378)
LoD 1.0-2.9 (N=ll): India, Sri Lanka, Dom. Rep, Colombia, PapuaNG, Mauritius, Turkey, Gambia,
Malaysia, El Salvador, Honduras.
LoD 3.0-5.9 (N=22): Botswana, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Nicaragua, South Korea,
Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, Madagascar, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Indonesia, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Nepal, Sudan, Liberia 
LoD 6.0-7.0 (N-30): Tanzania, Egypt, Lesotho, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Jordan, Ivory Coast,
Syria, Algeria, Mozambique, Ghana, Cameroon, Rwanda, China, Haiti, Malawi, 
Zaire, Congo, Chad, Togo, Angola, Central Afr. Rep., Afghanistan, Niger, Mali, 
Burundi, Myanmar, Benin, Somalia
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Fig. 6.2 Individual Capabilities Rates By Level Of Democracy (1970-90),
Controlling For Economic Development
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The findings regarding life expectancy rates (graph b) closely mirror the patterns 
for literacy rates. In the wealthy sample, democracies displayed a lower average increase 
(7.8 years) than the non-democratic (6-7) states (9.8 years). But since they began the 
period at a somewhat higher average level (63.7 years, compared to 56.5 years for non- 
democratic (6-7) states), they also ended up at a higher level in 1990 (71.5  years, 
compared to 66.3 years for non-democratic (6-7) states); the non-democratic (3-5*) states
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produced an average increase of 7.4 years (up to 66.8 years in 1990). In the poor sample, 
the democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) states produced almost identical rate increases 
over the period (9.5 and 9.8 years). The differences in average life expectancy rates in 
1970 (54.4 and 48.3 years) meant that the democratic states ended the period at a higher 
average level (63.9 years, compared to 58.1 years for the non-democratic (3-5*) states). 
The non-democratic (6-7) states started from a lower average level (44.6 years) and 
produced the smallest average increase (8.8 years).
The results involving the liberty indicators were quite similar (Figure 6.3). 
Looking First at the child survival rates (graph a), democratic states began and ended the 
period at the highest average levels in both samples: from 92.6% to 96.1% for the wealthy 
sample; and from 84.6% to 91.1% for the poor sample. This partly explains the smaller 
rate increase for the wealthy democracies (3.5%, compared to 4.8% for the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states and 6.2% for the non-democratic (6-7) states). In the poor 
sample, the average increases were indistinguishable: 6.6% for the democratic states, 
6.3% for the non-democratic (3-5*) states and 6.4% for the non-democratic (6-7) states. 
The gaps between the LoD groups therefore remained intact by 1990: 91.1% of children 
survived to the age of Five in poor democracies, compared to 86.7% of children in non- 
democratic (3-5*) states and 83.4% of children in non-democratic (6-7) states.
When child survival increases are combined with changes in levels of civil 
liberties, the average changes in Liberty Index values may be depicted (graph b). Given 
their much higher Liberty Index levels to begin with (0.815 and 0.709), the democratic 
states in both samples were expected to produce comparatively smaller average increases 
(0.071 and 0.015). Primarily as a result of improvements in their civil liberties values, the 
non-democratic (3-5*) states exhibited the highest LIB increases in the wealthy and poor 
samples (0.108 and 0.129); on the whole, democratic states had very little room to 
improve in terms of civil liberties. The negligible changes in levels of civil liberties 
shown by non-democratic (6-7) states tempered whatever progress they made towards 
improving child survival rates; with LIB rates of 0.046 and 0.060, their LIB levels 
increased marginally from 0.471 to 0.516 in the wealthy sample, and from 0.373 to 0.434 
in the poor sample.
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Fig. 6.3 Liberty Indicator Rates By Level o f Democracy (1970-90), 
Controlling For Economic Development
(a) Child Survival
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Figure 6.4 portrays the changes in levels o f security over the period. With respect 
to the peace/stability (CONF) measure (graph a), democratic states produced mixed 
results. In the wealthy sample, democratic states began and ended the period at the 
highest levels (1.000 and 0.921); the slight average decrease (-0.079) was due entirely to 
Peru’s decline from 1.000 in 1970 to 0 .524 in 1990 (owing to the conflict with the 
Shining Path). The dramatic decline for the non-democratic (3-5*) states (-0.145) was 
largely affected by the plight of Iran, which went from one extreme to the other over the 
period (i.e., from a value o f 1.000 in 1970 to a value of 0.000 in 1990). The non- 
democratic (6-7) states showed a slight improvement (0.018).
233
Fig. 6.4 Security Indicator Rates By Level O f Democracy (1970-90), 
Controlling For Economic Development
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In the poor sample, democratic states began the period at the same average level 
of peace/stability as the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.759). But whereas the non- 
democratic (6-7) states produced an increase o f 0.052 by 1990, democratic states had an 
average decrease of -0.054 as a consequence of deteriorating conditions in four countries: 
El Salvador (-0.728); Colombia (-0.308); Sri Lanka (-0.279); and Turkey (-0.069). The 
non-democratic (3-5*) states displayed the highest increase (0.096). By 1990, the poor 
democracies stood at the lowest average level of peace/stability (0.705, compared to 
0.725 for the non-democratic (3-5*) states and 0.811 for the non-democratic (6-7) states).
When the impact of inflation rates is factored in, changes in the Security Index 
may be traced (graph b). A quick glance reveals that democratic states did not fare well.
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In the wealthy sample, democratic states began the period at the highest SEC level 
(0.954) but saw their collective fortunes deteriorate by a steep margin (-0.203) by 1990; 
indeed, five of the six wealthy democracies (save for Barbados) displayed negative SEC 
rates, ranging from a modest -0.033 for Trinidad and Tobago to a severe -0.634 for Peru. 
The large average decrease in SEC values for the non-democratic (3-5*) states (-0.144), 
coupled with an almost negligible decrease for the non-democratic (6-7) states (-0.028), 
meant that all three LoD groups displayed SEC values below 0.800 by 1990: 0.751 for the 
democratic states; 0.689 for the non-democratic (3-5*) states; and 0.766 for the non- 
democratic (6-7) states.
Whereas all three LoD groups produced negative SEC rates in the poor sample, 
the average decrease for the democratic states (-0.144) was the most noteworthy. Of the 
eleven poor democracies, only India and Honduras exhibited positive SEC rates (0.121 
and 0.097); the worst affected were Turkey and El Salvador (-0.426 and -0.533). The non- 
democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states saw their respective average SEC 
levels decrease by -0.097 (from 0.755 to 0.658) and -0.072 (from 0.833 to 0.761). Despite 
having the highest average SEC value in 1970 (0.841), the poor democracies ended the 
period at a lower SEC level (0.697) than the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.761); the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states began and ended the period at the lowest SEC levels (0.755 and 
0.658).
The four illustrations comprising Figure 6.5 demonstrate that democratic states in 
both samples performed largely on par with the non-democratic states in terms of 
improving levels of social mobility. Regarding tertiary enrollment (TERT) rates (graph 
a), the three LoD groups produced almost identical increases in the wealthy sample (11.8, 
9.4 and 10.2). Democratic states therefore began and ended the period at higher levels 
(7.5 and 19.2). In the poor sample, the democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) states had 
similar average TERT values in 1970 (3.2 and 3.5), and almost identical TERT increases 
over the period (5.0 and 5.5); the non-democratic (6-7) states showed an average TERT 
increase of 2.8, from 1.2 in 1970 to 4.0 in 1990.
The results for democratic states were mixed in terms of gender equity (GEND) 
rates (graph b). In the wealthy sample, democratic states began and ended the period at 
the highest average GEND levels (0.452 and 0.627), but produced the smallest GEND 
increase (0.175); the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states produced 
GEND increases of 0.226 and 0.267. The relatively worse record for the democratic states 
may not be explained by their higher average starting level, since, unlike other cases (e.g. 
literacy), they still had ample room to improve on the fixed GEND scale. In the poor 
sample, however, democratic states did produce the highest average GEND increase 
(0.154); the rates for the non-democratic groups were 0.140 and 0.083. The poor
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Fig. 6.5 Mobility Indicator Rates By Level O f Democracy (1970-90),
Controlling For Economic Development
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democracies thus began and ended the period at the highest GEND levels (0.273 and 
0.427), but not by much: the non-democratic (3-5*) states had increased their average 
GEND level from 0.238 to 0.378; and the non-democratic (6-7) states improved more 
modestly, from 0.246 to 0.330.
The findings for % non-agricultural employment (%NAgr) rates varied by sample 
(graph c). Am ong the wealthy states, the three LoD groups displayed comparable 
increases over the period: 12%, 14%, and 11%. Very little also separated their respective 
%NAgr levels in either 1970 (68%, 65% and 60%) or 1990 (80%, 79% and 71%). In the 
poor sample, democratic states produced the highest increase (19%), raising their average 
%NAgr level from 39% to 58%. The non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) 
states produced increases of 11% and 8%, thereby raising their respective levels to 42% 
and 34% by 1990. Owing to the modest rate difference between the democratic and non- 
democratic (3-5*) states (8%), too much should not be read into these results.
Given the similar rate increases for its constituent indicators, it is not surprising 
that the rate increases for the Mobility Index (MOB) were also broadly similar (graph d). 
In the wealthy sample, democratic states exhibited a slightly lower increase (0.152) than 
the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states (0.164 and 0.170); but having 
started from a higher average MOB level (0.412), they still ended the period at a higher 
level (0.563), barely above the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.514). Conversely, in the 
poor sample, the average MOB increase for the democratic states (0.137) was slightly 
higher than the increase for the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.108); the non-democratic 
(6-7) states displayed a MOB increase of only 0.067. Hence, the average MOB levels in
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1990 were similar for both the democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.371 and 
0.308), with the non-democratic (6-7) states further behind (0.242).
The above findings confirm that no LoD group consistently displayed the highest 
indicator rates (Table 6.8 summarizes the results, and the average levels at the 
beginning/end of the period are given in parentheses below the rates). In the wealthy 
sample, the democratic states began and ended the period at higher average levels in 
almost every case (save for the Security Index). For four indicators (life expectancy, 
tertiary enrollment, % non-agricultural employment, and the Mobility Index) they 
performed largely on par with the non-democratic states. Although democratic states 
produced lower performance rates for the remaining six indicators, it would be 
misleading to read too much into this: for three of these indicators (literacy, child 
survival, and the Liberty Index) the more incremental increases may be explained by the 
already high average levels at the beginning of the period; and for one indicator 
(peace/stability) the dismal record of one state (Peru) had a significant impact on the 
average rate. Taking these factors into consideration, it may be argued that, in the wealthy 
sample, democratic states did not perform as well for only two indicators, the Security 
Index and gender equity.
In the poor sample, democratic states began and ended the period at higher 
average levels for seven of the ten indicators (the exceptions being peace/stability, the 
Security Index and tertiary enrollment). They exhibited broadly similar performance rates 
as the non-democratic states for exactly half of the indicators: life expectancy, child 
survival, tertiary enrollment, gender equity, and the Mobility Index. The democratic states 
displayed lower rates for four indicators; although, once again, the special circumstances 
in the case of two indicators should be acknowledged: while they fell short of the non- 
democratic (6-7) states in terms of increases in literacy rates (albeit by only 7%), 
democratic states were, on average, twice as literate to begin with (53% compared to 
26%); they were also bound to produce more incremental increases in LIB values given 
their already high LIB level in 1970 (0.709). There were, in essence, only two indicators 
for which the poor democracies did not fare particularly well, peace/stability and the 
Security Index. The only indicator for which they produced the highest average increase 
was the % NAgr rate.
Therefore, across both samples, democratic states did not compare favourably for 
only the Security Index over the 1970-90 period. In most other cases, the differences 
between the democratic and non-democratic states were either slight or could be 
explained by other factors (e.g. considerably higher indicator levels for democratic states 
in 1970). For one indicator, gender equity, the results differed by sample: democratic 
states had the lowest average increase for the wealthy sample but the highest average 
increase for the poor sample.
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Table 6.8 Average Indicator Performance Rates (1970-90)
By Level of Democracy, Controlling For Economic Development
WEALTHY (INC1&2) POOR (INC 3&4)
Indicator
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Level of Democracy 
1-2* 3-5* 6-7
Literacy (%) 7
(87/94)
21
(61/82)
23
(46/69)
20
(53/73) .....
18
(44/62)
27
(26/53)
Life Exp (yrs) 7.8
(63.7/71.5)
7.4
(59.5/66.8)
9.8
(56.5/66.3)
9.5
(54.4/63.9)
9.8
(48.3/58.1)
8.8
(44.6/53.4)
ChildSur (%) 3.5
(92.6/96.1)
4.8
(89.3/94.1)
6.2
(85.2/91.4)
6.6
(84.6/91.1)
6.3
(80.4/86.7)
6.4
(77.0/83.4)
LIB Index** 0.071 
(.815/.886)
0.108 
(.595/.703)
0.046
(.471/.516)
0.015 
(.709/.724)
0.129 
(.490/.619)
0.060 
(373/.434)
CONF** -0.079 -0.145 
(1.000/.921) (.958/.813)
0.018 
(.738/.755)
-0.054 
(.759/.705)
0.096 
(.629/.725)
0.052 
(.759/.811)
SEC Index** -0.203
(.954/.751)
-0.144 
(.834/.689)
-0.028 
(.795/.766)
-0.144 
(.841/.697)
-0.097 
(.755/.658)
-0.072
(.833/.761)
Tert Enr. (%) 11.8
(7.5/19.2)
9.4
(5.6/15.0)
10.2
(3.9/14.2)
5.0
(3.2/8.2)
5.5
(3.5/9.0)
2.8
(1.2/4.0)
GEND** 0.175 
(.452/.627)
0.226 
(.329/.555)
0.267 
(.249/.516)
0.154
(.273/427)
0.140
(.238/378)
0.083
(.246/330)
NAgr (%) 12
(68/80)
14
(65/79)
11
(60/71)
19
(39/58)
11
(31/42)
8
(26/34)
MOB Index** 0.152
(.412/.563)
0.164 
(.350/.514)
0.170
(.301/.471)
0.137 
(.234/.371)
0.108 
(.199/.308)
0.067 
(.175/.242)
Notes. **Scale ranges from 1.000 (highest) to 0.000 (lowest)
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Controlling For Indicator Levels: Literacy, Life Expectancy, Child Survival and 
Gender Equity
Having considered the average performance rates across all indicators once levels 
o f economic development were controlled for, this section will examine the specific 
changes in the levels o f four key indicators - adult literacy, life expectancy, child survival 
and gender equity - once the initial ‘take-off levels are controlled for.
Democratic states did not appear to perform as well in terms of adult literacy rates 
over the period (Figure 6.6): they displayed lower average increases among the states at 
the three highest literacy levels. The rate differences were, however, extremely modest: 
only 4% separated the democratic and non-democratic (6-7) states at the 30-59% literacy 
level; only 2% separated the democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) states at the 60-79%  
level; and only 4% separated the democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) states at the 
80%+ level (two o f the four democratic states, Barbados and Jamaica, had almost 
completely literate populations in 1970, thereby accounting for the lower average 
increase). The actual increases for the LoD groups (1-2*, 3-5*, 6-7) were: 24%, 22% and 
28% (30-59% level); 14%, 16% and 10% (60-79% level); 3%, 7% and 6% (80%+ level). 
The lone democratic state at the 0-29% literacy level, Gambia, had a slightly higher 
increase (30%) than the average for the non-democratic (6-7) states (28%); the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states showed the lowest average increase (23%).
Fig. 6.6 Average Literacy Rate Increases (1970-90), 
Controlling For Literacy Levels (1970)
0-29%  30-59% 60-79%  80%+
Literacy Levels (1970)
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Table 6.9 gives the rate increase for each developing democracy and shows how 
the increase compared against the average for all states beginning from the same literacy 
level in 1970 (+/-Avg). At the 30-59% literacy level, Papua New Guinea and Turkey 
produced above average increases (33% and 30%), whereas Honduras (22%), El Salvador 
(18%) and India (16%) produced below average increases. At the 60-79% level, three 
countries (Malaysia, the Dominican Republic and Peru) had above average increases, one 
country (Venezuela) equaled the level average, and three countries (Sri Lanka, Mauritius 
and Colombia) produced slightly below average increases. Five of the seven democratic 
states hovered around the average increase for the level (14%), while Malaysia (20%) and 
Colombia (9%) exhibited the highest and lowest increases. The performance of 
democracies at the 80%+ level cannot be generalized: given their already high levels in 
1970, it was impossible for Barbados and Jamaica to surpass the average for the level 
(6%); Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago fell just 1% shy of the average increase.
Table 6.9 Literacy Rate Increases (1970-90) In Comparative Perspective,
Developing Democracies
Level Country Value Value Increase +/- Avg Rank
1970 1970 1990 1970-90 (Level)* (Level)**
0-29% Gambia 6 36 30 +4 10
30-59% India 34 50 16 -9 25
Papua NG 32 65 33 +8 6
Turkey 52 82 30 +5 11
El Salvador 57 75 18 -7 24
Honduras 53 75 22 -3 20
60-79% Venezuela 75 89 14 0 9
Sri Lanka 77 89 12 -2 11
Dom. Rep. 67 84 17 +3 3
Colombia 78 87 9 -5 15
Mauritius 68 80 12 -2 12
Malaysia 60 80 20 +6 2
Peru 71 86 15 +1 5
80%+ Costa Rica 88 93 5 -1 6
Barbados 99 100 1 -5 12
Trinidad &T. 92 97 5 -1 7
Jamaica 97 99 2 -4 11
Notes. *The country’s increase compared to the average increase for all countries starting from
the same 1970 level. The average increases per level were: 26% (0-29%), 25% (30-59%), 14%
(60-79%), and 6% (80%+). **The country’s increase ranked against all countries starting from
the same 1970 level. The number of countries per level were: 31 (0-29%), 30 (30-59%), 15 (60-
79%), 12 (80%+).
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The rate differences across the four life expectancy levels were negligible (Figure
6 .7). At the two uppermost levels, where m ost developing dem ocracies were 
concentrated, the non-democratic (6-7) states produced the highest rate increases. 
However, an average o f only 1 year separated the rate increases for the democratic 
(1 lyrs) and non-democratic (6-7) states (12 yrs) at the 50-59 yrs level, and an average o f 
2 years separated the two groups (7 yrs and 9 yrs, respectively) at the 60+yrs level. At the 
30-39 yrs level, Gambia’s rate increase (9 yrs) fell just short o f the average increase (10  
yrs) for the non-democratic (3-5*) states, whereas, conversely, at the 40-49yrs level the 
increase for Papua New Guinea (10 yrs) was slightly better than the average increase for 
the non-democratic (3-5*) states (9 yrs); the rate increase for the non-democratic (6-7) 
states at both levels was 8 yrs.
s
Fig. 6.7 Average Life Expectancy Rate Increases (1970-90), 
Controlling For Life Expectancy Levels (1970)
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When evaluated against the averages found for all states at similar life expectancy 
levels in 1970, the democratic states had mixed success (Table 6.10). Gambia and Papua 
New Guinea both showed above average increases at their respective levels and both 
placed within the top third set of ranks (Gambia was ranked 4th o f 12, Papua New Guinea 
was 9th o f 31). Of the seven democratic states at the 50-59yrs level, two (Honduras and 
Peru) had above average increases, one (Malaysia) equaled the average for the level, and 
four (India, Dominican Republic, Turkey and El Salvador) had below average increases.
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Table 6.10 Life Expectancy Rate Increases (1970-90) In
Comparative Perspective, Developing Democracies
Level Country Value Value Increase +/- Avg Rank
1970 1970 1990 1970-90 (Level)* (Level)**
30-39yrs Gambia 35yrs 44 9 +1 4
40-49yrs Papua NG 45 55 10 +2 9
50-59yrs India 50 60 10 -1 15
Dom. Rep. 57 67 10 -1 16
Turkey 58 67 9 -2 19
Malaysia 59 70 11 0 12
El Salvador 56 65 9 -2 21
Peru 52 64 12 +1 8
Honduras 51 65 14 +3 4
60+yrs Costa Rica 66 76 10 +3 3
Barbados 69 75 6 -1 16
Venezuela 64 70 6 -1 12
Trinidad &T. 65 71 6 -1 13
Sri Lanka 65 71 6 -1 13
Jamaica 66 73 7 0 10
Colombia 60 69 9 +2 5
Mauritius 62 70 8 +1 7
Notes. *The country’s increase compared to the average increase Tot all countries starting from
the same 1970 level. The average increases per level were: 8yrs (30-39yrs), 8yrs (40-49yrs),
11 yrs (50-59yrs), and 7yrs (60+yrs). **The country’s increase ranked against all countries
starting from the same 1970 level. The number of countries per level were: 12 (30-39yrs), 31
(40-49yrs), 25 (50-59yrs), and 20 (60+yrs).
Only Honduras (4th of 25) and Peru (8th) placed among the top third set of ranks. At the 
60+yrs level, four of the eight democracies displayed increases which were slightly below 
the level average (7 yrs): Barbados, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, and Sri Lanka all 
had increases of 6 yrs. Jamaica equaled the level average, while Costa Rica (10 yrs), 
Colombia (9 yrs) and Mauritius (8 yrs) produced above average increases. Excluding 
these three, which were ranked 3rd (of 20), 5th, and 7th, the remaining five democratic 
states were located among the bottom ten ranks.
Democratic states performed largely on par with respect to child survival rates 
(Figure 6.8). At the 60-69% level, Gambia’s survival rate increase (8.1%) was only 
fractionally less than the average (8.9%) for the non-democratic (3-5*) states; the non- 
democratic (6-7) states produced an average increase of only 6.0%. At the 70-79% level, 
the rate increases were identical: 6.8% for the sole democracy, India, and 6.6% for both 
the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states. The seven democratic states 
at the 80-89% level produced an average increase of 7.1%, marginally ahead of the non-
Fig. 6.8 Average Child Survival Rate Increases (1970-90),
Controlling For Survival Levels (1970)
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democratic (3-5*) states at 6.3% and the non-democratic (6-7) states at 6.6%. At the 90- 
99% level, the rates for the democratic and non-democratic (6-7) states were virtually 
indistinguishable (4.1% and 4.5%), with a slightly lower rate (3.5%) observed for the 
non-democratic (3-5*) states.
The records of democratic states against the rate averages (+/-Avg) varied by level 
(Table 6.11). At the lowest survival level (60-69%), Gambia produced an above average 
increase (8.1%), placing it among the middle ranks (4th of 9). At the 70-79%  level, 
India’s increase (6.8%) essentially equaled the average for the level, thereby giving it a 
moderate rank (11th o f 26). Of the seven democracies at the next level (80-89%), four 
displayed above average rates (Papua New Guinea, Turkey, El Salvador and Honduras), 
one (Colombia) equaled the level average, and two (the Dominican Republic and Peru) 
displayed below average increases. Turkey’s increase (9.3%) was twice Peru’s (4.7%), 
thereby giving the former a rank of 3rd (of 33) for the level and the latter a rank o f 27th. 
The results at the highest survival level (90-99% ) were fairly nondescript: two 
democracies (Sri Lanka and Mauritius) had above average increases; four (Costa Rica, 
Barbados, Jamaica and Malaysia) essentially equaled the level average (3.7%); and two 
(Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago) displayed slightly below average increases.
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Table 6.11 Child Survival Rate Increases (1970-90) In
Comparative Perspective, Developing Democracies
Level Country Value Value Increase +/- Avg Rank
1970 1970 1990 1970-90 (Level)* (Level)**
60-69% Gambia 67.8% 75.9 8.1 +1 4
70-79% India 78.7 85.5 6.8 0 11
80-89% Dom. Rep. 873 92.0 4.7 -2 26
Colombia 883 95.0 6.7 0 16
Papua NG 83.4 91.7 8.3 +1 6
Turkey 81.7 91.0 9.3 +2 3
El Salvador 83.5 91.0 7.5 +1 11
Peru 83.4 88.1 4.7 -2 27
Honduras 81-5 89.7 8.2 +2 7
90-99% Costa Rica 94.1 98.2 4.1 0 6
Barbados 94.6 98.5 3.9 0 9
Venezuela 93.2 95.6 2.4 -1 17
Trinidad &T. 95.8 98.2 2.4 -1 18
Sri Lanka 92.0 96.4 4.4 +1 5
Jamaica 94.4 97.9 3.5 0 12
Malaysia 93.7 97.0 3.3 0 13
Mauritius 923 97.1 4.8 +1 4
Notes. *The country’s increase compared to the average increase for all countries starting from
the same 1970 level (rounded up). The average increases per level were: 6.9% (60-69%), 6.6%
(70-79%), 6.6% (80-89%), and 3.7% (90-99%). **The country’s increase ranked against all
countries starting from the same 1970 level. The number of countries per level were: 9 (60-69%),
26 (70-79%), 33 (80-89%), and 20 (90-99%).
Democratic states fared worse in terms of gender equity (Figure 6.9). Specifically, 
they came out second best at three of the four levels. At the lowest level (0-0.199), the 
non-democratic (6-7) states produced the highest average GEND increase (0.210), 
followed by the democratic states (0.181) and the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.160). 
At the 0.200-0.299 level, the non-democratic (3-5*) states produced a considerably better 
average increase (0.154) than the democratic states (0.118); the non-democratic (6-7) 
states were well behind (0.066). Only at the upper-middle level (0.300-0.399) did 
democratic states display the highest average increase (0.167, compared to 0.131 for the 
non-democratic (3-5*) states and 0.092 for the non-democratic (6-7) states). At the 
0.400+ level, the democratic states showed a lower average increase (0.205) than the non- 
democratic (3-5*) states (0.234), while the non-democratic (6-7) states produced the 
lowest increase (0.187).
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The relatively poorer showing was also reflected in the large number of below  
average democratic states (Table 6.12). At the 0-0.199 level, the Dominican Republic 
produced an above average increase, both Papua New Guinea and Honduras did not 
(although Honduras fell just shy of the mark). At the 0.200-0.299 level, only Colombia 
and Mauritius produced above average increases; their ranks, 7th and 9th (of 44), were 
quite respectable. The remaining four states at this level (India, Turkey, Gambia, El 
Salvador) produced below average increases; India barely fell short o f the average for the 
level (0.111). The records were somewhat evenly split at the 0.300-0.399 level: Peru and 
Malaysia showed significant increases, ranking first and second at this level; Costa Rica’s 
increase was just slightly below average; and Venezuela produced a noticeably lower 
increase (ranking 8th of 11). At the highest level (0.400+), Trinidad and Tobago had an 
above average rate, Sri Lanka essentially equaled the average for the level (0.216), and 
both Jamaica and Barbados showed below average increases (it should be noted that 
Barbados already had a very high gender equity value in 1970,0.728).
246
Table 6.12 Gender Equity (GEND) Rate Increases (1970-90) In 
Comparative Perspective, Developing Democracies
Level
1970
Country Value
1970
Value
1990
Increase
1970-90
+/- Avg 
(Level)*
Rank
(Level)**
0-0.199 Dom. Rep. 0.186 0.486 0.300 +0.100 5
Papua NG 0.192 0.261 0.069 -0.121 11
Honduras 0.173 0.347 0.174 -0.016 15
0.200-0.29S India 0.263 0.367 0.104 -0.007 15
Colombia 0.288 0.519 0.231 +0.120 7
Mauritius 0.290 0.518 0.229 +0.118 9
Turkey 0.244 0.283 0.040 -0.071 29
Gambia 0.263 0309 0.047 -0.064 26
El Salvador 0.262 0.318 0.057 -0.054 23
0.300-0.39S Costa Rica 0.307 0.421 0.114 -0.012 6
Venezuela 0358 0.440 0.082 -0.044 8
Malaysia 0.371 0.597 0.226 +0.100 2
Peru 0.304 0.551 0.247 +0.121 1
0.4004- Barbados 0.728 0.900 0.173 -0.043 10
Trinidad &T. 0.466 0.738 0.271 +0.055 4
Sri Lanka 0.472 0.686 0.214 -0.002 7
Jamaica 0.550 0.713 0.163 -0.053 12
Notes. *The country’s increase compared to the average increase for all countries starting from
the same 1970 level. The average increases per level were: 0.190 (0-0.199), 0.111 (0.200-0.299),
0.126 (0.300-0399), and 0.216 (0.400+). **The country’s increase ranked against all countries
starting from the same 1970 level. The number of countries per level 
(0.200-0.299), 11 (0300-0399), and 14 (0.4004-).
were: 19 (0-0.199), 44
Three general points may be made on the basis of the above analysis. First, when 
controls were made for similar take-off levels, democratic states, for the most part, 
performed as well as the best performing non-democratic group (LoD 3-5* or 6-7) in 
terms of increases in adult literacy, life expectancy and child survival, but compared less 
favourably in terms of increases in levels of gender equity. Given the broad similarities in 
average performance rates, therefore, the level of democracy accounted for very little, if 
anything.
Second, it was shown that the rate increases for developing democracies did not 
consistently exceed the average increases produced by all countries starting from similar 
starting levels in 1970 (Table 6.13 below summarizes the findings). Excluding Jamaica 
and Barbados (which were already at extremely high levels), only 6 of the 15 
democracies had literacy rate increases above the averages for their respective starting 
levels. These findings were mirrored for the other three indicators: 7 of the 17
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Table 6.13 Evaluating the Records of Developing Democracies (1970-90) Against 
The Average Increases For Their Starting Levels (1970), Selected Indicators
Democracy Lit LExp Surv GEND
Gambia + + +
India - - = -
Papua NG + + + -
Turkey + - + -
El Salvador - - + -
Honduras - + + -
Venezuela = - - -
Sri Lanka - - + -
Dominican Rep + - - +
Colombia - + = +
Mauritius - + + +
Malaysia + = = +
Peru + + - +
Costa Rica - + = -
Barbados - - = -
Trinidad & Tobago - - - +
Jamaica - — — -
Notes for each indicator are found in Tables 6.9 to 6.12 above.
+/- means above/below average for level, = means equals average for level
democracies had above average life expectancy rate increases (2 equaled their level 
averages); 7 had above average child survival rate increases (6 equaled their level 
averages); and 6 had above average gender equity rate increases. Strictly speaking, then, 
the majority of developing democracies did not surpass the average rate increases for 
their levels (although many equaled the averages, especially for the child survival 
indicator). Furthermore, no democracy managed to produce above average increases for 
all four indicators. Four democracies had above average rates for three indicators (Papua 
New Guinea, Mauritius, Peru and Gambia), five democracies had above average rates for 
two indicators (Turkey, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Malaysia), four 
democracies had above average rates for only one indicator (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Sri 
Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago), and four democracies failed to surpass the level averages 
for any indicator (Barbados, India, Jamaica and Venezuela).
Third, given their records against the level averages, it is not surprising that 
individual democratic states were infrequently found among the very top performers at 
each level (Table 6.14 below). More accurately, less than one-quarter of the developing 
democracies displayed top five performance ranks for any specific indicator. Four 
democratic states had top five literacy increases (Papua New Guinea at the 30-59% level, 
and Malaysia, the Dominican Republic, and Peru at the 60-79% level), four had top five 
life expectancy increases (Gambia at the 30-39yrs level, Honduras at the 50-59yrs level, 
and Costa Rica and Colombia at the 60+yrs level), four had top five child survival
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Table 6.14 The Top Five Performing States (1970-90)
By Starting Level (1970), Selected Indicators
Indie Level 1* 
Country LoD Incr
Level 2 
Country LoD Incr
Level 3 
Country LoD Incr
Level 4 
Country LoD Incr
Lit UAE 5.4 57% Tunisia 6.3 37% Singapore 4.5 21% Paraguay 4.0 11%
(%) SaudiAr 6.6 55 SouthAfr 5.3 35 Malaysia 2.6 20 Panama 5.3 9
Malawi 6.7 44 Jordan 6.3 35 DomRep 2.0 17 SKorea 4.1 8
IvoryC. 6.4 38 Botswana 3.0 34 Brazil 4.2 16 Cuba 6.8 8
Tanzania 6.0 36 PapuaNG 2.1 33 Peru 2.8 15 Philipp 4.1 7
LExp Senegal 5.1 llyrs Indonesia 5.5 16yrs Tunisia 63 15yrs Chile 6.3 llyrs
(yrs) Chad 6.8 10 Bolivia 3.4 16 SaudiAr 6.6 15 China 6.7 11
Angola 6.8 10 Lesotho 6.2 13 Algeria 6.5 15 Costa R 1.0 10
Gambia 2.5 9 Camer. 6.5 12 Honduras 2.9 14 Mexico 3.3 10
BurkFaso 6.2 9 Botswana 3.0 11 Guatem. 3.4 14 Colombia 2.1 9
Surv Liberia 5.9 9.4% Egypt 6.0 14.4% Iran 5.7 13.2% Thailand 4.4 6.2%
(%) Malawi 6.7 8.5 Algeria 6.5 10.7 Tunisia 63 11.8 UAE 5.4 5.7
SierraL 5.6 8.4 Madagas. 4.6 10.5 Turkey 2.4 9.3 China 6.7 5.6
Gambia 2.5 8.1 Benin 7.0 10.2 SaudiAr 6.6 9.0 Mauritius 2.2 4.8
BurkFaso 6.2 7.4 Sudan 5.7 7.9 Indonesia 5.5 8.3 Sri Lanka 1.8 4.4
Gend UAE 5.4 0.443 Cuba 6.8 0.556 Peru 2.8 0.247 SKorea 4.1 0.376
Egypt 6.0 0.352 SouthAfr 5.3 0.394 Malaysia 2.6 0.226 HongK 4.0 0.317
Algeria 6.5 0.345 Mexico 3.3 0.290 Congo 6.8 0.226 Chile 6.3 0.278
Libya 6.7 0.324 Zimbab. 4.9 0.264 Brazil 4.2 0.160 Trinid. 1.8 0.271
DomRep 2.0 0.300 Ecuador 6.0 0.249 Lesotho 6.2 0.141 Kuwait 6.1 0.250
Note. ♦Level 1: 0-29% (Lit), 30-39yrs (LExp), 60-69% (Surv), 0-0.199 (GEND)
Level 2: 30-59% (Lit), 40-49yrs (LExp), 70-79% (Surv), 0.200-0.299 (GEND)
Level 3: 60-79% (Lit), 50-59yrs (LExp), 80-89% (Surv), 0300-0399 (GEND)
Level 4: 80%+ (Lit), 60+yrs (LExp), 90-99% (Surv), 0.400+ (GEND)
increases (Gambia at the 60-69% level, Turkey at the 80-89% level, and Mauritius and Sri 
Lanka at the 90-99% level), and four had top five gender equity increases (the Dominican 
Republic at the 0-0.199 level, Peru and Malaysia at the 0.300-0.399 level, and Trinidad 
and Tobago at the 0.400+ level). There were four democracies with top five ranks for two 
indicators: Gambia (literacy, child survival); Malaysia (literacy, gender equity); the 
Dominican Republic (literacy, gender equity); and Peru (literacy, gender equity). To place 
this observation in perspective, four autocratic Middle Eastern states were among the top 
five ranks for three indicators: Saudi Arabia (excluding gender equity), the UAE 
(excluding life expectancy), Tunisia (excluding gender equity), and Algeria (excluding 
literacy).
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6.3 Summary of Chapter Findings
Conclusions Regarding Democracy and Social Indicator Levels in the Developing World
Over the 1970-90 period, democracy was strongly correlated (predictably) with 
only the measures of ‘liberty’ (civil liberties and the Liberty Index), and was moderately 
correlated with the measures of ‘individual capabilities’ (literacy and life expectancy) and 
the measures of ‘social mobility’ (tertiary enrollment, gender equity, non-agricultural 
employment and the Mobility Index); there was no relationship between levels of 
democracy and the measures of ‘security’ (peace/stability, inflation and the Security 
Index). Given that the level of economic development also appears to influence the 
indicators, albeit to varying degrees, no clear-cut relationships can be established between 
democracy and any of the indicators, save for the liberty indicators (Table 6.1). 
Moreover, there were tremendous variations in indicator rates both across and within all 
three levels of democracy (Table 6.2).
After controlling for similar levels of economic development, democratic states, 
on average, produced the highest indicator values, although the differences between the 
three levels of democracy were not great (sometimes indistinguishable) and usually 
masked wide rate fluctuations within each level (Table 6.3).
After controlling for regional variations, democratic states did not consistently 
display the highest indicator averages across and within each developing region (Table 
6.4); democratic states fared better in Latin America.
A large percentage of democratic states displayed indicator rates above the 
averages found for all developing states (Figure 6.1), although these numbers were 
heavily influenced by wealthy democracies, principally from Latin America (Table 6.5).
Conclusions Regarding Democracy and Social Indicator Performance Rates in the 
Developing World
The level of democracy did not, in general, have any observable impact on 
changes in indicator levels over the period. In particular, extremely weak correlations 
were found between levels of democracy and changes in the levels of adult literacy, life 
expectancy, child survival, the Liberty Index, peace/stability, the Security Index, tertiary 
enrollment, gender equity, % non-agricultural employment, and the Mobility Index 
(Table 6.6). As expected, indicator performance rates varied considerably across and 
within each level of democracy (Table 6.7).
When levels of economic development were controlled for, the average 
performance rates for the democratic and non-democratic states were broadly similar for
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every indicator except the Security Index, where democratic states performed worse 
(Rgures 6.2-6.5, Table 6.8).
When starting levels were controlled for, democratic and non-democratic states 
produced similar average increases in adult literacy (Figure 6.6), life expectancy (Figure
6.7), and child survival (Figure 6.8); democratic states fared slightly worse in terms of 
gender equity rates (Figure 6.9). However, the majority of democratic states displayed, 
relative to their starting levels in 1970, below average increases in literacy, life 
expectancy, child survival and gender equity (Tables 6.9-6.13). Moreover, democratic 
states were not well represented among the very top performers for any of the four 
indicators (Table 6.14).
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CHAPTER 7
EXAMINING THE ‘VIRTUOUS CYCLE’ OF DEVELOPMENT: 
DEMOCRACY AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
The preceding chapters provided empirical evidence detailing the dual nature of the 
relationship between democracy and human development Accordingly, it is argued that 
democracy is most likely to be the by-product of human development, not its catalyst 
Given that the level of democracy has no real influence on human development performance, 
it is important to examine which variable, if any, does.
The key appears to be economic growth. Indeed, this chapter will demonstrate that 
by expanding “the material base for the fulfillment of human needs” (UNDP 1996: 66), 
economic growth is the engine most likely to propel a country to a higher developmental 
plateau. But while the UNDP proclaims that strong economic growth and human 
development are mutually reinforcing phenomena which underpin a ‘ virtuous cycle’ of 
development, a belief also shared by the World Bank (1991: 36), there does not, however, 
appear to be any relationship between a country’s ability to establish such a ‘virtuous cycle’ 
and its level of democracy. This suggests the need to consider an argument best articulated 
in the work of Adrian Leftwich: the most exceptional performers, ‘developmental states’, are 
characterized not by regime-type or level of democracy but by the nature and role of the 
‘state’.
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 7.1 examines the general 
relationship between economic growth and human development Section 7.2 considers 
whether there is a general relationship between economic growth and democracy, thus 
exploring the possibility that the level of democracy might at least have an indirect impact on 
human development performance (through economic growth). Section 7.3 examines which 
level of democracy, if any, appears most likely to translate economic growth into human 
development gains. Section 7.4 assesses Leftwich’s thesis and then identifies the 
developmental states for the 1970-90 period. Section 7.5 summarizes the findings.
7.1 Economic Growth and Human Development 
General Patterns
Chapter 1 provided an overview of the debate which has raged among theorists and 
policy-makers alike with respect to the relative priority to be assigned to economic growth 
and human development as developmental objectives. The idea of viewing both as desirable 
and co-realizable was shown to be quite recent, and owes much to the publication of the
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UNDP’s first Human Development Report in 1990. This section will consider the 
relationship between the two objectives in the context of the 1970-90 period.1
A succinct theoretical explanation of how economic growth and human development 
are related is provided in the 1996 Human Development Report. In brief, the UNDP 
contends that the two phenomena are linked in a ‘virtuous cycle’: economic growth is likely 
to promote higher human development performance; in turn, higher levels of human 
development are likely to reinforce economic growth. In the first part of the equation, 
economic growth increases the disposable income available to households, thereby 
increasing in principle the income available for expenditure on basic needs. Economic 
growth also increases the revenue available to governments for public expenditure in 
general, and4 social priority spending’ in particular (UNDP 1996: 70). The second part of 
the equation is based on the premise that “healthy, well-educated people make an economy 
more productive” (UNDP 1996: 75). While the UNDP goes to great lengths to emphasize 
that improving human conditions is a goal in itself, a case is also made for the economic 
benefits which accompany an increase in 4 human capital’ (UNDP 1996: 76).
The UNDP’s thesis therefore considers both the impact of economic growth on 
human development performance and the impact of human development levels on economic 
growth. In working towards an examination of the ‘developmental state’ later in this 
chapter, where high economic growth is combined with high human development 
performance,it is the first part of the UNDP’s argument which is of primary concern here. 
However, given the additional importance attached to the second part of the argument by the 
UNDP, and in order to evaluate the performances of similarly-situated groups of countries, 
the subsequent analysis will control for levels of human development where necessary.
Table 7.1 confirms that the UNDP is largely correct: there is a general relationship 
between economic growth and human development performance. Positive and moderate 
correlations are produced throughout for both the All States and Developing States samples, 
although the correlations are stronger in the latter case. The correlations are very similar for 
both the HDI and I-HDI performance rates, but somewhat weaker for ISC rates. In the All 
States sample, it appears as if economic growth may, at most, account for roughly 22% of 
the variation in HDI rates (39% for Developing States), 16% of the variation in ISC rates 
(18% for Developing States), and 28% of the variation in I-HDI rates (38% for the 
Developing States). In the Developing States sample, the correlations tend to be noticeably 
stronger over the longer period (1970-90).
^Unless specified otherwise, the principal variables to be employed are the GNP per capita (GNP/C) rate 
(1965-90) and the I-HDI performance rate (1970-90). The values are found in Appendix Q (GNP/C) and 
Appendix O (I-HDI).
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Table 7.1 Correlations Between Economic Growth and
Human Development Performance
Index 1970/80
All States 
1980/90 1970/90
Developing States 
1970/80 1980/90 1970/90
HDI r= 
P=
0.464
0.215
0.305
0.093
0.420
0.177
0.542
0.294
0.507
0.257
0.622
0.387
ISC r= 
P=
0.279
0.078
0.295
0.087
0.402
0.162
0.268
0.072
0.297
0.088
0.421
0.177
I-HDI r= 
P=
0.431
0.186
0.370
0.137
0.532
0.283
0.453
0.205
0.462
0.213
0.620
0.384
Notes: 1. The period correlations are index 1970/80 with GNP/C avg 1965/80, index 1980/90 with 
GNP/C avg 1980/92, and index 1970/90 with GNP/C avg 1965/90.
2. Sample sizes (N): For All States, 1970/80 (116), 1980/80 (115), 1970/90 (100);
For Developing States, 1970/80 (89), 1980/90 (85), 1970/90 (76)
These correlations suggest that human development performance and economic 
growth tend to be complementary phenomena. This is certainly evident in Figure 7.1, which 
depicts the average rates of economic growth behind the aggregate human development 
scores (1970-90). In the All States sample, the nine countries which produced I-HDI 
increases of 0.200+ over the 1970-90 period displayed a very high average rate of economic 
growth (4.8%). In stark contrast, the seven countries which actually experienced a decline in 
human development conditions over the period (negative I-HDI rates) displayed a negative 
average rate of economic growth (-1.2%). Countries falling within the 0.199/0.100 
performance range had an average GNP/C rate of 1.8%, while countries in the performance 
group below (0.099/0.000) had a slightly lower average GNP/C rate of 1.4%. This exact 
pattern is mirrored for the Developing States sample: countries with extremely high human 
development increases (0.200+) also displayed by far the highest average rate of economic 
growth (5.0%), whereas countries with negative I-HDI rates displayed a negative average 
rate of economic growth (-1.2%); countries with moderate human development increases 
(0.199/0.100) had a higher average rate of economic growth (1.5%) than countries with 
modest I-HDI increases (0.9%).
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Fig. 7.1 Average Rates of Economic Growth By
Human Development Performance Groups
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Human Development (I-HDI) Performance Rate Groups, 1970-90
Judging from the distributional patterns in Figure 7.2 below (given for the All States 
sample), the average growth rates do not conceal any noteworthy discrepancies. When 
countries are grouped according to human development performance and economic growth, 
the general tendencies observed above remain valid, although it becomes clear that the 
relationship is not automatic. Of the nine countries with extremely high I-HDI performance 
rates (0.200+), six grew at average GNP/C rates of 4.0% or more, while the other three 
grew at fairly decent rates (2.0/3.9%). Twenty-one o f the 25 countries in the next highest I- 
HDI performance group (0.199/0.100) produced economic growth rates between 0.0/3.9%, 
two produced very high growth rates (4.0%+), and two produced negative growth rates. The 
majority of countries in the sample (59 of 100) displayed only modest I-HDI performance 
rates (0.099/0.000), o f which only five had economic growth rates of 4.0% + (the other 
economic growth brackets were fairly evenly represented). At the extreme end o f the scale, 6  
of the 7 countries with negative I-HDI performance rates also had negative economic 
growth rates.
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Fig. 7.2 Distribution of Countries By Economic Growth (1965-90)
and Human Development Performance (1970-90)
Econ. Growth (%), 1965-90
0.200+ 0.199/0.100 0.099/0.000 -0.001/-0.099
Human Development (I-HDI) Performance Rate Groups, 1970-90
From the reverse perspective, the thirteen countries with high economic growth rates 
(4.0%+) were evenly distributed between the highest I-HDI performance group (6 
countries) and the very modest I-HDI performance group (5 countries), with two countries 
in the moderate (0.199/0.100) performance group. The 33 countries with economic growth 
rates between 2.0/3.9% were largely located in the two middle I-HDI performance groups, 
as were the 32 countries with growth rates between 0.0/1.9%. Most of the countries with 
negative growth rates (14 of 22) produced very modest I-HDI rates (0.099/0.000). Hence, it 
may be argued that strong economic growth is (almost) a necessary though insufficient 
condition for high human development performance.
This last statement deserves further analysis. Table 7.2 (overleaf) provides a detailed 
breakdown of the economic growth rates produced by the top/bottom 10 human 
development performers (section a), and the average human development increases 
produced by the top/bottom 10 economic growth states (section b). For the sake o f clarity, 
human development levels are controlled for in both cases (countries have been separated 
into Medium and Low I-HDI categories, depending on where they stood in 1970).
One may first confirm that the best human development scores were typically 
accompanied by the highest economic growth rates, and vice versa. At the Medium Level, 
the top I-HDI performers displayed an average economic growth rate of 2.8%, compared to 
an average rate of -0.4% for the worst performers. Furthermore, the top performers at the
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Table 7.2 Comparing the Top and Bottom Country Ranks
(Human Development Performance and Economic Growth),
Controlling For Levels of Human Development
(a) By I-HDI Performance Rank (b) By Economic Growth Rank
I-HDI Ra Country I-HDI EcGr EcGr Ra Country EcGr I-HDI I-HDI
Level Incr % Ra % Incr Ra
MED 1 Korea, S. 0.287 7.1 1 1 Korea, S. 7.1 0.287 1
2 Thailand 0.223 4.4 5 2 Singapore 6.5 0.099 11
3 Chile 0.183 0.4 20 3 Hong Kong 6.2 0.078 18
4 Malaysia 0.163 4.0 6 4 Paraguay 4.6 0.086 13
5 Panama 0.142 1.4 15 5 Thailand 4.4 0.223 2
6 Mauritius 0.141 3.2 7 6 Malaysia 4.0 0.163 4
7 Philippines 0.118 1.3 17 7 Mauritius 3.2 0.141 6
8 Saudi Arab 0.111 2.6 11 8 Sri Lanka 2.9 0.024 24
9 Uruguay 0.104 0.8 19 9 Ecuador 2.8 0.100 10
10 Ecuador 0.100 2.8 9 10 Mexico 2.8 0.009 28
TlOAyg 2.8 770 Avg ......9:1?..L . .............
22 Bolivia 0.031 -0.7 27 22 Papua New G. 0.1 0.057 21
23 Jamaica 0.026 -1.3 29 23 Trinidad & T. 0.0 0.080 16
24 Sri Lanka 0.024 2.9 8 24 Pem -0.2 -0.016 29
25 Venezuela 0.013 -1.0 28 25 Argentina -0.3 0.057 20
26 South Afr. 0.013 1.3 18 26 El Salvador -0.4 -0.021 30
27 Kuwait 0.012 4.0 31 27 Bolivia -0.7 0.031 22
28 Mexico 0.009 2.8 10 28 Venezuela -1.0 0.013 25
29 Peru -0.016 -0.2 24 29 Jamaica -1.3 0.026 23
30 El Salvador -0.021 -0.4 26 30 Nicaragua -3.3 -0.041 31
31 Nicaragua -0.041 -3.3 30 31 Kuwait -4.0 0.012 27
B10 Avg -0.4 B10 Avg 0.020
LOW 1 Indonesia 0.331 4.5 4 1 Botswana 8.4 0.244 2
2 Egypt 0.304 4.1 5 2 China 5.8 0.223 5
3 Botswana 0.244 8.4 1 3 Lesotho 4.9 0.080 27
4 Syria 0.238 2.9 11 4 Indonesia 4.5 0.331 1
5 Tunisia 0.231 3.2 8 5 Egypt 4.1 0.204 2
6 China 0.223 5.8 2 6 Burundi 3.4 0.181 9
7 Pakistan 0.191 2.5 12 7 Brazil 3.3 0.180 10
8 Libya 0.190 -3.0 45 8 Tunisia 3.2 0.231 4
9 Burundi 0.181 3.4 6 9 Congo 3.1 0.116 15
10 Brazil 0.180 3.3 7 10 Cameroon 3.0 0.082 25
T10 Avg 3.5 TIOAvg 0.187
36 Madagascar 0.030 -1.9 40 36 Cen. Afr. R. -0.5 0.054 32
37 Zaire 0.028 -2.2 42 37 Senegal -0.6 0.120 14
38 Rwanda 0.028 1.0 19 38 Chad -1.1 0.082 24
39 Tanzania 0.015 -0.2 35 39 Ghana -1.4 0.010 40
40 Ghana 0.010 -1.4 39 40 Madagascar -1.9 0.030 36
41 Sudan 0.004 0.0 30 41 Zambia -1.9 -0.027 43
42 Uganda -0.012 -2.4 44 42 Zaire -2.2 0.028 37
43 Zambia -0.027 -1.9 41 43 Mger -2.4 0.058 30
44 Sierra Leo. -0.050 0.0 31 44 Uganda -2.4 -0.012 42
45 Somalia -0.089 -0.1 34 45 Libya -3.0 0.190 8
B10 Avg -0.9 BIO Avg 0.053
Notes.
Ra=Rank (I-HDI Perf/EcGr), I-HDI Iner=Absolute I-HDI Increase 1970-90, EcGr=GNP/C (%) 
1965-90.
MED= Medium I-HDI Level (0.799/0.500) in 1970, LOW=Low I-HDI Level (0.499/0.000) in 
1970.
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Low Level had an average GNP/C rate of 3.5%, compared to a miserable -0.9% for the 
worst performers. The same pattern holds from the opposite perspective. The top 10 
economic growth states at the Medium Level displayed an I-HDI average of 0.121, whereas 
the bottom 10 states displayed an average of only 0.020. At the Low Level, the average I- 
HDI rate for the top economic growth states (0.187) dwarfed the average increase for the 
worst economic growth states (0.053).
While the general tendency is for human development performance to accompany 
economic growth, there are of course many exceptions to the rule. In fact, one may divide 
the countries in the table into four main groups (a more comprehensive treatment will follow 
in the section dealing with the4 links’ between human development and economic growth).
The first group consists of those countries which displayed high human 
development performance and high economic growth (among the top 10 ranks in both 
samples). In addition to the exceptional case of South Korea (the top human development 
performer and the top economic growth state), there were four countries beginning from the 
Medium Level (Thailand, Malaysia, Mauritius and Ecuador) and seven from the Low Level 
(Indonesia, Botswana, Tunisia, China, Egypt, Brazil and Burundi) which made both top 10 
lists.
The second group consists of those countries which managed to dramatically 
improve human development conditions (top 10) despite poor economic growth. Examples 
from the Medium Level over the period include Chile (0.4%, 20th rank), Panama (1.4%, 
15th rank), the Philippines (1.3%, 17th rank) and Uruguay (0.8%, 19th rank). Only the 
erratic case of Libya could be found at the Low I-HDI Level (top 10 I-HDI rate despite 
having a GNP/C rate of -3%, or 45th rank in the sample).
The third group consists of those countries which managed to produce 
comparatively high rates of economic growth (top 10) but very little improvement in human 
development conditions. At the Medium I-HDI Level, one finds Sri Lanka (0.024, 24th 
rank) and Mexico (0.009,28th rank). The two notable cases at the Low Level were Lesotho 
(0.080,27th rank) and Cameroon (0.082,25th rank).
The fourth group consists of those countries which displayed very poor records of 
human development performance and economic growth. Seven countries from the Medium 
Level made the bottom 10 list in both samples: Bolivia, Jamaica, Venezuela, Kuwait, Peru, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. Five countries from the Low Level shared this dubious distinction, 
all from sub-Saharan Africa: Madagascar, Zaire, Ghana, Uganda and Zambia
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Qualifying the General Relationship
The general relationship between the two variables should be qualified slightly to 
take into account the levels of economic and human development at the beginning of the 
period in question. The reason is that economic growth seems to have a considerably greater 
impact on human development performance in the relatively poor and less developed 
countries. Focusing exclusively on developing states, Figure 7.3 (overleaf) demonstrates 
that this was the case over the 1970-90 period.
Once similar levels of economic development were controlled for (graph a), 
economic growth appeared to make little difference to I-HDI performance among states in 
the wealthy sample (INC 1&2, N=20). The average I-HDI rates were similar for the top 
three economic growth brackets: 0.089 (4.0%+), 0.100 (2.0/3.9%), and 0.097 (0.0/1.9%). 
Those states with negative economic growth rates during the period produced a 
considerably lower average I-HDI increase (0.036).
The situation was altogether different, however, in the sample of poor developing 
states (INC 3&4, N=56). Countries with growth rates of 4.0% or higher produced an 
average I-HDI increase of 0.205. Those states in the next highest economic growth bracket 
(2.0/3.9%) produced an average performance rate of 0.130 (the other I-HDI averages were 
0.072 for the 0.0/1.9% bracket and a paltry 0.025 for the states with negative economic 
growth rates). For the poorer states, higher economic growth appears to translate into higher 
human development performance.
Similar patterns emerge when one controls for similar levels of human development 
(graph b). The High I-HDI Level (0.800+) has been omitted from the graph in order to 
focus on developing states (the I-HDI averages produced by the different economic growth 
brackets at the High I-HDI Level were virtually identical). At the Medium I-HDI Level 
(0.799/0.500, N=25), the highest I-HDI performance average (0.136) was produced by 
those states with economic growth rates of 4.0%+. The next two economic growth brackets 
displayed successively lower average I-HDI rates of 0.113 and 0.101, while states with 
negative economic growth rates produced an average I-HDI rate of only 0.019.
The same tendency, only significantly more pronounced, emerged for states at the 
Low I-HDI Level (0.499/0.000, N=55). The highest economic growth bracket (4.0%+) 
produced the highest I-HDI average (0.210), while the negative growth bracket produced the 
lowest I-HDI average (0.032); the averages for the other growth brackets were 0.144 
(2.0/3.9%) and 0.073 (0.0/1.9%). Thus, for countries at similar levels of human 
development, higher economic growth suggests, on average, higher human development 
performance.
The relationship between economic growth and human development performance 
should also be qualified in another way. While economic growth does appear to bring about 
an improvement in overall human development conditions, as defined by the composite
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Fig. 7.3 Human Development Performance and Economic Growth,
Controlling For Levels of Economic and Human Development 
(Developing States, N=76)
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indices, it does not necessarily follow that economic growth brings about an immediate and 
marked improvement in the level of any specific indicator. The rate of economic growth has 
virtually no direct impact on changes in the levels of adult literacy, life expectancy, child 
survival and gender equity (Table 7.3).
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Table 7.3 Correlations Between Economic Growth and Changes in the
Levels of Four Key Indicators, Developing States (N=76)
Lit% LifeExp ChildSurv GendEq.
r= 0.022 0.192 -0.078 0.325
i*= 0.000 0.037 0.006 0.106
Notes. Economic Growth (GNP/C 1965-90), all Indicators (1970-90)
Nonetheless, while the relationships are by no means automatic, moderately-strong 
to strong economic growth does appear to make some difference. Table 7.4 presents the 
average increases in indicator levels (1970-90) for countries with different rates of economic 
growth (1965-90), controlling for indicator levels at the beginning of the period (the two 
middle levels on each indicator scale were selected because of the fairly even distribution of 
countries). The fastest growing states (4.0%+) experienced an average increase of 21% in 
their literacy levels, the same figure as for the negative growth states (-0. l/-4.0%). Countries 
with only slow growth (1.9/0.0%) actually experienced the highest average absolute increase 
(24%), although the increases were quite similar among all four groups. The fastest growing 
states did produce the highest average increases in life expectancy (12 years) and child 
survival (8.4%), with the smallest increases (8 years and 6.3%) shown by the negative 
growth states. In terms of gender equity, the average increases produced by the top two 
economic growth brackets were almost identical (0.169 and 0.171), with negative growth 
states falling well behind (0.068).
Table 7.4 Average Indicator Increases (1970-90) By Rates of Economic Growth 
(1965-90), Controlling For Indicator Levels
Indicator Level (1970)
Economic Growth Rate Brackets 
4.0%+ 3.9/2.0% 1.9/0.0% -0.1/-4.0%
Adult Literacy 30-79% 21% 20% 24% 21%
(N) (9) (12) (9) (12)
Life Expect 40-59yrs 12yrs lOvrs 9yrs 8yrs
(7) (13) (18) (13)
Child Survival 70-80% 8.4% 6.9% 6.7% 6.3%
(4) (15) (18) (13)
Gender Equity 0.200/0.399 0.169 0.171 0.110 0.068
(6) (10) (15) (16)
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When levels of economic development (1970) are controlled for, the results are 
more inconclusive (Table 7.5 shows the findings for the poor sample of developing states, 
INC 3&4, N=56). The worst economic performers actually produced a slightly higher 
average increase in literacy rates (23%) than the fastest growing states (20%). The reverse 
was true for life expectancy rates: the highest average increase was produced by the fastest 
growing states (llyears), whereas the lowest increase was shared by the slow growth and 
negative growth states (9 years). The four groups displayed indistinguishable increases in 
child survival rates, ranging from 6.2% to 6.7%. As was found above in Table 7.4, countries 
with economic growth of 4.0%+ produced a similar average increase in gender equity levels 
(0.197) as the countries with growth of 3.9/2.0% (0.189); the negative growth countries had 
an average increase of only 0.050.
Table 7.5 Average Indicator Increases (1970-90) By Rates of Economic Growth
(1965-90), Poor Sample (INC 3&4)
Indicator
Rates of Economic Growth 
4.0%+ 3.9/2.0% 1.9/0.0% -0.1/-4.0%
Adult Literacy 
Life Expect
20% 23% 22% 23% 
llyrs lOyrs 9yrs 9yrs
Child Survival 
Gender Equity
6.2% 6.7% 6.7% 6.5% 
0.197 0.189 0.084 0.050
Notes. (N)=4.0%+ (S>),3.9/2.0% (14), 1.9/0.0% (18), -0.1M.0% (15)
It is obvious that economic growth alone is not enough to improve the individual 
indicators. Other factors must also of course be taken into account, including (but not 
limited to) the level of government spending in these areas, and the specific policies adopted 
by governments.
Examining the Impact of Other Variables on Human Development Performance
Do other variables influence human development performance to the same extent as 
economic growth? This is a valid question to pose, for despite the strong links between the 
two when levels of human and economic development are controlled for, economic growth 
may explain, at most, around 38% of the variation in I-HDI increases (1970-90) for the 
sample of developing states (from Table 7.1). Given how frequently they are mentioned in
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development literature, three variables in particular will be briefly considered here: the 
economic system;2 the size of government;3 and social expenditures.4
Judging from the extremely weak correlations in Table 7.6, one may certainly rule 
out the existence of a general relationship between human development performance and 
any of the variables. The nature of the economic system may account for less than 1% of 
the variation in I-HDI rates among developing states, whereas the size of government and 
the level of social expenditures may each account for roughly 3% of the variation in 
performance rates.
Table 7.6 Correlations Involving the Three Variables and 
Human Development Performance (Developing States)
Econ. System Size of Gov’t Social Expen.
(N=76) (N=58) (N=53)
I-HDI Increase r= -0.091 0.172 -0.164
(1970-90) i*= 0.008 0.030 0.027
Table 7.7 below provides a detailed look at the distribution patterns for developing 
states, allowing one to trace I-HDI increases by variable category and to determine which 
variable category, if any, is best represented among each I-HDI increase bracket The actual 
number of countries is given for each cell, along with the corresponding percentage in 
parenthesis (to place the numbers in proportional contexts).
2Economic systems are classified according to the typology employed by Raymond Gastil in his Freedom 
In the World surveys. Specifically, the reference date is 1984-5 (Gastil 1985, Table 8), and five economic 
systems are considered: Capitalist (N=26); Capitalist-Statist (N=28); Mixed-Capitalist (N=7); Mixed- 
Socialist (N= 12); and Socialist (N=3). Gastil divides economic systems furtherinto ‘inclusive’ (modem) and 
‘non-inclusive’ (traditional) variants, a practice which is abandonedhere for the sake of simplification. Most 
developing states fall into the non-inclusive category (especially in the sub-Saharan Africa group). The two 
economic systems at either end of the spectrum, Capitalist and Socialist, require no elaboration. Capitalist- 
Statist countries are those "that have very large productive enterprises, either because of elitist development 
philosophy or major dependenceon a key resource such as oil". In Mixed-Capitalist states "private control 
over property is sacrificed to egalitarian purposes”, and capitalism’s "legitimacy is grudgingly accepted by 
many in government”. Mixed-Socialist states "proclaim themselves to be socialist but in fact allow rather 
large portions of the economy to remain in the private domain".
3The size of government is defined by the total central government expenditure as a percentage of GNP. 
This measure "excludes consumption expenditure by state and local governments...(but) includes 
government’s gross domestic investment and transfer payments" (World Bank 1991: 279). The primary 
source for the datais the World Bank’s 1991 World Development Report (Table 11) and the reference date is 
1972.1 have divided countries into three groups according to their levels of expenditure at the beginning of 
the performance period: ‘Large’=25%+ (N=12); ‘Medium’=15-24% (N=28); and ‘Small’=5-14% (N=18). 
These designations were selectedfor purposes of illustration only.
“The UNDP refers to combined expenditure on education and health, expressed as a percentage of total 
central government spending, as the ‘social allocation ratio’ (UNDP 1996: 71). For the sake cf 
simplification, the term ‘social expenditures’ will be used here to denote these ratios. Having first gathered 
expenditure data on education and health, presented separately in the various World Development Reports 
(particularly the 1984, 1985 and 1991 editions), I then calculated social expenditure levels for 1972 (roughly 
the beginning of the performance period). I divided those developing countries for which data was available 
into three expenditure groups: ‘High’=25%+ (N=20); ‘Medium’=15-24% (N=23); and ‘Low’=0=14% 
(N= 10). These designations were selectedfor purposes of illustration only.
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Table 7.7 Distribution of Developing States By Variable Category and
Human Development Performance (N and %)
Variable Category
I-HDI Increase Brackets (1970-90) 
0.200+ 0.199/ 0.099/ -0.001/ 
0.100 0.000 -0.099
(a) Economic 
System 
(N=76)
CAP
CAP-STAT
MIX-CAP
MIX-SOC
SOC
3 (11%)
1 (3%)
2 (29%) 
2 (17%)
8(31%) 
8 (29%) 
3 (43%) 
2(17%) 
1 (33%)
13 (50%) 
17 (61%)
1 (14%) 
6 (50%)
2 (67%)
2 (8%)
2 (7%)
1 (14%) 
2(16%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
(b) Size of 
Gov’t 
(N=58)
Large (25%+) 
Med.( 15-24%) 
Small (5-14%)
2(17%)
4(14%)
6 (50%) 
6 (22%) 
5 (28%)
3 (25%) 
14 (50%) 
11 (61%)
1 (8%) 
4(14%) 
2(11%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
(c) Social 
Expend. 
(N=53)
High (25%+) 
Med. (15-24%) 
Low (0-14%)
1 (5%)
3 (13%)
2 (20%)
6 (30%) 
4(17%) 
4 (40%)
10 (50%) 
13 (57%) 
3 (30%)
3 (15%) 
3 (13%) 
1 (10%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
As may be expected given the very weak correlations, there were no discernible 
patterns when countries were separated by I-HDI increases and economic systems (section 
a). Of the eight countries with very high I-HDI rates (0.200+), three had Capitalist systems 
(South Korea, Botswana and Thailand), one had a Capitalist-Statist system (Indonesia), two 
had Mixed-Capitalist systems (Tunisia and Egypt), and two had Mixed-Socialist systems 
(Syria and China). Translated into percentages: 11% of the Capitalist states in the sample 
produced I-HDI increases of 0.200+, compared to 3% of the Capitalist-Statist states, 29% 
of the Mixed-Capitalist states, and 17% of the Mixed-Socialist states. The economic 
systems were also fairly evenly represented at the other extreme: among those countries 
with actual I-HDI rate decreases (-0.001/-0.099) one finds two Capitalist states, two 
Capitalist-Statist states, one Mixed-Capitalist state, and two Mixed-Socialist states. These 
numbers translate into similar percentages (8%, 7%, 14% and 16%). Perhaps most 
indicative of the relative distributional parity is the fact that, with the exception of Mixed- 
Capitalist states, roughly half of all states in each category produced very modest I-HDI 
rates (0.099/0.000): 50% of Capitalist states; 61% of Capitalist-Statist states; 50% of 
Mixed-Socialist states; and 67% of Socialist states.
Very little also distinguishes human development increases when the ‘size of 
government’ is considered (section b). Most of the six countries with high I-HDI rates 
(0.200+) had ‘medium’-size governments (i.e., total central government expenditure as a 
percentage of GNP in the 15-24% range): only Botswana and Syria had what might be 
called ‘large’ governments (ratios of 25%+); although, proportionally, the ‘large’ and 
‘medium’ categories were evenly represented. At the other end of the table, there is a similar
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percentage breakdown in the -0.001/ -0.099 I-HDI rate bracket: 8% (large); 14% (medium); 
and 11% (small). The only observable difference between the categories - and a relatively 
minor one at that - seems to be the placement of the majority of country cases: whereas half 
(6) of all countries with ‘large’ governments produced I-HDI rates between 0.199/0.100, 
half (14) of all countries with ‘medium’ size governments, and 61% of all countries with 
‘small’ governments, fell into the I-HDI increase group below (0.099/0.000).
Perhaps most surprisingly, there is no clear relationship between levels of social 
expenditures and human development performance (section c), confirming the viewthat it is 
how money is spent that is important, not how much.5 Of the six countries with very high 
I-HDI increases (0.200+), only Tunisia invested over 25% of total government expenditures 
into education and health (Thailand, South Korea and Botswana spent between 15-24%, 
whereas Syria and Indonesia spent between 0-14%). To put this into perspective: Tunisia 
spent roughly four times more on social expenditures (38%) than Indonesia (9%), but 
produced a lower I-HDI increase (0.231, compared to 0.331 for Indonesia). Moreover, on a 
proportional basis, ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ social spenders were fairly evenly 
represented among countries with negative I-HDI rates (15%, 13% and 10%, respectively). 
Little also separated the categories in the two middle I-HDI increase brackets: there were 
proportionally more ‘low’ than ‘high’ social spenders at the 0.199/0.100 level (40% and 
30%); and the percentages of ‘high’ and ‘medium’ spenders at the 0.099/0.000 level were 
virtually the same (50% and 57%).
Hence, none of the three variables - the economic system, the size of government, or 
social expenditures - has any discernible impact on human development performance. It is 
therefore valid to view economic growth as the single most important factor.
7.2 Democracy and Economic Growth
General Patterns
If, as has just been demonstrated, economic growth often acts the engine behind 
overall human development performance, one may return to a familiar question that has 
preoccupied political scientists: Is there a relationship between democracy and economic 
growth? Most importantly, which level of democracy appears more likely to promote rapid 
economic growth, which in turn promotes higher human development dividends?
The findings in Table 7.8 may lead one to conclude that, of the three broad 
approaches outlined in Chapter 1, it is the Skeptical Perspective which is the most accurate: 
there is no general relationship between rates of economic growth and levels of democracy.
^Within the composite I-HDI measure, the impact of social expenditures would be reflected in certain 
indicators in particular the health and education components in the Human Development Index, the social 
deprivation (child survival) rate in the Liberty Index, and both the gender equity (female education variable) 
and tertiary enrolment rates in the Mobility Index.
265
Irrespective of sample group and period, very weak and negative correlations were 
produced. The r-squared values suggest that the level of democracy may explain, at most, 
only 2-14% of the variation in economic growth rates.
Table 7.8 Correlations Between Democracy and Economic Growth
Sample 1970/80 1980/90 1970/90
All States r= -0.277 -0.374 -0.207
i*= 0.077 0.140 0.043
Developing r= -0.258 -0.123
States i*= 0.066 0.066 0.015
Sample Sizes (All, Devel.): 1970/80 (116, 89), 1980/90 (115, 85), 1970/90 (100, 76).
The lack of any clear-cut relationship between the two may also be demonstrated in 
another manner. By employing as a standard threshold the average economic growth rate 
for all developing states, it is possible to calculate the percentage of countries from each 
level of democracy with ‘above average’ economic growth rates (Table 7.9). During the 
1970/80 period, three-quarters (75%) of all democratic states produced growth rates above 
the developing average, compared to 63% of all non-democratic (3-5*) states and only 37% 
of all non-democratic (6-7) states. In the 1980/90 period, just under half of the democratic 
states (46%) grew at rates above the developing average (the percentages for the two non- 
democratic groups were 50% and 31%). Over the entire 1970/90 period, more than half of 
all democracies (53%) surpassed the developing average, a marginally higher percentage 
than was found for the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states (49% and 
45%, respectively). As suggested by the correlations, there is very little here to separate the 
three levels of democracy: the democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) states had similar 
percentages throughout, while the non-democratic (6-7) states performed worst of all 
(although they were not far behind over the longer period).
Table 7.9 Percentage of Countries From Each Level of Democracy With 
‘Above Average’ Rates of Economic Growth, Developing States (N=76)
LoD
% Above Developing Average* 
1970/80 (N) 1980/90 1970/90
___ 1-2*___
3-5*_
75% (12) 46% (12) 53% (8) 
63% (12) 50% (12) 49% (15) 
37% (19) 31% (10) 45% (13)
♦The average growth rates (GNP/C) for the developing states were: 
2.2% (1970/80), 0.1% (1980/90) and 1.3% (1970/90).
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Nor are any significant discrepancies revealed after computing the average rates of 
economic growth by level of democracy (Figure 7.4 shows the findings over three different 
periods for the Developing States sample). The non-democratic (3-5*) states grew at quite a 
high average rate (3.5%) during the 1970/80 period, followed by the democratic states (with 
a respectable 2.7%) and the non-democratic (6-7) states (1.7%). The averages for all three 
LoD groups declined noticeably over the 1980/90 period, with the democratic states 
producing a slightly higher average growth rate (0.9%) than the non-democratic (3-5*) 
states (0.4%), while the most authoritarian states produced a negative average rate (-0.7%). 
Over the longer period (1970/90), the non-democratic (3-5*) states (1.6%) slightly edged 
out the democratic states (1.2%) and the non-democratic (6-7) states (1.0%). Overall, the 
non-democratic (3-5*) states and democratic states were separated by only 0.4-0.8%. With 
its large contingent of sub-Saharan African countries, the non-democratic (6-7) group 
consistently grew at the slowest rates.
s
Fig. 7.4 Rates of Economic Growth By Level of Democracy, 
Developing States (N=76)
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Regional Groups and Rapid Growth States
One may question the validity of lumping together, say, authoritarian states from 
Asia with their counterparts in sub-Saharan Africa for the sake of arriving at a neat 
generalization regarding the performance of all authoritarian states, just as one might wish 
to differentiate between the performances of the longer established Latin American
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democracies and Turkey, the solitary ‘democratic’ representative in the Middle East. In 
order to control for variations between the four developing regions, Figure 7.5 presents the 
average rates of economic growth by level of democracy and region over the 1970-90 
penod.
Fig. 7.5 Average Rates of Economic Growth 
By Level of Democracy and Region
6.0
5.0-
4.0 ■
3.0 ■
2.0 -
( 10)
(19)
( 1 1 )
0.0
<0ca
CO co
Lev of Dem
ASI AFR
Looking across the regions, no level of democracy produced the highest average 
rates of economic growth throughout. The only non-democratic (6-7) state in the ASI 
region, China, grew at a phenomenal rate of 5.8%, compared to an impressive 3.7% for the 
nine non-democratic (3-5*) states and a more modest 2.2% for the four democratic states. 
In the LAT region, the highest average rate was produced by the non-democratic (3-5*) 
states (1.2%), followed by the democratic states (0.4%) and the non-democratic (6-7) states 
(0.3%). Turkey produced a higher economic growth rate (2.6%) than the averages for the 
non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states (1.2% and 1.1%) in the MID 
region. The only country in the sample from the AFR region to statistically qualify as a 
democracy for the entire period, Mauritius, grew at an impressive rate of 3.2%, significantly 
higher than the average rates for the two non-democratic groups (0.4% and 0.7%).
It is also worth observing that there was considerable variation within each level of 
democracy. For example, with a paltry average growth rate of 0.4%, democratic states in the 
LAT region performed much differently than their counterparts in the ASI (2.2%), MID 
(2.6%) and AFR (3.2%) regions. Furthermore, with an average rate of 3.7%, the non-
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democratic (3-5*) states in the ASI region grew at more than three times the average rates of 
their counterparts in the LAT (1.2%), MID (1.2%) and AFR (0.4%) regions. The most 
dramatic discrepancies could be found among the non-democratic (6-7) states, where 
China’s rate of 5.8% towered over the dismal average rates produced by non-democratic (6- 
7) states in the LAT (0.3%), MID (1.1%), and AFR (0.7%) regions.
The variations across the regions, and within the three levels of democracy, suggest 
that the ranking of regional performance groups would not reflect any concrete patterns. 
This is largely true (Table 7.10). The best and worst performing groups displayed strongly 
authoritarian LoD values: the non-democratic (6-7) states from the ASI and LAT regions 
had rates of 5.8% and 0.3%, respectively. The second-best and second-worst performing 
groups also displayed similar LoD values: the ASI non-democratic (3-5*) states had an 
average rate of 3.7%, while the AFR non-democratic (3-5*) states had an average of only 
0.4%. With the exception of the LAT democratic (1-2*) group, which displayed an average 
of 0.4%, the democratic regional groups were clustered in the upper part of the table, with 
average rates of 3.2% (AFR 1-2*), 2.6% (MID 1-2*), and 2.2% (ASI 1-2*).
Table 7.10 Ranking Regional Groups By Rates of Economic Growth (1965-90)
Rank Regional
Group
N GNP/C
(1965-90)
1. ASI 6-7 1 5.8%
2. ASI 3-5* 9 3.7%
3. AFR 1-2* 1 3.2%
4. MID 1-2* 1 2.6%
5. ASI 1-2* 4 2.2%
6. LAT 3-5* 10 1.2%
6. MID 3-5* 2 1.2%
8. MID 6-7 7 1.1%
9. AFR 6-7 19 0.7%
10. LAT 1-2* 9 0.4%
10. AFR 3-5* 11 0.4%
12. LAT 6-7 2 0.3%
While generalizations on the basis of levels of democracy may not be warranted, it is 
difficult to ignore one key regional distinction brought out in the table: the ASI region fared 
particularly well (especially the non-democratic states). The three ASI groups were ranked 
first (ASI 6-7), second (ASI 3-5*) and fifth (ASI 1-2*). This is in line with the 
considerably higher average economic growth rate produced by the ASI region as a whole 
(3.4%); the average rates for the other regions were 1.3% (MID), 0.8% (LAT) and 0.7% 
(AFR).
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The list of rapid growth states (those with GNP/C rates of 4%+) in the developing 
world therefore consisted largely of non-democratic states from the ASI region, the so- 
called NIC ‘tiger economies’. Table 7.11 presents the rapid growth states for the two 
shorter periods (1970-80 and 1980-90) and the one longer period (1970-90). Countries are 
listed by decreasing rates of economic growth, along with their respective LoD values.
Table 7.11 Rapid Growth States (4.0%+) in the Developing World, 1970-90
Country GNP/C
1965/
1980
LoD
1970/
1980
Country GNP/C
1980/
1992
LoD
1980/
1990
Country GNP/C
1965/
1990
LoD
1970/
1990
Botswana 9.9 3.6 Korea, S. 8.5 2.9 Botswana 8.4 3.0
Singapore 8.3 5.0 China 7.6 6.6 Korea, S. 7.1 4.1
Korea, S. 73 5.9 Botswana 6.1 2.4 Singapore 6.5 4.5
Lesotho 6.8 6.2 Thailand 6.0 3.4 Hong Kong 6.2 4.0
Brazil 6.3 5.7 Mauritius 5.6 2.0 China 5.8 6.7
Hong Kong 6.2 4.0 Hong Kong 5.5 4.0 Lesotho 4.9 6.2
Jordan 5.8 6.5 Singapore 5.3 4.1 Paraguay 4.6 4.0
Gabon 5.6 6.0 Indonesia 4.0 6.1 Indonesia 4.5 5.5
Ecuador 5.4 6.4 Thailand 4.4 4.4
Indonesia 5.2 5.0 Egypt 4.1 6.0
Syria 5.1 6.4 Malaysia 4.0 2.6
Malaysia 4.7 2.4
Tunisia 4.7 6.5
Thailand 4.4 6.2
Nigeria 4.2 6.2
Algeria 4.2 6.6
Paraguay 4.1 3.5
China 4.1 6.8
The ASI region provided 7 of the 18 rapid growth states during the 1970-80 period, 
6 of the 8 rapid growth states in the 1980-90 period, and 7 of the 11 rapid growth states 
over the entire 1970-90 period. Within this region, only Malaysia qualified statistically as a 
democracy (a distinction that will be scrutinized more closely in the section on 
developmental states). In fact, there were preciously few rapid growth states across the 
regions with democratic LoD values. Only Malaysia qualified in both the 1970-80 and 
1970-90 periods, and three states qualified in the 1980-90 period (Botswana, Mauritius and 
South Korea), although South Korea’s inclusion should be treated with caution, because of 
its relatively late conversion to democratic governance. The only truly ‘multi-party’ 
democracy appearing in the table is Mauritius, and then only for the 1980-90 period.
This last point begs another familiar question: Is there something ‘inherent’ in 
democratic structures of government which precludes the possibility of rapid economic 
growth over a sustained period of time, as the Conflict Perspective suggests? Given the 
comparatively fewer democratic states in the developing world, it is perhaps not entirely
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accurate to base any firm conclusions on the absolute numbers given in Table 7.11 above. 
Instead, one should also take into account the number of rapid growth countries as a 
percentage of all countries from each level of democracy (Table 7.12).
Table 7.12 Percentage of ‘Rapid Growth’ States 
By Level of Democracy, Developing Countries
LoD
% of Rapid Growth States (GNP/C 4%+) 
1970/80 (N) 1980/90 1970/90
^ 1-2 ^  
3-5* 
6-7
6% (1)_____ 12% (3)______ 7% (D __
37% (7) 13% (3) 22% (7) 
19% (10) 6% (2) 10% (3)
Democratic states did not compare favourably against the non-democratic (3-5*) 
states, except over the 1980/90 period. Quite a high percentage (31%) of non-democratic (3- 
5*) states grew at rates of 4.0% or higher during 1970/80, compared to 19% of non- 
democratic (6-7) states and 6% of democratic states (only Malaysia). In the next period 
(1980/90), the democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) groups contained virtually the same 
percentage of rapid growth states (12% and 13%); the non-democratic (6-7) group 
contained roughly half as many (6%). Over the entire 1970/90 period, the non-democratic 
(3-5*) group contained about three times as many rapid growth states (22%), 
proportionally, as the democratic group (7%, only Malaysia), and more than twice as many 
as the non-democratic (6-7) group (10%).
Insofar as this specific period (1970-90) is concerned, democracies in the 
developing world may have performed as well in general as their non-democratic 
counterparts, but they rarely produced rapid economic growth over a sustained period of 
time. This evidence appears to support the argument that a non-democratic regime may be a 
necessary though insufficient condition for sustained rapid growth (this theme will be 
revisited in the section on developmental states).
Examining the Impact of Other Variables on Economic Growth
Given that the level of democracy has little effect on the variation in general 
economic growth rates, it is worthwhile to consider the possible influence of other factors. 
Do any of the three variables - the economic system, the size of government, or the level of 
social expenditure - have any observable impact on economic growth? The short answer 
would have to be no.
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The correlations in Table 7.13 are extremely weak for all three variables. At most, 
the type of economic system may explain around 2.4% of the variation in economic growth 
rates, the size of government explains literally 0% of the variation, and the level of social 
expenditure may explain around 0.3%. These figures are comparable to the r-squared value 
produced by the level of democracy (1.5%) over the same period (Table 7.8 above).
Table 7.13 Correlations Involving the Three Variables and Economic Growth
(Developing States)
Econ. System Size of Gov’t Social Expen.
(N=76) (N=58) (N=53)
Econ. Growth r= -0.155 0.022 -0.054
(1965-90) r*= 0.024 0.000 0.003
Table 7.14 below provides a more detailed account by depicting the distribution of 
developing states according to variable category and economic growth bracket (the actual 
numbers are given along with the relative percentages for each category). No firm 
conclusions can be drawn regarding economic systems (section a). Although six of the 
eleven countries (23%) which produced rapid economic growth (4.0%+) had Capitalist 
systems, a slightly higher proportion of Mixed-Capitalist states (29%) were located in this 
growth bracket (granted, however, there were considerably fewer countries in the Mixed- 
Capitalist sample). Among states with moderate growth (3.9%-2.0%), those with Capitalist 
systems were less represented proportionally (19%) than all but the Mixed-Socialist states 
(17%). Just under half (46%) of all Capitalist states produced slow growth (1.9%-0.0%), a 
higher proportion than was found for the other categories of economic systems. However, 
only 12% of all Capitalist states had negative economic growth rates (-0.1%/-4.0%), 
compared to just over one-third (36%) of all Capitalist-Statist states, 29% of Mixed- 
Capitalist states, 42% of Mixed-Socialist states, and 67% of Socialist states (2 of 3).
There is certainly nothing to distinguish the economic growth brackets in terms of 
the size of government (section b). Four of the eight countries which produced rapid 
economic growth rates had ‘medium’-size governments; although, more tellingly, roughly 
the same proportion of ‘medium’-size governments (14%) produced rates of 4.0% as did 
‘large’- and ‘small’-size governments (17% and 11%, respectively). Likewise, there was a 
fairly even (proportional) distribution of countries in the moderate growth (3.9%-2.0%) and 
slow growth (1.9%-0.0%) brackets: 25%, 25%, 17%; and 42%, 25%, 50%. Ten of the 16 
countries which produced negative economic growth rates had ‘medium’-size governments 
(proportionally, the ‘large’- and ‘small’-size governments were fairly evenly represented).
272
Table 7.14 Distribution of Developing States By Variable Category and
Economic Growth (N and %)
Variable Category
Economic Growth Brackets (1965-90) 
4.0%+ 3.9%/ 1.9%/ -0.1%/ 
2.0% 0.0% -4.0%
(a) Econ. 
System 
(N=76)
CAP
CAP-STA
MIX-CAP
MIX-SOC
sex:
6 (23%) 
2 (7%)
2 (29%) 
1 (8%)
5(19%) 
7 (25%) 
2 (29%) 
2(17%) 
1 (33%)
12 (46%) 
9 (32%) 
1 (13%) 
4 (33%)
3 (12%) 
10 (36%) 
2 (29%) 
5 (42%) 
2 (67%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
(b) Size of 
Gov’t 
(N=58)
Large (25%+) 
Med. (15-24%) 
Small (5-14%)
2(17%)
4(14%)
2(11%)
3 (25%) 
7 (25%) 
3 (17%)
5 (42%) 
7 (25%) 
9 (50%)
2(17%) 
10 (36%) 
4 (22%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
(c) Social 
Expend. 
(N=53)
High (25%+) 
Med. (15-24%) 
Low (0-14%)
2(10%) 
5 (22%) 
1 (10%)
4 (20%) 
6 (26%) 
2 (20%)
8 (40%) 
5 (22%) 
5 (50%)
6 (30%)
7 (30%) 
2 (20%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
/(100%)
Very similar observations may be made regarding the relationship between social 
expenditure levels and economic growth rates (section c). There were only two ‘high’- 
spending countries in the rapid economic growth bracket, compared to five ‘medium’- 
spending countries and one ‘low’-spending country (as a proportion of their respective 
categories, the ‘high’ and ‘low’ spenders were evenly represented, at 10%). In both the 
moderate growth (3.9%-2.0%) and slow growth (1.9%-0.0%) brackets, the ‘high’ and 
‘low’ spenders were evenly represented (proportionally), whereas the ‘high’- and 
‘medium’-spending countries were evenly represented in the negative growth bracket
From the foregoing, it appears that general conclusions may not be reached 
concerning the relationship between economic growth and any of the three variables, nor 
does it seem possible to account for rapid economic growth on the basis of these variables.
7.3 Comparing Levels of Democracy: Economic Growth and
Human Development Performance, 1970-90
Translating Economic Growth into Human Development Gains
The importance of economic growth to overall improvements in human development 
conditions has been established, as has the fact that the level of democracy has no real 
impact on general rates of economic growth. So which level of democracy, if any, appears to 
do a better job of translating economic growth - irrespective of the rate - into human 
development gains? In other words, if two states, one democratic and one non-democratic, 
are drawn from the same control group (level of human/economic development), and share a
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similar rate of economic growth, which is more likely to produce greater human 
development returns?
Given the earlier results of this chapter, it is hardly surprising that no clear answers 
emerge to these questions. Part of the problem is that countries are not evenly distributed by 
level of democracy, economic growth, and control group (starting level). One must therefore 
avoid extrapolating from single- or few- country cases. A second crucial factor mitigating 
against any broad conclusions is that no level of democracy produced the highest human 
development scores on a consistent basis, irrespective of the rate of economic growth. The 
following two figures help to illustrate these points.
Figure 7.6 depicts the average I-HDI increases (1970-90) produced by each level of 
democracy after controlling for initial human development levels (Medium I-HDI or Low I- 
HDI) and economic growth rates over the period (1965-90). Of the countries with rapid 
growth rates (4.0%+) beginning from the Medium I-HDI level (0.799/0.500), the solitary 
democratic state, Malaysia, produced an I-HDI increase (0.163) which was fractionally 
better than the average I-HDI increase (0.155) produced by the five countries with LoD 
values in the non-democratic (3-5*) range. Among countries with growth rates of 3.9/2.0%, 
Saudi Arabia (LoD 6-7) produced a higher I-HDI increase (0. I l l )  than the average increase 
found for the five democratic states (0.085), while the two non-democratic (3-5*) states 
produced an average increase of only 0.054. The only non-democratic (6-7) country among 
the slow growth (1.9/0.0%) states, Chile, displayed a relatively high I-HDI increase of 
0.183, compared to 0.087 for the non-democratic (3-5*) states and 0.073 for the democratic 
states. The I-HDI increases produced by the three LoD groups with negative economic 
growth rates were very small: 0.001 (LoD 1-2*), 0.015 (3-5*), and 0.012 (6-7).
There were only two democratic states at the Low I-HDI Level (0.499/0.000), India 
and Honduras, and both produced economic growth rates between 1.9/0.0%. Their average 
I-HDI increase (0.125) was considerably better than the average increases for the non- 
democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states (0.069 and 0.062) with similar economic 
growth rates. To place this record in perspective, however, the two non-democratic (3-5*) 
states which exhibited economic growth rates of 4.0%+, Botswana and Indonesia, produced 
an average I-HDI increase of 0.288, and three other rapid growth states with LoD values of 
6-7 (Egypt, China and Lesotho) produced an average I-HDI increase of 0.169; not far 
behind were the non-democratic (3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states with growth rates 
of 3.9/2.0%, which had average increases of 0.161 and 0.166, respectively.
Ignoring the single-country cases in the two graphs, there were only four instances 
where direct comparisons could be made between the records of democratic and non- 
democratic states with similar rates of economic growth. The results were mixed: in two of 
these instances (3.9/2.0% at the Medium Level and 1.9/0.0% at the Low Level) democratic 
states achieved greater average human development gains, and in two instances (1.9/0.0% 
and -0.1/-4.0% at the Medium Level) they achieved lower average gains.
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Fig. 7.6 Economic Growth and Human Development Gains By Level of Democracy.
Controlling For Levels of Human Development (Developing States)
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Figure 7.7 (overleaf) follows a similar approach, this time controlling for levels of 
economic development (developing countries have been divided into the wealthy and poor 
samples, INC 1&2 and INC 3&4, depending on their INC group in 1970). In the wealthy 
sample (graph a), no democratic state produced an economic growth rate of either 4.0%+ or 
3.9/2.0%. Among countries with economic growth rates of 1.9/0.0%, the two democratic 
states, Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago, had a slightly lower average I-HDI increase 
(0.081) than the five non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.086); Chile towered over both groups
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Fig. 7.7 Economic Growth and Human Development Gains By Level of Democracy, 
Controlling For Levels of Economic Development (Developing States)
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with an increase of 0.183. Among countries with negative economic growth rates, the 
democratic states (Venezuela, Peru and Jamaica) had an average I-HDI increase of only
0.008, compared to 0.015 for the non-democratic (3-5*) states and 0.101 for the non- 
democratic (6-7) states.
Democratic states were more evenly spread out across the economic growth rate 
brackets in the poor sample (graph b). Among the countries experiencing rapid growth,
276
Malaysia’s I-HDI increase of 0.163 was only marginally less than the average for the non- 
democratic (6-7) states (0.169), though considerably less than the average increase for the 
non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.234). Of the countries with growth rates of 3.9/2.0%, the 
democratic states produced an average I-HDI increase (0.085) which was almost half the 
increase for the non-democratic (6-7) states (0.166), and noticeably lower than the increase 
for the non-democratic (3-5*) states (0.135). But in the next economic growth group 
(1.9/0.0%),the three democratic states (India, Honduras and Papua New Guinea) displayed 
a much higher average I-HDI increase (0.102) than both the non-democratic (3-5*) and 
non-democratic (6-7) states (0.069 and 0.054). The only democratic state in this sample 
with a negative growth rate, El Salvador, also exhibited a negative I-HDI rate (-0.021), 
whereas slight increases (0.026 and 0.030) were observed for the non-democratic (3-5*) 
and non-democratic (6-7) states.
After excluding the single-country cases from the two samples, democratic states did 
not fare quite as well as non-democratic states with similar rates of economic growth, 
although the results were far from conclusive. In the wealthy sample, democratic states 
produced a lower average I-HDI increase than the non-democratic (3-5*) states among the 
slow growth states (1.9/0.0%) and produced a lower increase than both the non-democratic 
(3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states among the negative growth states (-0. l/-4.0%). The 
record was mixed in the poor sample: among countries with economic growth of 3.9/2.0%, 
democratic states produced a lower average I-HDI increase than both non-democratic 
groups, but produced a better average increase among countries with economic growth rates 
of 1.9/0.0%.
The level of democracy therefore provides no significant insight into a country’s 
general ability to translate economic growth into human development gains, since the results 
vary by sample group and economic growth bracket But, again ignoring the single-country 
cases, another pattern does in fact emerge: on average, the highest human development gains 
over the period were made by non-democratic states with strong or rapid economic growth. 
In Figure 7.6 above, the non-democratic (3-5*) states with economic growth of 4.0%+ 
produced by far the highest average I-HDI increases at both the Medium and Low I-HDI 
Levels (0.155 and 0.288). In Figure 7.7, the non-democratic (3-5*) states in the poor 
sample with growth rates of 4.0% produced by far the highest average increase (0.234), 
followed by those non-democratic (6-7) states with rapid growth (0.169) and strong growth 
(0.166). Only the wealthy sample provides an apparent exception which, upon closer 
inspection, may be explained by two factors: (1) the high average increase produced by the 
two non-democratic (6-7) states with negative growth conceals an enormous imbalance 
between the two (0.012 for Kuwait, 0.190 for Libya); and (2) the two non-democratic (3- 
5*) states with rapid growth (Singapore and Hong Kong) already had very high I-HDI 
values in 1970, and were thus expected to develop more incrementally.
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This observation deserves further scrutiny. The actual degree of variation concealed 
by these average results may be seen in Figure 7.8, where human development (I-HDI) 
increases are compared for the rapid growth states (4.0%+), the democratic states, and 
selected non-democratic states, after controlling for initial levels of human development (the 
GNP/C rate is also given for each state). Several points are worth making, some of which 
have already been touched upon.
Fig. 7.8 Comparing Human Development Increases: Rapid Growth States, 
Democratic States and Selected Non-Democradc States
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Many rapid growth states displayed altogether dissimilar human development gains. 
In the Medium I-HDI sample (graph a), Paraguay’s I-HDI increase (0.080) must be judged 
to be unsatisfactory given its high growth rate of 4.9% (Singapore and Hong Kong 
produced similar I-HDI increases but began the period with much higher I-HDI values). By 
contrast, Thailand had virtually the same economic growth rate (4.4%) but its I-HDI 
increase (0.223) was almost three times as great as Paraguay’s. In the Low I-HDI sample 
(graph b), a wide gulf separated the I-HDI records of Indonesia (0.331) and Lesotho 
(0.080), although both displayed similar growth rates (4.5% and 4.9%, respectively).
It is also evident that rapid growth states did not always produce higher human 
development increases than countries with slower rates of economic growth, whether 
democratic or non-democratic. Despite its rapid growth rate, Paraguay had roughly the same 
I-HDI increase as the Dominican Republic (0.085), which had a growth rate of 2.3%, and 
had almost half the increase of Chile (0.183), which had a growth rate of only 0.4%. Among 
the least developed countries, Lesotho displayed a much lower I-HDI increase (0.080) than 
India (0.109) and Nigeria (0.141) despite posting a vastly superior economic growth rate 
(4.9%, compared to 1.9% for India and 0.1% for Nigeria).
Moreover, as a corollary to the point just made, while rapid economic growth 
certainly helps, it is not a prerequisite for substantial human development gains. Some non- 
democratic states were able to achieve relatively high I-HDI increases with growth rates 
below the 4% threshold, most notably Chile (0.4%) and Panama (1.4%) at the Medium I- 
HDI Level,and Syria (2.9%) and Tunisia (3.2%) at the Low I-HDI Level. Mauritius (3.2%) 
is the most obvious democratic state to be included among the elite group of performers. It 
may also be noted that slow growth democracies such as Costa Rica (1.4%) and Trinidad 
and Tobago (0.0%) were at the same high I-HDI plateau in 1970 as Singapore (6.5%) and 
Hong Kong (6.2%), and produced quite similar I-HDI increases over the period (0.083 for 
Costa Rica, 0.080 for Trinidad and Tobago, 0.099 for Singapore, and 0.078 for Hong 
Kong). However, this combination of good human development performance and slow 
economic growth was, to use the UNDP’s terminology, ‘unbalanced’.
Democracy and the ‘Links* Between Economic Growth and Human Development 
Performance
Another useful means of examining how well economic growth is translated into 
human development progress is provided by the UNDP in the 1996 Human Development 
Report. It is suggested that countries may be classified according to how strong the ‘links’ 
are between economic growth and human development performance:
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When the links arc strong, (economic growth and human development) contribute to each 
other. But when the links are weak or broken, they can become mutually stifling as the 
absence of one undermines the other. Unbalanced links are the result of rapid human 
development with little growth or of fast growth with slow human development (UNDP 
1996: 66; emphasis added).
Fast growth is defined by the UNDP as a GDP/C rate over 3% (“the rate that would double 
per capita income in a generation”), and rapid human development is defined as a reduction 
in ‘HDI shortfall’ above 40% (the average for the countries included in the UNDP’s study) 
between 1960-92.
The UNDP’s criteria have been slightly modified in the analysis to follow. The 3% 
threshold for economic growth is still retained, although the GNP/C variable is used instead 
of GDP/C. Likewise, the practice of measuring the reduction in human development 
‘shortfalls’ is accepted, although the I-HDI variable is used instead of the HDI.6 Given that 
the periods under review are shorter than the UNDP’s three-decade survey, the reduction 
thresholds have been adjusted to 20% for the 1970-80 and 1980-90 periods, and 30% for 
the longer 1970-90 period. Therefore, under the new formula to be employed: countries 
with ‘strong links’ displayed economic growth rates (GNP/C) of 3% or more and 
reductions of 30%+ in their ‘I-HDI shortfalls’ over the 1970-90 period (20%+ over the 
shorter periods); countries with ‘unbalanced links’ displayed either strong economic 
growth (3%+) and weak I-HDI performance (reduction rates below the 20% or 30% 
thresholds, depending on the period), or weak economic growth (below 3%) and strong I- 
HDI performance (reduction rates above the 20% or 30% thresholds, depending on the 
period); countries with ‘weak links’ displayed weak economic growth (below 3%) and 
weak I-HDI performance (reduction rates below the 20% or 30% thresholds).
The actual distribution of countries (N) by level of democracy and type of ‘link’ is 
given in Table 7.15 below. Irrespective of period, the number of countries with ‘weak links’, 
most of which were from sub-Saharan Africa, remained high throughout, and formed the 
largest single block of states: 46 of 88 (52%) in 1970-80, 55 of 82 (67%) in 1980-90, and 
46 of 76 (61%) in 1970-90. In contrast, roughly one-tenth of the developing countries in the 
shorter periods displayed ‘strong links’ (9 of 88 or 10% in 1970-80, 10 of 82 or 12% in 
1980-90), rising up to one-sixth (13 of 76 or 17%) over the longer 1970-90 period. In both 
the 1970-80 and 1970-90 periods, most countries with ‘unbalanced links’ crossed the 
economic growth threshold but not the human development performance threshold, whereas 
the reverse was true for the 1980-90 period.
6A country’s I-HDI shortfall is the difference between its I-HDI value for a given date and the absolute 
maximum on the I-HDI scale (1.000). Thus, to calculate a country’s I-HDI reduction rate (%) for 1970-90: 
I-HDI shortfall reduction rate= ((I-HDI 1990 - I-HDI 1970) I (1 - I-HDI 1970)) X 100 
For example, Malaysia had an I-HDI value of 0.595 in 1970 (its ‘I-HDI shortfall’ in 1970 was 1.000 - 
0.595 = 0.405). By 1990 its I-HDI value stood at 0.758, suggesting a reduction of 40% in its I-HDI 
shortfall since 1970: ((0.758 - 0.595) / (1 - 0.595)) X 100 = 40%
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Table 7.15 Distribution of Developing Countries (N) By Level of Democracy
and Type of ‘Link’
Period LoD Strong
Links
Unbalanced Links 
+EcoGr +I-HDI
Weak
Links
1970-80 1-2* 1 9 0 6
3-5* 3 9 1 7
6-7 5 12 2 33
1980-90 1-2* 4 3 6 13
3-5* 3 1 4 16
6-7 3 1 2 26
1970-90 1-2* 2 2 2 9
3-5* 7 4 2 19
6-7 4 5 2 18
Notes. N for each sample= 88 (1970-80), 82 (1980-90), 76 (1970-90)
Of the nine countries with ‘strong links’ in the 1970-80 period, Malaysia came 
from the democratic group, Hong Kong, South Korea and Brazil came from the non- 
democratic (3-5*) group, and Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Ecuador and Panama came from the 
non-democratic (6-7) group (Table 7.16 overleaf). The ratio of democratic states to all states 
with ‘strong links’ (1 of 9, or 11%) was only slightly less than the ratio of democratic states 
to all developing states in the sample (16 of 88, or 18%). Four of the ten countries with 
‘strong links’ in the 1980-90 period had democratic LoD values (Mauritius, Malaysia, 
Botswana and, barely, South Korea); the other states with ‘strong links’ were Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Thailand from the non-democratic (3-5*) group, and Indonesia, China and 
Chile from the non-democratic (6-7) group. Again the ratios were largely similar 40% of 
countries with ‘strong links’ were democratic, as were 32% (26 of 82) of all developing 
countries during the period. There were two democratic states with ‘strong links’ over the 
1970-90 period (Malaysia and Mauritius), compared with seven non-democratic (3-5*) 
states (Botswana, Hong Kong, South Korea, Brazil, Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia) 
and four non-democratic (6-7) states (Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and China). This ratio (2 of 13, 
or 15%) was similar to the ratio of democratic states to all developing states (15 of 76, or 
20%).
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Table 7.16 Developing Countries With ‘Strong Links’, 1970-90
(a) 1970-80
Country LoD Shortf. GNP/C* 
1970/ Red. 1965/ 
1980 Rate 1980
(b) 1980-90
Country LoD 
1980/ 
1990
Shortf.
Red..
Rate
GNP/C
1980/
1992
(c) 1970-90
Country LoD Shortf. GNP/C 
1970/ Red. 1965/ 
1990 Rate 1990
Jordan 6.5 35% 6% Korea, S. 2.9 56% 9% Korea, S. 4.1 66% 7%
Brazil 5.7 25% 6% Chile 6.2 44% 4% Thailand 4.4 49% 4%
Egypt 5.8 25% 3% Thailand 3.4 40% 6% Botswana 3.0 46% 8%
Syria 6.4 24% 5% Mauritius 2.0 39% 6% Indonesia 5.5 45% 5%
Panama 6.7 23% 3% Botswana 2.4 36% 6% Egypt 6.0 45% 4%
Ecuador 6.4 22% 5% Indonesia 6.1 33% 4% Tunisia 6.3 45% 3%
Malaysia 2.4 22% 5% China 6.6 28% 8% Mauritius 2.2 41% 3%
Korea, S. 5.9 22% 7% Malaysia 2.8 23% 3% Malaysia 2.6 40% 4%
Hong K. 4.0 21% 6% Singapore 4.1 22% 5% Syria 6.4 40% 3%
Hong K. 4.0 20% 6% HongK. 4.0 37% 6%
China 6.7 37% 6%
Brazil 4.2 36% 3%
Singapore 4.5 35% 7%
Notes. *GNP/C rates have been rounded up for all three periods.
To further demonstrate how insupportable any generalizations are, the actual 
numbers of states with each type of ‘link’ have been computed as a percentage of the total 
from each level of democracy (Figure 7.9). By and large, the percentage breakdowns were 
quite similar for all three LoD groups. Between 6-15% of all developing democracies 
displayed ‘strong links’, a range similar to the percentages found for the non-democratic 
(3-5*) and non-democratic (6-7) states (13-22% and 8-14%, respectively). At the other 
extreme, a similar percentage of democratic and non-democratic (3-5*) states showed ‘weak 
links’ over the two shorter periods (38-50% and 35-66%), and all three LoD groups had 
indistinguishable percentages over the 1970-90 period (61%, 59% and 62%). Nor does the 
level of democracy reveal much about the likelihood of producing ‘unbalanced links’ of 
either type. Over the entire 1970-90 period, the percentages from each LoD group with 
‘unbalanced links’ in favour of economic growth were 13%, 13% and 17%, and the 
percentages from each LoD group with ‘unbalanced links’ in favour of human development 
were 13%, 6% and 7%. Clearly, there is no strict relationship between the level of 
democracy and the type of ‘link’ between economic growth and human development 
performance.
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Fig. 7.9 Distribution of Developing Countries By Level of Democracy
and Type of Link' (%)
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7.4 Identifying the Exceptional Performers: Developm ental States, 1970-90
If a general relationship cannot be established, are there any underlying similarities 
between those individual countries with exceptional developmental records? More 
specifically, do exceptional performers have anything in common politically? Recent 
attempts to address these questions have focused on the notion of the ‘developmental 
state’,7 whose comparative political dimension has been analyzed most comprehensively by 
Adrian Leftwich (1990, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1998).8 After first 
summarizing the main tenets in his thesis, it will be shown that the developmental states 
identified by Leftwich were unquestionably the most exceptional performers over the 1970- 
90 period.
7The concept of the developmental state is, of course, not new. According to Leftwich, its core features 
may be traced back to the writings of Marx and Weber (Leftwich 1993b: 70). More recently, it was in 
Chalmers Johnson’s landmark study of the Japanese model of development (1982) "that the phrase 
‘developmental state’ made its formal debut and that a serious attempt was made to conceptualise it" 
(Leftwich 1994: 403). Common to all accounts is the "concept of the state as crucial stimulant and 
organizer of socio-economic progress" (White 1984: 97).
8Leftwich succeeds in bridging theory and practice. No other political analyst, to the best of my knowledge, 
takes the actual step of assigning statistical criteria for identifying developmental states over a given period. 
His theoretical assumptions are, therefore, empirically verifiable.
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The Politics o f Developmental States: A Synopsis o f Leftwich*s Thesis
The principal argument running through Leftwich’s writing on politics and 
development is that: “what matters for development is not the system of government, or 
regime-type - that is, whether it is democratic or not - but the type o f state ” (Leftwich 1996a: 
5; emphasis added). This argument may be broken down into two parts, each of which 
challenges a key conventional assumption. The first part criticizes the prevailing view in 
Western policy-making circles, that “‘good governance* and democracy are not simply 
desirable but essential conditions for development in all societies”, as being based on 
ideology, not historical reality (Leftwich 1993a: 605; Leftwich 1994: 363-373). Indeed, as 
confirmed by the findings in this study, the form of government reveals virtually nothing 
about developmental potential.
The second part of the argument brings the state back in as the central unit of 
analysis to challenge the accepted belief, best articulated by the World Bank (recall Chapter 
1), that successful development must be market-led, not state-led. Whereas Leftwich 
believes in the ‘primacy of politics’ (1993a: 613-614) but acknowledges the importance of 
an effective market, the World Bank believes in the ‘primacy of the market’ but (now) 
acknowledges the importance of an effective state (World Bank 1997: 1-38).9 At the heart 
of the issue is the actual role of the state in the development process.
According to Leftwich, countries which have achieved the greatest developmental 
success over the past few decades have been characterized by a strong, competent, and 
interventionist state with clearly-defined developmental objectives. To prove this point, 
Leftwich selects a statistical benchmark of 4% GNP/C growth for the 1965-90 period and 
identifies eight ‘developmental states’ which managed to surpass this rapid growth 
threshold: Botswana, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and 
China (1996b: 288). In all cases, state intervention, the exact nature and level of which
9Prior to the mid-1990s, the World Bank held that the role of the state should essentially be limited to three 
broad, yet extremely important, functions: (1) to create an enabling environment for market forces to 
flourish; (2) to invest in human capital; and (3) to provide a safety net for society’s most vulnerable (World 
Bank 1983: 47, 56; World Bank 1987a: 58-60; World Bank 1990a: 51; World Bank 1991a: 128). The 
landmark 1997 World Development Report considered the role of the state in much greater detail, and 
acknowledgedquite explicitly that: "the state is central to economic and social development, not as a direct 
provider of growth but as a partner, catalyst, and facilitator1* (World Bank 1997: 1). The need for an 
‘effective state’ with strong ‘institutional capability’ became more clearly recognized in this Report (ibid: 
29-37), but the state’s position was still definedin relation to the market: "the state is essential for putting 
in place the appropriate institutional foundations for markets. And government’s credibility - the 
predictability of its rules and policies and the consistency with which they are applied - can be as important 
for attracting private investment as the content of those rules and policies'* (ibid: 4). Most significantly, the 
World Bank now argued against: "the folly of thinking that development strategy is a matter of choosing 
between the state and the market..(since) the two are inextricably linked. Countries need markets to grow, 
but they need capable state institutions to grow markets'* (ibid: 38). The World Bank is not, therefore, 
strictly against state intervention per se, provided that such intervention is limited to correcting "market 
failure" and "improving equity" (ibid: 26); within these parameters there is considerable room for state 
action: depending on the need, this intervention may assume ‘minimal’, ‘intermediate’, or ‘activist’ 
functions (ibid: 27). But by the World Bank’s own admission, does the seminal role of the state in creating 
the conditions for growth, coupled with the wide scope for state action to ensure that growth does occur, not 
in fact confirm Leftwich’s argument regarding the ‘primacy of politics’ ?
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varied, involved considerably more than simply creating favourable market conditions: the 
state established developmental targets and ensured that these targets were met. The key, in 
other words, was “not market demand but state command” (Shin 1998: 4); or, to 
paraphrase the title of an influential study, the state’s ability to effectively “govern the 
market” (Wade 1990).10
From the experiences of these highly successful cases, a new paradigm emerges in 
which the interventionist state “coordinates socioeconomic resources toward growth, sets 
performance goals for high-priority sectors, and controls opposition to growth” (Cho and 
Kim 1998: 129). Leftwich describes the dynamics involved:
(developmental states) are those states whose internal politics and external relations have 
served to concentrate sufficient power, authority, autonomy, competence and capacity at 
the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental 
objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions of economic growth, or 
by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of both (Leftwich 1996b: 284).
Six features are therefore required to underpin the political basis of developmental states:
(i) a dedicated developmental elite; (ii) relative autonomy for the state apparatus; (iii) a 
competent and insulated economic bureaucracy; (iv) a weak and subordinated civil society;
(v) the capacity to manage effectively local and foreign economic interests; and (vi) a 
varying balance of repression, legitimacy, and performance which appears to succeed by 
offering a trade-off between such repression as may exist and the delivery of regular 
improvements in material circumstances (Leftwich 1998: 62-63).
The most recent of several such formulations (Leftwich 1994: 378-380; Leftwich 1996b: 
285-289), this model is broadly consistent with the findings of other analysts (White 1984; 
Sorensen 1993a; Shin 1998).11 While not embodying these features to the same extent,12
1(1The World Bank acknowledges the key role played by the state in the case of the East Asian NICs (and 
Japan), but maintains that this success was attributable to the market’s ability to ‘discipline’ and ‘check’ the 
scope of state intervention, however well-planned and executed (World Bank 1987a: 39). Furthermore, the 
very nature of the interventions are described in administrative terms: the 1987 World Development Report 
recognized that "industrial targeting" was successfully implemented "by strong and capable governments" 
(World Bank 1987a: 71); and the 1997 Report claimed that these states, possessing "strong institutional 
capability", pursued "an activist industrial policy" which employed "a variety of mechanisms for market 
enhancement" (World Bank 1997: 6; emphasis added). Nonetheless, despite the World Bank’s interpretation 
of events, the fact remains that without state support and guidance "sound policies for promoting economic 
growth will not be implemented or even formulatedin the first place" (Quah 1994: 15).
11Shin in particular (1998: 7-9) observes the following characteristics for the developmental states of East 
Asia: (1) "autocratic power, compulsion, and oppression"; (2) "centralized economic policy-making 
organizations"; (3) state control over the economy (especially investment flows); (4) export-oriented 
industrialization strategies; (5) the creation of "economic agencies and big capitalists to carry out economic 
planning in the private sector"; and (6) a "good business climate" (through, for example, "oppressive labour 
policies").
12Leftwich himself recognizes that the cases often "vary with respect to all the major (political) factors" 
(1995: 420). For example, Thailand and Indonesia do not meet the criterion of competent, corruption-free 
governance as well as Botswana (ibid: 407), just as China "provides the weakest example of an dfective 
economic bureaucracy" (ibid: 414). By providing well-argued justifications for the inclusion of each 
political feature (1994: 377-381; 1995: 405-420), Leftwichlays the basis for a general analytical framework 
which allows for some degree of variation between the cases.
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developmental states all appear to epitomize the principles behind political development 
theory’s “constant programme: autonomy and elite dominance” (Cammack 1994a: 370; 
recall Chapter 2); which, in turn, may be traced even further back to “Marx’s autonomous 
state and Weber’s legal-rational authority” (Leftwich 1993b: 70).
Although this model of the developmental state does not contain any features 
traditionally assigned to a liberal democracy, it does not preclude the emergence of a 
democratic developmental state. The implication here is two-fold: that a liberal democracy 
cannot be sufficiently ‘developmental’; and that a democratic developmental state is unlikely 
to exhibit liberal democratic features (Robinson and White 1998: 6). It is necessary to make 
this distinction because of what Leftwich calls the “structural contradiction between the 
conservative requirements of stable democratic survival and the transformative logic of 
economic growth” (Leftwich 1998: 56-57). White concurs: “any democratic developmental 
state will need sufficient political authority and administrative capacity to maintain public 
order by managing the social and political conflicts arising from structural divisions in 
society and from the tensions inherent in a successful growth process” (White 1998: 29). 
Given these requirements, it is not surprising that a democratic developmental state:
may be a rare bird on the developmental scene in the future, as it has been in the past.
This is partly because it is defined in terms which are potentially contradictory and 
difficult to achieve: autonomy and accountability; growth end redistribution; consensus 
and inclusiveness (White 1998: 44).
Hence, the only way to counter the argument that there is a fundamental 
incompatibility between democracy and superior developmental performance is to broaden 
the definition of democracy beyond its strictly liberal democratic parameters. By doing so, 
Leftwich is able to argue that formally democratic states such as Singapore, Malaysia and 
Botswana should be viewed as examples of ‘democratic developmental states’ because of 
their comparatively better, though not completely satisfactory, records on human rights and 
civil liberties.13 There is no question that these states, which he refers to more accurately as 
‘authoritarian democracies’ or ‘dominant-party’ democracies (Leftwich 1996b: 290-291), 
are characterized by de facto one-party/coalition rule: the People’s Action Party (PAP) has 
governed Singapore since 1959; the ruling National Front coalition in Malaysia has been 
dominated by the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) since 1969; and the 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been in power since independence in 1968. Indeed, 
Leftwich claims that this condition of one-party/coalition rule may be essential to the 
success of the ‘democratic sub-type’:
13This argument is of course relative. On the seven-point scale of civil liberties (with 1.0 being the best 
score) the period CL values (1970-90) were 4.9 for Singapore, 4.0 for Malaysia, and 3.0 for Botswana. 
Objectively speaking, therefore, Singapore and Malaysia fell into the bottom half of the CL scale. 
Furthermore, compared to four non-democratic developmental states, Singapore actually fared worse than 
Thailand (3.9), about the same as South Korea (5.1) and Indonesia (5.2), but better than China (6.4).
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...without this central condition of long-term, dominant-party rule...(the state’s) 
developmental elites would have been dividedor paralysed; relative state autonomy would 
have been impossible and the badgering demands of special interests would have come to 
predominate; bureaucratic continuity and capacity would have been compromised; and 
either local or foreign economic interests, or both, would soon have become entrenched in 
ways that would be unlikely to serve national developmental goals (1996b: 291).
Speaking as Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore in 1985, Goh Chok Tong provided a 
variation of this theme by stressing the importance of ‘stability’ (control) over ‘politics’ 
(pluralism):
A stable government is a prerequisite for economic development Without it, private 
investors will not be able to make long-term investment decisions....A stable government 
alone is not enough for economic development to take place. It must also be 
development-oriented....Economic development can succeed only if the government is 
totally committed to it. Politics must not be allowed to interfere in the development 
process. The government would have to make policy decisions on the basis of economic 
decisions rather than on political ideology ; otherwise the results will be disastrous (quoted 
in Quah 1998: 16; emphasis added).
In other words, political pluralism has no place in ‘rational’ development planning. Hence, 
despite its overtly pluralistic nature, Botswana is better described as an ‘administrative state’ 
(like Singapore and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia):
Resources are allocated by commands issued by administrative elites, and there is no 
control by any other social group over decision-making. Authority...flows downward 
from the rulers to the ruled; the administrative elites have complete control over the 
decision-making process (Gunderson in Heard 1987: 13).
Thus the apparent dilemma: in order to successfully pursue developmental objectives, states 
with formally democratic trappings need to suppress formally democratic procedures. 
Successful development, led and managed by the state,14 requires that ‘competitive’
14Successful state-led development requires a total commitment on the part of political elites, who tend to 
view themselves as ‘modernizers’, to the development project (Leftwich 1996b: 285). The description of 
Malaysia’s political elite as "rational, pragmatic, essentially conservative" (Girling 1996: 46) applies 
equally as well to Singapore and Botswana. The PAP leadership in Singapore formulated its ‘hegemonic 
ideology’ around the twin concepts of national survival and pragmatism: without economic development, 
the very survival of the country would be placed in jeopardy; and without pragmatic (i.e. PAP) leadership 
and policies, economic development would be impossible (Huat 1994: 123). Under its New Economic 
Policy, the UMNO-dominated National Front coalition in Malaysia linked the necessity for development 
with the loftier goal of ‘communal harmony’: in addition to increasing the overall prosperity of the country 
as a whole, it was also believed that economic growth would serve the purpose of partially redressing the 
socio-economic imbalance between the affluent Chinese and the poorer Malay (and Indian) communities 
(Girling 1996: 48). Though lacking "any overriding ideology" (Heard 1987: 219) as well-articulated as the 
PAP and UMNO platforms, the BDP in Botswana is led by "a cohesive group of elites who see themselves 
as modernizing agents" committed to a "state-managed, top-down strategy of economic growth" (ibid: 271).
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structures and mechanisms be replaced by ‘administrative’ ones,15 backed by the threat of 
coercion if and where necessary.16
But how well does this interpretation apply to the curious case of Mauritius, an 
apparently successful liberal democracy? Although it fell short (3.2%) of his previously 
established 4% GNP/C threshold for the 1965-90 period, the reason for its exclusion in his 
earlier articles (Leftwich 1996b: 283), Leftwich recently (1998) added Mauritius to his list 
of ‘developmental democratic states’ (to use his new preferred term). Its excellent record, 
which fully justifies its status as a developmental state (as subsequent sections will show), 
was achieved in a political environment characterized by: “a seamless web of consolidation 
and fragmentation among political parties and an endless parade of alliances and fissures 
between members of the political class” (Bowman 1991: 68). Nonetheless, there are 
perhaps two main reasons why Mauritius may not be so different after all: (1) the 
groundwork for the eventual success which Mauritius enjoyed was actually laid during the
15Displaying an obsession with economic development (Quah 1994: 4-14), the PAP has systematically 
and effectively "depoliticized the citizenry" and transformed Singapore into an "administrative state" (Chee 
in Girling 1996: 51). Truly competitive politics has not existed in Singapore since the 1955-65 period 
(Huat 1994: 121), a fact attributable to both the PAP’s complete control of the state machinery and to the 
opposition’s decision to boycott parliament throughout the 1966-1981 period. Economic policies are 
formulated and implemented by the bureaucracy with virtually no public input Since the watershed election 
of 1984, in which the PAP lost an ‘alarming’ total of two seats (more importantly, its share of the vote fell 
from 76% to 63%), the PAP has taken steps to at least appearto consult the public (primarily about social 
issues) (Quah 1994: 23; Huat 1994: 126-127). To a slightly lesser extent than Singapore, Malaysia has 
also assumed some of the characteristics of an administrative state. The cornerstone of development 
planning, the New Economic Policy, has "created enormous concentration of power in the hands of 
government" and allowed for a "marriage between business and politics" (Mahmood 1994: 67). Through its 
strong hold over the Malaysian Civil Service and other branches of the state bureaucracy (Girling 1996: 47), 
the NF coalition ensures that economic strategies can be implemented with little or no obstruction. 
Political opposition to the NF coalition has been effectively contained and reduced to almost irrelevance 
(Mahmood 1994: 68). In the case of Botswana, Picardargues (1987: 270-271) that: “the nature of the state 
is bureaucratic rather than political, with an administrative hierarchy that is authoritarian in its approach to 
the policy process". In fact, "the day-to-dayranning of the country (is left) to the administrative cadre of the 
civil service" (ibid: 167). The government’s favoured strategy for dealing with key opposition politicians is 
to ‘co-opt’ them into the BDP* s fold (ibid: 168).
1 ^ Singapore’s authoritarian tendencies have been well documented: armed with ‘draconian’ legislation such 
as the Internal Security Act, the government has ensured that political opponents could be effectively 
muzzled, trade unions controlled, and press freedom curtailed (Quah 1994: 19; Girling 1996: 51-52; 
Bhardwajand Vijayakrishnan 1998: 91-93). So all-pervasive has been the power and influence of the state 
that one scholar observes that: "the ubiquitous social controls, constant exhortations and slogans, the 
extensive cadre network and the use of trade unions as transmission belts (from the centre to the masses) am 
all more reminiscent of conditions in communist countries than in the West...(although, in Singapore’s 
case, they must be) greatly modified by the need to reconcile foreign investment and multinational 
enterprise with social welfare and state capitalism" (Girling 1996: 52). Malaysia’s recordis not much better 
detention without trial is permitted; the independence of the judiciary has been curtailed; and the media "has 
beenreducedto a mouthpiece of the government" (Mahmood 1994: 72-73). The NF coalition’s domination 
of the state economic enterprises, coupled with its ‘authoritarian’ powers granted by legislation (the Internal 
Security Act, the Sedition Act, the Industrial Coordination Act, etc), ensured that "the state has (extended) 
its control into every comer of Malaysian society" (ibid: 71-73). By comparison, Botswana is a mote 
tolerant and open society; among other things, the BQP allows "reasonable opposition access to the media" 
(Picard 1987: 172). The BDP prefers to exercise a more subtle form of socio-political control in the largely 
rural areas of the country: through its influence over district administrations and district commissioners, 
which are treated as extensions of the national bureaucracy, the BDP is able to mobilize electoral support, 
ensure the acceptanceand implementation of its policies, and monitor opposition activities (ibid: 148).
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country’s brief period of Emergency Rule (1972-1975);17 and (2) beneath the overtly 
pluralistic character of Mauritian politics emerged a fairly unified elite consensus about 
development strategy, so that while the composition of the ruling coalitions changed with 
some degree of frequency following the period of Emergency Rule, the overall development 
plan stayed on course (Mannick 1989: 95; Bowman 1991: 101; Leftwich 1998: 68).18 
With respect to the second (and arguably less contentious) point, the absence of any real 
choice rendered the ‘free and fair’ elections since 1982 largely meaningless from a 
developmental perspective, prompting one worried political observer to lament that
there is very little to choose between the various parties. Consensus politics rules the day.
With only minor differences, all parties agree that the momentum of development should
continue...The danger here is that politics becomes opportunistic - a game to get into
government - rather than a debate over policy issues. Real problems might be forgotten while
politicians struggle for positions in the decision-making process (Mannick 1989: 95).
It is therefore debatable whether the people of Mauritius truly had any more substantive 
input into the developmental process than did the people of Singapore, Botswana, or 
Malaysia.
The elite consensus on development strategy allows Leftwich to more accurately 
classify Mauritius as a ‘coalitional developmental democratic state’, a label also given to 
Malaysia,19 as opposed to a ‘dominant-party developmental democratic state’, a label
17 With the suspension of democratic politics, necessitatedby the need to restore stability following a series 
of politically-inspired strikes which had largely paralyzed the country, Mauritius experienced its first 
economic boom. The country’s long-term development strategy was formulated during this period based on 
the NIC-inspired model of export-led growth (Bowman 1991: 73). It is debatable whether the main vehicle 
for this proposed growth, the Export Processing Zone (EPZ), could have been established under more 
democratic conditions. Together with the Industrial Relations Act, which controlled the growth of trade 
unions, the Public Order Act ensured that any opposition to the EPZ could be effectively suppressed. For 
example, the very fact that workers in the newly-established EPZ were not permitted to unionize provided 
sufficient grounds for potentially disruptive industrial action on a wide scale, likely to be supported by the 
(then) militant socialist party (MMM). There is perhaps a parallel here to Singapore’s case, where the 
complete absence of political opposition in parliament (1966-73) enabled the PAP to drop its previous 
policy of import substitution and adopt a policy of export-substitution "without any difficulty" (Quah 
1994: 10).
18Prior to 1982, the main political parties representing this elite consensus on development (mainly the 
Labour Party and the MSM) essentially formed a tactical alliance to exclude the radical socialist party, the 
Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM), from gaining power. In the mid-1970s, the MMM’s electoral 
platform included a call for "the rejection of capitalism and the adoption of self-managed socialism" 
(Bowman 1991: 75). Ironically, perhaps the best illustration of the country’s ‘elite consensus’ emerged after 
die MMM actually came into power during the 1982-3 period. Elected on the wave of popular 
dissatisfaction following several years of economic stagnation and unrest, it was believed that the MMM 
would alter or altogether replace the long-established development strategies. However, once in office, 
pragmatism prevailed over ideology and the MMM came to represent a "continuity of leadership" (ibid: 83- 
84): the MMM-led government accepted the need to continue with the structural adjustment policies 
recommendedby the IMF in order to get the economy back on track, despite pressure from some factions of 
the MMM and the party’s grass-roots supporters to resist such ‘harsh’ medicine. History has shown that 
this decision to essentially ignore the electorate served the country well: economic growth accelerated 
shortly thereafter.
19The very nature of their societies - "characterized predominantly by sharp and primary vertical cleavages 
in ethnicity, culture, (and)religionH (Leftwich 1998: 67) - has obliged Malaysia and Mauritius to accept this 
‘coalitional’ form of government in order to be successful developmentally. This should not, however, 
obscure some obvious differences between the two cases. Essentially the same coalition, dominated by the 
United Malay National Organization (UMNO), has governed Malaysia uninterruptedly over the past few
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reserved for Botswana and Singapore (1998: 63-70). Common to both sub-types are 
"political elites and state structures with the determination and capacity to preside over 
economic growth and welfare" (ibid: 52). This definition distinguishes these states from 
those found in either of the two non-developmental democratic groups: ‘class-compromise’ 
(Venezuela, post-apartheid South Africa) and ‘party-altemation’ (Costa Rica, Jamaica) 
(ibid: 70-77). After subjecting non-democratic states to the same performance-defined 
criteria, Leftwich establishes a simple typology listing his preferences (1996b: 282):
1. Developmental Democratic States (Botswana, Malaysia, Singapore, Mauritius)
2. Developmental Non-Democratic States (South Korea, Indonesia, China, Thailand)
3. Non-Developmental Democratic States (Jamaica, India, Gambia, Venezuela)
4. Non-Developmental Non-Democratic States (Haiti, most sub-Saharan African states)
One would surely agree that developmental democratic states are preferable to both 
developmental non-democratic states and to non-developmental democratic states; because 
of their superior records, developmental non-democratic states are, in turn, preferable to 
non-developmental democratic states (which are preferable to the worst type of all, the non- 
developmental non-democratic state).
Why Developmental States Are Exceptional: The Evidence, 1970-90
Having outlined the politics of developmental states, it will now be demonstrated 
precisely why such states are exceptional developmentally. The basic theoretical assumption 
is that developmental states are most likely to promote the twin objectives of “growth and 
welfare” (Sorensen 1993a: 76). Leftwich certainly supports this premise (1998: 52), but his 
focus is primarily on the former aspect, a point underlined by his benchmark of 4% GNP/C 
growth. A similar benchmark for assessing human development progress is not given, 
although he does stress how well developmental states score on the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index (1994: 380; 1996b: 289).
By analyzing the human development dimension more comprehensively, this section 
will show that developmental states are exceptional not simply because of their success in 
fostering rapid economic growth, but because of their unparalleled ability to combine
decades,a point which undedines claims that Malaysia is a de facto one-party (or ‘one-coalition’) state. On 
the other hand, Mauritius has been governed by a series of coalitions, the composition of which has rarely 
been the same in successive terms; moreover, the principal political party around which the governing 
coalitions were built during the first decadeafter independence, the Labour Party, had become largely extinct 
by the early 1980s (during the 1982 election, for instance, the Labour Party failed to win a single seat). 
Externally, Mauritius did resemble the continuity shown by Malaysia in one respect: from 1968 to 1990, 
only two individuals held the post of Prime Minister, Seewoosagur Rangaloom (to 1982) and Aneerod 
Jugnauth (after 1982); Mahathir Mohamad has held this post in Malaysia since 1981.
290
sustained rapid growth with superior human development gains; that is, to establish the 
‘virtuous cycle’ advocated by the UNDP. The nine cases under review include those seven 
originally identified above by Leftwich as having surpassed his 4% GNP/C threshold over 
the 1965-90 period - Botswana, South Korea, Singapore, China, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia - plus two worthy new additions to his list, Mauritius and Hong Kong.20
How should developmental success be defined? Two approaches have been 
considered thus far. Leftwich accepts rapid economic growth as his sole selection criterion 
and assumes that human development progress will naturally follow. On the other hand, the 
UNDP’s method of assessing ‘strong links’ adds human development progress as an 
explicit condition to strong (but not necessarily rapid) growth. The resulting lists of 
applicable cases overlap to a considerable degree (Table 7.17).
Table 7.17 Assessing Developmental Success: 
Comparing the Approaches of Leftwich and the UNDP
(a) Leftwich’s Approach:
Rapid Growth States (4%+)
(b) The UNDP’s Approach: 
States with ‘Strong Links’
Country GNP/C
1965/90
Country GNP/C
1965/90
Shon
Rate
Botswana 8% Botswana 8% 46%
Korea, S. 7% Korea, S. 7% 66%
Singapore 7% Singapore 1% 35%
China 6% China 6% 37%
Indonesia 5% Indonesia 5% 45%
Thailand 4% Thailand 4% 49%
Malaysia 4% Malaysia 4% 40%
Hong Kong* 6% Hong Kong 6% 37%
Egypt* 4% Egypt 4% 45%
Lesotho* 5% Syria 3% 40%
Paraguay* 5% Tunisia 3% 45%
Mauritius 3% 41%
Brazil 3% 36%
Notes: 1. *Case meets Leftwich’s statistical benchmark but is not included in his list 
of developmental states.
2. GNP/C figures are rounded
3. ‘Strong Links’ defined as 3%+ GNP/C growth (1965-90) and I-HDI 
shortfall reduction of 30%+ (1970-90)
20Hong Kong easily surpasses Leftwich’s threshold (6.2%) but Mauritius falls just shy (3.2%). Given how 
often Hong Kong is featured in comparative studies on the East Asian economic miracle (Wade 1990; Kim 
1998), and owing to its remarkable achievements over the 1970-90 period in terms of both rapid economic 
growth and human development, it is difficult to ignore its claim to be a developmental state, despite its 
colonial status (the reason for its omission from Leftwich’s original sample). Likewise, although omitted 
from Leftwich’s original sample (being 0.8% short of the 4% GNP/C threshold), Mauritius also produced a 
very admirable developmental record over the period, prompting Leftwich (1998) to recently call Mauritius a 
‘democraticdevelopmental state’. The inclusion of both Hong Kong and Mauritius is therefore entirely 
justifiable on developmental grounds: as will be demonstrated, their records were largely indistinguishable 
from those in Leftwich’s original set of developmental states. Taiwan does not appear in the list because cf 
its incomplete human development data.
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Eleven states surpassed Leftwich’s 4% threshold for the period, including eight of 
the nine developmental states (save for Mauritius), whereas thirteen states satisfied the 
UNDP’s criteria,21 including all nine developmental states. Careful analysis of the two 
samples shows that the UNDP’s method addresses a two-fold dilemma exposed by the 
strict application of Leftwich’s 4% threshold: (1) not all rapid growth states produce good 
human development performance (Lesotho and Paraguay);22 and (2) good human 
development performance may be achieved in the absence of rapid economic growth (Syria, 
Tunisia, Mauritius and Brazil). This is particularly well illustrated in Figure 7.10 
(developmental states appear in red; the sample includes all developing states, N=76).
Fig. 7.10 Developmental States and Other States with 'Strong Links' 
In Comparative Perspective, 1970-90
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21The statistical definition of ‘strong links’, if altered, would produce different lists. For instance, if 
Leftwich’s 4% growth threshold replaces the 3% threshold in the UNDP’s framework, but the human 
development threshold remains at 30% of the I-HDI shortfall reduction rate, the list is shortened to nine 
countries: Leftwich’s seven developmental states plus Hong Kong and Egypt. However, if Leftwich’s 4% 
rapid growth threshold replaces the 3% threshold end the human development performance threshold is raised 
to 40% of the I-HDI shortfall reduction rate, only six countries would appear in the new list: South Korea, 
Thailand, Botswana, Egypt, Indonesia and Malaysia.
22As demonstrated throughout this chapter, there are cases where rapid economic growth does not in fact 
produce satisfactory human development performance; in the UNDP’s parlance, some countries produce 
‘unbalanced’links in favour of economic growth (see also Figures 7.2, 7.8, 7.9 and Tables 7.2 and 7.15). 
Lesotho and Paraguay both surpassed Leftwich’s 4% threshold (with GNP/C rates of around 5% between 
1965-90) and yet their respective I-HDI increases over the period were very modest (0.080 and 0.086); these 
increases were even below the average increase (0.090) produced by the 76 developing countries in the 
general sample. While such examples are relatively rare, they nonetheless illustrate the difficulty of 
classifying such states as sufficiently ‘developmental’. Sorensen refers to such cases as ‘authoritarian 
growth regimes’ (1993a: 77).
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Whereas both approaches confirm the excellent records of developmental states, 
neither goes as far as explaining why these records are unique: if Leftwich’s criterion is 
accepted,Egypt, Paraguay and Lesotho also deserve acclaim (but Mauritius does not); if the 
UNDP’s criteria are accepted, then Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Brazil also deserve honorable 
mention. Given their ‘unbalanced links’, Paraguay and Lesotho may be dropped from 
further consideration. But what about the four remaining cases?
Evaluated solely in terms of overall human development progress, Egypt, Tunisia, 
Syria and Brazil performed largely on par with the nine developmental states. Table 7.18 
demonstrates this point by showing how the shortfall reduction rates (HDI, ISC and I-HDI) 
of the thirteen states compared against four threshold standards: the average for all 
developing states (D); the average for all countries starting from the same take-off point or 
index level (L); the average for all countries starting from the same level of economic 
development (E); and the average for all countries from the same regional group (R).
Table 7.18 Evaluating the Human Development Records of Developmental States 
and Other States With ‘Strong Links’ Against Four Threshold Standards, 1970-90
HDI Shortf Reduct. ISC Shortf. Reduct. I-HDI Shortf Reduct.
State % D L E R % D L E R % D L E R
Botswana 54 + + + + 29 + + + + 46 + + + +
Korea, S. 70 + + + + 60 + + + + 66 + + + +
Singapore 48 + + + + 18 + + + + 35 + + + +
China 43 + + + + 30 + + + + 37 + + + +
Indonesia 40 + + + + 50 + + + + 45 + + + +
Thailand 62 + + + + 30 + + + + 49 + + + +
Malaysia 61 + + + + 1 + + - - 40 + + + +
Hong Kong 52 + + + + 12 + + + + 37 + + + +
Mauritius 53 + + + + 13 + + + + 41 + + + +
Egypt 39 + + + _ 52 + + + + 45 + + + +
Tunisia 53 + + + + 30 + + + + 45 + + + +
Syria 53 + + + + 28 + + + + 40 + + + +
Brazil 51 + + + + 22 + + + + 36 + + + +
Notes. 1. The avg. shortfall reduction rates for all developing states were: 28%(HDI), 1%(ISC), 18%(I-HDI)
2. The avg. shortfall reduction rates for the index levels (Medium, 0.799/0.500; Low, 0.499/0.000)
were: 42% (M) and23% (L) for the HDI; 0% (M) and7% (L) for the ISC; 22% (M) and 14% (L)
for the I-HDL
3. The avg. shortfall reduction rates for the levels of economic development (INC 2, INC 3, INC 4)
were: 36%, 34% and 16% for the HDI; 3%, 3% and0% for the ISC; 22%, 22% and 10% for the
I-HDI.
4. The avg. shortfall reduction rates for the regions (ASI, LAT, MID, APR) were: 34%, 36%, 43%
and 15% for the HDI; 12%, -4%, 8% and 2% for the ISC; 25%, 20%, 29% and 9% for the I-HDI.
5. (+) above or equal to threshold average; (-) below threshold average.
Eleven of the thirteen cases achieved the remarkable feat of surpassing every 
threshold average for every index; only Malaysia (due to its largely unchanged ISC values
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over the period) and Egypt (due to its below average HDI value against the regional 
threshold) failed to do so. All thirteen states displayed shortfall reduction rates (HDI, ISC 
and I-HDI) above both the developing averages and the averages for countries beginning 
from similar index levels. All thirteen states produced better HDI and I-HDI shortfall 
reduction rates than the averages for countries starting from similar levels of economic 
development,and only Malaysia failed to accomplish this feat for the ISC. All thirteen states 
exceeded the average regional I-HDI shortfall reduction rates, all but Egypt exceeded the 
average HDI regional rates, and all but Malaysia exceeded the average regional ISC rates.
The actual reduction rates in the table also fail to reveal any noteworthy differences 
between the two samples. Each of the four other cases with ‘strong links’ compared 
favourably against the developmental states. For example, Egypt’s HDI reduction rate 
(39%) was similar to Indonesia’s (40%), its ISC reduction rate (52%) was better than all 
but South Korea’s (60%), and its I-HDI reduction rate was similar to the rates for 
Botswana (46%) and Indonesia (45%). Analyzing the reduction rates in terms of ranks 
shows that Egypt is 13th (or last) for the HDI, 2nd for the ISC and 4th (tied) for the I- 
HDI; Tunisia is 5th (tied) for the HDI, fourth (tied) for the ISC, and 4th (tied) for the I- 
HDI; Syria is 5th (tied) for the HDI, 8th for the ISC, and 8th (tied) for the I-HDI; and 
Brazil is 9th for the HDI, 9th for the ISC, and 12th for the I-HDI. These four cases were, in 
other words, interspersed among the developmental states.
Since the two samples cannot easily be differentiated by human development 
performance alone, one must return to the question of economic growth. Not only did the 
developmental states produce higher growth rates over the 1965-90 period but, more 
tellingly, these rates were consistently high throughout the period. It is this condition of 
sustainability which the four other cases - and the two earlier cases of Lesotho and 
Paraguay - failed to meet (Figure 7.11).
All nine developmental states either surpassed, or just barely failed to surpass, the 
4% rapid growth threshold over both shorter periods; the partial exception being Malaysia, 
which nonetheless produced fairly strong growth (2.9%) over the second period.23 In 
sharp contrast, the four cases with ‘strong links’ displayed highly inconsistent growth from 
the first period (1965-80) to the second (1980-91): 2.8% and 1.9% for Egypt; 4.7% and 
1.1% for Tunisia; 5.1% and -1.4% for Syria; and 6.3% and 0.5% for Brazil. These states - 
together with Lesotho (6.8% and -0.5%) and Paraguay (4.1% and -0.7%) - were clearly 
unable to sustain strong growth over the longer term.24
23The actual rates (1965-80 and 1980-91) for the developmental states were: 9.9% and 5.6% for Botswana; 
7.3% and8.7% for South Korea; 8.3% and5.3% for Singapore; 4.1% and 7.8% for China; 5.2% and 3.9% 
for Indonesia; 4.4% and 5.9% for Thailand; 4.7% and 2.9% for Malaysia; 6.2% and 5.6% for Hong Kong; 
and3.7% and 6.1% for Mauritius. (Source: World Bank data in UNDP 1994.)
24Recalling that the MID region as a whole made considerable human development gains during the period 
(section 5.4 in Chapter 5), it is particularly interesting to look at how such gains were undermined by 
uneven economic development in the cases of Egypt, Tunisia and Syria. Significantly, the very foundations 
of economic development were shaky: the growth experienced by the three cases in the 1970s was based in 
large part on the (temporary) windfall in oil revenues following the events of 1973; and, in the cases of
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In brief, the nine developmental states displayed the most exceptional records of all 
the developing countries during the 1970-90 period. They were the only states which 
managed to combine high rates of sustained economic growth with extremely strong human 
development performance. Furthermore, that these records were achieved under a diverse set 
of operating circumstances lends credence to Leftwich’s emphasis on the “primacy of
Egypt and Syria, on a heavy reliance on foreign aid, particularly from other Arab states. Egypt’s growth 
depended on "external rents to prop up the economy" (Brumberg 1992: 90): revenue from oil; expatriate 
w orkers; revenue from the Suez Canal; and foreign aid (first from the Gulf Arab states, and then from the 
U.S.). By 1980 two factors had combined to grind economic growth to a halt: Egypt’s enormous external 
debt, which had financed the industrialization projects of the previous decade; and the decision by Arab 
donors to suspend aid following Egypt’s peace accord with Israel (ibid: 86). As in most Middle Eastern 
states, Egypt’s inefficient and bloated public sector "served one primary purpose, employment" (ibid: 79). 
Tunisia differed from Egypt and Syria in three key respects: it relied more heavily on its economic 
bureaucracy and teams of ‘technocrats’; it encouraged the private sector to a much greater extent; andit had a 
more transparent bureaucratic apparatus, so that political connections were less important to businessmen 
and corruption was less widespread (Beilin 1991: 48-54). However, despite attempts in the 1970s to 
encourage a more vibrant private sector (ibid: 50-52), the state sector grew uncontrollably on the strength of 
oil revenues, with predictable results: financial losses by the public sector mounted, leading to "a rapid 
growth in the external debt, and an insupportable...deterioration in the country’s balance of payments" 
(Grissa 1991: 125). Syria also benefited from higher world oil prices and substantial Arab aid (Perthes 
1995: 42). The latter factor was crucial: public expenditure was the "main determinant of the course of 
economic development" (ibid: 3), with "Arab aid...(enabling) the regime to pursue a large-scale investment 
programme" (ibid: 42). The reduction in aid by the early 1980s, together with the fall in the price of oil, 
meant that economic growth could not be sustained (Heydemann 1992: 18). As in the case of Egypt, 
mismanagement and corruption were rampant, and development policy, which was never fully defined, had 
more to do with (party) political considerations and patronage than economic efficiency (Heydemann 1992: 
18; Perthes 1995: 44-46).
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politics”. Consider, for example, how little the developmental states had in common on 
several other fronts (Table 7.19).
Table 7.19 Comparing Developmental States (Selected Variables)
Developmental LoD Lev of Econ Size of Social
State 1970/ EconDev* Syst** Gov’t*** Expend.****
1990 1970 1970 1970
Botswana 3.0 INC 4 CAP 34% (L) 16% (M)
Korea, S. 4.1 INC 3 CAP 19% (M) 17% (M)
Singapore 4.5 INC 2 MIX-CAP 17% (M) 24% (M)
China 6.7 INC 4 MIX-SOC N/A N/A
Indonesia 5.5 INC 4 CAP-STAT 15% (M) 9% (L)
Thailand 4.4 INC 3 CAP 17%(M) 24% (M)
Malaysia 2.6 INC 3 CAP 26% (L) 30% (H)
Hong Kong 4.0 INC 2 CAP N/A N/A
Mauritius 2.2 INC 3 CAP 16% (M) 24% (M)
Notes. * Basedon 1970 GDP/C rates: $1133/$388(INC 2), S378/$187(INC 3), $175/$54{INC 4)
** see footnote 2 for descriptions.
*** see footnote 3 for descriptions. L=‘large’ government, M=‘medium-size’ government
**** see footnote 4 for descriptions. H=‘high’ (spending state), M=‘medium\ L=‘low’
Malaysia and Mauritius were the only states with democratic LoD values,25 only 
China had a period LoD value in the 6-7 range, and the remaining six states had LoD values 
between 3.0-5.9. There was a considerable gulf between the levels of economic development 
at the beginning of the period: Singapore and Hong Kong were at the INC 2 level; South 
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Mauritius were at the INC 3 level; and Botswana, China and 
Indonesia were at the INC 4 level. In terms of economic structures, six states operated 
within a Capitalist system, one within a Mixed-Capitalist system (Singapore), one within a 
Capitalist-Statist system (Indonesia), and one within a Mixed-Socialist system (China). The 
size of government measure revealed some discrepancies, ranging from a high of 34% for 
Botswana to a low of 15% for Indonesia; viewed by category, Botswana and Malaysia had 
Targe-size* governments, whereas South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Mauritius all had ‘medium-size’ governments (data was unavailable for China and Hong 
Kong). An equally diverse set of figures is found for social expenditure levels: Malaysia 
(30%) was the only ‘high-spender’; Botswana, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and 
Mauritius were all ‘medium-spenders’ (15-24%); and Indonesia (9%) was the only Tow- 
spender’ (data was not available for China and Hong Kong).
25Of the four developmental democratic states identified by Leftwich, Malaysia and Mauritius were labeled 
as ‘coalitional’, whereas Botswana and Singapore were labeled as ‘dominant-party’. Given their more 
inclusive nature, it is not surprising that, using the LoD measure, the ‘coalitionaT states statistically 
qualified as democracies (1.0-2.9) whereas the ‘dominant-party' states did not (Botswana barely failed to 
qualify, but Singapore was some way off)-
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Developmental states may not, therefore, be stereotyped by level of democracy, 
initial level of economic development, economic system, size of government, or level of 
social expenditure. The glue binding these seemingly diverse cases together is political in 
nature. This does not suggest that all developmental states necessarily conform to 
Leftwich’s political model of the developmental state to the same degree (they do not), nor 
does it ignore some of the obvious similarities between their developmental strategies.26 
Simply put: “the distinguishing characteristic of developmental states is that their political 
purposes and institutional structures have been driven by developmental needs, while their 
developmental objectives have been politically driven” (Leftwich 1996b: 289-290).
A Closer Look at the Individual Records of Developmental States
Having outlined the general progress made by the nine developmental states in terms 
of human development, the individual accomplishments will now be considered in greater 
detail. These records must be evaluated in the context of the different starting levels at the 
beginning of the period, given that some states (Hong Kong and Singapore) were more 
developed than others (Botswana and Indonesia) (Table 7.20).
Table 7.20 Human Development Profiles For Developmental States, 1970-90
Devel’tal
State
GNP/C
1965/
1990
HDI
1970
HDI
1990
HDI
1970/
1990
Shortf
Red.
Rate
ISC
1970
ISC
1990
ISC
1970/
1990
Shortf
Red.
Rate
I-HDI
1970
I-HDI I-HDI Shortf 
1990 1970/ Red. 
1990 Rate
Botswana 8% 0.284 0.670 0.386 54% 0.652 0.754 0.102 29% 0.468 0.712 0.244 46%
Korea, S. 7% 0.523 0.859 0.336 70% 0.602 0.839 0.237 60% 0.563 0.849 0.287 66%
Singapore 7% 0.682 0.836 0.154 48% 0.751 0.796 0.045 18% 0.717 0.816 0.099 35%
China 6% 0.372 0.644 0.272 43% 0.408 0.583 0.175 30% 0.390 0.613 0.223 37%
Indonesia 5% 0.306 0.586 0.280 40% 0.235 0.617 0.382 50% 0.271 0.602 0.331 45%
Thailand 4% 0.465 0.798 0.333 62% 0.616 0.730 0.114 30% 0.541 0.764 0.223 49%
Malaysia 4% 0.471 0.794 0.323 61% 0.720 0.722 0.002 1% 0.595 0.758 0.163 40%
Hong K. 6% 0.737 0.875 0.138 52% 0.845 0.863 0.018 12% 0.791 0.869 0.078 37%
Mauritius 3% 0.524 0.778 0.254 53% 0.787 0.815 0.028 13% 0.656 0.797 0.141 41%
26It is widely acceptedthat the East Asian developmental states have, to varying degrees, all attempted to 
emulate the export-driven developmental strategy adopted by Japan since the Second World War (Johnson 
1982; Wade 1990; Bhardwaj and Vijayakrishnan 1998; Kim 1998). Regardless of any differences in 
application, the policies adopted have produced the following defining characteristics: (1) a high average rate 
of economic growth; (2) reducedinequality; (3) more rapid output and productivity growth in agriculture; (4) 
higher rates of growth of manufacturedexports; (5) earlier and steeper declines in fertility; (6) higher growth 
rates of physical capital, supported by higher rates of domestic savings; (7) higher initial levels and growth 
rates of human capital; and (8) generally higher rates of productivity and growth (Bhardwaj and 
Vijayakrishnan 1998: 12). In turn, the strategies of the East Asian NICs have been fairly blatandy copied 
by Mauritius (Mannick 1989: 101-102; Bowman 1991: 127), especially in its creation of the Export 
Processing Zones. Indeed,by the late 1980s Mauritian politicians had come to think of their country as a 
"Little Tiger" (Bowman 1991: 122). Botswana’s spectacular growth was largely based on the development 
of its mineral sector (copper-mckel and, especially, diamonds)(Picard 1987: 232-233). Like the East Asian 
developmental states, Botswana has relied heavily on its highly efficient bureaucracy to formulate and 
execute development strategies (ibid: 147).
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Arguably, the most exceptional performer of all was South Korea. During the 
course of two decades, South Korea witnessed reductions of 70% in its HDI shortfall, 60% 
in its ISC shortfall, and 66% in its I-HDI shortfall. These reductions propelled South Korea 
from the Medium to the High index levels by 1990. The remaining nine cases may roughly 
be divided into four groups. Among the cases which moved from the Low to Medium 
Levels for at least two of the indices were Botswana (HDI, I-HDI), China (HDI, ISC, I- 
HDI), and Indonesia (HDI, ISC, I-HDI). Both Thailand (ISC, I-HDI) and Mauritius (HDI, 
I-HDI) moved from the lower to upper Medium index levels. Malaysia had a unique record, 
moving from the Low to Medium HDI Levels, showing little movement within the Medium 
ISC Level,and moving from the lower to upper part of the Medium I-HDI Level. Singapore 
(HDI, I-HDI) and Hong Kong (HDI, I-HDI) both moved from the Medium to High index 
levels.
These changes in the composite indices highlighted the increases in the levels of the 
specific indicators (Table 7.21 overleaf). It is at this level of analysis where the diversity of 
the individual accomplishments can perhaps be most appreciated. Regarding adult literacy 
rates, for example, neither Botswana nor Indonesia had very literate populations in 1970 
(41% and 54%). Not surprisingly, these two states produced the largest absolute rate 
increases over the period (34% and 30%, respectively). In contrast, the more incremental 
period increase for South Korea (8%) was due to its already high level of literacy (88%). Of 
the three states with almost identical rates in 1970 (68-69%), Singapore’s period increase 
(21%) was considerably better than the increases for China (10%) and Mauritius (12%). 
Seven of the nine developmental states had literacy rates above 80% by 1990 (excepting 
Botswana and China), four of which had rates above 90%: South Korea (96%), Thailand 
(94%), Hong Kong (91%) and Singapore (90%).
There were also substantial discrepancies in terms of life expectancy rates: 24 years 
separated Hong Kong (70) and Indonesia (46) in 1970; the gap had narrowed to 15 years 
by 1990 because of Indonesia’s dramatic increase (16). Botswana increased its rate from 49 
years in 1970 to 60 years in 1990. Of the four states with comparably higher life 
expectancy rates in 1970 (60 years or more), China showed the highest rate increase (11), 
followed by Mauritius (8), Hong Kong (7) and Singapore (6). Whereas only Hong Kong 
had a life expectancy rate of 70 years in 1970, six states had equaled or surpassed this mark 
by 1990: Hong Kong (77), Singapore (74), China (71), South Korea (70), Malaysia (70), 
and Mauritius (70).
Seven developmental states displayed relatively high child survival rates (90%+) in 
1970, led by Hong Kong (98%) and Singapore (97%). Indonesia, however, had a rate of 
only 82%, suggesting that roughly one in five children could not be expected to reach the 
age of five; this situation had improved noticeably by 1990, when its child survival rate 
increased to 90%. The other state below the 90% mark in 1970, Botswana (86%), produced 
an increase of 5% (to 91%). All developmental states had child survival rates above 90% by 
1990, six of which had rates of 97%+.
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Table 7.21 A Detailed Overview of the Records of Developmental States (1970-90),
By Indicator
Indicator Reference Bots SKor Sing
Developmental States 
Chin Indo Thai Mala HKon Maur
Adult 1970 41 88 69 69 54 79 60 77 68
Literacy 1990 75 96 90 79 84 94 80 91 80
J/-~
S
1 l D/70-90 34___ 8___ j
<N 
j| 10___ 30___ 15 20 14___ 12
Life 1970 49 58 68 60 46 57 59 70 62
Expectancy 1990 60 70 74 71 62 69 70 77 70
(yrs) D/70-90 11 12 6 11 16 12 11 7 8
Child 1970 86 93 97 90 82 90 94 98 92
Survival 1990 91 97 99 96 90 97 97 99 97
(%) D/70-90 5 4 2 6 8 7 3 1 5
Civil 1970 4.0 6.0 5.0 7.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 2.0 2.0
Liberties 1990 2.3 3.0 4.3 6.7 5.0 3.0 4.3 2.0 2.0
PerAvg 3.0 5.1 4.9 6.4 5.2 3.9 4.0 2.0 2.4
LIB 1970 0.606 0.512 0.637 0.401 0.484 0.570 0.770 0.893 0.840
Index 1990 0.805 0.802 0.713 0.482 0.567 0.798 0.695 0.909 0.888
D/70-90 0.199 0.290 0.076 0.081 0.083 0.229 -0.075 0.016 0.048
Peace/ 1970 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.784 0.780 1.000 1.000
Stability 1990 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.795 0.784 0.794 0.787 1.000 1.000
(CONF) D/70-90 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.795 0.784 0.010 0.007 0.000 0.000
Inflation 1970 4 18 1 -1 63 2 0 2 4
Rate 1990 13 6 2 6 8 4 2 8 8
<%) PerAvg 12 13 4 3 15 6 4 8 12
SEC 1970 0.956 0.825 0.989 0.500 0.000 0.874 0.890 0.976 0.964
Index 1990 0.868 0.944 0.981 0.840 0.807 0.860 0.877 0.925 0.919
D/70-90 -0.088 0.119 -0.008 0.340 0.807 -0.014 -0.013 -0.051 -0.045
Tertiary 1970 -
_
”"o ~ ~2 T
Enrolment 1990 3 38 8 2 9 16 5 18 2
<%) D/70-90 3 30 1 2 6 14 3 11 -1
GendEq. 1970 0.277 0.404 0.468 0.488 0.246 0.361 0371 0.408 0.290
(GEND) 1990 0.520 0.780 0.672 0.522 0.456 0.464 0.597 0.724 0.518
Index D/70-90 0.243 0.376 0.204 0.033 0.210 0.103 0.226 0.317 0.229
%NonAgr - §i
s ! I ...»
~50 96 " 23 34 ~ 20 44 96 66
Rate 1990 72 83 100 27 44 33 74 99 84
D/70-90 59 33 4 4 10 13 30 3 18
MOB 1970 0.137 0.366 0.506 0.240 0.195 0.208 0.277 0.489 0.329
Index 1990 0.427 0.704 0.593 0.271 0.334 0.340 0.467 0.650 0.463
D/70-90 0.290 0.368 0.087 0.032 0.140 0.132 0.189 0.161 0.133
Notes. D/70-90 means the difference between the 1990 and 1970 values, whereas PerAvg means the 
average rate for the entire period
299
The picture for civil liberties was fairly bleak around 1970: only Hong Kong and 
Mauritius had strong CL values (2.0), followed by Malaysia (3.0) and Botswana (4.0). The 
worst offenders were China (7.0) and South Korea (6.0). By contrast, just over half of the 
cases (5) had ‘respectable’ CL values (below the median point of 3.5) by 1990: Hong 
Kong (2.0), Mauritius (2.0), Botswana (3.0), Thailand (3.0) and South Korea (3.0). Judging 
by their average CL values over the entire period, only Hong Kong (2.0), Mauritius (2.4) 
and Botswana (3.0) had respectable scores, followed at a slight distance by Malaysia (4.0) 
and Singapore (4.9).
According to the Liberty Index (LIB), which combines child survival and civil 
liberties indicators, Hong Kong (0.893) showed the greatest degree of overall 
‘liberty/freedom’ in 1970, followed by Mauritius (0.840) and Malaysia (0.770). At the 
other extreme, both China (0.401) and Indonesia (0.484) fell below the 0.500 mark. But a 
considerable change had occurred by 1990, with the number of cases displaying LIB values 
above 0.700 doubling to six, four of which had High LIB values (0.800+-): Hong Kong 
(0.909), Mauritius (0.888), Botswana (0.805) and South Korea (0.802). Thailand (0.798) 
fell just shy of the 0.800 threshold, whereas China (0.482) and Indonesia (0.567) continued 
to display much lower values. Predictably, the largest absolute changes in LIB levels over 
the period were found for newly-democratized South Korea (0.290) and Thailand (0.229). 
Malaysia (-0.075) was the only case where LIB values actually declined over the period - a 
phenomenon directly attributable to its poorer status on civil liberties (from 3.0 in 1970 to 
4.3 in 1990 on the inverted CL scale).
Five of the nine developmental states enjoyed complete socio-political tranquility 
around 1970, as indicated by their perfect scores of 1.000 for the peace/stability (CONF) 
index. Four cases experienced some measurable degree of strife, from the severe internal 
conflicts which engulfed Indonesia (0.000) and China (0.000), to the low-intensity conflicts 
in Thailand (0.784) and Malaysia (0.780). Although the same number of developmental 
states (5) had values of 1.000 in 1990, the conflicts in the remaining four cases were, on the 
whole, not as severe as in 1970, principally because China (0.795) and Indonesia (0.784) 
had become largely stabilized; roughly the same degree of low-intensity conflict continued 
in Thailand and Malaysia.
The measure of economic (instability, inflation, showed a slight diversity of results. 
Seven of the nine states had inflation largely under control (5% or less) in 1970. South 
Korea (18%) did not fare as well, although only Indonesia (63%) experienced runaway 
inflation. By 1990, however, only three states had rates below 5%: Singapore, Thailand, and 
Malaysia. Five cases had rates between 6-10% (South Korea, China, Indonesia, Hong 
Kong, Mauritius), but only Botswana (13%) exceeded the 10% mark. Looking at the 
average rates of inflation throughout the period, just over half of the developmental states (5) 
had rates below 10%, of which only Singapore, China and Malaysia had rates below 5%. 
Less impressive period averages were produced by Botswana (12%), Mauritius (12%), 
South Korea (13%) and Indonesia (15%).
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Embodying the above two component dimensions, the Security Index (SEC) 
confirms that seven developmental states displayed High SEC values (0.800+) in 1970, led 
by Singapore (0.989), Hong Kong (0.976), Mauritius (0.964) and Botswana (0.956). With 
its combination of socio-political instability and economic stability (as captured by the rate 
of inflation), China produced a SEC value of 0.500, whereas Indonesia’s combination of 
complete socio-political and economic instability produced a SEC value of 0.000. By 1990, 
however, all developmental states had SEC values above the 0.800 mark, led by Singapore 
(0.981), South Korea (0.944) and Hong Kong (0.925). The only substantial changes in 
SEC levels over the period were found, predictably, for China (0.340) and Indonesia 
(0.807); in the latter case, Indonesia’s CONF value had improved from 0.000 to 1.000 and 
its inflation rate fell from 63% to 8%.
Turning to the first indicator of social mobility/opportunity, all nine developmental 
states had tertiary enrollment (TERT) rates below 10% in 1970, ranging from a high of 8% 
for South Korea to a low of around 0-1% for Botswana and China. Three states had 
surpassed the 10% mark by 1990: South Korea (38%), Hong Kong (18%) and Thailand 
(16%). Aside from these three cases, which produced increases over the period of 30%, 
14%, and 11%, the other five states made very little progress on this front. Although 
Indonesia’s rate climbed to 9% by 1990, four states continued to exhibit rates of 5% or 
less: Malaysia (5%), Botswana (3%), China (2%) and Mauritius (2%). Given their 
comparably lower adult literacy rates in 1970, and the fact that a sizeable proportion of their 
populations (20-25%) remained illiterate by 1990, it was perhaps to be expected that 
attention and resources in these five cases would be diverted to addressing more basic 
educational shortfalls (e.g. at the primary and secondary school levels).
The status of women was relatively low in the developmental states in 1970: all nine 
cases had gender equity (GEND) rates below the 0.500 mark. At one extreme were China 
(0.488) and Singapore (0.468), at the other were Botswana (0.277) and Indonesia (0.246). 
But GEND rates had improved greatly by 1990: seven cases surpassed the 0.500 threshold, 
led by South Korea (0.780) and Hong Kong (0.724), while Thailand (0.464) and Indonesia 
(0.456) fell just shy of the mark. In absolute terms, the greatest gains over the period were 
made by South Korea (0.376) and Hong Kong (0.317); the fewest gains were made by 
China (0.033) and Thailand (0.103).
The extent to which the developmental states underwent changes in their 
employment structures was reflected by the percentage of workers not employed in 
agriculture (%NonAgr). Six states were largely defined by agricultural-based employment 
in 1970 (%NonAgr rates of 50% or less). The most heavily dependent on agriculture were 
Botswana (13%), Thailand (20%) and China (23%); Singapore and Hong Kong (both 
96%) were of course the least dependent. The situation had been completely reversed by 
1990: only three states remained heavily dependent on agricultural-based employment 
(China, Indonesia and Thailand). Botswana experienced the largest transformation of all 
(59%), principally due to the development of its mining-based sectors; in fact, only 28% of
301
the workforce was employed in agricultural activity by 1990 (compared to 87% in 1970). 
Dramatic changes also occurred in South Korea (33%) and Malaysia (30%).
As gathered from the three preceding indicators, the developmental states in 1970 
were characterized by very low levels of social mobility, a point succinctly captured by the 
Mobility Index (MOB). Only Singapore (0.506) and Hong Kong (0.489) may be thought 
of as partial exceptions. Seven states had MOB values below 0.400, four of which had 
values below 0.250: China (0.240), Thailand (0.208), Indonesia (0.195) and Botswana 
(0.137). By 1990, however, six states had MOB values above 0.400, three of which had 
values above 0.500 (compared to only one in 1970): South Korea (0.704), Hong Kong 
(0.650) and Singapore (0.593). In absolute terms, South Korea made the most progress 
over the period (0.368), followed at a distance by Botswana (0.290). The least progress was 
made by three states which began and ended the period with MOB values below the 0.400 
mark: Indonesia (0.140), Thailand (0.132) and, especially, China (0.032).
The diversity of their individual achievements illustrates the diversity of the 
challenges faced by each developmental state at the beginning of the period. No two 
developmental states produced largely identical records. Furthermore, as noted earlier (Table
7.19), these records were achieved in different operating circumstances. Nonetheless, by 
making sufficient progress in the areas they needed to - whether in terms of improving adult 
literacy, child survival rates, etc - developmental states produced strong overall human 
development records, supported by very high rates of economic growth.
Comparing the Records of Developmental and Non-Developmental Democratic States
The records of the four developmental democratic states - Mauritius, Malaysia, 
Botswana and Singapore - will now be directly compared against the records for the fifteen 
non-developmental democratic states in my sample. This latter group, consisting of those 
states with period democratic LoD values (1.0-2.9), includes ten ‘stable’ democracies 
(Barbados, Costa Rica, Venezuela, India, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Dominican 
Republic, Colombia, Papua New Guinea) and five ‘unstable* democracies which 
experienced bouts of military rule during the period (Turkey, Gambia, El Salvador, Peru and 
Honduras). It will be recalled that the key political difference between the developmental 
and non-developmental variants is the role of “political elites and state structures” and their 
“determination and capacity to preside over economic growth and welfare” (Leftwich 1998: 
52).
As illustrated so clearly in Figure 7.12, this distinction has been translated into 
considerably better aggregate records for the developmental democratic states, all of which 
displayed ‘strong links’ between economic growth and human development Conversely, an
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Fig. 7.12 Developmental and Non-Developmental Democratic States
In Comparative Perspective, 1970-90
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incredibly high proportion (12 of 15) of non-developmental democratic states produced 
‘weak links’, including 7 of the 10 stable democracies and all five unstable democracies. 
Only three stable democracies showed ‘unbalanced links’ in favour of human development 
by surpassing the 30% I-HDI shortfall reduction threshold (Barbados, Costa Rica and 
Trinidad and Tobago). None of the fifteen non-developmental cases crossed the 3% GNP/C 
threshold, although Sri Lanka (2.9%) and Turkey (2.6%) were just shy of the mark.
Figure 7.13 below considers the human development perspective in greater detail by 
depicting the shortfall reduction rates (HDI, ISC and I-HDI) together. Two points need to 
be stressed. First, despite their excellent records, the developmental democracies did not 
necessarily display the highest reduction rates for each specific index. For instance, 
although Malaysia had the highest HDI reduction rate (61%), both Colombia (58%) and 
Costa Rica (57%) had better rates than Botswana (54%), Mauritius (53%) and Singapore 
(48%); Turkey’s rate was comparable (53%). In terms of the ISC, the best reduction rate 
was produced by Trinidad and Tobago (44%); Honduras’ rate (29%) was identical to 
Botswana’s, but better than the rates for Singapore (18%), Mauritius (13%) and Malaysia 
(1%). Moreover, whereas Botswana (46%), Mauritius (41%), and Malaysia (40%) 
produced the best I-HDI reduction rates, Barbados (39%) and Trinidad and Tobago (38%) 
were only slightly behind, though still above Singapore (35%).
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Fig. 7.13 Comparing Index Shortfall Reduction Rates, 1970-90:
Developmental and Non-Developmental Democratic States
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However, the developmental democracies did exhibit high reduction rates on a fairly 
consistent basis. All four states had HDI and I-HDI reduction rates above the 30% 
threshold, an accomplishment matched by only Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Costa 
Rica; the latter’s record is somewhat tainted by its negative ISC rate (-21%). Looking 
across the spectrum, two non-developmental democratic states (Papua New Guinea and 
Gambia) failed to even reach the 15% reduction threshold for the HDI, and just under half 
(7) failed to reach the 15% reduction threshold for the I-HDI. Nine of the 15 non- 
developmental democracies actually showed a deterioration in social conditions (negative 
ISC reduction rates); the most dramatic declines were observed for the conflict-ravaged 
cases of El Salvador (-48%), Peru (-39%), Colombia (-39%), and Sri Lanka (-35%), and the 
inflation-plagued case of Venezuela (-36%).
It should also be noted that the four developmental democratic states did not 
necessarily produce the highest period increases for key indicators such as adult literacy, 
life expectancy, child survival and gender equity (Figure 7.14). Compared to other states 
beginning from broadly similar literacy levels in 1970 (graph a), Botswana’s increase 
(34%) was only fractionally better than the increases for Papua New Guinea (33%) and 
Turkey (30%); Honduras (22%) was further behind, followed by India (16%). Of the nine
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cases beginning from the 55-80% literacy levels, the increases produced by Singapore 
(21%) and Malaysia (20%) were slightly higher than those for El Salvador (18%) and the 
Dominican Republic (17%); Mauritius’ increase (12%) was identical to Sri Lanka’s, better 
than Colombia’s (9%), but worse than Peru’s (15%) and Venezuela’s (14%).
Botswana’s low life expectancy rate in 1970 (41 years) placed it in the company of 
four other states with rates between 45-54 years (graph b): its rate increase (llyrs) was 
better than India’s (10 yrs) and Papua New Guinea’s (10 yrs), but worse than Honduras’ 
(14 yrs) and Peru’s (12 yrs). Malaysia’s increase (11 yrs) was the highest in the 55-64 
years range, followed closely by the Dominican Republic (10 yrs); the increase for 
Mauritius (8 yrs) was lower than the increases for El Salvador, Turkey and Colombia (all 9 
yrs), but higher than Venezuela’s (6 yrs). Among the states at the highest levels (66+ yrs) 
in 1970, Singapore had the same increase as Barbados (6 yrs); Costa Rica (10 yrs) 
produced the highest increase, followed by Jamaica (7 yrs).
Of the eight countries starting from child survival levels of 80-89% (graph c), 
Botswana showed the sixth-highest increase (5.7%); Turkey made the greatest progress 
(9.3%), followed by Papua New Guinea (8.3%) and Honduras (8.2%). Mauritius produced 
the highest increase (4.8%) among the states in the 90-95% range, barely ahead of Sri 
Lanka (4.4%) and Costa Rica (4.1%); Malaysia’s increase (3.3%) was almost identical to 
Jamaica’s (3.5%) and Barbados’ (3.9%). Already showing the highest child survival rate in 
1970, Singapore (97.0%) improved its rate by 1.8%.
Regarding gender equity rates (graph d), Botswana and Mauritius both began the 
period with GEND values which placed them among the middle ranks (0.240/0.310): 
Botswana’s increase (0.243) was similar to Peru’s (0.247), while Mauritius’s increase
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(0.229) was similar to Colombia’s (0.231); the least progress was made by Turkey (0.040), 
Gambia (0.047) and El Salvador (0.057). Malaysia began from virtually the same plateau 
(0.371) as Venezuela (0.358) but its period increase (0.226) was almost three times higher 
(0.082). Of the three states in the 0.450/0.499 range, Singapore produced a lower GEND 
increase (0.204) than both Sri Lanka (0.214) and Trinidad and Tobago (0.271).
Given that the four developmental democracies produced very good, though not 
necessarily the highest, rate increases for these key indicators, an observation that was also 
recorded above for the composite indices, one must again return to the issue of economic 
growth, where the discrepancies between the two samples become pronounced (Figure
7.15).27 No non-developmental democracy, with the partial exception of Turkey (3.6% and 
2.9%), managed to sustain strong economic growth over the two shorter periods, and no 
non-developmental democracy managed to cross Leftwich’s rapid growth (4.0%) threshold 
in either period. Six of these states had rates above 3.0% in the first period (Barbados, 
Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Turkey), but only 
India (3.1%) surpassed this mark in the second period. Conversely, whereas six states had 
rates of 1.5% or less in the first period (India, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, El Salvador, 
Peru and Honduras), twelve states shared this dismal distinction in the second period (all 
but India, Sri Lanka and Turkey); moreover, six of these states actually produced negative 
average growth rates (Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic, Gambia, 
Peru and Honduras). Despite posting strong growth records over the first period, Barbados 
(3.5% and 1.0%), Costa Rica (3.3% and 1.0%) and Trinidad and Tobago (3.1% and -2.6%) 
- the three most promising cases in terms of human development (recall Figures 7.12 and 
7.13) - also failed the sustainability test
If, therefore, one defines the term ‘developmental’ according to the ‘growth and 
welfare’ thesis, only Mauritius, Malaysia, Botswana and Singapore truly deserve this 
accolade among the (de jure or de facto) democratic states in the sample. In addition to 
producing rapid economic growth on a sustained basis, they were the only states to establish 
‘strong links’ between economic growth and human development performance.
-7The actual GNP/C rates for the two periods (1965-80 and 1980-92) were: 3.7% and 5.6% for Mauritius; 
4.7% and3.2% for Malaysia; 9.9% and6.1% for Botswana; 8.3% and 5.3% for Singapore; 3.5% and 1.0% 
for Barbados; 3.3% and 0.8% for Costa Rica; 2.3% and -0.8% for Venezuela; 1.5% and 3.1% for India; 
3.1% and-2.6% for Trinidad and Tobago; 2.8% and2.6% for Sri Lanka; -0.1% and 0.2% for Jamaica; 3.8% 
and-0.5% for Dominican Republic; 3.7% and 1.4% for Colombia; 0.6% and 0.0% for Papua New Guinea; 
3.6% and2.9% for Turkey; 2.3% and-0.4% for Gambia; 1.5% and 0.0% for El Salvador; 0.8% and -2.8% 
for Peru; 1.1% and-0.3% for Honduras. (Source: World Bank data in UNDP 1994.)
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Fig. 7.15 Comparing the Sustainability of Economic Growth:
Developmental and Non-Developmental Democratic States
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7.5 Summary of Chapter Findings
On the basis of this chapter’s findings, four general observations may be forwarded: 
(1) economic growth has a strong impact on human development performance, although the 
relationship between the variables is not automatic (section 7.1); (2) general rates of 
economic growth are not influenced by the level of democracy, although sustained rapid 
growth is most often achieved by non-democratic regimes (section 7.2); (3) the level of 
democracy does not influence the establishment of a ‘ virtuous cycle’ between economic 
growth and human development performance (section 7.3); and (4) the nature and role of 
the state is the crucial variable in the development process, as demonstrated by the most 
exceptional performers, developmental states (section 7.4).
The correlations between economic growth and human development performance 
were found to be positive and moderate, but stronger for the sample of developing states
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(Table 7.1). Average economic growth rates varied directly by human development 
performance group: the highest average economic growth rate was produced by the highest 
I-HDI performance group; the second-highest average growth rate was produced by the 
second-highest performance group; and so on (Figure 7.1). That the relationship between 
economic growth and human development is strong but not automatic was further 
demonstrated by examining distribution patterns (Figure 7.2) and rank positions (Table 
7.2).
When levels of economic development and human development were controlled for, 
stronger economic growth appeared to coincide with marked improvements in human 
development conditions in poor, less developed countries, but less so in relatively wealthier, 
more developed countries (Figure 7.3). The relationship between economic growth and 
human development also needs to be qualified in another way. While economic growth does 
influence overall human development conditions, it does not appear to directly influence the 
four key individual indicators - literacy, life expectancy, child survival and gender equity - 
to the same extent (Tables 7.3,7.4,7.5).
The correlations between economic growth and levels of democracy were very weak 
for both samples (Table 7.8). The lack of any relationship was also shown by the similar 
percentages of countries from each level of democracy with economic growth rates above 
the developing average (Table 7.9), and by the similar average growth rates produced by the 
three levels of democracy (Figure 7.4).
Across the regions, it was shown that no level of democracy consistently produced 
the highest average rates of economic growth throughout, and that there was considerable 
variation within each level of democracy (Figure 7.5, Table 7.10). However, rapid economic 
growth rates (4.0%+) were almost exclusively achieved by non-democratic states (Tables 
7.11 and 7.12).
When levels of human and economic development were controlled for, no level of 
democracy managed to consistently translate economic growth - regardless of the rate - into 
higher human development gains (Figures 7.6 and 7.7). Moreover, the (almost exclusively 
non-democratic) rapid growth states often produced dissimilar human development gains; 
these gains were sometimes lower than those recorded for countries with slower rates of 
growth (Figure 7.8).
The level of democracy had little effect, in general, on the nature of the ‘links* 
between economic growth and human development performance (Tables 7.15, 7.16 and 
Figure 7.9). None of the three additional variables considered - structure of the economy, 
size of government, and government social expenditures - had any noticeable impact on 
human development performance (Tables 7.6 and 7.7) or economic growth (Tables 7.13 
and 7.14).
The developmental states identified by Adrian Leftwich were undoubtedly the best 
performers over the 1970-90 period because of their unique ability to combine high rates of 
sustained economic growth and strong human development gains (Tables 7.17, 7.18;
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Figures 7.10, 7.11). That they operated under different structural circumstances (Table
7.19) lends weight to Leftwich’s argument regarding the “primacy of politics”.
Given their different starting levels in 1970, the nature and magnitude of the gains 
made by the developmental states differed in terms of the composite indices (Table 7.20) 
and the individual indicators (Table 7.21). The four developmental democratic states - 
Singapore, Malaysia, Botswana and Mauritius - did in fact produce much better overall 
records than the non-developmental democracies in the sample (Figures 7.12, 7.13 and
7.15).
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION: THE FINDINGS ON DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
In contributing to the debate concerning democracy and development, this thesis 
accepts the concept of human development as the only truly universal and moral yardstick, 
one which may serve as the cornerstone of new efforts to reinvigorate comparative politics 
with a normative dimension. New indices have been constructed for the purposes of this 
research, including a new measure of democracy, the Level of Democracy (LoD) index, and 
a new measure of human development, the Integrated Human Development Index (I-HDI). 
Using time-series data (1970-90) from a large cross-national sample (123 countries), this 
thesis has filled a gap in existing research by comprehensively analyzing the relationship 
between democracy and human development levels and performance.
Much has been written on democracy and development since the end of the Second 
World War, largely by political scientists falling within the loose umbrella referred to as the 
political development school. Optimistic initial assessments were based upon the untested 
proposition that democracy not only corresponded to higher levels of development but also 
served as the vehicle best suited for propelling states to higher levels. The subsequent failure 
of democracy to take root in the developing world, coupled with the apparent success of 
some non-democratic regimes at embarking on national development programs, ensured that 
this view quickly gave way to more sober observations which held that, while democracy did 
correspond to higher levels of development, the actual process of development (or 
‘modernization’) required some form of bureaucratic-authoritarian regime to both ensure a 
sufficient degree of order and stability, by containing some of the inherently destabilizing 
consequences of rapid socio-economic change, and to guide the national project 
successfully along.
Yet others focused their attentions exclusively on the first part of the relationship; 
specifically, the potential preconditions for the emergence and maintenance of democratic 
governance. The issue of development, interpreted principally in terms of national income 
levels, formed part of an overall picture which included other key variables such as political 
culture, socio-economic cleavages, and the impact of external actors.
With the emergence of the humanist approach in the 1960s and 1970s, the tendency 
to equate development primarily with ‘economic development* was abandoned in favour of 
a broader concern with the concept of human development. Despite the noticeable shift in 
emphasis, political humanists arrived at the same basic conclusion as political development 
theorists regarding democracy and levels of development: democratic institutions and 
practices are more valued, and thus more likely to take root and persist, in countries at
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higher levels of human development (the ‘saliency of needs’ argument). Since most 
political humanists held a purely instrumentalist view of politics (‘whatever works best is 
morally justifiable’), there was little speculation about which form of government might be 
best suited to the task of improving, in the shortest possible period of time, living conditions 
in countries found at lower levels of human development However, some assumed, again 
along with the political development theorists, that modernizing authoritarian regimes 
operating within the parameters of a strong state structure could create the material 
conditions which would make democracy more likely at a future stage.
Returning to the seminal question asked at the onset of the investigation - ‘Is 
democracy typically the by-product of development, the catalyst for development, or 
neither?’ - the consensus in both the political development and political humanist camps 
therefore held that democracy was more likely to be the by-product of development, not its 
catalyst. Interpreted explicitly in the context of human development, the empirical findings 
in this thesis clearly confirm these assumptions to be correct
8.1 Establishing the Relationships: Democracy and Human Development, 1970-90
Insofar as any generalizations are warranted, it may be argued that, while there is a 
relationship between democracy and higher levels of human development there is no 
relationship between democracy and human development performance. While each part of 
this argument has been treated separately and at considerable length in Chapters 4-7, it may 
prudent to summarize and compare the results in tandem.
The first and most obvious indication that the relationships are altogether different 
may be seen in the results of the correlation analysis: the level of democracy may explain 
between44-47% of the variation in I-HDI values over the period (N=123), but only between 
0-3% of the variation in I-HDI performance rates.1 Weaker findings emerge when 
developing states are considered in isolation (N=88), though the patterns are similar: the 
level of democracy may explain between 25-30% of the variation in I-HDI values, but only 
0-2% of the variation in I-HDI performance rates.
Why this should be the case may be seen in Figure 8.1. In this highly generalized 
portrayal,2 the common basis of comparison is the level of human development, against 
which average levels of democracy and average performance rates may be traced. The fact
1From Tables 4.1 and 5.1. Similar results were observed for the other indices as well. The level of 
democracy could explain between 3440% (HDI) and 4149% (ISC) of the variation in index levels, but only 
0-5% (HDI) and 0-1% (ISC) of the variation in performance rates.
2The generalized patterns reflect the weight of the evidence in Chapters 4 and 5, and combine to some 
extent the trends observed specifically in Figures 4.1 and 5.4. The slope representing the average level of 
democracyin Figure 8.1 is basically similar to the ones found in Figure 4.1, except that the scale used is 
inverted.
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Figure 8.1 Tracing Average Levels of Democracy and
Average Human Development Performance Rates 
Across Levels of Human Development
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that the most developed states (the OECD countries) are democratic whereas the least 
developed states (largely in sub-Saharan Africa) are not, suggests that the slope tracing the 
average level of democracy (left-hand scale) descends steadily across the levels of human 
development The slope flattens out somewhat across the middle range of human 
development values, where developing states are fairly evenly represented by all levels of 
democracy (resulting in averages straddling the mid-range of democracy scores), and then 
descends further towards the lower range of human development values (where non- 
democratic regimes are more prevalent).
In contrast, the slope tracing average performance rates (right-hand scale) is at its 
lowest points at either end of the human development scale: the most developed (and 
democratic) states have less room for absolute growth on the fixed scale, and thus develop 
more incrementally, whereas the least developed (and non-democratic) states most often lack 
the resources (material and otherwise) for rapid development Along the middle range of 
human development values, where all levels of democracy are largely represented in equal 
measure, countries tend to produce by far the highest absolute increases, resulting in an 
inverted ‘IT pattern for the slope.
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The dual nature of the democracy-human development relationship also becomes 
readily apparent when the various independent thresholds are employed for the sample of 
developing states. For instance, between 79-86% of developing democracies had human 
development values above the average level for all developing states, but only 35% of them 
surpassed the developing threshold for human development performance rates for 1970- 
90. The percentage of developing democracies with human development values above the 
average found for countries at similar levels of economic development stood between 71- 
79%, but only 24% of them surpassed their economic development threshold for 
performance rates. Between 60-79% of developing democracies had human development 
values above the average for their respective regions, but only 41% surpassed their regional 
threshold for performance rates.
When democratic and non-democratic states are compared directly together, the 
results vary according to which relationship is under review. Given the above observations, 
the findings are to some extent predictable, even when controlling variables are introduced: 
democratic states, on average, compare favourably in terms of human development levels but 
less favourably in terms of human development performance.
When the level of economic development is controlled for, democratic states display 
higher average human development values irrespective of income quartile. On the other 
hand, democratic states produce marginally lower average human development performance 
rates than non-democratic states at similar levels of economic development There is a slight 
divergence from the general patterns when regional variations are controlled for democratic 
states do not always display the highest average human development values, nor do they 
often display the highest average human development performance rates.
The independent thresholds may again be applied to the sample of developing states. 
A considerably higher percentage of democratic states surpass the average human 
development levels found for all developing states, countries at similar levels of economic 
development, and countries from the same regional group. However, with regard to these 
same three thresholds, a slightly higher percentage of non-democratic states produce above 
average human development performance rates; this is also the case when a fourth threshold, 
the average for countries beginning from similar human development levels, is applied.
Therefore, while democratic states are typically associated with higher levels of 
human development, they do not improve overall living conditions better than non- 
democratic states; over the course of the 1970-90 period, developing democracies performed 
marginally worse than the less authoritarian (LoD 3-5*) of the two non-democratic groups. 
Though far from perfect, the lines of causation are clearly from human development to 
democracy, not vice versa.
These observations may be placed into context by constructing a model of the 
democracy-development relationships (Figure 8.2). The bottom half of the model indicates 
that the level of democracy is strongly influenced by the level of human development, and
314
Figure 8.2 A Model of the Democracy-Development Relationships
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moderately influenced by the level of economic development But the strength of these 
relationships weakens noticeably when developing states are considered in isolation: the 
level of economic development has virtually no impact, while the level of human 
development exerts a more moderate impact The level of economic development exerts a 
strong influence on the level of human development when all states are considered, and a 
moderately strong influence when developing states are considered alone.
These findings force one to reassess some of the core tenets in the literature on 
‘democratic preconditions’. There is virtually no relationship between levels of national 
affluence and levels of democracy in the developing world: economic development may at 
most explain 0.1-2% of the variation in LoD values for the 1970-90 period. To further 
undermine the ‘wealth-equals-democracy’ proposition, it will also be recalled that 
democratic states are not, on average, the wealthiest in the developing world. Substituting 
levels of human development into the equation allows one to consider another prominent 
argument in the literature: that democracy is more likely to take root in developing societies 
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where there is a greater ‘equality of conditions or life chances’. This is true in a broad 
sense, but the evidence shows that this relationship is far from automatic: the level of human 
development may at most explain only 25-30% of the variation in levels of democracy in the 
developing world. While developing democracies did consistently produce the highest 
average human development values over the 1970-1990 period, the findings are to some 
extent skewed by the disproportionate influence exerted by Latin American democracies.
The top part of the diagram shows that the level of democracy, in turn, has an 
extremely weak impact on both economic growth and human development performance (for 
both samples). As demonstrated in Chapter 7, economic growth has a moderately strong 
impact on human development performance, explaining between 14-28% of the variation 
(21-38% for developing states); by way of comparison, the level of democracy explains 
only 0-3% of the variation (both samples). This would seem to indicate that if the level of 
democracy were to exert any influence whatsoever on human development performance, it 
would have to be indirectly; that is, by influencing economic growth.
However, since the level of democracy explains very little of the variation in 
economic growth rates (4-14% for the All States sample, 2-7% for the Developing States 
sample), no general relationship exists between the variables.3 While this finding supports 
the Skeptical Perspective outlined in Chapter 1, the Conflict Perspective appears to be 
correct in one key respect: some non-democratic states generate relatively high rates of 
economic growth, whereas democratic states, on the whole, tend to muddle through with 
moderate or slow growth. Non-democratic states account for virtually all of the cases of 
‘rapid’ economic growth (4.0%+ GNP/C). Indeed, the ability of some non-democratic 
states to achieve high rates of economic growth helps to explain their considerably better 
human development performance.
The importance of strong economic growth to overall human development progress 
is clear. On average, states with the highest human development gains have benefited from 
the highest rates of economic growth, while the worst performing states have produced the 
worst average rates of growth. Viewed from another perspective, of the nine states with 
exceptionally high absolute I-HDI increases (0.200+) over the 1970-90 period, six had 
rapid economic growth rates, while three had moderately strong growth (2.0-3.9%). When 
levels of human development at the beginning of the performance period were controlled 
for, states with rapid rates of economic growth produced the highest average human 
development gains; a point confirmed when levels of economic development were controlled 
for in the poorest sample of developing states.
3Little separated the three levels of democracy when direct comparisons were made. For instance, the 
percentage of developing states from each LoD group with economic growth rates above the developing 
average for 1970-90 (1.3%) was similar 53% (LoD 1-2*), 49% (LoD 3-5*), 45% (LoD 6-7). Moreover, 
developing democracies had only a fractionally lower average growth rate (1.2%) than did the group of non- 
democratic (3-5*) states (1.6%); the non-democratic (6-7) group was not far behind (1.0%).
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Having ruled out the possibility of either the level of democracy or other structural 
variables (the structure of the economy, the size of government, and the size of governmental 
social expenditures) exerting any significant influence on human development performance, 
the fact remains that strong economic growth alone is not enough. There are cases where 
strong economic growth does not lead to superior human development performance, and 
where superior human development performance is achieved in the absence of strong 
economic growth. In either case, there is what the UNDP refers to as ‘unbalanced links’ in 
the developmental chain. To establish the ‘strong links’ which underpin the ‘virtuous cycle 
of development’, strong economic growth must be accompanied by strong human 
development performance. But how best to create such conditions?
Once again, the level of democracy does not provide any real clues, since it does not 
affect the nature of the ‘links’ (strong, unbalanced or weak) between economic growth and 
human development performance.4 Instead, one may turn to Adrian Leftwich’s proposition 
that developmental success is not contingent upon the level of democracy, or form of 
government, but on the nature and role of the state. The evidence shows quite convincingly 
that the most exceptional performers over the 1970-90 period were the ‘developmental 
states’ identified by Leftwich.5 These were the only states which managed to combine 
strong and sustained economic growth with strong human development gains.
With very little in common on several key fronts (the level of democracy, the level of 
economic development at the beginning of the performance period, the structure of the 
economy, the size of government, and the size of social expenditures), developmental states 
share certain political characteristics (recall section 7.4 in Chapter 7). The extent to which 
countries adopt these features will largely determine how successful they will be. Under this 
interpretation, development must be state-guided, with plans formulated and executed by 
determined and competent political elites, supported by an effective, autonomous, and 
centralized bureaucracy.
Far from being a passive player in a process where market forces determine the 
nature and pace of economic growth, the state is an active participant. It is the state’s 
responsibility to create the conditions necessary for strong and sustained economic growth. 
This involves not just establishing a ‘favourable business climate’ in the purely economic 
and legalistic sense, but also ensuring that governmental policies and expenditures are 
directed on the human development front. In addition to achieving the moral aim of 
empowering individuals and improving social conditions, ‘human capital’ expenditures 
ensure that the seeds are replanted for continued economic growth (via a healthier and better 
educated workforce, etc), the benefits of which are again reinvested into human development 
priorities, and so on. This reflects the essence of the UNDP’s ‘virtuous cycle’ framewoik,
4Overthe 1970-90 period, between 6-15% of democratic states displayed ‘strong links’, an almost identical 
range found for the two groups of non-democratic states (13-22% and 8-14%; recall Fig 7.9).
5The developmental states identified for the 1970-90 period were: Botswana, Mauritius, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, China, Indonesia, and South Korea (Chapter 7).
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which itself is an updated version of the World Bank’s ‘growth with redistribution’ thesis 
(except that the human development angle is more explicitly recognized).
The state is the most important factor in the development equation, and 
developmental states are overwhelmingly ‘non-democratic’ in character. Short-term changes 
in government may undermine the conditions of continuity and stability necessary for the 
successful implementation of development policy, which itself is largely formulated with the 
longer-term in mind. Moreover, the creation of a favourable climate for rapid and sustained 
economic growth, typically following a path of export-oriented industrialization, might 
require a clampdown on popular pressures in the event that developmental goals are 
perceived to be potentially compromised
Consequently, where they do display the external trappings of a democratic 
government, developmental states are likely to be of a more ‘authoritarian nature’, 
displaying the characteristics of de facto one-party/coalition rule (Singapore, Malaysia and 
Botswana), although some exceptions do exist where an underlying elite consensus on 
development policy masks any superficial (i.e. non-development related) differences 
suggested by competitive elections (Mauritius). The evidence has shown that, in stark 
contrast to the enviable records of these ‘developmental democratic states’, the majority of 
developing democracies have managed to establish only ‘weak links’ between economic 
growth and human development performance.
8.2 Post-1990 Trends
Although it is still premature to evaluate the relative success of democratic 
transitions since the early 1990s, a summary of the general trends during the 1990-97 
period suggests that the conclusions arrived at in this thesis, and the model derived thereof 
in Figure 8.2, remain intact Owing to limited data availability, which precludes the 
construction of the I-HDI, the version of the HDI in the 1999 Human Development Report 
will suffice as a compromise human development measure.6 Since Vanhanen does not 
provide ID values for this period, meaning that the Level of Democracy Index cannot be 
constructed, the measure of democracy employed is Gastil’s Political Rights Index (PRI).7 
The post-1990 data may be found in Appendix R.
6The version of the HDI constructed for the 1999 Report is based on a slightly different methodology than 
in previous editions (see Technical Note: Computing the Indices" in the Report). The resulting HDI 
values, computed for 1997, are not therefore directly comparable to the time-series HDI data employed in 
this thesis (which come from the 1994 Report).
~The PRI values are taken from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World, 1998-99. Like LoD values, PRI 
values range from 1.0 (most democratic) to 7.0 (least democratic).
318
Democracy is related to higher levels o f human development:
•A moderately strong correlation coefficient (-0.580) is produced for the level of 
democracy (PRI 1998) and the level of human development (HDI 1997) for the All 
States sample (N=l 18), while a significantly weaker coefficient (-0.297) is found 
for the Developing States sample (N=85). The entry of so many less developed 
states into the democratic fold is clearly reflected in the fact that the correlations for 
both samples are noticeably weaker than those found over the 1970-90 period 
(Table 4.1).
•Average PRI values become noticeably less democratic as one descends HDI rank 
groups. The top 25 HDI-ranked states have a staunchly democratic average PRI 
value of 1.3, while the bottom-ranked states (R101-118) have an average PRI value 
of 4.8; the other PRI averages are 2.6 (R26-50), 3.7 (R51-75) and 4.7 (R76-100). If 
the averages were plotted on a graph, the slope would be similar to those produced 
in Figure 4.1 for 1970-90, although it would flatten out more for the bottom three 
HDI groups, resulting in a less linear pattern (again because of the conversion of 
many less developed states to democratic governance).
•Of the 69 states in the sample with more or less democratic values (PRI 1.0-3.0), 
34 (or 49%) have High HDI values (0.800+), 26 (38%) have Medium Level values 
(0.500-0.799), and 9 (13%) have Low HDI values (below 0.499).8 Roughly half of 
all democratic states therefore display High HDI values. On the other hand, the 
High HDI threshold is surpassed by only 3 states (or 14%) with PRI values of 4.0-
5.0 (Hong Kong, Singapore and Kuwait), and only by the UAE among states with 
PRI values of 6.0-7.0 (3% of the group).9
•On average, democratic states have the highest HDI values. For the All States 
sample, the average HDI values by PRI group are: 0.754 (1.0-3.0), 0.619 (4.0-5.0) 
and 0.552 (6.0-7.0). While this rule holds for the Developing States sample, the 
gaps between the PRI groups are considerably less pronounced: 0.646 (1.0-3.0),
0.608 (4.0-5.0), and 0.552 (6.0-7.0).
8More or less democratic PRI values are defined as those falling within the 1.0-3.0 range, as opposed to the 
1.0-2.9 range on the LoD scale. There are many de facto democratic states in Latin America which Gastil 
has accorded PRI values of 3.0. There are some weak democracies - among them Turkey and Pakistan - 
which have been accordedPRI values of 4.0, and thus fall marginally outside the democratic group (given 
that some cut-off point was necessary). By way of comparison with the above percentages: of those 56 
countries with fairly strong democratic PRI values (1.0-2.0), 32 (57%) had High HDI values, 20 (36%) had 
Medium Level HDI values, and 4 (7%) had Low HDI values.
^To complete the picture, the following breakdowns apply to the two non-democratic groups across the 
HDI Levels (High, Medium, Low): 3 (or 14%), 12 (57%) and 6 (29%) for countries with PRI values of 4.0- 
5.0; 1 (3%), 15 (54%), and 12 (43%) for countries with PRI values of 6.0-7.0.
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• A strong correlation coefficient (0.721) is produced for the level of human 
development (HDI 1997) and the level of economic development (GDP/C 1997) for 
the Developing States sample (N=85), while a very weak coefficient (-0.134) is 
produced for the level of democracy (PRI 1998) and the level of economic 
development (GDP/C 1997). Very little of the variation in levels of democracy in the 
developing world is explained by either the level of human development (9%) or the 
level of economic development (2%).
•Although the two most advanced cases, Singapore and Hong Kong, do not display 
democratic PRI values, six of the top 10 HDI-ranked developing countries are 
democratic, as are thirteen of the top 20 ranked countries (Table 8.1 overleaf). The 
PRI values are fairly balanced at the other end of the HDI scale: of the bottom 20 
ranked countries, six display democratic PRI values, six display PRI values of 4.0-
5.0, and eight display PRI values of 6.0-7.0. More telling is the list of GDP/C 
values: eight of the top 10 HDI-ranked countries also display top 10 GDP/C ranks; 
and sixteen of the top 20 HDI-ranked countries also have top 20 GDP/C values 
(three of the four other states - Costa Rica, Libya and Thailand - barely fail to make 
the top 20 GDP/C list). Thirteen of the 20 least developed countries also make the 
list of the 20 poorest
•When levels of economic development are controlled for, developing democracies 
produce the highest average human development values in three of the five cases 
under review. This is the case for countries with GDP/C (US$) between $9,999-
5.000, $4,999-3,000, and $2,999-1,000, but not for countries located in either the 
wealthiest ($10,000 or more) or poorest (less than $1,000) groups.10
•In the developing world, the level of economic development explains much more of 
the variation in basic indicators such as adult literacy (25%) and life expectancy 
(38%) than does the level of democracy (8% of the variation in each).11
1^ The average HDI values for each PRI group (1.0-3.0, 4.0-5.0, 6.0-7.0) are: 0.845, 0.870 and 0.776 
($10,000+); 0.760, 0.701, andO.722 ($9,999-5,000); 0.714, 0.691 and0.668 ($4,999-3,000); 0.555, 0.459 
and0.472 ($2,999-$1,000); 0.364, 0.426 andO.391 (less than $1,000).
llrThe correlation coefficients found (N=58) are: 0.502 (GDP/C with Lit 1998), 0.613 (GDP/C with Life 
Exp 1998), -0.278 (PRI 1998 with Lit 1998), and-0.279 (PRI 1998 with Life Exp 1998).
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Table 8.1 Democracy and Levels of Human Development (HDI),
Developing States (cl997)
HDI
Rank
Country HDI
1997
PRI
1998
GDP 1C 
1997
GDP 1C 
Rank
HDI
Rank
Country HDI
1997
PRI
1998
GDP/C 
1997
GDP 1C 
Rank
1 Singapore 0.888 5.0 28460 1 43 Egypt 0.616 6.0 3050 43
2 Hong Kong 0.888 4.0 24350 3 44 Nicaragua 0.616 2.0 1997 50
3 Barbados 0.857 1.0 12001 7 45 Botswana 0.609 2.0 7690 15
4 Korea, S. 0.852 2.0 13590 5 46 Gabon 0.607 5.0 7550 16
5 Chile 0.844 3.0 12730 6 47 Iraq 0.586 7.0 3197 40
6 Kuwait 0.833 5.0 25314 2 48 Morocco 0.582 5.0 3310 38
7 Argentina 0.827 3.0 10300 8 49 Lesotho 0.582 4.0 1860 53
8 Uruguay 0.826 1.0 9200 11 50 Myanmar 0.580 7.0 1199 67
9 U.A.E 0.812 6.0 19115 4 51 PapuaN.G. 0.570 2.0 2654 46
10 Costa Rica 0.801 1.0 6650 23 52 Zimbabwe 0.560 5.0 2350 48
11 Trinidad&T. 0.797 1.0 6840 19 53 India 0.545 2.0 1670 56
12 Venezuela 0.792 2.0 8860 12 54 Ghana 0.544 3.0 1640 57
13 Panama 0.791 2.0 7168 18 55 Cameroon 0.536 7.0 1890 51
14 Mexico 0.786 3.0 8370 13 56 Congo 0.533 7.0 1620 58
15 Malaysia 0.768 5.0 8140 14 57 Kenya 0.519 6.0 1190 68
16 Colombia 0.768 3.0 6810 20 58 Pakistan 0.508 4.0 1560 59
17 Cuba 0.765 7.0 3100 42 59 Zaire 0.479 7.0 880 77
18 Mauritius 0.764 1.0 9310 10 60 Sudan 0.475 7.0 1560 60
19 Libya 0.756 7.0 6697 21 61 Togo 0.469 6.0 1490 61
20 Thailand 0.753 2.0 6690 22 62 Nepal 0.463 3.0 1090 70
21 Ecuador 0.747 2.0 4940 28 63 Nigeria 0.456 6.0 920 76
22 Saudi Arabia 0.740 7.0 10120 9 64 Madagascar 0.453 2.0 930 75
23 Philippines 0.740 2.0 3520 34 65 Bangladesh 0.440 2.0 1050 71
24 Brazil 0.739 3.0 6480 24 66 Zambia 0.431 5.0 960 74
25 Peru 0.739 5.0 4680 30 67 Haiti 0.430 5.0 1270 65
26 Jamaica 0.734 2.0 3440 37 68 Senegal 0.426 4.0 1730 55
27 Paraguay 0.730 4.0 3980 33 69 Ivory Coast 0.422 6.0 1840 54
28 Turkey 0.728 4.0 6350 25 70 Benin 0.421 2.0 1270 66
29 DominRep. 0.726 2.0 4820 29 71 Tanzania 0.421 5.0 580 84
30 Sri Lanka 0.721 3.0 2490 47 72 Uganda 0.404 4.0 1160 69
31 Iran 0.715 6.0 5817 26 73 Malawi 0.399 2.0 710 81
32 Jordan 0.715 4.0 3450 36 74 Guinea 0.398 6.0 1880 52
33 China 0.701 7.0 3130 41 75 Angola 0.398 6.0 1430 63
34 South Africa 0.695 1.0 7380 17 76 Chad 0.393 6.0 970 73
35 Tunisia 0.695 6.0 5300 27 77 Gambia 0.391 7.0 1470 62
36 Indonesia 0.681 6.0 3490 35 78 Rwanda 0.379 7.0 660 82
37 El Salvador 0.674 2.0 2880 44 79 CenAfrRep. 0.378 3.0 1330 64
38 Algeria 0.665 6.0 4460 31 80 Mali 0.375 3.0 740 79
39 Syria 0.663 7.0 3250 39 81 Mozambique 0.341 3.0 740 80
40 Bolivia 0.652 1.0 2880 45 82 Burundi 0.341 7.0 630 83
41 Honduras 0.641 2.0 2220 49 83 Burkina F. 0.304 5.0 1010 72
42 Guatemala 0.624 3.0 4100 32 84 Niger 0.298 7.0 850 78
85 Sierra Leone 0.254 3.0 410 85
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•As was found for the 1970-90 period, democratic states in the developing world are 
not, on average, the wealthiest: the average 1997 GDP/C values per PRI group are 
$4,937 (1.0-3.0), $6740 (4.0-5.0), and $3,257 (6.0-7.0). Developing democracies 
do, however, show the highest average literacy rate (74.4%, compared to 70.5% and 
62.5% for the non-democratic groups), and the highest average life expectancy rate 
(64.0 years, compared to 60.1 years and 57.8 years for the non-democratic groups).
Democracy has no impact on human development performance in the developing world:
•An extremely weak correlation coefficient (-0.174) is found for human 
development performance (HDI shortfall reduction rate for 1990-97) and the level 
of democracy (PRI average 1990-98) for the Developing States sample (N=58),12 
whereas a moderately strong coefficient (0.512) is found for human development 
performance and economic growth (GDP).13 Thus, of the variation in human 
development rates, the rate of economic growth may at most explain 26%, the level 
of democracy only 3%. Nor does the level of democracy account for much of the 
variation in economic growth rates (7%). These findings are consistent with those 
for the 1970-90 period (Tables 5.1,7.1 and 7.8).
•As was found for the 1970-90 period (Figure 5.1), when average levels of 
democracy are computed for each group of performing states, no patterns emerge as 
one moves from the best to the worst groups. The values fluctuate very little (3.3- 
5.4) along the mid-range on the PRI scale. The ten states with the highest HDI 
shortfall reduction rates (Rl-10) display an average PRI value of 4.1, compared to 
similar average values of 3.3 (Rll-20), 3.9 (R21-30), 4.3 (R31^40), and 5.4 (R41- 
54).
•Four of the top 10 HDI performing states, and exactly half of the top 20 
performers, exhibit more or less democratic period values (PRI 1.0-3.9) (Table 8.2 
below). Only four democratic states (Senegal, Venezuela, South Africa and 
Botswana) appear among the bottom 20 performing states. Seven of the top 10 HDI 
performers also display top 10 GDP growth rates. Indeed, the three fastest growing 
states - China (11.1%), Singapore (8.0%) and Malaysia (7.7%) - are ranked third, 
first and fourth in terms of HDI shortfall reduction rates.
12The method for calculating shortfall reduction rates was given in Chapter 7. The actual HDI rates come 
directly from the UNDP (1999). A country’s PRI period average has been calculated by simply adding the 
PRI values for the two end dates (c1990 and 1998) and then dividing by two.
13Since per capita GDP growth rates were unavailable for the 1990-97 period, aggregate GDP growth rates 
(1990-98) have been used instead (from The World Bank’s World Development Report 1999-2000).
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Table 8.2 Democracy and Human Development Performance (HDI),
Developing States (1990-97)
HDI
Perf
Rank
Country HDI
Shortf.
90-97
PRI
Avg
90-98
GDP
Growth
90-98
GDP
Growth
Rank
HDI
Perf
Rani
Country HDI
Shortf.
90-97
PRI
Avg
90-98
GDP GDP 
Growth Growth 
90-98 Rank
1 Singapore 32.5 4.5 8.0 2 28 Fniadnr 7.6 2.0 2.9 37
2 Korea, S. 24.6 2.0 6.2 7 29 Algeria 7.5 5.7 1.2 49
3 China 20.7 6.9 11.1 1 30 Benin 7.2 4.4 4.6 18
4 Malaysia 17.7 4.9 7.7 3 31 Guinea 7.0 6.4 5.0 14
5 Hong Kong 15.2 4.0 4.4 20 32 Bangladesh 6.8 3.2 4.8 16
6 Tunisia 15.2 5.7 4.4 21 33 Honduras 6.4 2.0 3.6 31
7 Indonesia 13.8 5.7 5.8 9 34 Uganda 6.4 4.9 7.4 5
8 Thailand 12.9 2.2 7.4 4 35 Nigeria 6.3 5.7 2.6 39
9 Peru 12.2 3.7 5.9 8 36 Senegal 5.6 3.8 3.0 36
10 Argentina 12.1 2.2 5.3 12 37 Venezuela 5.2 1.5 2.0 43
11 Uruguay 11.7 1.2 3.9 27 38 Malawi 5.1 4.4 3.9 28
12 Saudi Arabia 11.1 6.9 1.6 46 39 Chad 4.4 6.4 4.6 19
13 Brazil 10.7 2.5 3.3 34 40 Lesotho 2.9 5.0 7.2 6
14 DominiRep. 10.7 1.7 5.5 11 41 Togo 2.4 6.0 2.3 40
15 Bolivia 10.6 1.5 4.2 22 42 Burkina F. 2.1 5.7 3.5 32
16 Egypt 10.2 5.5 4.2 23 43 Niger 2.1 6.9 1.9 45
17 Philippines 10.1 2.2 3.3 35 44 Mozambique 1.1 4.5 5.7 10
18 Pakistan 9.6 3.7 4.1 26 45 Ivory Coast 1.0 6.0 3.5 33
19 Morocco 9.2 4.5 2.1 42 46 Cameroon 0.6 6.5 0.6 52
20 Sri Lanka 8.9 3.3 5.3 13 47 Congo 0.3 6.9 1.0 50
21 Guatemala 8.8 3.0 4.2 24 48 CenAfrRep. -1.0 4.5 1.5 48
22 Nepal 8.8 3.3 4.8 15 49 South Africa -1.8 3.2 1.6 47
23 Rwanda 8.5 6.5 -3.3 54 50 Burundi -3.0 7.0 -3.2 53
24 Mali 8.3 4.5 3.7 29 51 Kenya -5.4 6.0 2.2 41
25 Costa Rica 8.2 1.0 3.7 30 52 Zambia -5.4 5.5 1.0 51
26 Paraguay 8.0 4.4 2.8 38 53 Zimbabwe -12.6 5.5 2.0 44
27 Ghana 7.9 4.5 4.2 25 54 Botswana -18.5 1.7 4.8 17
•When one controls for similar levels of human developmental the beginning of the 
period, no consistent patterns emerge. At the High HDI Level, the three democratic 
states (Uruguay, Argentina, South Korea) produced a lower average HDI shortfall 
reduction rate (16.1%) than the two states (Hong Kong and Singapore) with PRI 
values in the 4.0-5.9 range (23.9%). At the Medium HDI Level, the fourteen 
democratic states produced a marginally lower average reduction rate (6.6%) than 
the ten states with PRI values of 4.0-5.9 (8.0%); an average rate of 5.5% was found 
for the five states with PRI values of 6.0-7.0. At the Low HDI Level, the four 
democratic states (Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Senegal) produced a better 
average reduction rate (7.7%) than either of the two non-democratic groups (3.3% 
and 3.2%).
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•Confirming the importance of strong economic growth to human development 
performance, the ten countries with the best HDI shortfall reduction rates (Rl-10) 
displayed an average GDP growth rate of 6.6%, compared to an average growth rate 
of only 2.0% for the worst performing HDI group (R41-54). Curiously, however, 
and to illustrate that the relationship between the variables is not automatic: the 
second-best performing HDI group (R11-20) had a lower average GDP growth rate 
(3.8%) than the second-worst performing HDI group (R31-40)(4.4%); the lowest 
average growth rate (2.9%) was found for the middle HDI performers (R21-30).
•The developmental states identified for the 1970-90 period continued to perform 
very well after 1990. Of the eight in the sample (missing data excluded Mauritius): 
Singapore, South Korea, China, Malaysia and Hong Kong comprise the top 5 HDI 
performers, while Indonesia and Thailand are ranked 7th and 8th; the fact that 
Botswana actually showed the worst HDI rate (-18.5%) is almost entirely 
attributable to the dramatic decline in the country’s life expectancy rates caused by 
the Aids epidemic (see UNDP 1999). Six of the eight cases are ranked in the top 10 
in terms of GDP growth, of which China, Malaysia and Singapore occupy the top 
three places; Botswana and Hong Kong are ranked 17th and 20th. All eight 
developmental states produced GDP growth above 4% for 1990-98.
A Glance at the Changes in the Former Communist States
Evaluated solely on the basis of the changes observed in their respective human 
development (HDI) levels between 1990 and 1997, the initial period of democratic rule in 
the former Communist states has not been particularly easy. Figure 8.3 depicts the changes 
in HDI levels for seven states and, for additional reference, Portugal.14 Relative to where 
they stood at the time of the 1989-91 democratic transitions, most of these countries were 
worse off in terms of individual capabilities, as captured by the HDI. Russia experienced the 
most pronounced decline, while Romania showed a very slight increase.15 In 1990, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the USSR all had higher HDI values than Portugal, the
14 Given that the HDI values for 1990 and 1997 are not strictly comparable, since they were constructed 
using slightly differentmethodologies (see the 1994 and 1999 Human Development Reports), the values for 
each state have been converted as a percentage of Canada’s HDI value (Canadais the comparative standard as 
it had the highest HDI values for 1990 and 1997 in both Reports). The values for the former 
Czechoslovakia are related to those for the Czech Republic (i.e., excluding Slovakia), and those for the 
former USSR arerelatedto those for Russia (i.e., excluding the other former Soviet republics).
15 The 1999 Report provides the HDI Shortfall Reduction Rates for the 1990-97 period: 2.8% for 
Romania, -0.9% for Albania, -8.5% for Bulgaria, and -18.5% for Russia (the negative rates indicate that the 
shortfall levels for these states actually increased).Though well short of Portugal’s HDI shortfall reduction 
rate of 23.3%, Poland’s rate of 10% is relatively decent, and is in contrast to the apparent HDI decrease 
depictedin Figure 8.3 (which uses a different comparative methodology). HDI shortfall reduction rates were 
unavailable for Hungary and the Czech Republic.
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Fig. 8.3 Changes In Human Development (HDI) Levels, 1990-97: 
Former Communist States and Portugal
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poorest and least developed of the democracies in the sample of Industrial states. This 
situation, however, changed dramatically in less than a decade, with Portugal posting by far 
the highest HDI value in 1997 (note in particular the position of Russia). Only the Czech 
Republic managed to remain somewhat within distance, followed by Poland and Hungary.
In terms of economic growth, the picture looked dire for all but Poland, which 
produced a GDP growth rate of 4.5% for 1990-98 (this was actually higher than Portugal’s 
rate of 2.3%). Albania showed a very modest increase of 1.8%, while the other states had 
negative rates: -0.2% for both Hungary and the Czech Republic, -0.6% for Romania, -3.3% 
for Bulgaria, and -7.0% for Russia. Combined with their poor human development profiles, 
Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia have the furthest to go in improving the lives of their 
citizens.
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8.3 Final Thoughts: The Politics of Human Development
Fortunate are those countries which score highly on a human development measure 
such as the I-HDI. They are most often democratic, although this is not entirely the case in 
the developing world. And fortunate are those developing countries which have managed to 
dramatically improve human development conditions in a short period of time, usually on 
the heels of strong economic growth. They have, on the whole, not been particularly 
democratic.
A country’s degree of ‘fortune’ is thus determined by the quality of life enjoyed by 
its citizens, and by the magnitude and pace of human development progress. Human 
development is the ultimate litmus test. This argument is the single, overriding theoretical 
contribution of the humanist approach to comparative political analysis.
Like all forms of government, democracy has an instrumental role to play which is 
quite independent of any intrinsic value it may hold for societies at different stages of 
development and with different cultural traditions. Democracy is certainly the most 
preferable form of government when human development conditions are found to be more 
or less equal between cases. If two countries, one democratic and one non-democratic, are at 
similar levels of human development, it would be absurd not to recognize that the former 
provides intrinsic benefits which the latter does not Likewise, if these same two countries 
share similar rates of human development progress, the democratic state should be 
applauded for improving conditions within a more open and humane political framework.
But the intrinsic value of democracy, though considerable, should not mask 
ineffectual results. For instance, democratic India has been a miserable failure on the human 
development front. The extent of this failure is perhaps most apparent when contrasted with 
the noticeably better record of China (Figure 8.4), another populous and underdeveloped 
country which began its period under Communist rule at roughly the same time that India 
gained its independence. Judging by the human development evidence, no one may 
reasonably claim that people in India are somehow ‘better off than their counterparts in 
China simply because they have the right to vote.16 For ordinary Indians, this symbolically 
powerful right has not been translated into significant human development gains.
^DrezeandSen (1990) would counter this argument by pointing to the past and claiming that some of the 
more catastrophic mistakes made by totalitarian regimes, which have resulted in the loss of countless lives, 
would not have been replicated by democratic regimes. Looking at the pairing of India and China, they 
argue that Mao's Great Leap Forward experiment, which produced widespread famine resulting in millions 
of Chinese lives, could not have been implemented in India. Regardless of the merits of this specific point, 
it is hard to ignore the fact that considerably more Indian than Chinese lives are lost every year due to poor 
health, sanitation, and hunger, as reflected by India’s comparatively dismal infant mortality and child 
survival rates. Tracing the figures back to the 1950s, one would likely find that several million more Indian 
lives have been lost in this manner. Moreover, playing the populist and nationalist cards, successive Tnriian 
governments have involved the country in wars with Pakistan, with enormous fatalities on both sides. 
Nonetheless, had the data been available to construct the I-HDI for the period in question (1950s/1960s), 
China’s I-HDI value would reflect the cost of Mao’s virtually unprecedented folly (through dramatically 
lower rates for several constituent indicators), just as India’s I-HDI value would reflect the cost of its 
various conflicts audits persistent poverty (through decreases in several constituent indicator rates).
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Figure 8.4 The Human Development Records of China and India
in Comparative Perspective
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On the other hand, despite some notable achievements by Cuba since its Revolution, 
especially in the health and education sectors, its overall human development record does 
not compare favourably against that of another small (but democratic) country, Costa Rica 
(Figure 8.5). Both countries were found at roughly similar income levels in 1970 (INC 2, or 
GDP/C of $701 for Cuba and $569 for Costa Rica), and yet their records differed 
tremendously: the HDI and I-HDI values for Costa Rica were noticeably higher than 
Cuba’s values for each given date. And while Costa Rica continued to make steady progress 
throughout the period, conditions in Cuba deteriorated between 1980 and 1990. There is no 
question that people in Costa Rica enjoyed substantially better living conditions by 1990. 
That they also enjoyed (and continue to enjoy) political freedoms only complemented their 
achievements on the human development front. Cubans have much less to celebrate.17
Figure 8.5 The Human Development Records of Costa Rica and Cuba 
in Comparative Perspective, 1970-90
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17 Admittedly, Cuba is a curious case. Its economy was (and is) heavily influenced by the U.S. embargo 
and, in turn, the subsidies (credit and other) it formerly received from the USSR. Whatever one’s own views 
on the subject, it may be argued that a significant change in the present status quo is necessary in order to 
improve economic conditions and bring about increased human development dividends: foreign investment 
will flow to the island, and its participation in the global economic system will be strengthened, when 
either the embargo is lifted, or when Cuba finally does become democratic. That the economic component 
is central to the above comparisons may be observed in the fact that Cuba and Costa Rica shared almost 
identical adult literacy rates (94.0% and 92.8%) and life expectancy rates (75.6 yrs and 76.0 yrs) in 1990.
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With Cold War rivalries over, and primarily in response to the external pressure 
exerted by the international donor community and many Western governments, an ever 
increasing number of developing states are turning to democratic forms of government. If 
current trends continue, it is entirely possible that democratic states will become the norm in 
the developing world within the next few decades, irrespective of levels of development and 
indigenous political cultures.18 Writers on ‘democratic preconditions’ may have to 
reconsider some long-held assumptions since this phenomenon, supported by the findings 
in this thesis, suggests that ‘structural’ factors may be largely sidelined: what will most 
likely determine and shape democratic transitions are the conscious strategies of both 
‘internal actors’ (political elites, democratic movements) and ‘external actors’ (the 
international donor community, Western governments).
A key question which then arises for political scientists to tackle concerns the 
second aspect of the democracy-human development equation: Once established, just how 
will the new democracies perform? Again, while the current wave of democratization is 
highly desirable, it should not lead to a confusion of ends and means. For while the mere 
acceptance of democratic structures invariably leads to an immediate improvement in certain 
areas (civil/human rights), and thus automatically increases the overall level of human 
development,19 there must be a continuous and noticeable improvement in other 
fundamental areas (socio-economic conditions, general welfare, etc) if democracy is to fully 
demonstrate its instrumental worth. Otherwise, underdeveloped societies will either be 
destined to a long and uncertain march on the path towards development, or they may again 
fall prey to despots promising full stomachs and a brighter future. Democracy, in short, 
must deliver the human development goods.
So far, developing democracies have not done too badly, performing largely on par 
with - or, in some cases, only marginally worse than - non-democratic states in similar 
circumstances (levels of human and economic development). While this refutes the 
currently popular view that democracy is a necessary precondition for human development 
progress, there is some comfort to be drawn from the argument that, since non-democratic 
regimes cannot be justified on the basis of vastly superior performance rates anyway,
18Even certain key indicators usually associated with democratic ‘potential’ have lost whatever explanatory 
value they may have once had: in my post-1990 sample of developing states, levels of literacy and life 
expectancy may each explain, at most, only 8% of the variation in the incidence of democracy. This is 
partly a reflection of how poorly several newly-democratized countries, none of which have what might be 
calieda ‘democratic tradition', score in terms of these social indicators. In six cases, less than half of the 
adult population is literate (cl997): Madagascar (47%); Central African Republic (42%); Mozambique 
(41%); Mali (36%); Benin (34%); and Sierra Leone (33%). Of these, four have life expectancy rates below 
50 years: Mozambique (45 yrs); Central African Republic (45 yrs); Malawi (39 yrs); and Sierra Leone (37 
yrs). Furthermore, in terms of national income, four have GDP1C rates ($US, PPP) below $1000: Mali 
($740); Mozambique ($740); Malawi ($710); and Sierra Leone ($410).
19This may be illustrated with reference to the I-HDI. Since the establishment or restoration of basic 
civil/human rights invariably follows a transition to democraticrule, a country’s CIVIL value will improve 
accordingly, thereby increasing, in order, its Liberty Index (LIB) value, its Index of Social Conditions (ISC) 
value and, finally, its I-HDI value.
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democratic forms and practices should be advocated unreservedly in their own right. This 
becomes even more imperative given that the vast majority of states, whether democratic or 
not, will likely end up developing in small increments. This being the case, as Leftwich 
would argue, it is better to have a non-developmental democratic state than a non- 
developmental non-democratic state. If democracy cannot demonstrate its instrumental 
worth, at least it may have the opportunity to display its intrinsic value.
If, however, substantial progress is to be made within a relatively short space of time, 
history tells us that the odds are not in democracy’s favour. Indeed, whether or not one 
chooses to describe Singapore, Malaysia and Botswana, all of which have achieved the 
‘virtuous cycle’ of development, as democratic developmental states,20 the fact remains that 
these three bear little resemblance to the truly competitive multi-party systems advocated by 
the international community for the newly-democratized states.
It is still too early to judge whether post-1990 trends will confirm the prediction that 
a country must abandon genuinely democratic structures and procedures if it is to adopt the 
political features of a ‘developmental state’. But there are encouraging signs of another 
kind: two formerly non-democratic developmental states, Thailand and South Korea, have 
since the late 1980s continued their successful policies under democratic forms of 
government21 The suggestion here is that, once they have attained sufficiently high levels 
of development,non-democratic developmental states may make the transition to democratic 
rule without slowing their rates of human development progress and economic growth.
Nevertheless, the reality is that developmental success cannot be made to order. The 
unpredictable journey from lower to higher levels of development might be more bearable 
and humane under democratic governance, but it is not shorter. The quality of the political 
leadership and the role of the state are more significant factors than the nature of the 
political system, and results breed legitimacy when human development is the objective. In 
this sense, politics matters, democracy does not.
20If there is little or no realistic chance, given the lack of a ‘level political playing-field’, that the long- 
serving and entrcnchedruling party/coalition - the PAP in Singapore, the National Front in Malaysia, and 
the BDP in Botswana - can actually lose an election, just how ‘democratic’ can these societies really be? Of 
course, as Leftwich suggests, such distinctions are relative (Chapter 7).
21South Korea had the second-best HDI shortfall reduction rate over the 1990-97 period (24.6%) among the 
developing states in my sample, while Thailand came in eighth (12.9%). Both had high GDP growth rates 
(1990-98) of 6.2% and 7.4%, respectively.
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Technical Note Is The Level of Democracy Index (LoD)
My chosen measure of democracy, the Level of Democracy Index (LoD), combines 
Gastil’s Political Rights Index (PRI) and a scaled version of Vanhanen’s Index of 
Democratization (ID). The following formula is used:
LoD = ( PRI + ID (scaled) ) /  2
A country’s LoD value equals the sum of its PRI value plus its scaled ID value, divided by 
two (the PRI value and ID value are weighted equally). The complete list of LoD values is 
given in Appendix B.
Like Gastil’s PRI, the LoD employs a seven point scale (with 1.0 the highest or most 
democratic value,and 7.0 the least democratic value). Its construction is based on a two-step 
procedure:
Step 1.
To ensure compatibility with Gastil’s PRI, Vanhanen’s ID values (raw) are first scaled 
into a seven-point format according to the conversion table below:
ID (Raw)= 17.00
+
16.99/
6.00
5.99/
4.00
3.99/
1.50
1.49/
0.20
0.19/
0.01
0.00
ID (Scaled)= 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
These conversion rates were selected because of two factors. First, Vanhanen’s own 
“minimum threshold for democracy” stands at 5.00 ID index points (Vanhanen 1990: 
33). Accordingly, this was roughly set as the ‘grey area’ between democracies and 
semi-democracies in the conversion table, so that any raw ID value of 6.00 or more is 
accorded a clearly ‘democratic value’ of either 1.0 or 2.0 (in Gastil’s index, 
democracies are also clearly designated as having a PRI value of 1.0 or 2.0). Likewise, 
countries with raw ID values between 5.99 and 0.00 are considered to be non- 
democratic and may have scaled ID values ranging from 3.0 to 7.0 (the least democratic/ 
most authoritarian value). Second there was the need to maintain a fairly consistent 
distribution of countries by level of democracy (the corresponding PRI values for each 
period were consulted as a general guide). The table below shows the distribution of 
countries by (scaled) ID values for three periods:
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1.0 2.0
ID VALUES (Scaled) 
3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
N( 1960/9) oo 15 7 14 18 8 23
N( 1970/9) 22 11 2 13 20 5 35
N( 1980/8) 33 23 6 8 9 5 39
where N per period= 107 countries (1960/9), 108 (1970/9), 123 (1980/8)
Step 2.
Once a country’s ID value has been scaled, it is then combined with its PRI value for 
the corresponding date/period and then divided by 2 to obtain its LoD value. Take the 
cases of Greece and Colombia (cl970):
Greece:
(Step 1) ID (1960/9)= 13.4 —> ID (scaled)=2.0 
since PRI (1972)= 6.0, then 
(Step 2) LoD= (2.0 + 6.0) / 2 = 4.0
Point and Period Measurement
Whereas Gastil presents PRI values on an annual basis, Vanhanen presents his ID values as 
decade averages (but annually for 1980/88). Since we are dealing with time-series figures of 
a slightly different nature, adjustments have to be made.
When calculating LoD values for a given date (1970, 1980 or 1990), Vanhanen’s ID 
(scaled) values are taken for the preceding decade, whereas Gastil’s PRI values are taken 
either for 1972 (the first date for which Gastil provides PRI values) or as a three-year 
average (PRI avg. 1979-81 for 1980, PRI avg. 1989-91 for 1990). The details are provided 
below:
LoD 1970 = (PRI 1972 + ID(S) 1960/9) / 2
LoD 1980 = (PRI 1979/81 avg. + ID(S) 1970/9) / 2
LoD 1990 = (PRI 1989/91 avg. + ID(S) 1980/8 avg.) / 2
When calculating LoD averages for a given period (1970/80, 1980/90 or 1970/90), Gastil’s 
annual averages for the period in question are added to Vanhanen’s corresponding ID 
period values as follows:
Colombia:
(Step 1) ID (1960/9)= 5.0 —> ID (scaled)=3.0 
since PRI (1972)= 2.0 
(Step 2) LoD= (2.0 + 3.0) I 2 = 2.5
332
Technical Note 1 - cont’d
LoD 1970/80 = (PRI 1972/79 avg. + ID 1970/9) / 2
LoD 1980/90 = (PRI 1980/91 avg. + ID 1980/8) /2
LoD 1970/90 = (PRI 1972/91 avg. + (ID 1970/9+1980/8 avg. 12)) 12
Special Cases
There are 16 countries in my sample for which Vanhanen does not provide complete ID 
values for the 1970/90 period: Barbados, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, Gabon, 
Mauritius, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, Angola, Bangladesh, Gambia, Mozambique, 
Papua New Guinea, Zimbabwe and Hong Kong (which is treated as an ‘independent state’
for the purposes of this research). To compensate, the PRI values and averages for these
special cases are taken as their LoD values:
LoD 1970 = PRI 1972
LoD 1980 = (PRI 1979/81 avg. + PRI 1972/9 avg.) / 2 
LoD 1990 = (PRI 1989/91 avg. + PRI 1980/91 avg.) / 2
LoD 1970/80 = PRI 1972/9 avg.
LoD 1980/90 = PRI 1980/91 avg.
LoD 1970/90 = PRI 1972/91 avg.
PRI averages are therefore substituted for the missing ID period values wherever possible to 
maintain the balance between point and period measurement which the LoD seeks to achieve 
(as indicated in the scaling measures above). For instance, whereas for the majority of cases 
(where ID values are available) LoD 1980 is typically calculated as:
LoD 1980 = (PRI 1979/81 avg. + ID(S) 1970/9) / 2
for special cases it is calculated as:
LoD 1980 = (PRI 1979/81 avg. + PRI 1972/9 avg.) / 2
Correlations
The correlations produced between the four measures - PRI, ID ‘raw’ (ID(R)), ID scaled 
(ID(S)), and LoD - are given in the table below for all the countries in my sample (N=123).
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TABLE N l.l Correlations Involving the LoD and its Constituent Indices
I. Point Measurement Correlations II. Period Measurement Correlations
PRI ID(R) ID(S)
ID(R)-70 -.776(a)
ID(R)-80 -.787(b)
ID(R)-90 -.831(c)
ID(S>70 .764(d) -.885(j)
ID(S)-80 .802(e) -.844(k)
ID(S)-90 .879(f) -.841(1)
LoD-70 .932(g) -.888(m) ,946(p)
LoD-80 .940(h) -.844(n) .958(q)
LoD-90 .964(i) -.863(o) .974(r)
Notes:
(a) PRI-1972 with ID(R)-1960/9
(b) PRI-1979/81 avg with ID(R)-1970/9
(c) PRI-1989/91 avg with ID(R)-1980/8
(d) PRI-1972 with ID(S)-1960/9
(e) PRI-1979/81 avg with ID(S)-1970/9
(f) PRI-1989/91 avg with ID(S)-1980/8
(g) PRI-1972 with LoD-1970
(h) PRI-1979/81 avg with LoD-1980
(i) PRI-1989/91 avg with LoD-1990 
(j) ID(R)-1960/9 with ID(S)-1960/9 
(k) ID(R)-1970/9 with ID(S)-1970/9 
0) ED(R)-1980/8 with ID(S)-1980/8 
(m) ED(R)-1960/9 with LoD-1970 
(n) ID(R)-1970/9 with LoD-1980
(o) ID(R)-1980/8 with LoD-1990 
(p) ID(S)-1960/9 with LoD-1970 
(q)ID(S)-1970/9 with LoD-1980
(r) ID(S)-1980/8 with LoD-1990
ID(R)-70/80
DD(R)-80/90
ID(R)-70/90
ID(S)-70/80
ID(S)-80/90
ID(S)-70/90
LoD-70/80
LoD-80/90
LoD-70/90
PRI ID(R) ID(S)
-.874(a)
-.868(b)
-.876(c)
.928(d) -.884{j)
.900(e) -.841(k)
.925(f) -.851(1)
.978(g) -.896(m) .985(p) 
.969(h) -,875(n) .980(q) 
.977(i) -.879(o) .985(r)
Notes:
(a) PRI-1972/9 avg with ID(R)-1970/9
(b) PRI-1980/91 avg with ID(R)-1980/8
(c) PRI-1972/91 avg wI ID(R)-1970/88 avg
(d) PRI-1972/9 avg with ID(S)-1970/9
(e) PRI-1980/91 avg with ID(S)-1980/8
(f) PRI-1972/91 avg wI ED(S)-1970/88 avg
(g) PRI-1972/9 with LoD-1970/80
(h) PRI-1980/91 avg with LoD-1980/90
(i) PRI-1972/91 avg with LoD-1970/90 
(j) ID(R)-1970/9 with ID(S)-1970/9 
(k) ID(R)-1980/8 with ID(S)-1980/8
d) ID(R)-1970/90 avg wI ID(S)-1970/90 avg
(m) ID(R)-1970/9 with LoD-1970/80
(n) ID(R)-1980/8 with LoD-1980/90
(o) ID(R)-1970/90 avg wI LoD-1970/90
(p) ID(S)-1970/9 with LoD-1970/80
(q) ID(S)-1980/8 with LoD-1980/90
(r) ID(S)-1970/90 avg with LoD-1970/90
Sources
PRI values (1972-98) have been taken directly from R. Gastil’s annual Freedom In The 
World surveys. See references in the Statistical Bibliography.
ID values have been taken from two sources: ID values for 1960/9 and 1970/9 come from 
the Appendix, pp. 137-159, in Vanhanen (1984); and ID values for 1980/88 are from Table 
2.2, pp. 27-29, in Vanhanen (1990). See references in the Statistical Bibliography.
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Technical Note 2: The UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI)
The UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) has been modified in several technical 
respects since the first Human Development Report appeared in 1990. The version of the 
HDI which I employ as my measure of individual capabilities comes from the 1994 Report. 
This version was selected for methodological consistency: my time-series HDI values come 
principally from the Report’s Annex Table A5.3.
The HDI consists of three sub-indices: life expectancy, educational attainment (mean years 
of schooling and adult literacy rate), and adjusted income (in PPP$). The exact 
computations and indexing procedures are found in the 1994 Report’s Technical Note 1 
(UNDP 1994: 108).
Point and Period Measurement
With the exception of the special cases (described below), all HDI values for 1970, 1980 
and 1990 are taken from Annex Table A5.3 in the 1994 Report (UNDP 1994: 105).
HDI period values (1970/80, 1980/90, 1970/90) reflect the increase in HDI levels between 
two dates, and are computed by simply taking the difference between the two dates in 
question. For instance, the following equation would be employed to calculate the 1980/90 
HDI increase (also referred to as the performance rate) for a given country (in this example, 
Thailand):
Thailand (HDI 1980/90) = HDI 1990 - HDI 1980 = 0.798 - 0.551 = 0.247 
The list of HDI values for all countries is presented in Appendix C.
Special Cases
There are 11 countries in my study for which HDI values are not found in the time-series 
format of Annex Table A5.3: Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany 
(GDR), Kuwait, Libya, Poland, Romania, USSR and Yugoslavia.
As the cl990 HDI values for these countries are found in the 1994 Report (with the 
exceptions of GDR and Yugoslavia, which were calculated below), I was obliged to compute
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their HDI values for cl970 and cl980. This was done by first obtaining the relevant data on 
each individual HDI component (longevity, knowledge and income standard), and then 
indexing the raw data. The HDI values were then calculated according to the weighting 
scheme adopted by the UNDP (1/3 weight for each sub-index). Given the unavailability or 
incompleteness of much of the data for the required period, owing primarily to poor 
individual country sources, several different sources were consulted.
I tried to remain as true to the UNDP’s methodological guidelines as possible, but was 
sometimes forced to substitute one indicator for another. The extent of this, however, 
involved either substituting gross enrollment ratios for mean years of schooling (in the 
educational attainment index) or one source of GDP/C (PPP$) for another (in the adjusted 
income index).
As a final reliability check, raw HDI values were also computed for two ‘reference 
countries’ - Hungary for the former communist countries and Cuba, and the UAE for 
Kuwait and Libya - using the same techniques employed for the special cases. The raw 
computed HDI values for each set of special case countries were then compared to those 
obtained for the corresponding ‘ reference country’ (for which actual HDI values are given 
in the UNDP s Annex Table A5.3), and then adjusted into their final HDI values.
For example, I had originally calculated Romania’s raw HDI value for 1970 to be 0.701, 
which was 84.7% of the raw HDI value (0.828) calculated for its reference country, 
Hungary. Hence, knowing that Hungary’s actual HDI value was 0.705 (from the 1994 
Report), and applying the same percentage difference between the two countries that was 
found for the raw estimates, Romania’s adjusted HDI value was computed as:
Romania HDI (adj.)= 0.705 x 84.7% = 0.597
By this method, the HDI values calculated for the special case countries are consistent in 
relative terms with the UNDFs HDI values for the other countries in my sample. 
Therefore, though derived using slightly different techniques (out of necessity), the adjusted 
HDI values may be viewed as fairly good approximations. Table N2.1 (overleaf) provides a 
detailed breakdown of the data and the corresponding computations. The column on the far 
right (HDI) denotes the final adjusted HDI values used in this study.
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Table N2.1 Computing the HDI Values for Special Case Countries
Country LE 1(LE) L it Enrol I(ED) PPP$ I(AD) HDI(R) Adj.F HDI
(a) 1970
Kuwait 66.1 0.685 54.0 73.0 0.603 4189 0.769 0.685 1.138 0.684
Libya 51.9 0.448 39.0 95.0 0.577 1873 0.187 0.404 0.671 0.403
UAE 61.1 0.602 20.9 63.0 0.349 4637 0.856 0.602 1.000 0.601
.Albania 68.0 0.717 78.2 86.0 0.808 1381 0.228 0.584 0.705 0.497
Bulgaria 71.0 0.767 92.0 98.0 0.940 3888 0.711 0.806 0.973 0.686
Czechosl. 70.0 0.750 99.0 78.0 0.920 5718 0.958 0.876 1.058 0.746
GDR 71.0 0.767 99.0 93.0 0.970 5822 0.959 0.899 1.086 0.766
Poland 70.2 0.753 98.0 83.0 0.930 3878 0.709 0.797 0.963 0.679
Romania 68.8 0.730 94.0 87.0 0.917 2557 0.455 0.701 0.847 0.597
USSR 68.6 0.727 98.0 94.0 0.967 4462 0.822 0.839 1.013 0.714
Yugoslavia 67.7 0.712 84.0 77.0 0.817 2878 0.516 0.682 0.824 0.581
Cuba 71.9 0.782 87.0 74.0 0.827 2485 0.441 0.683 0.825 0.582
HUNGARY 69.8 0.747 98.0 84.0 0.933 4369 0.804 0.828 1.000 0.705
(b) 1980
Kuwait 70.8 0.763 67.5 89.0 0.747 20204 0.996 0.835 1.070 0.769
Libya 57.3 0.538 56.0 95.0 0.690 11735 0.980 0.736 0.940 0.676
UAE 68.2 0.720 53.5 77.0 0.613 25629 1.004 0.779 1.000 0.719
Albania 70.4 0.757 85.0 93.0 0.877 1621 0.274 0.636 0.719 0.603
Bulgaria 71.3 0.772 93.0 94.0 0.933 4881 0.903 0.869 0.982 0.823
Czechosl. 70.6 0.760 99.0 91.0 0.963 6969 0.965 0.896 1.012 0.848
GDR 71.7 0.778 99.0 94.0 0.973 7855 0.969 0.907 1.025 0.859
Poland 70.9 0.765 98.0 92.0 0.960 4983 0.922 0.883 0.998 0.836
Romania 69.7 0.745 98.0 93.0 0.963 3982 0.719 0.809 0.914 0.766
USSR 67.9 0.715 99.0 99.9 0.993 5599 0.957 0.888 1.003 0.841
Yugoslavia 68.9 0.732 90.0 89.0 0.897 4712 0.870 0.833 0.941 0.789
Cuba 74.2 0.820 95.0 91.0 0.937 2903 0.521 0.759 0.858 0.719
HUNGARY 69.7 0.745 99.0 88.0 0.953 5482 0.956 0.885 1.000 0.838
Notes. 1. HDI(R): the raw HDI value, which equals (I(LE)+ I(ED) + I(AD) ) / 3
2. Adj.F (factor): HDI(R) dividedby HDI(R) of reference country (UAE or Hungary)
3. HDI: the final adjustedHDI value, which equals Adj.F x HDI of reference country
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Computing HDI Values for Special Case Countries: Techniques and Sources
In computing the HDI values for the special case countries, attention was given to the 
procedures outlined in the 1994 Human Development Report (Technical Note 1). 
Specifically, the new HDI values were computed after first translating the data into the 
HDI’s three constituent sub-indices, and then taking the average of the three:
HDI = ( I(LE) + I(ED) + I(AI)) / 3
where: I(LE) is Indexed Life Expectancy
RED) is Indexed Educational Attainment 
I(AI) is Indexed Adjusted Income
The techniques involved in computing the sub-indices, together with the sources for the raw 
data, are described below. The sub-indices are constructed as per UNDP guidelines (except 
where specified).
•Indexed Life Expectancy fKLEfi 
Technique:
RLE) = (X - Min) / (Max - Min) = (X - 25) / 60;
where Max=85 and Min=25, X=raw data (years)
Data Sources:
UNDP (1990,1994), UN (1992), World Bank (1992a, 1992b)
•Indexed Educational Attainment (IfEDfi 
Technique:
(Due to lack of data, the combined primary and secondary school gross 
enrolment rates indicator was substituted for the UNDP’s mean years of 
schooling indicator)
RED) = (2(Lit) + Enr)/3;
where: Lit is the raw adult literacy rate (%),
Enr is the combined primary and secondary enroLrate (%)
Data Sources:
Adult Literacy Rates: Banks (1971), UNDP (1990, 1991, 1994), UNESCO 
(1990), World Bank (1983). Note: Albania and Romania (1970) estimated from 
Banks.
Combined Primary and Secondary School Enrolment Rates: UNDP (1993), 
UNESCO (1970,1975,1976,1981,1986,1992)
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•Indexed Adjusted Income (If AD)
Technique:
I(AI) = (X - Min) / (Max - Min) = (X - 200) / 5185;
where: X=raw data (PPP$); Min = 200,Max= 5385
However, before income above 5120 (the ‘threshold PPP$’) is applied to the 
above formula it is first scaled (thereby ‘discounting at a progressively higher 
rate’):
Income adjusted = 5120 + 2(X - 5120)expl/2 
Data Sources:
Summers and Heston (1984,1988), UNDP (1991,1992,1994), UN (1993a). 
Note: raw PPP$ for Libya is presented as WB Adas Method (in UN 1993a).
Further Notes
1. HDI Values (cl990) for GDR and Yugoslavia:
HDI values (c. 1990) are not given in the UNDP’s Annex Table A5.3 for the former 
East Germany (GDR) and Yugoslavia. The ‘reference country’ method was 
therefore applied to determine these values (as above, using Hungary). Obtaining the 
cl990 values from the 1991 HDR (which employed a slighdy different HDI 
measure), the relative differences for GDR and Yugoslavia were calculated with 
Hungary=100. I then multiplied the relative factors for the two countries by 
Hungary’s actual HDI value (from the 1994 Report) to get the approximate 1990 
values: GDR=0.899, Yugoslavia=0.861.
2. Computing PPP$ for Special Case Countries (former Communist countries and Cuba):
(a) Former Communist Countries (excl. Albania and Cuba).
As Purchasing Power Parity (PPP$) values are generally unavailable for 
centrally planned economies, I was obliged to employ some creative techniques 
in order to arrive at what I feel are reasonable approximations. Several notes of 
caution are therefore warranted.
Knowing the 1960 PPP$ values for three countries (Hungary, Poland and 
Yugoslavia) from the 1991 and 1992 Reports, and obtaining their respective Real 
Gross Domestic Product per capita (RGDP/C) values for 1960 from Summers
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and Heston (1984), I discovered that a definite relationship existed between the 
two variables:
PPP$ divided by RGDP/C = 1.42
Since this factor of 1.42 was found for all three countries (and even, as a 
reliability check, for the United States), I concluded that it would serve as a 
useful means of determining the remaining PPP$ values (knowing only the 
RGDP/C values).
The PPP$ values for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, USSR, and Yugoslavia for 1970 and 1980 were therefore calculated 
by multiplying their respective RGDP/C values (from Summers and Heston 
1984) by the factor of 1.42.
The relative consistency of the calculated PPP$ values was further confirmed by 
comparing the PPP$ values for 1980 with the Real Gross National Product per 
capita (RGNP/C) values from Summers and Heston (1988). For all eight 
countries, the differential was exactly the same (PPP$/RGNP(C) = .995).
(b) Albania and Cuba.
The PPP$ values for Albania and Cuba could not be calculated as above because 
their respective RGDP/C values are not given in Summers and Heston. The 
GDP/C (Market Exchange Rates) values for the eight former Communist 
countries and Albania and Cuba are, however, listed in United Nations (1993a).
The GDP/C averages for the eight countries were First calculated for both 1970 
and 1980. Then the GDP/C values for Albania and Cuba for 1970 and 1980 
were divided into the respective eight-country averages to obtain a percentage. 
Albania’s GDP/C values were 37.0% and 29.2% of the eight-country averages 
for 1970 and 1980, respectively, while the corresponding figures for Cuba were 
57.6% and 56.6%. These percentages were then multiplied against the eight- 
country average PPP$ values for 1970 and 1980 to obtain the PPP$ values for 
Albania and Cuba.
340
Technical Note 3: The Index of Social Conditions (ISC) and its
Constituent Indices (SEC, LIB, MOB)
(1) The Index of Social Conditions (ISC)
Overview
My measure of the prevailing social environment, the Index of Social Conditions (ISC), 
combines three separate indices according to the formula:
ISC= (SEC x .4) + (LIB x .4) + (MOB x .2)
where: SEC = The Security Index
LIB = The Liberty Index
MOB = The Mobility Index
The decision to weigh the three indices in this manner was a subjective one. However, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the indices representing the Security and Liberty 
dimensions should be weighted equally, given the equal treatment of the two dimensions in 
the UNDP’s own investigation into ‘Human Security’ (see Chapter 3). In turn, it is felt that 
they should be accorded twice as much weight (40% each) as the Mobility Index (20%); 
which, though important, does not have as immediate nor as fundamental an impact on 
people’s lives as, say, either the outbreak of socio-political conflict or the suspension of civil 
liberties.
In order to be consistent with the scaling systems used for the HDI and the ISC’s three 
sub-indices (see below), countries are accorded ISC values ranging from between 1.000 (the 
highest possible value) to 0.000 (the lowest possible value). The ISC values for all the 
countries in my sample are presented in Appendix D.
Point and Period Measurement
A country’s ISC value is calculated by simply inserting the necessary values for each sub­
index (SEC, LIB and MOB) for the date in question (1970, 1980 or 1990) into the above 
formula. Hence, to calculate a country’s ISC value for around 1970:
ISC = (SEC x .4) + (UB x .4) + (MOB x .2)
1970 1970 ' 1970 1970
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For example, the ISC value for Malta (1970) is calculated as:
ISC = (0.976 x .4) + (0.889 x .4) + (0.488 x .2) = 0.843
1970
ISC period values (1970/80,1980/90,1970/90) reflect the changes (increases / decreases) in 
ISC levels between the two dates in question. The change in a country’s ISC values over 
the period 1970/1980 is calculated as:
ISC* = ISC - ISC
1970/80 1980 1970
*A positive value indicates an improvement in social conditions, a negative 
value indicates a deterioration in social conditions.
For example, the ISC value for Morocco (1970/80) is computed as:
ISC = ISC - ISC = (0.579) - (0.654) = -0.076*
1970/80 1980 1970
♦indicates a slight deterioration in social (ISC) conditions
(21 The Security Index (SEC)
The Security Index (SEC) is comprised of two equally-weighted sub-indices, one 
measuring economic (in)security and one measuring socio-political (in)security, so that
SEC = (INFL + CONF) / 2
where: INFL = inflation index, CONF = conflict index
Each component captures one vital aspect of a country’s security situation. In practice, a 
country experiencing extreme socio-political instability will almost inevitably experience 
economic instability (although the reverse is not necessarily true).
All countries are accorded SEC values ranging from 1.000 (maximum security) to 0.000 
(maximum insecurity). The SEC values for all the countries in my sample are presented in 
Appendix R
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Point and Period Measurement
A country’s SEC value is calculated by simply inserting the necessary values for each sub­
index (INFL and CONF) for the date in question (1970, 1980 or 1990) into the above 
formula. Hence, to calculate a country’s SEC value for around 1970:
SEC = (INFL + CONF) 12
1970 1970 1970
For example, the SEC value for Cyprus c l970 is calculated as:
SEC = (INFL + CONF ) / 2 = (0.934 + 0.720) / 2 = 0.827
1970 1970 1970
SEC period values (1970/80, 1980/90, 1970/90) reflect the changes (increases / decreases) 
in SEC levels between the two dates in question. For instance, the change in a country’s 
SEC values over the period 1970/1980 is computed as:
SEC* = SEC - SEC
1970/80 1980 1970
*A positive value indicates an improvement in security conditions, a negative value 
indicates a deterioration in security conditions.
For example, the SEC value for El Salvador (1970/80) is calculated as:
SEC = SEC - SEC = (0.490) - (0.859) = -0.369*
1970/80 1980 1970
♦indicates a noticeable deterioration in security conditions 
•The INFL variable
The INFL variable indicates the scaled inflation rate (where inflation rates could not be 
found, consumer price index values were used as substitute measures). The list of all scaled 
INFL values is presented in Appendix F.
Measurement
The raw inflation value corresponding to a particular date is taken as the average inflation 
rate for the 10-year period that preceded it (as provided in World Bank sources); although 
in some cases I have had to rely on other period averages (1965-73, 1973-83, or 1980-91). 
This was done to best capture the true inflationary climate prior to the date in question
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(since inflation rates may fluctuate wildly from one year to the next). Hence, generally 
speaking:
INFL 1970= 1960/70 avg.
INFL 1980= 1970/80 avg.
INFL 1990= 1980/90 avg.
Scaling
Raw inflation values are scaled using the technique below:
INFL = 1 - (Max - X)/(Min) = 1 - (0-X)/(-50) = 1 - (X)/(50) 
where: Max= 0, Min=50
Therefore, countries are accorded an indexed INFL value between 1.000 (highest degree of 
economic security - i.e. zero inflation, or even negative values indicating ‘deflation’) and 
0.000 (least degree of economic security - i.e. inflation rates of 50% or more).
Sources
Most inflation statistics are drawn from the World Bank’s various World Development 
Reports: World Bank 1983 (1960-70), World Bank 1985 (1965-73,1973-83), World Bank 
1990a (1980-88), World Bank 1992a (1980-90), World Bank 1993 (1970-80, 1980-91). 
Other sources include: World Bank (1991b); UNDP (1993,1994).
For several countries whose inflation rates were not available for any or all dates - mostly 
the former communist states, Cuba, Angola, Jordan, Mozambique, UAE and Guinea - 1 have 
had to rely on estimates based on average variations in their consumer price indexes. The 
sources consulted here include: various UN Statistical Yearbooks (UN 1971, 1981a, 1984a, 
1991a),ILO (1994a),IMF (1988a, 1988b).
•The CONF variable
There are, unfortunately, no existing measures of socio-political conflict in cross-national, 
time-series formats. I have been forced to therefore construct my own peace/conflict index 
(CONF) from raw data indicating the number of conflict-related deaths for all waning 
parties. Hence, the CONF variable measures the severity of a given conflict The CONF 
values (scaled) for all states are given in Appendix G.
344
Technical Note 3 - cont’d
In the case of intra-state conflict (civil war, other expressions of socio-political violence, etc), 
the total number of conflict deaths for all indigenous factions is recorded. For conflicts 
involving two or more states, the total number of conflict deaths for all warring parties is 
taken together and then attributed to each state (regardless of the number of deaths on each 
side). Thus, when considering the USSR’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which 
claimed an estimated 100 lives, both the USSR and Czechoslovakia are each ‘allocated’ the 
scaled equivalent of 100 deaths. It is, for all intents and purposes, almost impossible to 
attribute reasonable estimates of deaths per warring state for a sample of this size (and my 
reference sources do not do so). Furthermore, as a ‘security component’, the CONF 
variable must not only take into account the devastating impact of a particular conflict on the 
state which happens to bear the brunt of the fighting (the main battleground), it must also 
‘punish’ the state which inflicts (or participates in) the carnage. The wars in Vietnam and 
Afghanistan are prime illustrations of this point: the CONF values for the USA and USSR, 
respectively, must reflect the severity of the conflicts in which they were engaged (especially 
given,moreover, the tremendous psychological and material tolls on the home fronts).
Measurement
For measurement purposes, conflicts have been broken down according to specific periods. 
The first two periods (1965-74 and 1975-84) are measured as 10-year averages, while the 
last period (1985-93) is measured as a nine-year average. The measurement periods 
correspond to CONF values as follows:
CONF 1970= 1965-74 avg.
CONF 1980= 1975-84 avg.
CONF 1990 = 1985-93 avg.
Hence, the severity of a conflict which may have lasted from 1965-67 is captured in the 
CONF value for cl970. To search only for the existence of conflict at that exact point in 
time (1970) would be to potentially underestimate and misrepresent the security situation in 
a particular country, since the ramifications of war (in terms of human, material and 
psychological costs) are often felt long after the cessation of hostilities.
Consider the example of Indonesia. Someone examining the degree of socio-political strife 
in Indonesia for 1970 may, owing to the number of conflict-deaths recorded for that 
particular year (0), conclude that Indonesia was completely at peace and therefore entitled to 
a CONF value of 1.000 (denoting maximum socio-political security). However, under my 
approach, the 500 000 deaths which resulted from the internal conflict of 1965-66 would be 
reflected in Indonesia’s CONF value for cl970 (0.000 or maximum insecurity). The 
magnitude of such a conflict cannot be dismissed simply because it did not occur exactly on 
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the reference date. By measuring conflict according to my technique, the security situation 
for every year from 1965-1993 is accounted for.
What about trying to determine CONF values for conflicts which spanned two or more 
periods? For instance, to which measurement period should one allocate the values for a 
conflict which lasted from 1972-77 (Pakistan’s conflict with Baluch and other separatists, 
which claimed an estimated 9000 lives)? Three years (1972,1973 and 1974) fall within the 
period for CONF cl970 (1965-74), while three years (1975, 1976, 1977) fall within the 
period for CONF cl980 (1975-84). For such cases, two steps are followed:
Step 1.
The total number of conflict-related deaths are divided by the number of 
years of conflict to get the average deaths/year.
Step 2.
The average deaths/year are then multiplied by the number of ‘conflict years’ 
falling within each measurement period (to get the deaths per measurement period).
Thus, in the above example we have:
Step 1. 9000 deaths / 6 years = 1500 deaths/year
Step 2. For cl970: 1500 deaths/year x 3 years of conflict = 4500 deaths (cl970)
For cl980: 1500 deaths/year x 3 years of conflict = 4500 deaths (cl980)
Admittedly, this is a crude method because it does not reflect the actual intensity of conflict 
for each specific period (and the corresponding number of actual deaths for each specific 
year). Nonetheless, because my sources simply list the total deaths per conflict, I was 
forced to use this method of approximation.
One final note must be made regarding those instances where a country was engaged in two 
or more conflicts within one measurement period. In such cases, the number of total deaths 
attributable to that country (for all the conflicts in which it was engaged) were added up and 
then recorded for that measurement period. Thus, for the USSR I have recorded 1100 
conflict deaths circa 1970: 100 deaths (conflict with Czechoslovakia in 1968) plus 1000 
deaths (border skirmishes with China in 1969).
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Scaling
There is a two-step procedure for calculating a country’s CONF index value:
Step 1.
The number of conflict deaths per measurement period is scaled as follows:
Deaths/Period (scaled) = (Max. - X) / (Max. - Min) = (50 000 - X)/(50 000) 
where: Max.=50 000 deaths, Min=0 deaths.
Thus, countries with attributable conflict deaths of 50,000 or more in a given 
measurement period are allocated the lowest possible scaled value of 0.000.
Step 2.
The scaled Deaths/Period value is then multiplied by a ‘peace buffer’ value of 
either
(a) 0.8 for countries with 100 Deaths/Period or more; or
(b) 1.0 for countries with less than 100 Deaths/Period (or no recorded conflict 
deaths)
Thus, the following equation emerges:
CONF = Deaths/Period (scaled) x ‘peace buffer’ (0.8 or 1.0)
For example, the respective CONF values for India (cl970) and Tanzania (cl980) are:
India (c!970): Tanzania (cl980):
•20 000 deaths (vs Pakistan, 1965) *3 000 deaths (vs Uganda, 11/78-
•30 000 deaths (vs Pakistan-re Bangl., 1971) 6/79)
=50 000 deaths =3 000 deaths
CONF = 0.000 x 0.8 = 0.000 CONF = 0.940 x 0.8 = 0.752
The ‘peace buffer’ is introduced to reward those states which enjoyed complete socio­
political security, while at the same time further distinguishing them from those states which 
experienced even ‘low-intensity’ conflict Take the respective cases of Belgium cl990 (no 
conflict) and the United Kingdom cl990 (low-intensity conflict waged by both the IRA and 
loyalist groups):
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UK (cl990):
•avg 129 Deaths/Year since 1969, 
x 9 years in measurement period (1985-93) 
=1161 deaths (total for 1985-93, approx.)
Belgium (c l990):
•0 deaths
CONF = 0.977 x 0.8 = 0.783 CONF = 1.000 x 1.0= 1.000
Note the practically insignificant differences between the CONF values for these two states 
if the different ‘peace buffers’ are not employed to magnify the security situations (UK 
0.977, Belgium 1.000).
The principal sources used for data on conflict deaths were: SIPRI Yearbooks (editions 
1987-1994), Sivard(1985), Sullivan (1991).
The Liberty Index (LIB1
The Liberty Index (LIB) is comprised of two equally-weighted sub-indices, one measuring 
civil liberties and one measuring the degree of social deprivation, and is represented by the 
formula;
Each sub-index captures one supposedly ‘cultural’ interpretation of rights and freedoms: 
the ‘ Western’ (individualist) emphasis on civil rights, and the ‘Eastern’ (collectivist) 
emphasis on social rights (Chapter 3). All countries are accorded LIB values ranging from
1.000 (maximum liberty/freedom) to 0.000 (no liberty/freedom). The LIB values for all the 
countries in my sample are presented in Appendix H.
Sources
LIB = (CIVIL + SURV) 12
where: CIVIL = civil liberties, SURV = child survival
348
Technical Note 3 - cont’d
Point and Period Measurement
A country’s LIB value is calculated by inserting the necessary values for each sub-index 
(CIVIL and SURV) for the date in question (1970, 1980 or 1990) into the above formula. 
Hence, to calculate a country’s LIB value for around 1970:
LIB = (CIVIL + SURV)/2
1970 1970 1970
For example, the LIB value for Greece cl970 is calculated as:
LIB = (CIVIL + SURV) / 2 = (0.167 + 0.912) / 2 = 0.539
1970 1970 1970
LIB period values (1970/80,1980/90,1970/90) reflect the changes (increases / decreases) in 
LIB levels between the two dates in question. For instance, the change in a country’s LIB 
values over the period 1970/1980 is calculated simply as:
LIB* = LIB - UB
1970/80 1980 1970
*A positive value indicates an improvement in overall liberty, a negative 
value indicates a deterioration in overall liberty.
For example, the LIB value for Spain (1970/80) is:
UB = UB - LIB = (0.841) - (0.546) = 0.295*
1970/80 1980 1970
*indi cates a noticeable improvement in overall liberty (in this case, following the death 
of Franco).
•The CTVIL Variable
Gastil has been allocating civil rights values for countries in the Freedom in the World 
surveys annually since 1973. My civil rights variable (CIVIL) is derived by simply scaling 
Gastil’s data. The list of scaled CIVIL values is found in Appendix I.
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Measurement
CIVIL values are derived from GastiFs civil liberties (CL) values (based on his Civil Rights 
Index) as follows:
CIVIL 1970 = CL 1972 
CIVIL 1980 = CL 1979-81 avg.
CIVIL 1990 = CL 1989-91 avg.
For both CIVIL 1980 and CIVIL 1990,3-year CL averages are computed in order to best 
account for the prevailing civil liberties situation surrounding that date (this cannot be done 
for CIVIL 1970 because GastiFs data begin at CL 1972). For instance, taking GastiFs 
single CL value for 1980 as the figure for CIVIL 1980 might prove misleading, for reasons 
attributable to all point values (recall the problems associated with GastiFs PRI point values 
noted in Chapter 3). Consider the case of Kuwait for CIVIL 1980, should one use the 
country’s CL value for 1980 (‘6’), which is very poor, or for 1981 (‘4’), which is 
noticeably better? Both should be taken into consideration, along with Kuwait’s CL value 
for 1979 (‘6’), so that
CIVIL 1980 = (CL 1979+CL 1980+CL 1981) / 3 = (6+6^4) / 3 = 5.3
The following conversions are used to calculate the CIVIL period averages (1970/80, 
1980/90,1970/90):
CIVIL 1970/80 = CL (1972 + 1974 + 1976 + 1978 + 1980) / 5
CIVIL 1980/90 = CL (1982 + 1984 + 1986 + 1988 + 1990) / 5
CIVIL 1970/90 = (CIVIL 1970/80 + CIVIL 1980/90) / 2
Note: Gastil’s CL value for Hong Kong for 1979-81 was given as ‘2’. This is the CL value I 
have taken for Hong Kong throughout (since annual data cannot otherwise be found).
Scaling
GastiFs CL values are based on a different scale format than the one chosen for CIVIL 
values (to ensure their convertibility into other scales). To convert GastiFs raw CL values 
into CIVIL values I have set Max = 1 (CL),Min=7 (CL). Hence:
CIVIL = 1 - (Max - X) / (Max - Min) = 1 - (1 - X) / (-6)
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CIVIL values therefore range from 1.000 (greatest civil rights) to 0.000 (fewest/no civil 
rights). A CL value of 1 translates into a CIVIL value of 1.000, and a CL value of 7 
translates into a CIVIL value of 0.000.
Sources
Gastil (1986,1988,1989,1990,1991).
•The SURV Variable
Child survival (SURV) rates provide a very good indication of the degree of social 
deprivation in a society. As an output indicator, the SURV variable also reflects the 
availability of adequate water and sanitation facilities, caloric intake rates, and access to basic 
health services. The scaled SURV values for all countries in my sample are listed in 
Appendix J.
Measurement
In general, the SURV rates are given for the exact dates in question (1970, 1980 and 1990), 
except for the cases where they had to be estimated (explained below). There were only a 
few cases where data had to be substituted for the closest available date (e.g. 1985 for 
1980).
Scaling
A three-step process is followed for converting raw Under Five Mortality Rates (U5MR) 
into scaled SURV rates.
Step 1.
As per UNICEF guidelines, a country’s raw U5MR rate is first converted and 
scaled to show the percentage of those bom who survive to the age of five 
(SURV%):
SURV% = (1000 - U5MR) /10
Step 2.
This figure is then divided by 100 to express the number in three decimal places.
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Step 3.
To scale the values between 1.000 (the ‘best’ rate - no social deprivation) and 0.000 
(the ‘worst’ rate - extreme social deprivation), the following formula is applied:
SURV (scaled) = 1 - (Max - X) / (Max - Min) = 1 - ( 1 - X ) /  (.5)
Knowing its U5MR value (62.0), Argentina’s scaled SURV rate for cl970 is calculated as:
Notes Regarding Estimates for Missing Data
Raw U5MR data for around 1970 were not available for most industrial countries in my 
sample. However, knowing the relevant data for cl960 and cl980,1 took the average of the 
two dates as my estimation of U5MR data for cl970. Hence, to use Australia as an 
example:
Given that: Raw U5MR cl960 = 25.0, Raw U5MR cl980 = 13.0,
Raw U5MR cl970 (est) = (25.0 + 13.0) / 2 = 19.0
In the case of Yugoslavia, I had to first estimate the raw U5MR rate for cl960 (from the 
survival rate given in UNICEF 1987); and then, knowing the raw U5MR value for cl980,1 
estimated the figure for cl970 using the formula above.
where: Max = 1, Min = 50*
♦The lowest SURV% value among the countries in my sample throughout the 
entire 1970/90 period was 64.2% for Mali cl970.1 thus simply reduced the 
minimum value to 50 rather than have Min=Mali U5MR=64.2.
Step 1. 
Step 2. 
Step 3.
SURV% = (1000 - 62) /10 = 93.8 
93.8/100 =.938
SURV (scaled) = 1 - (1 - .938) / (.5) = 0.876
Sources
UNICEF (1987,1991a, 1991b, 1995).
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(4) The Mobility Index (MOB)
The Mobility Index (MOB) is comprised of three equally-weighted sub-indices - measuring 
social equity, occupational stratification and opportunities for social advancement - so that
MOB = (GEND + %NAgr + TERT) / 3
where: GEND = gender equity
%NAgr = % of workers not employed in agriculture 
TERT = tertiary enrollment rate
Each sub-index captures an important dimension of social mobility/opportunity (described 
below). All countries are accorded MOB values ranging from 1.000 (maximum 
mobility/opportunity) to 0.000 (no mobility/opportunity). The MOB values for all the 
countries in my sample are presented in Appendix K.
Point and Period Measurement
A country’s MOB value is calculated by inserting the necessary values for each sub-index 
(GEND, %NAgr, and TERT) for the date in question (1970, 1980 or 1990) into the above 
formula. Hence, to calculate a country’s MOB value for around 1970:
MOB = (GEND + %NAgr + TERT) / 3
1970 1970 1970 1970
For example, the MOB value for Jordan cl970 is calculated as:
MOB = (GEND+%NAgr+TERT) /3 = (0.199+0.660+0.029) 13 = 0.296*
1970 1970 1970 1970
*In this example, Jordan scores poorly in terms of gender equity and tertiary enrollment, and 
modestly in terms of occupational stratification. It therefore has a low overall MOB value.
MOB period values (1970/80,1980/90,1970/90) reflect the changes (increases / decreases) 
in MOB levels between the two dates in question. For instance, the change in a country’s 
MOB values over the period 1970/1980 is calculated simply as:
MOB* = MOB - MOB
1970/80 1980 1970
*A positive value indicates an improvement in social mobility, a negative 
value indicates a deterioration in social mobility.
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For example, the MOB value for Cuba (1970/80) is calculated as:
MOB = MOB - MOB = (0.580) - (0.339) = 0.241*
1970/80 1980 1970
i^ndicates a noticeable increase in the level of social mobility
•The GEND Variable
My measure of social equality/equity, the Gender Equity index (GEND), combines two 
separate indicators which reflect the status of women in society, female secondary 
enrollment rates (FSec) and women in the labour force as a % of total labour force 
(%FLab), as follows:
GEND = (FSec x .7) + (%FLab x .3)
The %FLab indicator has been given less weight (30%) than the FSec indicator (70%) 
because it does not discriminate as well between the nature of the work that women may be 
doing in different societies (and is therefore less reliable as a basis of comparison). For 
instance, the %FLab rate for Benin around 1970 was 48%, whereas the comparable rate for 
Switzerland was only 34%; no one can possibly make the argument, on this basis, that 
women in Benin were ‘better off’ than their counterparts in Switzerland
GEND values for all countries in my sample are given in Appendix L.
Measurement
In general, the GEND rates are given for the exact dates in question (1970, 1980, 1990), 
except for the cases where they had to be estimated (explained below). There were only a 
few cases where data had to be substituted for the closest available date (e.g. 1985 for 
1980).
Seeding
GEND values range from 1.000 (maximum gender equity) to 0.000 (least/no gender 
equity). GEND values can only be calculated once the raw FSec and %FLab values have 
been scaled.
354
Technical Note 3 - cont’d
Raw FSec rates are scaled by simply dividing the raw data by 100. Gross enrollment rates 
of 100 (or more, due to methodological variations) are accorded a scaled value of 1.000, 
rates of 90% are accorded a scaled value of 0.900, and so forth.
Raw %FLab rates are scaled as follows:
%FLab (scaled) = 1 - (Max - X) / (Max - Min) = 1 - (55 - X) / (55)
where: Max= 55 (the highest recoidedvalue in my sample was 51% for the USSR c l990 - 1 
therefore increased the maximum ‘ceiling’ slightly), andMin=0.
The scaled FSec and %FLab values are then inserted into the above equation to determine 
GEND values. For instance, the GEND value for Mexico cl990 is calculated as:
GEND = (FSec x .7) + (%FLab x .3) = (0.530 x .7) + (0.491 x .3) = 0.518 
Estimating for Missing Data (FSec)
There were several countries for which FSec data had to be estimated on the basis of 
combined male and female enrollment rates: Angola (cl990), Guatemala (cl980 and cl990), 
Uruguay (cl980 and cl990), the Dominican Republic (cl980 and cl990). For Libya 
(cl990), Liberia (cl990), and Congo (cl990), estimates were made on the basis of literacy 
rates and mean years of schooling. For USA c l970 the female enrollment rates (1st and 
2nd levels) for 1974 were used as substitute figures.
Sources
Sources for FSec data include: UNESCO’s Statistical Yearbooks (various years),
UNESCO’s World Education Report (1991,1993), World Bank (1993), UNDP (1994).
Sources for %FLab data include: IBRD World Tables (World Bank 1972, 1980, 1987b, 
1992c, 1994c), and World Bank (1988b, 1994b).
•The %NAgr Variable
For my measure of occupational stratification, I have selected the percentage of the 
workforce not employed in agriculture (%NAgr). An economy which is overwhelmingly
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reliant on its agricultural sector is one in which the working population is effectively ‘tied to 
the land’. In such cases, social mobility, in terms of occupational opportunities, is very low.
Why not use instead the percentage of people employed in service industries, given that the 
most sophisticated economies (OECD) are largely service-based? The reason is that this 
particular indicator is misleading since the definition of service-related employment varies 
widely from one country to another. Moreover, service-related jobs in developing countries 
are not strictly comparable to those in the industrial countries. Consider the examples of 
Zambia and Austria: since both countries had a similar percentage of workers employed in 
service industries around 1990 (54% and 56%), they are better differentiated on the basis of 
agricultural employment, where the differences are pronounced (38% and 7%).
Scaled %NAgr values for all countries in my sample are presented in Appendix M. 
Measurement
The %NAgr rates are generally given for the exact dates in question (1970,1980 and 1990). 
There were only a few cases where data had to be substituted for the closest available date 
(e.g. 1985 for 1980).
Scaling
Raw data pertaining to the percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture are 
converted onto the (inverted) %NAgr scale, ranging from 1.000 (most occupational 
mobility/opportunity) to 0.000 (least mobility/opportunity), according to the formula:
%NAgr (scaled) = 1 - ( (Max - X) / (Max - Min)) = 1 - ( (-X) / (-100)) = 1 - (X /100)
where: Max = 0 (Singapore cl990), Min = 100 (a level less than Nepal’s 94% agricultural
employment rate for cl970); andX = percentage of workforce employed in agriculture
Therefore, knowing that 3% of its workforce was employed in the agricultural sector in 
1990, the %NAgr value for the United States is computed as:
%NAgr= 1 - ( X /100) = 1 - (3/100) = 0.970
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Sources:
Sources consulted for data (% employed in agriculture) include: World Bank (1983, 1988a, 
1992b), UNDP (1994).
•The TERT Variable
The third measure of social mobility, the tertiary enrollment variable (TERT), reflects the 
opportunities available in a society for both higher education and social advancement (better 
job prospects, perhaps in the professional classes; I have found correlation coefficients of 
0.75 (N=60, cl970) and 0.78 (N=50, cl990) between tertiary enrollment rates and the size 
of professional classes).
The complete list of scaled TERT values for all countries is given in Appendix N. 
Measurement
The TERT rates are presented for the exact dates in question (1970, 1980, 1990), except for 
one case where the TERT rate had to be estimated (Gambia cl970). There were only a few 
cases where data had to be substituted for the closest availabledate (e.g. 1985 for 1980).
Scaling
To convert raw tertiary enrollment rates into scaled TERT values, ranging from 1.000 
(highest possible value) to 0.000 (lowest possible value), the following formula is used:
TERT = 1 - (Max - X) / (Max - Min) = 1 - (75 - X) / (75)
where: Max = 75 (the highest recordedvalue was found for USA cl990,72.2 - I just increased the 
maximum ceiling slighdy); Min = 0.
Hence, Finland’s TERT value for 1980 is calculated as:
TERT = 1 - (75 - 32.2) / 75 = 0.429
Sources
UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks (various), UNESCO World Education Report (1993), 
World Bank (1993).
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APPENDIX A - List of Countries By Regional Group (N=123)
Industrial Asia Latin America Middle East & sub-Saharan
North Africa Africa
(IND, N=3 5) (ASI, N=16) (LAT, N=23) (MID, N=13) (APR, N=36)
Albania Afghanistan Argentina Algeria Angola1
Australia Bangladesh1 Barbados Egypt Benin
Austria China Bolivia Iran Botswana
Belgium Hong Kong2 Brazil Iraq Burkina Faso
Bulgaria India Chile Jordan Burundi
Canada Indonesia Colombia Kuwait Cameroon
Cyprus Korea, S. Costa Rica Libya Cen. Afr. Rep.
Czechoslovakia Malaysia Cuba Morocco Chad
Denmark Myanmar Dominican Rep. Saudi Arabia Congo
Finland Nepal Ecuador Syria Gabon
France Pakistan El Salvador Tunisia Gambia
GDR Papua New G. 1 Guatemala Turkey Ghana
Germany, W. Philippines Haiti UAE " Guinea
Greece Singapore Honduras Ivory Coast
Hungary Sri Lanka Jamaica Kenya
Iceland Thailand Mexico Lesotho
Ireland Nicaragua Liberia
Israel Panama Madagascar
Italy Paraguay Malawi
Japan Peru Mali
Luxembourg Trinidad &T. Mauritius
Malta Uruguay Mozambique 1
Netherlands Venezuela Niger
New Zealand Nigeria
Norway Rwanda
Poland Senegal
Portugal Sierra Leone
Romania Somalia
Spain South Africa
Sweden Sudan
Switzerland Tanzania
UK Togo
USA Uganda
USSR Zaire
Y ugoslavia Zambia
Zimbabwe 1
Notes
1 The country became independent after 1970, the starting date for the empirical analysis. Some of its index 
values for the period 1970-90 were therefore recorded when the country was still a colony.
2 Despite its technical status as a colony over the 1970-90 period, the unique case of Hong Kong is treated 
as an ‘ independent state’ for the purposes of this research, a practice not uncommon in the literature on the 
political economy of East Asia.
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APPENDIX B - Level of Democracy (LoD) Values* 
Part 1. All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country LoD
1970
LoD
1980
LoD
1990
LoD
1970/
1980
LoD
1980/
1990
LoD
1970/
1990
Afghanistan 5.5 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.9 6.9
Albania 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Algeria 6.5 6.5 5.7 6.6 5.9 6.5
Angola 7.0 6.8 7.0 6.6 7.0 6.8
Argentina 4.0 6.0 1.2 6.3 2.0 3.2
Australia 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Austria 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Bangladesh 2.0 4.0 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.5
Barbados 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Belgium 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Benin 6.5 7.0 6.9 7.0 6.9 7.0
Bolivia 4.5 6.4 2.0 6.2 2.4 3.4
Botswana 3.0 3.5 2.2 3.6 2.4 3.0
Brazil 5.5 5.5 2.5 5.7 2.8 4.2
Bulgaria 7.0 7.0 6.4 7.0 6.9 6.9
Burkina Faso 5.0 5.0 6.7 5.5 6.8 6.2
Burundi 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.9
Cameroon 4.5 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.5
Canada 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Cen. Afr. Rep. 7.0 7.0 6.5 7.0 6.8 6.9
Chad 6.0 6.7 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8
Chile 1.5 6.0 5.3 6.0 6.2 6.3
China 7.0 6.5 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.7
Colombia 2.5 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.1
Congo 6.5 7.0 6.9 6.5 6.9 6.8
Costa Rica 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Cuba 7.0 6.5 7.0 6.9 6.7 6.8
Cyprus 2.0 2.7 1.1 3.0 1.2 1.9
Czech. 7.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 6.8 6.8
Denmark 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Dominican R. 3.0 2.0 1.2 2.7 1.2 2.0
Ecuador 6.0 4.5 2.0 6.4 2.0 3.3
Egypt 6.5 5.5 6.0 5.8 5.9 6.0
El Salvador 4.0 3.7 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.6
Finland 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.4
France 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Gabon 6.0 6.0 5.6 6.0 5.8 5.9
Gambia 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.0 2.8 2.5
GDR 7.0 7.0 6.8 7.0 6.9 7.0
Germany, W. 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Ghana 6.0 4.8 6.5 6.8 6.4 6.5
Greece 4.0 2.0 1.2 3.1 1.2 1.8
Guatemala 3.0 3.4 3.5 2.7 4.1 3.4
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Country LoD
1970
LoD
1980
LoD
1990
LoD
1970/
1980
LoD
1980/
1990
LoD
1970/
1990
Guinea 7.0 7.0 6.9 7.0 6.9 7.0
Haiti 7.0 6.7 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.7
Honduras 7.0 5.7 2.0 6.6 2.2 2.9
Hong Kong 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Hungary 6.5 6.5 5.3 6.5 6.1 6.2
Iceland 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
India 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Indonesia 6.0 5.0 6.2 5.0 6.1 5.5
Iran 6.0 6.2 5.4 6.2 5.2 5.7
Iraq 7.0 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.9
Ireland 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Israel 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Italy 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1
Ivory Coast 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.4
Jamaica 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.0 1.9
Japan 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.2
Jordan 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.5 6.2 6.3
Kenya 6.0 6.0 6.5 6.0 6.4 6.2
Korea, S. 3.5 5.9 2.0 5.9 2.9 4.1
Kuwait 5.5 6.2 6.7 6.0 6.2 6.1
Lesotho 4.0 6.0 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.2
Liberia 6.5 6.5 5.5 6.5 5.3 5.9
Libya 7.0 6.5 6.9 6.9 6.6 6.7
Luxembourg 2.0 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6
Madagascar 5.0 6.5 3.4 6.2 3.6 4.6
Malawi 7.0 6.5 6.9 6.9 6.6 6.7
Malaysia 2.0 2.5 3.4 2.4 2.8 2.6
Mali 7.0 7.0 6.5 7.0 6.9 6.9
Malta 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5
Mauritius 3.0 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.2
Mexico 5.0 4.0 2.8 4.5 2.7 3.3
Morocco 6.0 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.6
Mozambique 7.0 6.9 6.2 6.7 6.3 6.5
Myanmar 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.0
Nepal 6.5 5.3 5.3 6.4 5.1 5.6
Netherlands 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
New Zealand 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Nicaragua 4.0 5.2 3.2 4.9 3.6 4.0
Niger 6.5 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9
Nigeria 5.0 4.5 4.2 6.2 3.9 5.0
Norway 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Pakistan 5.0 5.4 4.7 4.2 5.5 4.9
Panama 4.5 5.7 3.9 6.7 3.6 5.3
Paraguay 3.5 3.5 4.9 3.5 5.0 4.0
Peru 5.0 5.0 2.2 6.5 2.1 2.8
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Country LoD LoD LoD LoD LoD LoD
1970 1980 1990 1970/ 1980/ 1970/
1980 1990 1990
Philippines 3.0 6.0 0 0 5.9 2.8 4.1
Papua NG 4.0 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.1
Poland 6.5 6.4 5.3 6.5 6.1 6.3
Portugal 6.0 3.0 1.0 3.8 1.1 1.6
Romania 7.0 7.0 6.4 7.0 6.4 7.0
Rwanda 7.0 6.5 6.5 6.9 6.5 6.7
Saudi Arabia 6.5 6.5 6.9 6.5 6.6 6.6
Senegal 6.0 5.5 4.3 6.2 4.2 5.1
Sierra Leone 3.0 5.0 6.4 5.2 6.1 5.6
Singapore 5.0 4.9 4.1 5.0 4.1 4.5
Somalia 4.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
South Africa 4.5 5.0 5.7 4.4 5.6 5.3
Spain 6.0 3.5 1.0 4.4 1.1 1.6
Sri Lanka 1.5 1.5 2.3 1.5 2.0 1.8
Sudan 6.5 6.0 5.0 6.4 4.6 5.7
Sweden 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Switzerland 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Syria 7.0 6.0 6.9 6.4 6.4 6.4
Tanzania 6.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Thailand 7.0 5.2 3.2 6.2 3.4 4.4
Togo 7.0 7.0 6.5 7.0 6.7 6.8
Trinidad &T. 1.5 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.1 1.8
Tunisia 6.5 6.4 6.2 6.5 6.2 6.3
Turkey 2.5 2.5 2.2 1.6 2.6 2.4
UAE 7.0 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.2 5.4
Uganda 6.5 6.2 3.9 6.9 3.5 4.9
UK 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Uruguay 2.0 5.2 1.2 5.2 2.1 3.0
USA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
USSR 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.8 6.7 6.7
Venezuela 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1
Yugoslavia 6.0 6.5 6.2 6.5 6.4 6.4
Zaire 6.5 6.5 6.7 6.9 6.7 6.8
Zambia 6.0 4.5 6.0 4.5 5.7 5.1
Zimbabwe 6.0 4.5 5.2 5.6 4.5 4.9
♦Notes. See Technical Note 1 for the details behind the construction of the Level of Democracy (LoD) 
Index and the sources used. The LoD is based on a seven-point scale, with 1.0 being the most democratic 
score and 7.0 the least democratic (most authoritarian) score.
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Country LoD
1970
Country LoD
1980
Country LoD
1990
Country LoD
1970-
1980
Country LoD
1980-
1990
Country LoD
1970-
1990
Australia 1.0 Australia 1.0 Australia 1.0 Australia 1.0 Australia 1.0 Australia 1.0
Austria 1.0 Austria 1.0 Austria 1.0 Austria 1.0 Austria 1.0 Austria 1.0
Barbados 1.0 Barbados 1.0 Barbados 1.0 Barbados 1.0 Barbados 1.0 Barbados 1.0
Belgium 1.0 Belgium 1.0 Belgium 1.0 Belgium 1.0 Belgium 1.0 Belgium 1.0
Canada 1.0 Canada 1.0 Canada 1.0 Canada 1.0 Canada 1.0 Canada 1.0
Denmark 1.0 Costa Rica 1.0 Costa Rica 1.0 Costa Rica 1.0 Costa Rica 1.0 Costa Rica 1.0
France 1.0 Denmark 1.0 Denmark 1.0 Denmark 1.0 Denmark 1.0 Denmark 1.0
Germ., W. 1.0 France 1.0 . Finland 1.0 France 1.0 France 1.0 France 1.0
Iceland 1.0 Germ., W. 1.0 France 1.0 Germ., W. 1.0 Germ., W. 1.0 Germ., W. 1.0
Ireland 1.0 Iceland 1.0 Germ., W. 1.0 Iceland 1.0 Iceland 1.0 Iceland 1.0
Italy 1.0 Ireland 1.0 Iceland 1.0 Ireland 1.0 Ireland 1.0 Ireland 1.0
Jamaica 1.0 Netherlands 1.0 Ireland 1.0 Netherlands 1.0 Italy 1.0 Netherlands 1.0
Malta 1.0 New Zeal. 1.0 Italy 1.0 New Zeal. 1.0 Japan 1.0 New Zeal. 1.0
Netherlands 1.0 Norway 1.0 Japan 1.0 Norway 1.0 Netherlands 1.0 Norway 1.0
New Zeal. 1.0 Sweden 1.0 Netherlands 1.0 Switzerland 1.0 New Zeal. 1.0 Switzerland 1.0
Norway 1.0 Switzerland 1.0 New Zeal. 1.0 UK 1.0 Norway 1.0 UK 1.0
Sweden 1.0 UK 1.0 Norway 1.0 USA 1.0 Sweden 1.0 USA 1.0
UK 1.0 USA 1.0 Portugal 1.0 Sweden 1.0 Switzerland 1.0 Sweden 1.0
USA 1.0 Venezuela 1.0 Spain 1.0 Italy 1.2 UK 1.0 Italy 1.1
Chile 1.5 Italy 1.2 Sweden 1.0 Venezuela 1.2 USA 1.0 Venezuela 1.1
Costa Rica 1.5 Japan 1.2 Switzerland 1.0 Malta 1.4 Venezuela 1.0 Japan 1.2
Finland 1.5 Luxemb. 1.3 Trinid &T. 1.0 Finland 1.5 Portugal 1.1 Finland 1.4
Israel 1.5 Finland 1.5 UK 1.0 India 1.5 Spain 1.1 India 1.5
Japan 1.5 India 1.5 USA 1.0 Israel 1.5 Trinid &T. 1.1 Israel 1.5
Sri Lanka 1.5 Israel 1.5 Venezuela 1.0 Japan 1.5 Domin Rep. 1.2 Malta 1.5
Switzerland 1.5 Sri Lanka 1.5 Cyprus 1.1 Sri Lanka 1.5 Cyprus 1.2 Portugal 1.6
Trinid & T. 1.5 Malta 1.7 Argentina 1.2 Turkey 1.6 Greece 1.2 Luxemb. 1.6
Venezuela 1.5 Colombia 20 Domin Rep. 1.2 Luxemb. 1.6 Finland 1.3 Spain 1.6
Bangladesh 20 Domin Rep. 20 Greece 1.2 Jamaica 1.7 India 1.5 Trinid &T. 1.8
Cyprus 2 0 Greece 20 Uruguay 1.2 Colombia 2.0 Israel 1.5 Sri Lanka 1.8
Gambia 2 0 Jamaica 20 Luxemb 1.3 Gambia 20 Luxemb 1.6 Greece 1.8
India 20 Trinid &T. 20 Malta 1.3 Trinid &T. 20 Malta 1.6 Jamaica 1.9
Luxemb. 20 Gambia 22 India 1.5 PNG 23 Argentina 2 0 Cyprus 1.9
Malaysia 20 PapuaNG 22 Israel 1.5 Malaysia 24 Sri Lanka 2 0 Domin Rep. 2.0
Uruguay 2 0 Mauritius 22 Bolivia 2 0 Mauritius 2.4 Ecuador 2 0 Colombia 2.1
Colombia 2 5 Malaysia 25 Ecuador 2.0 El Salvador 25 Jamaica 20 PapuaNG 21
Turkey 25 Turkey 25 Honduras 20 Domin Rep. 27 Mauritius 2 0 Mauritius 22
Botswana 3.0 Cyprus 27 Jamaica 2 0 Guatemala 27 PapuaNG 2 0 Turkey 2 4
Domin Rep. 3.0 Portugal 3.0 Korea, S. 2.0 Cyprus 3.0 Peru 21 Gambia 2 5
Guatemala 3.0 Guatemala 3.4 Mauritius 2 0 Greece 3.1 Uruguay 21 Malaysia 2 6
Mauritius 3.0 Botswana 3.5 PapuaNG 2 0 Paraguay 3.5 Colombia 21 El Salvador 2 6
Philippines 3.0 Paraguay 3.5 Botswana 2.2 Botswana 3.6 Honduras 2 2 Peru 2 8
Sierra Leo. 3.0 Spain 3.5 Peru 2.2 Portugal 3.8 Bolivia 2 4 Honduras 2 9
Korea, S. 3.5 El Salvador 3.7 Philippines 2 2 Hong Kong 4.0 Botswana 2 4 Botswana 3.0
Paraguay 3.5 Bangladesh 4.0 Turkey 2 2 Pakistan 4.2 Turkey 2 6 Uruguay 3.0
Argentina 4.0 Hong Kong 4.0 Colombia 23 South Afr 4.4 Mexico 2 7 Argentina 3.2
El Salvador 4.0 Mexico 4.0 Sri Lanka 2.3 Spain 4.4 El Salvador 2 8 Ecuador 3.3
Greece 4.0 Zimbabwe 4.5 Brazil 2 5 Mexico 4.5 Malaysia 2 8 Mexico 3.3
Hong Kong 4.0 Ecuador 4.5 El Salvador 25 Zambia 4.5 Gambia 2 8 Bolivia 3.4
Lesotho 4.0 Nigeria 4.5 Gambia 2 6 Bangladesh 4.6 Philippines 2 8 Guatemala 3.4
Nicaragua 4.0 Zambia 4.5 Mexico 2 8 Nicaragua 4.9 Brazil 2 8 Paraguay 4.0
PNG 4.0 Ghana 4.8 Nicaragua 3.2 Indonesia 5.0 Korea, S. 2 9 Hong Kong 4.0
Bolivia 4.5 Singapore 4.9 Thailand 3.2 Singapore 5.0 Thailand 3.4 Nicaragua 4.0
Cameroon 4.5 Burk. Faso 5.0 Madagascar 3.4 Uruguay 5.2 Uganda 3.5 Philippines 4.1
Panama 4.5 Indonesia 5.0 Malaysia 3.4 Sierra Leo. 5.2 Madagascar 3.6 Korea, S. 4.1
Somalia 4.5 Peru 5.0 Guatemala 3.5 Burk Faso 5.5 Nicaragua 3.6 Brazil 4.2
South Afr 4.5 Sierra Leo 5.0 Panama 3.9 UAE 5.6 Panama 3.6 Thailand 4.4
Burk. Faso 5.0 South Afr 5.0 Uganda 3.9 Zimbabwe 5.6 Nigeria 3.9 Bangladesh 4.5
Madagascar 5.0 Nicaragua 5.2 Hong Kong 4.0 Brazil 5.7 Hong Kong 4.0 Singapore 4.5
Mexico 5.0 Thailand 5.2 Singapore 4.1 Morocco 5.7 Guatemala 4.1 Madagascar 4.6
Nigeria 5.0 Uruguay 5.2 Nigeria 4.2 Egypt 5.8 Singapore 4.1 Uganda 4.9
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Country LoD
1970
Country LoD
1980
Country LoD
1990
Country LoD
1970-
1980
Country LoD
1980-
1990
Country LoD
1970-
1990
Pakistan 5.0 UAE 5.3 Senegal 4.3 Korea, S. 5.9 Senegal 4.2 Pakistan 4.9
Peru 5.0 Morocco 5.3 Bangladesh 4.4 Philippines 5.9 Bangladesh 4.4 Zimbabwe 4.9
Singapore 5.0 Nepal 5.3 Pakistan 4.7 Chile 6.0 Zimbabwe 4.5 Nigeria 5.0
Afghanistan 5.5 Pakistan 5.4 Paraguay 4.9 Gabon 6.0 Sudan 4.6 Zambia 5.1
Brazil 5.5 Brazil 5.5 Sudan 5.0 Kenya 6.0 Paraguay 5.0 Senegal 5.1
Kuwait 5.5 Egypt 5.5 Zimbabwe 5.2 Kuwait 6.0 Nepal 5.1 South Afr 5.3
Chad 6.0 Senegal 5.5 Chile 5.3 Tanzania 6.0 Iran 5.2 Panama 5.3
Ecuador 6.0 Honduras 5.7 Hungary 5.3 Bolivia 6.2 UAE 5.2 UAE 5.4
Gabon 6.0 Panama 5.7 Nepal 5.3 Lesotho 6.2 Liberia 5.3 Indonesia 5.5
Ghana 6.0 Korea, S. 5.9 Poland 5.3 Madagascar 6.2 Morocco 5.5 Morocco 5.6
Indonesia 6.0 Argentina 6.0 Iran 5.4 Nigeria 6.2 Pakistan 5.5 Sierra Leo 5.6
Iran 6.0 Chile 6.0 UAE 5.5 Thailand 6.2 South Afri 5.6 Nepal 5.6
Kenya 6.0 Gabon 6.0 Liberia 5.5 Senegal 6.2 Zambia 5.7 Iran 5.7
Morocco 6.0 Kenya 6.0 Morocco 5.5 Iran 6.2 Gabon 5.8 Sudan 5.7
Portugal 6.0 Lesotho 6.0 Gabon 5.6 Argentina 6.3 Algeria 5.9 Liberia 5.9
Senegal 6.0 Philippines 6.0 Algeria 5.7 Sudan 6.4 Egypt 5.9 Gabon 5.9
Spain 6.0 Sudan 6.0 South Afr 5.7 Ecuador 6.4 Tanzania 6.0 Tanzania 6.0
Yugoslavia 6.0 Syria 6.0 Czech. 6.0 Nepal 6.4 Hungary 6.1 Egypt 6.0
Zambia 6.0 Tanzania 6.0 Egypt 6.0 Syria 6.4 Indonesia 6.1 Kuwait 6.1
Zimbabwe 6.0 Iran 6.2 Tanzania 6.0 Congo 6.5 Sierra Leo 6.1 Lesotho 6.2
Algeria 6.5 Kuwait 6.2 Zambia 6.0 Hungary 6.5 Poland 6.1 Kenya 6.2
Benin 6.5 Uganda 6.2 Indonesia 6.2 Ivory Coast 6.5 Chile 6.2 Hungary 6.2
Congo 6.5 Bolivia 6.4 Jordan 6.2 Jordan 6.5 Kuwait 6.2 Burk Faso 6.2
Egypt 6.5 Ivory Coast 6.4 Mozambiq 6.2 Liberia 6.5 Lesotho 6.2 Poland 6.3
Hungary 6.5 Poland 6.4 Tunisia 6.2 Peru 6.5 Tunisia 6.2 Chile 6.3
Ivory Coast 6.5 Tunisia 6.4 Y ugoslavia 6.2 Poland 6.5 Jordan 6.2 Tunisia 6.3
Jordan 6.5 Algeria 6.5 Bulgaria 6.4 Saudi Arab 6.5 Mozambiq 6.3 Jordan 6.3
Liberia 6.5 Cameroon 6.5 Romania 6.4 Tunisia 6.5 Ghana 6.4 Ivory Coast 6.4
Nepal 6.5 China 6.5 Sierra Leo 6.4 Yugoslavia 6.5 Kenya 6.4 Yugoslavia 6.4
Niger 6.5 Cuba 6.5 USSR 6.4 Algeria 6.6 Ivory Coast 6.4 Syria 6.4
Poland 6.5 Hungary 6.5 Cameroon 6.5 Cameroon 6.6 Yugoslavia 6.4 Algeria 6.5
Saudi Arab 6.5 Jordan 6.5 Cen. Afr.R 6.5 Honduras 6.6 Romania 6.4 Mozambiq 6.5
Sudan 6.5 Liberia 6.5 Ghana 6.5 Angola 6.6 Syria 6.4 Ghana 6.5
Tanzania 6.5 Libya 6.5 Haiti 6.5 Haiti 6.7 Cameroon 6.5 Cameroon 6.5
Tunisia 6.5 Madagascar 6.5 Ivory Coast 6.5 Panama 6.7 Rwanda 6.5 Saudi Arab 6.6
Uganda 6.5 Malawi 6.5 Kenya 6.5 Mozambiq 6.7 China 6.6 Rwanda 6.7
USSR 6.5 Rwanda 6.5 Lesotho 6.5 Chad 6.8 Libya 6.6 China 6.7
Zaire 6.5 Saudi Arab 6.5 Mali 6.5 Ghana 6.8 Malawi 6.6 USSR 6.7
Albania 7.0 USSR 6.5 Rwanda 6.5 USSR 6.8 Saudi Arab 6.6 Haiti 6.7
Angola 7.0 Yugoslavia 6.5 Togo 6.5 Afghanistan 6.8 Cuba 6.7 Libya 6.7
Bulgaria 7.0 Zaire 6.5 Burk Faso 6.7 China 6.8 Togo 6.7 Malawi 6.7
Burundi 7.0 Chad 6.7 Kuwait 6.7 Cuba 6.9 USSR 6.7 Cuba 6.8
Cen. Afr. R  7.0 Haiti 6.7 Zaire 6.7 Libya 6.9 Zaire 6.7 Zaire 6.8
China 7.0 Iraq 6.7 GDR 6.8 Malawi 6.9 Haiti 6.7 Congo 6.8
Cuba 7.0 Angola 6.8 Afghanistan 6.9 Myanmar 6.9 Burk. Faso 6.8 Chad 6.8
Czech. 7.0 Mozambiq 6.9 Benin 6.9 Niger 6.9 Czech. 6.8 Togo 6.8
GDR 7.0 Afghanistan 7.0 Chad 6.9 Rwanda 6.9 Cen. Afr. R 6.8 Angola 6.8
Guinea 7.0 Albania 7.0 China 6.9 Uganda 6.9 Chad 6.8 Czech. 6.8
Haiti 7.0 Benin 7.0 Congo 6.9 Zaire 6.9 Bulgaria 6.9 Cen. Afr. R  6.9
Honduras 7.0 Bulgaria 7.0 Guinea 6.9 Albania 7.0 Iraq 6.9 Afghanistan 6.9
Iraq 7.0 Burundi 7.0 Libya 6.9 Benin 7.0 Mali 6.9 Niger 6.9
Libya 7.0 Cen. Afr. R 7.0 Malawi 6.9 Bulgaria 7.0 Burundi 6.9 Bulgaria 6.9
Malawi 7.0 Congo 7.0 Niger 6.9 Burundi 7.0 Niger 6.9 Iraq 6.9
Mali 7.0 Czech. 7.0 Saudi Arab 6.9 Cen. Afr. R 7.0 Afghanistan 6.9 Mali 6.9
Mozambiq 7.0 GDR 7.0 Syria 6.9 Czech. 7.0 Benin 6.9 Burundi 6.9
Myanmar 7.0 Guinea 7.0 Albania 7.0 GDR 7.0 Congo 6.9 Myanmar 7.0
Romania 7.0 Mali 7.0 Angola 7.0 Guinea 7.0 GDR 6.9 Benin 7.0
Rwanda 7.0 Myanmar 7.0 Burundi 7.0 Iraq 7.0 Guinea 6.9 GDR 7.0
Syria 7.0 Niger 7.0 Cuba 7.0 Mali 7.0 Albania 7.0 Guinea 7.0
Thailand 7.0 Romania 7.0 Iraq 7.0 Romania 7.0 Angola 7.0 Romania 7.0
Togo 7.0 Somalia 7.0 Myanmar 7.0 Somalia 7.0 Myanmar 7.0 Albania 7.0
UAE 7.0 Togo 7.0 Somalia 7.0 Togo 7.0 Somalia 7.0 Somalia 7.0
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Appendix C, Part 1. (cont’d)
Country HDI
1970
HDI
1980
HDI
1990
HDI
1970/80
HDI
1980/90
HDI
1970/90
Portugal 0.588 0.736 0.838 0.148 0.102 0.250
Romania 0.597 0.766 0.729 0.148 -0.037 0.132
Rwanda 0.215 0.244 0.274 0.029 0.030 0.059
Saudi Arabia 0.511 0.629 0.742 0.118 0.113 0.231
Senegal 0.176 0.233 0.322 0.057 0.089 0.146
Sierra Leone 0.155 0.177 0.209 0.022 0.032 0.054
Singapore 0.682 0.780 0.836 0.098 0.056 0.154
Somalia 0.124 0.162 0.217 0.038 0.055 0.093
South Africa 0.591 0.629 0.650 0.038 0.021 0.059
Spain 0.82 0.851 0.888 0.031 0.037 0.068
Sri Lanka 0.506 0.552 0.665 0.046 0.113 0.159
Sudan 0.188 0.229 0.276 0.041 0.047 0.088
Sweden 0.881 0.899 0.928 0.018 0.029 0.047
Switzerland 0.872 0.897 0.931 0.025 0.034 0.059
Syria 0.419 0.658 0.727 0.239 0.069 0.308
Tanzania 0.211 0.282 0.306 0.071 0.024 0.095
Thailand 0.465 0.551 0.798 0.086 0.247 0.333
Togo 0.183 0.255 0.311 0.072 0.056 0.128
Trinidad &T. 0.789 0.816 0.855 0.027 0.039 0.066
Tunisia 0.34 0.499 0.690 0.159 0.191 0.350
Turkey 0.441 0.549 0.739 0.108 0.190 0.298
UAE 0.601 0.719 0.771 0.118 0.052 0.170
Uganda 0.213 0.215 0.272 0.002 0.057 0.059
UK 0.873 0.892 0.919 0.019 0.027 0.046
Uruguay 0.762 0.830 0.859 0.068 0.029 0.097
USA 0.881 0.905 0.925 0.024 0.020 0.044
USSR 0.714 0.841 0.858 0.127 0.017 0.144
Venezuela 0.728 0.784 0.820 0.056 0.036 0.092
Yugoslavia 0.581 0.789 0.861 0.208 0.072 0.280
Zaire 0.235 0.286 0.341 0.051 0.055 0.106
Zambia 0.315 0.342 0.352 0.027 0.010 0.037
Zimbabwe 0.326 0.386 0.474 0.060 0.088 0.148
♦Notes. See Technical Note 2 for the details concerning the construction of the Human Development Index 
(HDI) and the sources used. The HDI is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 0.000 
(lowest possible value).
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Appendix C (cont’d) Part 2. Country Ranks By HDI Values (1970,1980,1990)
Ra Country HDI
1970
Ra Country HDI
1980
Ra Country HDI
1990
1 Canada 0.887 1 Canada 0.911 1 Canada 0.932
2 Sweden 0.881 2 Japan 0.906 2 Switzerland 0.931
3 USA 0.881 3 USA 0.905 3 Japan 0.929
4 Denmark 0.879 4 Norway 0.901 4 Norway 0.928
5 Norway 0.878 5 Sweden 0.899 5 Sweden 0.928
6 Japan 0.875 6 Switzerland 0.897 6 France 0.927
7 UK 0.873 7 France 0.895 7 Australia 0.926
8 Switzerland 0.872 8 UK 0.892 8 USA 0.925
9 France 0.871 9 Australia 0.890 9 Netherlands 0.923
10 Netherlands 0.867 10 Iceland 0.890 10 UK 0.919
11 Iceland 0.863 11 Denmark 0.888 11 Germany, W. 0.918
12 Australia 0.862 12 Netherlands 0.888 12 Austria 0.917
13 New Zealand 0.861 13 Germany, W. 0.881 13 Belgium 0.916
14 Austria 0.857 14 Austria 0.880 14 Iceland 0.914
15 Germany, W. 0.856 15 Finland 0.880 15 Denmark 0.912
16 Finland 0.855 16 New Zealand 0.877 16 Finland 0.911
17 Belgium 0.851 17 Belgium 0.873 17 Luxembourg 0.908
18 Luxembourg 0.843 18 Luxembourg 0.869 18 New Zealand 0.907
19 Italy 0.831 19 Ireland 0.862 19 Israel 0.900
20 Ireland 0.829 20 Israel 0.862 20 GDR 0.899
21 Israel 0.827 21 GDR 0.859 21 Barbados 0.894
22 Barbados 0.824 22 Italy 0.857 oo Ireland 0.892
23 Spain 0.820 23 Barbados 0.856 23 Italy 0.891
24 Trinidad &T. 0.789 24 Spain 0.851 24 Spain 0.888
25 GDR 0.766 25 Czech. 0.848 25 Hong Kong 0.875
26 Uruguay 0.762 26 Cyprus 0.844 26 Greece 0.874
27 Argentina 0.748 27 USSR 0.841 27 Cyprus 0.873
28 Czech. 0.746 28 Greece 0.839 28 Czech. 0.872
29 Hong Kong 0.737 29 Hungary 0.838 29 Hungary 0.863
30 Cyprus 0.733 30 Poland 0.836 30 Y ugoslavia 0.861
31 Venezuela 0.728 31 Hong Kong 0.830 31 Korea, S. 0.859
32 Greece 0.723 32 Uruguay 0.830 32 Uruguay 0.859
33 USSR 0.714 33 Bulgaria 0.823 33 USSR 0.858
34 Hungary 0.705 34 Trinidad &T. 0.816 34 Trinidad & T. 0.855
35 Bulgaria 0.686 35 Malta 0.802 35 Argentina 0.853
36 Kuwait 0.684 36 Argentina 0.790 36 Chile 0.848
37 Chile 0.682 37 Yugoslavia 0.789 37 Costa Rica 0.848
38 Singapore 0.682 38 Venezuela 0.784 38 Malta 0.843
39 Poland 0.679 39 Singapore 0.780 39 Portugal 0.838
40 Jamaica 0.662 40 Kuwait 0.769 40 Singapore 0.836
41 Costa Rica 0.647 41 Romania 0.766 41 Venezuela 0.820
42 Mexico 0.642 42 Mexico 0.758 42 Panama 0.816
43 Malta 0.615 43 Chile 0.753 43 Bulgaria 0.815
44 UAE 0.601 44 Costa Rica 0.746 44 Poland 0.815
45 Romania 0.597 45 Portugal 0.736 45 Colombia 0.813
46 Panama 0.592 46 Cuba 0.719 46 Kuwait 0.804
47 South Africa 0.591 47 UAE 0.719 47 Mexico 0.804
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Appendix C, Part 2. (cont’d)
Ra Country HDI
1970
Ra Country HDI
1980
Ra Country HDI
1990
48 Portugal 0.588 48 Malaysia 0.687 48 Thailand 0.798
49 Cuba 0.582 49 Panama 0.687 49 Malaysia 0.794
50 Yugoslavia 0.581 50 Libya 0.676 50 Mauritius 0.778
51 Colombia 0.554 51 Brazil 0.673 51 UAE 0.771
52 Peru 0.528 52 Korea, S. 0.666 52 Brazil 0.756
53 Mauritius 0.524 53 Syria 0.658 53 Jamaica 0.749
54 Korea, S. 0.523 54 Colombia 0.656 54 Saudi Arabia 0.742
55 Paraguay 0.511 55 Jamaica 0.654 55 Turkey 0.739
56 Saudi Arabia 0.511 56 Saudi Arabia 0.629 56 Romania 0.729
57 Brazil 0.507 57 South Africa 0.629 57 Syria 0.727
58 Sri Lanka 0.506 58 Mauritius 0.626 58 Ecuador 0.718
59 Albania 0.497 59 Ecuador 0.613 59 Albania 0.714
60 Philippines 0.489 60 Albania 0.603 60 Libya 0.703
61 Ecuador 0.485 61 Paraguay 0.602 61 Tunisia 0.690
62 Malaysia 0.471 62 Peru 0.590 62 Paraguay 0.679
63 Thailand 0.465 63 Iraq 0.581 63 Iran 0.672
64 Nicaragua 0.462 64 Philippines 0.557 64 Botswana 0.670
65 Domin. Rep. 0.455 65 Jordan 0.553 65 Cuba 0.666
66 Iraq 0.452 66 Sri Lanka 0.552 66 Sri Lanka 0.665
67 Turkey 0.441 67 Thailand 0.551 67 South Africa 0.650
68 El Salvador 0.422 68 Turkey 0.549 68 China 0.644
69 Syria 0.419 69 Domin. Rep. 0.541 69 Peru 0.642
70 Iran 0.406 70 Nicaragua 0.534 70 Domin. Rep. 0.638
71 Jordan 0.405 71 Tunisia 0.499 71 Jordan 0.628
72 Libya 0.403 72 Iran 0.497 72 Philippines 0.621
73 Guatemala 0.392 73 Guatemala 0.477 73 Iraq 0.614
74 Gabon 0.378 74 Algeria 0.476 74 Indonesia 0.586
75 China 0.372 75 Gabon 0.468 75 Nicaragua 0.583
76 Bolivia 0.369 76 China 0.457 76 Guatemala 0.564
77 Honduras 0.350 77 El Salvador 0.454 77 Algeria 0.553
78 Tunisia 0.340 78 Bolivia 0.442 78 Egypt 0.551
79 Zimbabwe 0.326 79 Honduras 0.435 79 Morocco 0.549
80 Papua New G 0.325 80 Indonesia 0.418 80 El Salvador 0.543
81 Algeria 0.323 81 Botswana 0.414 81 Bolivia 0.530
82 Myanmar 0.318 82 Lesotho 0.404 82 Gabon 0.525
83 Zambia 0.315 83 Zimbabwe 0.386 83 Honduras 0.524
84 Congo 0.307 84 Morocco 0.383 84 Lesotho 0.476
85 Lesotho 0.307 85 Congo 0.368 85 Zimbabwe 0.474
86 Indonesia 0.306 86 Egypt 0.360 86 Congo 0.461
87 Madagascar 0.291 87 Myanmar 0.356 87 Cameroon 0.447
88 Botswana 0.284 88 Papua New G. 0.348 88 Kenya 0.434
89 Ghana 0.283 89 Madagascar 0.344 89 Papua New G. 0.408
90 Morocco 0.282 90 Zambia 0.342 90 Myanmar 0.406
91 Egypt 0.269 91 Kenya 0.340 91 Madagascar 0.396
92 India 0.254 92 Cameroon 0.332 92 Pakistan 0.393
93 Kenya 0.254 93 Ivory Coast 0.330 93 Ghana 0.382
94 Cameroon 0.253 94 Ghana 0.323 94 India 0.382
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Appendix C, Part 2. (cont’d)
Ra Country HDI
1970
Ra Country HDI
1980
Ra Country HDI
1990
95 Mozambique 0.248 95 Nigeria 0.297 95 Ivory Coast 0.370
96 Pakistan 0.244 96 India 0.296 96 Haiti 0.354
97 Ivory Coast 0.243 97 Haiti 0.295 97 Zambia 0.352
98 Zaire 0.235 98 Pakistan 0.287 98 Nigeria 0.348
99 Nigeria 0.230 99 Zaire 0.286 99 Zaire 0.341
100 Liberia 0.229 100 Tanzania 0.282 100 Senegal 0.322
101 Haiti 0.218 101 Liberia 0.277 101 Liberia 0.317
102 Rwanda 0.215 102 Togo 0.255 102 Togo 0.311
103 Uganda 0.213 103 Mozambique 0.247 103 Bangladesh 0.309
104 Tanzania 0.211 104 Rwanda 0.244 104 Tanzania 0.306
105 Bangladesh 0.199 105 Bangladesh 0.234 105 Nepal 0.289
106 Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.196 106 Senegal 0.233 106 Burundi 0.276
107 Angola 0.195 107 Sudan 0.229 107 Sudan 0.276
108 Sudan 0.188 108 Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.226 108 Rwanda 0.274
109 Togo 0.183 109 Burundi 0.219 109 Uganda 0.272
110 Malawi 0.176 110 Malawi 0.216 110 Angola 0.271
111 Senegal 0.176 111 Uganda 0.215 111 Benin 0.261
112 Benin 0.162 112 Angola 0.212 112 Malawi 0.260
113 Nepal 0.162 113 Nepal 0.209 113 Mozambique 0.252
114 Burundi 0.157 114 Benin 0.197 114 Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.249
115 Sierra Leone 0.155 115 Sierra Leone 0.177 115 Somalia 0.217
116 Chad 0.135 116 Afghanistan 0.165 116 Gambia 0.215
117 Niger 0.134 117 Niger 0.163 117 Mali 0.214
118 Afghanistan 0.131 118 Somalia 0.162 118 Chad 0.212
119 Somalia 0.124 119 Burkina Faso 0.151 119 Niger 0.209
120 Burkina Faso 0.116 120 Chad 0.151 120 Sierra Leone 0.209
121 Guinea 0.111 121 Gambia 0.148 121 Afghanistan 0.208
122 Gambia 0.107 122 Guinea 0.148 122 Burkina Faso 0.203
123 Mali 0.102 123 Mali 0.146 123 Guinea 0.191
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Appendix D, Part 1. (cont’d)
Country ISC
1970
ISC
1980
ISC
1990
ISC
1970/80
ISC
1980/90
ISC
1970/90
Poland 0.709 0.777 0.640 0.068 -0.137 -0.069
Portugal 0.478 0.777 0.807 0.299 0.030 0.329
Romania 0.686 0.721 0.653 0.034 -0.068 -0.034
Rwanda 0.509 0.506 0.506 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003
Saudi Arabia 0.567 0.527 0.558 -0.041 0.032 -0.009
Senegal 0.563 0.619 0.658 0.056 0.039 0.095
Sierra Leone 0.556 0.537 0.401 -0.019 -0.136 -0.155
Singapore 0.751 0.749 0.796 -0.002 0.047 0.045
Somalia 0.418 0.332 0.148 -0.087 -0.183 -0.270
South Africa 0.620 0.557 0.588 -0.064 0.031 -0.033
Spain 0.673 0.800 0.897 0.128 0.097 0.224
Sri Lanka 0.685 0.677 0.574 -0.007 -0.103 -0.111
Sudan 0.339 0.348 0.258 0.009 -0.090 -0.081
Sweden 0.910 0.907 0.920 -0.004 0.014 0.010
Switzerland 0.879 0.907 0.922 0.028 0.014 0.043
Syria 0.391 0.433 0.560 0.041 0.127 0.168
Tanzania 0.566 0.477 0.501 -0.088 0.023 -0.065
Thailand 0.616 0.663 0.730 0.047 0.067 0.114
Togo 0.606 0.570 0.599 -0.037 0.029 -0.007
Trinidad &T. 0.789 0.788 0.882 -0.001 0.094 0.093
Tunisia 0.626 0.655 0.738 0.030 0.082 0.112
Turkey 0.592 0.513 0.491 -0.079 -0.022 -0.101
UAE 0.556 0.689 0.758 0.133 0.069 0.203
Uganda 0.336 0.211 0.252 -0.125 0.041 -0.084
UK 0.855 0.825 0.874 -0.031 0.049 0.019
Uruguay 0.585 0.553 0.695 -0.032 0.142 0.110
USA 0.741 0.896 0.867 0.154 -0.028 0.126
USSR 0.696 0.527 0.595 -0.169 0.068 -0.101
Venezuela 0.817 0.794 0.752 -0.023 -0.042 -0.065
Yugoslavia 0.640 0.696 0.394 0.056 -0.303 -0.247
Zaire 0.461 0.482 0.411 0.022 -0.071 -0.049
Zambia 0.600 0.593 0.508 -0.007 -0.084 -0.091
Zimbabwe 0.578 0.547 0.606 -0.031 0.059 0.028
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 1) for the details concerning the construction of the Index of Social 
Conditions (ISC) and the sources used. The ISC is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 
0.000 (lowest possible value).
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Appendix D (cont’d) Part 2. Country Ranks By ISC Values (1970,1980,1990)
Ra Country ISC
1970
Ra Country ISC
1980
Ra Country ISC
1990
1 Canada 0.913 1 Canada 0.918 1 Canada 0.967
2 Sweden 0.910 2 Switzerland 0.907 2 Netherlands 0.942
3 Australia 0.905 3 Sweden 0.907 3 Japan 0.938
4 Belgium 0.903 4 Norway 0.906 4 Belgium 0.936
5 Germany, W. 0.902 5 Belgium 0.906 5 Norway 0.935
6 Norway 0.899 6 Denmark 0.905 6 Denmark 0.931
7 New Zealand 0.898 7 Japan 0.905 7 Austria 0.928
8 Iceland 0.895 8 Netherlands 0.905 8 Finland 0.928
9 Netherlands 0.893 9 Austria 0.896 9 Switzerland 0.922
10 Japan 0.892 10 USA 0.896 10 Sweden 0.920
11 Denmark 0.892 11 Germany, W. 0.883 11 Germany, W. 0.919
12 Austria 0.889 12 Australia 0.880 12 Australia 0.916
13 Switzerland 0.879 13 New Zealand 0.880 13 Ireland 0.913
14 France 0.865 14 Luxembourg 0.875 14 Barbados 0.910
15 Luxembourg 0.864 15 Barbados 0.868 15 New Zealand 0.908
16 Finland 0.862 16 Finland 0.865 16 France 0.899
17 Barbados 0.857 17 Ireland 0.863 17 Spain 0.897
18 UK 0.855 18 France 0.862 18 Italy 0.893
19 Hong Kong 0.845 19 Hong Kong 0.842 19 Malta 0.889
20 Malta 0.843 20 Costa Rica 0.826 20 Luxembourg 0.889
21 Ireland 0.842 21 Malta 0.826 21 Cyprus 0.888
22 Italy 0.841 22 UK 0.825 22 Trinidad &T. 0.882
23 Costa Rica 0.837 23 Italy 0.825 23 UK 0.874
24 Venezuela 0.817 24 Greece 0.802 24 USA 0.867
25 Jamaica 0.816 25 Spain 0.800 25 Hong Kong 0.863
26 Trinidad &T. 0.789 26 Cyprus 0.798 26 Korea, S. 0.839
27 Mauritius 0.787 27 Venezuela 0.794 27 Greece 0.820
28 Kuwait 0.772 28 Trinidad &T. 0.788 28 Iceland 0.817
29 Singapore 0.751 29 Iceland 0.784 29 Mauritius 0.815
30 USA 0.741 30 Poland 0.777 30 Hungary 0.808
31 Colombia 0.737 31 Portugal 0.777 31 Portugal 0.807
32 GDR 0.733 32 Kuwait 0.766 32 Costa Rica 0.803
33 Mexico 0.732 33 Ecuador 0.762 33 Singapore 0.796
34 Cyprus 0.729 34 Hungary 0.758 34 Czech. 0.790
35 Malaysia 0.720 35 Czech. 0.753 35 Jamaica 0.782
36 Poland 0.709 36 Singapore 0.749 36 GDR 0.772
37 Ecuador 0.709 37 Panama 0.749 37 Chile 0.759
38 Papua New G. 0.707 38 GDR 0.744 38 UAE 0.758
39 Hungary 0.706 39 Cuba 0.737 39 Botswana 0.754
40 Domin. Rep. 0.702 40 Romania 0.721 40 Venezuela 0.752
41 USSR 0.696 41 Domin. Rep. 0.718 41 Jordan 0.750
42 Romania 0.686 42 Papua New G. 0.715 42 Tunisia 0.738
43 Sri Lanka 0.685 43 Jamaica 0.714 43 Papua New G. 0.738
44 Argentina 0.681 44 Mauritius 0.710 44 Honduras 0.737
45 Bulgaria 0.680 45 Yugoslavia 0.696 45 Panama 0.731
46 Spain 0.673 46 Honduras 0.696 46 Thailand 0.730
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Ra Country ISC
1970
Ra Country ISC
1980
Ra Country ISC
1990
47 Panama 0.671 47 Mexico 0.695 47 Bulgaria 0.730
48 El Salvador 0.661 48 Bulgaria 0.693 48 Cuba 0.728
49 Kenya 0.658 49 UAE 0.689 49 Malaysia 0.722
50 Gambia 0.655 50 Jordan 0.688 50 Egypt 0.704
51 Morocco 0.654 51 Botswana 0.683 51 Uruguay 0.695
52 Nicaragua 0.653 52 Malaysia 0.682 52 Argentina 0.690
53 Botswana 0.652 53 Sri Lanka 0.677 53 Domin. Rep. 0.688
54 Czech. 0.646 54 Israel 0.670 54 Albania 0.682
55 Bolivia 0.644 55 Thailand 0.663 55 Kuwait 0.677
56 Cuba 0.644 56 Tunisia 0.655 56 Ecuador 0.676
57 Lesotho 0.643 57 Albania 0.650 57 Senegal 0.658
58 Yugoslavia 0.640 58 Paraguay 0.649 58 Romania 0.653
59 Paraguay 0.636 59 Korea, S. 0.648 59 Congo 0.652
60 Madagascar 0.634 60 Kenya 0.645 60 Haiti 0.642
61 Greece 0.630 61 Colombia 0.627 61 Ivory Coast 0.640
62 Honduras 0.629 62 Gambia 0.623 62 Poland 0.640
63 Tunisia 0.626 63 Egypt 0.621 63 Paraguay 0.639
64 Cameroon 0.625 64 Senegal 0.619 64 Algeria 0.639
65 Peru 0.623 65 Congo 0.611 65 Gabon 0.638
66 South Africa 0.620 66 Nepal 0.603 66 Colombia 0.636
67 Thailand 0.616 67 Lesotho 0.600 67 Israel 0.635
68 Albania 0.614 68 Bolivia 0.594 68 Lesotho 0.634
69 Israel 0.614 69 Zambia 0.593 69 Pakistan 0.634
70 Benin 0.611 70 Algeria 0.587 70 Philippines 0.620
71 Iran 0.607 71 Ivory Coast 0.582 71 Gambia 0.619
72 Togo 0.606 72 Benin 0.581 72 Indonesia 0.617
73 Korea, S. 0.602 73 Haiti 0.581 73 Morocco 0.614
74 Zambia 0.600 74 Burkina Faso 0.580 74 Libya 0.611
75 Burkina Faso 0.599 75 Morocco 0.579 75 Benin 0.609
76 Turkey 0.592 76 Brazil 0.578 76 Zimbabwe 0.606
77 Myanmar 0.592 77 Nigeria 0.571 77 Nepal 0.605
78 Uruguay 0.585 78 Togo 0.570 78 Brazil 0.601
79 Algeria 0.579 79 Peru 0.560 79 Togo 0.599
80 Zimbabwe 0.578 80 Libya 0.559 80 USSR 0.595
81 Ghana 0.577 81 India 0.559 81 Nigeria 0.594
82 Congo 0.573 82 South Africa 0.557 82 Cameroon 0.594
83 Haiti 0.571 83 Cameroon 0.556 83 Kenya 0.590
84 Ivory Coast 0.567 84 Uruguay 0.553 84 Madagascar 0.589
85 Saudi Arabia 0.567 85 Chile 0.550 85 Mexico 0.588
86 Tanzania 0.566 86 Liberia 0.548 86 South Africa 0.588
87 Guatemala 0.564 87 Zimbabwe 0.547 87 China 0.583
88 Senegal 0.563 88 Madagascar 0.538 88 Burkina Faso 0.577
89 Chile 0.560 89 Sierra Leone 0.537 89 Sri Lanka 0.574
90 Nepal 0.557 90 Ghana 0.535 90 Niger 0.573
91 Gabon 0.557 91 Myanmar 0.535 91 Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.568
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Ra Country ISC Ra Country ISC Ra Country ISC
1970 1980 1990
92 Siena Leone 0.556 92 Gabon 0.530 92 Guatemala 0.568
93 UAE 0.556 93 Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.527 93 Burundi 0.563
94 Liberia 0.536 94 USSR 0.527 94 Syria 0.560
95 Libya 0.532 95 Saudi Arabia 0.527 95 Saudi Arabia 0.558
96 Niger 0.532 96 Burundi 0.520 96 India 0.551
97 Philippines 0.517 97 Niger 0.516 97 Bolivia 0.545
98 Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.512 98 Guatemala 0.514 98 Mali 0.529
99 Rwanda 0.509 99 Turkey 0.513 99 Zambia 0.508
100 Malawi 0.503 100 Pakistan 0.508 100 Rwanda 0.506
101 Guinea 0.499 101 Guinea 0.507 101 Tanzania 0.501
102 Afghanistan 0.496 102 Rwanda 0.506 102 El Salvador 0.498
103 Brazil 0.490 103 El Salvador 0.503 103 Ghana 0.497
104 Mali 0.483 104 Philippines 0.501 104 Turkey 0.491
105 Portugal 0.478 105 Mali 0.492 105 Guinea 0.491
106 Zaire 0.461 106 Zaire 0.482 106 Chad 0.489
107 India 0.460 107 Tanzania 0.477 107 Myanmar 0.487
108 Jordan 0.433 108 Malawi 0.472 108 Malawi 0.486
109 Nigeria 0.431 109 China 0.469 109 Peru 0.477
110 Somalia 0.418 110 Argentina 0.469 110 Liberia 0.474
111 Bangladesh 0.415 111 Nicaragua 0.460 111 Bangladesh 0.465
112 China 0.408 112 Chad 0.442 112 Iran 0.460
113 Pakistan 0.401 113 Syria 0.433 113 Nicaragua 0.449
114 Chad 0.401 114 Bangladesh 0.418 114 Iraq 0.427
115 Syria 0.391 115 Indonesia 0.385 115 Zaire 0.411
116 Iraq 0.390 116 Iran 0.375 116 Sierra Leone 0.401
117 Egypt 0.379 117 Iraq 0.356 117 Yugoslavia 0.394
118 Mozambique 0.342 118 Sudan 0.348 118 Sudan 0.258
119 Angola 0.342 119 Somalia 0.332 119 Uganda 0.252
120 Sudan 0.339 120 Mozambique 0.296 120 Afghanistan 0.225
121 Uganda 0.336 121 Afghanistan 0.283 121 Mozambique 0.170
122 Burundi 0.319 122 Angola 0.258 122 Somalia 0.148
123 Indonesia 0.235 123 Uganda 0.211 123 Angola 0.120
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Appendix E (cont’d)
Country SEC
1970
SEC
1980
SEC
1990
SEC
1970/80
SEC
1980/90
SEC
1970/90
Poland 0.988 0.953 0.500 -0.035 -0.453 -0.488
Portugal 0.470 0.833 0.826 0.363 -0.007 0.356
Romania 1.000 0.989 0.822 -0.011 -0.167 -0.178
Rwanda 0.869 0.849 0.815 -0.020 -0.034 -0.054
Saudi Arabia 0.949 0.751 0.763 -0.198 0.012 -0.186
Senegal 0.983 0.915 0.940 -0.068 0.025 -0.043
Sierra Leone 0.981 0.875 0.500 -0.106 -0.375 -0.481
Singapore 0.989 0.941 0.981 -0.048 0.040 -0.008
Somalia 0.665 0.503 0.003 -0.162 -0.500 -0.662
South Africa 0.819 0.719 0.582 -0.100 -0.137 -0.236
Spain 0.918 0.839 0.911 -0.079 0.072 -0.007
Sri Lanka 0.802 0.739 0.569 -0.063 -0.170 -0.233
Sudan 0.463 0.355 0.165 -0.108 -0.190 -0.298
Sweden 0.957 0.900 0.926 -0.057 0.026 -0.031
Switzerland 0.956 0.950 0.962 -0.006 0.012 0.006
Syria 0.474 0.382 0.727 -0.092 0.345 0.253
Tanzania 0.982 0.735 0.743 -0.247 0.008 -0.239
Thailand 0.874 0.800 0.860 -0.074 0.060 -0.014
Togo 0.987 0.911 0.956 -0.076 0.045 -0.031
Trinidad &T. 0.968 0.815 0.935 -0.153 0.120 -0.033
Tunisia 0.964 0.913 0.924 -0.051 0.011 -0.040
Turkey 0.804 0.548 0.379 -0.256 -0.170 -0.426
UAE 0.661 0.873 0.989 0.212 0.116 0.328
Uganda 0.468 0.000 0.000 -0.468 0.000 -0.468
UK 0.848 0.737 0.834 -0.112 0.097 -0.015
Uruguay 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.000 0 .000
USA 0.471 0.824 0.715 0.353 -0.109 0.244
USSR 0.891 0.497 0.483 -0.394 -0.014 -0.408
Venezuela 0.987 0.860 0.788 -0.127 -0.072 -0.199
Yugoslavia 0.874 0.816 0.000 -0.058 -0.816 -0.874
Zaire 0.701 0.686 0.500 -0.015 -0.186 -0.201
Zambia 0.924 0.924 0.578 0.000 -0.346 -0.346
Zimbabwe 0.830 0.681 0.770 -0.150 0.089 -0.061
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 2) for the details concerning the construction of the Security Index 
(SEC) and the sources used. The SEC is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 0.000 
(lowest possible value).
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APPENDIX F - Scaled Inflation (INFL) Rates*
All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country INFL
1970
INFL
1980
INFL
1990
Country INFL
1970
INFL
1980
INFL
1990
Country INFL
1970
INFL
1980
INFL
1990
Afghanistan 0.762 0.956 0.498 Indonesia 0.000 0.570 0.830 Spain 0.836 0.678 0.822
Albania 0.992 0.992 1.000 Iran 1.000 0.552 0.724 Sri Lanka 0.964 0.754 0.776
Algeria 0.946 0.710 0.798 Iraq 0.966 0.642 0.794 Sudan 0.926 0.710 0.330
Angola 0.934 0.580 0.000 Ireland 0.896 0.716 0.884 Sweden 0.914 0.800 0.852
Argentina 0.572 0.000 0.000 Israel 0.876 0.210 0.000 Switzerland 0.912 0.900 0.924
Australia 0.938 0.764 0.860 Italy 0.912 0.688 0.810 Syria 0.948 0.764 0.714
Austria 0.926 0.870 0.928 Ivory Coast 0.944 0.740 0.924 Tanzania 0.964 0.718 0.486
Bangladesh 0.926 0.584 0.814 Jamaica 0.920 0.654 0.608 Thailand 0.964 0.816 0.926
Barbados 0.870 0.730 0.896 Japan 0.898 0.830 0.970 Togo 0.974 0.822 0.912
Belgium 0.928 0.844 0.916 Jordan 0.946 0.864 0.968 Trinid &T. 0.936 0.630 0.870
Benin 0.962 0.794 0.968 Kenya 0.968 0.798 0.816 Tunisia 0.928 0.826 0.848
Bolivia 0.930 0.580 0.000 Korea, S. 0.650 0.598 0.888 Turkey 0.888 0.412 0.106
Botswana 0.912 0.768 0.736 Kuwait 0.988 0.796 1.000 UAE 0.322 0.746 0.978
Brazil 0.078 0.228 0.000 Lesotho 0.946 0.806 0.728 Uganda 0.936 0.000 0.000
Bulgaria 0.992 0.954 0.844 Liberia 0.962 0.816 0.870 UK 0.918 0.710 0.884
Burki Faso 0.974 0.828 0.924 Libya 0.812 0.768 0.996 Uruguay 0.000 0.000 0.000
Burundi 0.944 0.786 0.914 Luxembourg 0.900 0.862 0.916 USA 0.942 0.850 0.916
Cameroon 0.916 0.804 0.910 Madagascar 0.936 0.802 0.664 USSR 1.000 0.994 0.966
Canada 0.938 0.826 0.914 Malawi 0.910 0.824 0.702 Venezuela 0.974 0.720 0.576
Cen. Afr. R. 0.918 0.758 0.898 Malaysia 1.000 0.854 0.966 Y ugoslavia 0.748 0.632 0.000
Chad 0.908 0.846 0.978 Mali 0.900 0.806 0.912 Zaire 0.402 0.372 0.000
Chile 0.340 0.000 0.590 Malta 0.952 0.924 0.916 Zambia 0.848 0.848 0.156
China 1.000 0.982 0.884 Mauritius 0.928 0.694 0.838 Zimbabwe 0.974 0.812 0.750
Colombia 0.762 0.554 0.500 Mexico 0.930 0.638 0.000
Congo 0.882 0.832 0.992 Morocco 0.960 0.834 0.858
Costa Rica 0.962 0.694 0.542 Mozambique 0.944 0.806 0.248
Cuba 0.990 0.990 0.990 Myanmar 0.946 0.786 0.622
Cyprus 0.934 0.832 0.890 Nepal 0.846 0.840 0.818
Czech. 0.994 0.976 0.930 Netherlands 0.892 0.842 0.964
Denmark 0.872 0.798 0.896 New Zealand 0.928 0.750 0.794
Domin Rep. 0.958 0.818 0.510 Nicaragua 0.964 0.744 0.000
Ecuador 0.878 0.724 0.240 Niger 0.958 0.806 0.954
Egypt 0.948 0.808 0.750 Nigeria 0.920 0.696 0.638
El Salvador 0.990 0.786 0.652 Norway 0.912 0.832 0.896
Finland 0.880 0.754 0.868 Pakistan 0.934 0.732 0.860
France 0.916 0.796 0.886 Panama 0.968 0.850 0.952
Gabon 0.932 0.650 0.970 Papua NG. 0.920 0.818 0.896
Gambia 0.936 0.788 0.636 Paraguay 0.938 0.746 0.498
GDR 0.998 1.000 1.000 Peru 0.792 0.398 0.000
Germ., W. 0.936 0.898 0.944 Philippines 0.884 0.734 0.708
Ghana 0.848 0.296 0.200 Poland 0.976 0.906 0.000
Greece 0.936 0.710 0.646 Portugal 0.940 0.666 0.652
Guatemala 0.994 0.790 0.682 Romania 1.000 0.978 0.876
Guinea 0.970 0.912 0.556 Rwanda 0.738 0.698 0.918
Haiti 0.920 0.814 0.858 Saudi Arabia 0.898 0.502 1.000
Honduras 0.942 0.838 0.864 Senegal 0.966 0.830 0.880
Hong Kong 0.952 0.816 0.850 Sierra Leone 0.962 0.750 0.000
Hungary 0.948 0.944 0.794 Singapore 0.978 0.882 0.962
Iceland 0.948 0.298 0.400 Somalia 0.910 0.696 0.006
India 0.858 0.832 0.836 South Africa 0.940 0.740 0.712
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 2) for the details concerning the construction of the INFL variable
and the sources used. The INFL variable is based on a scale from 1.000 (best possible value) to 0.000
(worst possible value).
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APPENDIX G - Scaled Peace/Conflict (CONF) Rates*
All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country CONF CONF CONF Country CONF CONF CONF Country CONF CONF CONF
1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
Afghanistan 1.000 0.000 0.000 Indonesia 0.000 0.000 0.784 Spain 1.000 1.000 1.000
Albania 1.000 1.000 1.000 Iran 1.000 0.000 0.000 Sri Lanka 0.640 0.724 0.361
Algeria 1.000 1.000 0.752 Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.000 Sudan 0.000 0.000 0.000
Angola 0.000 0.000 0.000 Ireland 1.000 1.000 1.000 Sweden 1.000 1.000 1.000
Argentina 0.794 0.529 1.000 Israel 0.000 0.660 0.640 Switzerland 1.000 1.000 1.000
Australia 1.000 1.000 1.000 Italy 1.000 1.000 1.000 Syria 0.000 0.000 0.740
Austria 1.000 1.000 1.000 Ivory Coast 1.000 1.000 1.000 Tanzania 1.000 0.752 1.000
Bangladesh 0.000 0.182 0.305 Jamaica 1.000 0.784 1.000 Thailand 0.784 0.784 0.794
Barbados 1.000 1.000 1.000 Japan 1.000 1.000 1.000 Togo 1.000 1.000 1.000
Belgium 1.000 1.000 1.000 Jordan 0.000 1.000 1.000 Trinid &T. 1.000 1.000 1.000
Benin 1.000 1.000 1.000 Kenya 1.000 1.000 1.000 Tunisia 1.000 1.000 1.000
Bolivia 1.000 1.000 1.000 Korea, S. 1.000 1.000 1.000 Turkey 0.720 0.685 0.651
Botswana 1.000 1.000 1.000 Kuwait 1.000 1.000 0.514 UAE 1.000 1.000 1.000
Brazil 1.000 0.784 1.000 Lesotho 1.000 1.000 1.000 Uganda 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bulgaria 1.000 1.000 1.000 Liberia 1.000 1.000 0.480 UK 0.779 0.763 0.783
Burkina Faso 1.000 1.000 1.000 Libya 0.763 0.763 0.763 Uruguay 1.000 1.000 1.000
Burundi 0.000 1.000 1.000 Luxembourg 1.000 1.000 1.000 USA 0.000 0.798 0.514
Cameroon 1.000 1.000 1.000 Madagascar 1.000 1.000 1.000 USSR 0.782 0.000 0.000
Canada 1.000 1.000 1.000 Malawi 1.000 1.000 1.000 Venezuela 1.000 1.000 1.000
Cen. Afr. Rep. 1.000 1.000 1.000 Malaysia 0.780 0.784 0.787 Y ugoslavia 1.000 1.000 0.000
Chad 0.613 0.613 0.632 Mali 1.000 1.000 1.000 Zaire 1.000 1.000 1.000
Chile 0.400 1.000 1.000 Malta 1.000 1.000 1.000 Zambia 1.000 1.000 1.000
China 0.000 0.000 0.795 Mauritius 1.000 1.000 1.000 Zimbabwe 0.686 0.549 0.789
Colombia 1.000 0.608 0.692 Mexico 1.000 1.000 1.000
Congo 1.000 1.000 1.000 Morocco 1.000 0.649 0.664
Costa Rica 1.000 1.000 1.000 Mozambique 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cuba 1.000 1.000 1.000 Myanmar 0.750 0.713 0.702
Cyprus 0.720 1.000 1.000 Nepal 1.000 1.000 1.000
Czech. 0.798 1.000 1.000 Netherlands 1.000 1.000 1.000
Denmark 1.000 1.000 1.000 New Zealand 1.000 1.000 1.000
Domin. Rep. 0.752 1.000 1.000 Nicaragua 0.707 0.093 0.560
Ecuador 1.000 1.000 1.000 Niger 1.000 1.000 1.000
Egypt 0.000 1.000 1.000 Nigeria 0.000 0.630 1.000
El Salvador 0.728 0.194 0.000 Norway 1.000 1.000 1.000
Finland 1.000 1.000 1.000 Pakistan 0.000 0.723 0.774
France 1.000 1.000 1.000 Panama 1.000 1.000 0.789
Gabon 1.000 1.000 1.000 Papua NG. 1.000 1.000 1.000
Gambia 1.000 1.000 1.000 Paraguay 1.000 1.000 1.000
GDR 1.000 1.000 1.000 Peru 1.000 0.628 0.524
Germany, W. 1.000 1.000 1.000 Philippines 0.351 0.101 0.347
Ghana 1.000 0.784 1.000 Poland 1.000 1.000 1.000
Greece 0.720 1.000 1.000 Portugal 0.000 1.000 1.000
Guatemala 0.320 0.570 0.454 Romania 1.000 1.000 0.768
Guinea 1.000 1.000 1.000 Rwanda 1.000 1.000 0.712
Haiti 1.000 1.000 1.000 Saudi Arabia 1.000 1.000 0.525
Honduras 0.728 1.000 1.000 Senegal 1.000 1.000 1.000
Hong Kong 1.000 1.000 1.000 Sierra Leone 1.000 1.000 1.000
Hungary 1.000 1.000 1.000 Singapore 1.000 1.000 1.000
Iceland 1.000 1.000 1.000 Somalia 0.420 0.310 0.000
India 0.000 0.384 0.264 South Africa 0.697 0.698 0.453
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 2) for the details concerning the construction of the CONF variable 
and the sources used. The CONF variable is based on a scale from 1.000 (complete peace/stability) to 0.000 
(complete conflict/instability).
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Appendix 
H 
(cont’d)
Appendix H (cont’d)
Country LIB
1970
LIB
1980
LIB
1990
LIB
1970/80
LIB
1980/90
LIB
1970/90
Poland 0.535 0.700 0.790 0.165 0.090 0.255
Portugal 0.511 0.886 0.901 0.374 0.015 0.389
Romania 0.524 0.547 0.524 0.023 -0.023 0 .000
Rwanda 0.345 0.352 0.382 0.007 0.030 0.037
Saudi Arabia 0.398 0.452 0.463 0.054 0.011 0.065
Senegal 0.346 0.543 0.619 0.197 0.076 0.273
Sierra Leone 0.322 0.367 0.406 0.045 0.039 0.084
Singapore 0.637 0.651 0.713 0.014 0.062 0.076
Somalia 0.315 0.253 0.282 -0.062 0.029 -0.033
South Africa 0.558 0.492 0.597 -0.065 0.104 0.039
Spain 0.546 0.841 0.965 0.295 0.124 0.419
Sri Lanka 0.753 0.780 0.656 0.027 -0.125 -0.098
Sudan 0.329 0.432 0.383 0.102 -0.048 0.054
Sweden 0.985 0.991 0.993 0.006 0.002 0.008
Switzerland 0.981 0.988 0.991 0.007 0.003 0.010
Syria 0.367 0.495 0.438 0.128 -0.057 0.071
Tanzania 0.360 0.381 0.435 0.021 0.054 0.075
Thailand 0.570 0.715 0.798 0.145 0.083 0.229
Togo 0.444 0.399 0.433 -0.044 0.034 -0 .010
Trinidad &T. 0.791 0.891 0.982 0.099 0.091 0.191
Tunisia 0.483 0.564 0.709 0.081 0.145 0.226
Turkey 0.567 0.586 0.685 0.019 0.099 0.118
UAE 0.579 0.624 0.636 0.045 0.012 0.057
Uganda 0.306 0.456 0.558 0.150 0.102 0.252
UK 0.979 0.985 0.990 0.006 0.005 0.011
Uruguay 0.697 0.599 0.890 -0.098 0.291 0.193
USA 0.978 0.985 0.988 0.007 0.003 0 .010
USSR 0.538 0.488 0.657 -0.050 0.169 0.118
Venezuela 0.849 0.867 0.814 0.018 -0.052 -0.034
Yugoslavia 0.508 0.630 0.698 0.121 0.068 0.190
Zaire 0.372 0.420 0.426 0.048 0.006 0.054
Zambia 0.495 0.462 0.542 -0.032 0.079 0.047
Zimbabwe 0.513 0.576 0.602 0.063 0.026 0.089
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 3) for the details concerning the construction of the Liberty Index 
(LIB) and the sources used. The LIB index is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 0.000 
(lowest possible value).
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APPENDIX I - Scaled Civil Liberties (CIVIL) Values*
All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country CIVIL CIVIL CIVIL Country CIVIL CIVIL CIVIL Country CIVIL CIVIL CIVIL
1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
Afghanistan 0.333 0.000 0.050 Indonesia 0.333 0.333 0.333 Spain 0.167 0.717 0.950
Albania 0.000 0.000 0.050 Iran 0.167 0.217 0.283 Sri Lanka 0.667 0.667 0.383
Algeria 0.167 0.167 0.383 Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.050 Sudan 0.167 0.283 0.117
Angola 0.167 0.000 0.000 Ireland 0.833 1.000 1.000 Sweden 1.000 1.000 1.000
Argentina 0.667 0.333 0.833 Israel 0.667 0.833 0.833 Switzerland 1.000 1.000 1.000
Australia 1.000 1.000 1.000 Italy 0.833 0.833 1.000 Syria 0.000 0.167 0.000
Austria 1.000 1.000 1.000 Ivory Coast 0.167 0.333 0.333 Tanzania 0.167 0.167 0.217
Bangladesh 0.500 0.617 0.383 Jamaica 0.833 0.667 0.833 Thailand 0.333 0.550 0.667
Barbados 1.000 1.000 1.000 Japan 1.000 1.000 1.000 Togo 0.333 0.167 0.167
Belgium 1.000 1.000 1.000 Jordan 0.167 0.167 0.333 Trinid & T. 0.667 0.833 1.000
Benin 0.333 0.167 0.167 Kenya 0.500 0.500 0.167 Tunisia 0.333 0.333 0.550
Bolivia 0.500 0.450 0.667 Korea, S. 0.167 0.217 0.667 Turkey 0.500 0.450 0.550
Botswana 0.500 0.667 0.783 Kuwait 0.500 0.500 0.283 UAE 0.333 0.333 0.333
Brazil 0.333 0.667 0.717 Lesotho 0.500 0.333 0.283 Uganda 0.000 0.283 0.450
Bulgaria 0.000 0.000 0.167 Liberia 0.167 0.217 0.217 UK 1.000 1.000 1.000
Burkina Faso 0.500 0.450 0.283 Libya 0.167 0.117 0.050 Uruguay 0.500 0.283 0.833
Burundi 0.000 0.117 0.167 Luxembourg 1.000 1.000 1.000 USA 1.000 1.000 1.000
Cameroon 0.500 0.167 0.167 Madagascar 0.667 0.167 0.450 USSR 0.167 0.050 0.383
Canada 1.000 1.000 1.000 Malawi 0.167 0.000 0.117 Venezuela 0.833 0.833 0.717
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.000 0.217 0.217 Malaysia 0.667 0.500 0.450 Yugoslavia 0.167 0.333 0.450
Chad 0.000 0.167 0.167 Mali 0.167 0.167 0.217 Zaire 0.167 0.167 0.117
Chile 0.833 0.333 0.667 Malta 0.833 0.717 0.950 Zambia 0.333 0.217 0.333
China 0.000 0.217 0.050 Mauritius 0.833 0.550 0.833 Zimbabwe 0.333 0.383 0.383
Colombia 0.833 0.667 0.550 Mexico 0.667 0.550 0.550
Congo 0.000 0.050 0.167 Morocco 0.500 0.450 0.450
Costa Rica 1.000 1.000 1.000 Mozambique 0.167 0.000 0.050
Cuba 0.000 0.167 0.050 Myanmar 0.333 0.167 0.050
Cyprus 0.667 0.667 0.950 Nepal 0.333 0.500 0.450
Czech. 0.000 0.167 0.383 Netherlands 1.000 1.000 1.000
Denmark 1.000 1.000 1.000 New Zealand 1.000 1.000 1.000
Domin. Rep. 0.833 0.667 0.667 Nicaragua 0.667 0.333 0.500
Ecuador 0.667 0.833 0.833 Niger 0.167 0.167 0.217
Egypt 0.167 0.283 0.500 Nigeria 0.500 0.667 0.383
El Salvador 0.667 0.500 0.550 Norway 1.000 1.000 1.000
Finland 0.833 0.833 0.950 Pakistan 0.333 0.283 0.617
France 0.833 0.833 0.833 Panama 0.167 0.450 0.450
Gabon 0.167 0.167 0.333 Papua NG. 0.833 0.833 0.783
Gambia 0.833 0.717 0.783 Paraguay 0.167 0.333 0.500
GDR 0.000 0.050 0.167 Peru 0.333 0.617 0.550
Germany, W. 1.000 0.833 0.883 Philippines 0.167 0.333 0.667
Ghana 0.167 0.617 0.283 Poland 0.167 0.450 0.617
Greece 0.167 0.833 0.833 Portugal 0.167 0.833 0.833
Guatemala 0.667 0.217 0.617 Romania 0.167 0.167 0.117
Guinea 0.000 0.000 0.217 Rwanda 0.167 0.167 0.167
Haiti 0.167 0.217 0.383 Saudi Arabia 0.167 0.167 0.117
Honduras 0.667 0.667 0.667 Senegal 0.167 0.550 0.617
Hong Kong 0.833 0.833 0.833 Sierra Leone 0.333 0.333 0.333
Hungary 0.167 0.333 0.667 Singapore 0.333 0.333 0.450
Iceland 1.000 1.000 1.000 Somalia 0.167 0.000 0.000
India 0.667 0.717 0.667 South Africa 0.333 0.167 0.333
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 3) for the details concerning the construction of die CIVIL variable
and the sources used The CTVIL variable is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 0.000
(lowest possible value).
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APPENDIX J - Scaled Child Survival (SURV) Values*
All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country SURV SURV SURV 
1970 1980 1990
Country SURV SURV SURV 
1970 1980 1990
Country SURV SURV SURV 
1970 1980 1990
Afghanistan 0.302 0.360 0.408 Indonesia 0.634 0.724 0.800 Spain 0.926 0.966 0.980
Albania 0.792 0.884 0.940 Iran 0.608 0.772 0.872 Sri Lanka 0.840 0.894 0.928
Algeria 0.582 0.706 0.796 Iraq 0.712 0.780 0.822 Sudan 0.492 0.580 0.650
Angola 0.396 0.478 0.416 Ireland 0.950 0.972 0.978 Sweden 0.970 0.982 0.986
Argentina 0.876 0.906 0.928 Israel 0.942 0.962 0.976 Switzerland 0.962 0.976 0.982
Australia 0.962 0.974 0.982 Italy 0.932 0.964 0.978 Syria 0.734 0.824 0.876
Austria 0.940 0.966 0.980 Ivory Coast 0.592 0.666 0.722 Tanzania 0.554 0.596 0.654
Bangladesh 0.554 0.576 0.632 Jamaica 0.888 0.944 0.958 Thailand 0.806 0.880 0.930
Barbados 0.892 0.944 0.970 Japan 0.950 0.978 0.988 Togo 0.554 0.632 0.700
Belgium 0.950 0.972 0.976 Jordan 0.754 0.838 0.890 Trinid&T. 0.916 0.948 0.964
Benin 0.496 0.648 0.700 Kenya 0.668 0.734 0.778 Tunisia 0.632 0.794 0.868
Bolivia 0.514 0.586 0.670 Korea, S. 0.858 0.912 0.938 Turkey 0.634 0.722 0.820
Botswana 0.712 0.780 0.826 Kuwait 0.882 0.932 0.960 UAE 0.824 0.914 0.938
Brazil 0.736 0.794 0.830 Lesotho 0.630 0.678 0.736 Uganda 0.612 0.628 0.666
Bulgaria 0.906 0.952 0.966 Liberia 0.394 0.510 0.582 UK 0.958 0.970 0.980
Burkina Faso 0.388 0.468 0.536 Libya 0.634 0.700 0.768 Uruguay 0.894 0.914 0.946
Burundi 0.514 0.550 0.608 Luxembourg 0.948 0.978 0.974 USA 0.956 0.970 0.976
Cameroon 0.580 0.650 0.700 Madagascar 0.432 0.568 0.642 USSR 0.910 0.926 0.930
Canada 0.954 0.974 0.982 Malawi 0.314 0.402 0.484 Venezuela 0.864 0.900 0.912
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.520 0.512 0.562 Malaysia 0.874 0.916 0.940 Yugoslavia 0.850 0.926 0.946
Chad 0.408 0.492 0.562 Mali 0.284 0.350 0.426 Zaire 0.578 0.674 0.736
Chile 0.790 0.912 0.946 Malta 0.944 0.972 0.980 Zambia 0.656 0.708 0.750
China 0.802 0.888 0.914 Mauritius 0.846 0.916 0.942 Zimbabwe 0.692 0.768 0.820
Colombia 0.766 0.870 0.900 Mexico 0.780 0.864 0.898
Congo 0.682 0.736 0.776 Morocco 0.618 0.694 0.768
Costa Rica 0.882 0.950 0.964 Mozambique 0.408 0.464 0.406
Cuba 0.892 0.950 0.972 Myanmar 0.710 0.764 0.818
Cyprus 0.934 0.960 0.972 Nepal 0.506 0.556 0.614
Czech. 0.946 0.960 0.974 Netherlands 0.968 0.972 0.984
Denmark 0.964 0.980 0.980 New Zealand 0.958 0.968 0.976
Domini. Rep. 0.746 0.794 0.840 Nicaragua 0.664 0.734 0.816
Ecuador 0.716 0.786 0.830 Niger 0.418 0.482 0.550
Egypt 0.524 0.656 0.812 Nigeria 0.530 0.604 0.660
El Salvador 0.670 0.756 0.820 Norway 0.968 0.980 0.980
Finland 0.962 0.982 0.986 Pakistan 0.562 0.614 0.676
France 0.954 0.976 0.982 Panama 0.856 0.914 0.934
Gabon 0.536 0.612 0.666 Papua NG. 0.668 0.776 0.834
Gambia 0.356 0.446 0.518 Paraguay 0.820 0.860 0.878
GDR 0.940 0.970 0.982 Peru 0.668 0.712 0.762
Germany, W. 0.944 0.968 0.980 Philippines 0.780 0.826 0.856
Ghana 0.632 0.668 0.714 Poland 0.904 0.950 0.964
Greece 0.912 0.954 0.976 Portugal 0.856 0.938 0.968
Guatemala 0.650 0.740 0.806 Romania 0.882 0.928 0.932
Guinea 0.382 0.450 0.518 Rwanda 0.524 0.538 0.598
Haiti 0.578 0.674 0.734 Saudi Arabia 0.630 0.738 0.810
Honduras 0.630 0.718 0.794 Senegal 0.526 0.536 0.622
Hong Kong 0.952 0.970 0.984 Sierra Leone 0.310 0.400 0.478
Hungary 0.916 0.948 0.966 Singapore 0.940 0.968 0.976
Iceland 0.970 0.984 0.984 Somalia 0.464 0.506 0.564
India 0.574 0.638 0.710 South Africa 0.782 0.818 0.860
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 3) for the details concerning the construction of the SURV variable 
and the sources used. The SURV variable is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 0.000 
(lowest possible value).
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Appendix K (cont’d)
Country MOB
1970
MOB
1980
MOB
1990
MOB
1970/80
MOB
1980/90
MOB
1970/90
Portugal 0.427 0.446 0.582 0.019 0.136 0.155
Romania 0.384 0.532 0.570 0.148 0.039 0.187
Rwanda 0.117 0.129 0.135 0.012 0.006 0.018
Saudi Arabia 0.142 0.227 0.339 0.085 0.113 0.197
Senegal 0.158 0.180 0.173 0.021 -0.007 0.015
Sierra Leone 0.174 0.203 0.194 0.028 -0.008 0.020
Singapore 0.506 0.563 0.593 0.057 0.030 0.087
Somalia 0.131 0.146 0.171 0.015 0.025 0.040
South Africa 0.350 0.361 0.581 0.012 0.219 0.231
Spain 0.435 0.641 0.733 0.206 0.092 0.298
Sri Lanka 0.313 0.347 0.422 0.035 0.074 0.109
Sudan 0.111 0.165 0.194 0.054 0.029 0.083
Sweden 0.667 0.751 0.762 0.083 0.012 0.095
Switzerland 0.523 0.661 0.704 0.139 0.042 0.181
Syria 0.275 0.410 0.469 0.135 0.059 0.194
Tanzania 0.143 0.154 0.146 0.010 -0.007 0.003
Thailand 0.195 0.287 0.334 0.093 0.047 0.140
Togo 0.170 0.228 0.217 0.057 -0.011 0.046
Trinidad &T. 0.425 0.526 0.574 0.102 0.048 0.150
Tunisia 0.235 0.323 0.423 0.088 0.099 0.187
Turkey 0.218 0.295 0.328 0.077 0.033 0.111
UAE 0.298 0.452 0.541 0.153 0.090 0.243
Uganda 0.132 0.144 0.145 0.012 0.001 0.013
UK 0.622 0.681 0.724 0.059 0.043 0.102
Uruguay 0.532 0.568 0.698 0.036 0.130 0.166
USA 0.809 0.860 0.931 0.051 0.071 0.122
USSR 0.623 0.664 0.696 0.041 0.033 0.074
Venezuela 0.414 0.518 0.555 0.103 0.037 0.140
Yugoslavia 0.437 0.590 0.572 0.154 -0.018 0.135
Zaire 0.157 0.200 0.204 0.043 0.004 0.047
Zambia 0.161 0.191 0.302 0.030 0.111 0.141
Zimbabwe 0.203 0.220 0.286 0.018 0.065 0.083
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 4) for the details concerning the construction of the Mobility Index 
(MOB) and the sources used. The MOB index is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 
0.000 (lowest possible value).
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APPENDIX L - Scaled Gender Equity (GEND) Rates*
All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country GEND GEND GEND Country GEND GEND GEND Country GEND GEND GEND
1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
Afghanistan 0.052 0.072 0.091 Indonesia 0.246 0.341 0.456 Spain 0.445 0.754 0.836
Albania 0.435 0.665 0.728 Iran 0.202 0.327 0.433 Sri Lanka 0.472 0.546 0.686
Algeria 0.080 0.226 0.426 Iraq 0.169 0.375 0.379 Sudan 0.137 0.193 0.265
Angola 0.273 0.281 0.270 Ireland 0.686 0.818 0.864 Sweden 0.797 0.891 0.896
Argentina 0.465 0.567 0.671 Israel 0.589 0.738 0.787 Switzerland 0.514 0.790 0.805
Australia 0.740 0.711 0.802 Italy 0.543 0.665 0.721 Syria 0.212 0.334 0.399
Austria 0.724 0.736 0.813 Ivory Coast 0.230 0.268 0.283 Tanzania 0.287 0.287 0.284
Bangladesh 0.110 0.096 0.121 Jamaica 0.550 0.692 0.713 Thailand 0.361 0.452 0.464
Barbados 0.728 0.886 0.900 Japan 0.815 0.865 0.886 Togo 0.234 0.325 0.266
Belgium 0.729 0.829 0.885 Jordan 0.199 0.555 0.494 Trinid &T. 0.466 0.620 0.738
Benin 0.283 0.330 0.298 Kenya 0.264 0.341 0.351 Tunisia 0.167 0.255 0.416
Bolivia 0.260 0.342 0.359 Korea, S. 0.404 0.682 0.780 Turkey 0.244 0.353 0.283
Botswana 0.277 0.361 0.520 Kuwait 0.441 0.680 0.691 UAE 0.092 0.363 0.535
Brazil 0.307 0.399 0.468 Lesotho 0.311 0.398 0.452 Uganda 0.249 0.256 0.280
Bulgaria 0.791 0.832 0.781 Liberia 0.203 0.266 0.381 UK 0.707 0.808 0.808
Burkina Faso 0.269 0.276 0.286 Libya 0.089 0.416 0.413 Uruguay 0.595 0.591 0.743
Burundi 0.280 0.281 0.284 Luxembourg 0.475 0.609 0.658 USA 0.809 0.859 0.861
Cameroon 0.230 0.287 0.327 Madagascar 0.292 0.294 0.339 USSR 0.789 0.840 0.955
Canada 0.640 0.876 0.918 Malawi 0.252 0.254 0.245 Venezuela 0.358 0.457 0.440
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.281 0.311 0.287 Malaysia 0.371 0.513 0.597 Y ugoslavia 0.608 0.767 0.766
Chad 0.125 0.127 0.136 Mali 0.107 0.128 0.115 Zaire 0.252 0.333 0.296
Chile 0.419 0.539 0.697 Malta 0.458 0.561 0.670 Zambia 0.209 0.224 0.262
China 0.488 0.494 0.522 Mauritius 0.290 0.454 0.518 Zimbabwe 0.244 0.244 0.507
Colombia 0.288 0.440 0.519 Mexico 0.228 0.448 0.518
Congo 0.302 0.589 0.528 Morocco 0.131 0.238 0.325
Costa Rica 0.307 0.472 0.421 Mozambique 0.301 0.294 0.291
Cuba 0.297 0.750 0.854 Myanmar 0.332 0.339 0.363
Cyprus 0.549 0.856 0.833 Nepal 0.212 0.254 0.288
Czech. 0.513 0.867 0.865 Netherlands 0.630 0.799 0.869
Denmark 0.732 0.940 0.945 New Zealand 0.696 0.773 0.828
Domin. Rep. 0.186 0.296 0.486 Nicaragua 0.228 0.442 0.450
Ecuador 0.254 0.461 0.503 Niger 0.274 0.283 0.279
Egypt 0.199 0.336 0.552 Nigeria 0.223 0.293 0.304
El Salvador 0.262 0.297 0.318 Norway 0.756 0.890 0.896
Finland 0.940 0.951 0.956 Pakistan 0.084 0.111 0.162
France 0.741 0.857 0.918 Panama 0.422 0.590 0.587
Gabon 0.253 0.393 0.356 Papua NG. 0.192 0.241 0.261
Gambia 0.263 0.278 0.309 Paraguay 0.234 0.297 0.325
GDR 0.867 0.804 0.783 Peru 0.304 0.509 0.551
Germany, W. 0.791 0.851 0.886 Philippines 0.474 0.663 0.694
Ghana 0.285 0.441 0.435 Poland 0.700 0.805 0.839
Greece 0.527 0.681 0.826 Portugal 0.504 0.476 0.615
Guatemala 0.127 0.195 0.233 Romania 0.506 0.734 0.886
Guinea 0.264 0.285 0.248 Rwanda 0.280 0.294 0.298
Haiti 0.300 0.324 0.371 Saudi Arabia 0.062 0.194 0.331
Honduras 0.173 0.297 0.347 Senegal 0.266 0.273 0.290
Hong Kong 0.408 0.658 0.724 Sierra Leone 0.226 0.247 0.264
Hungary 0.609 0.709 0.798 Singapore 0.468 0.604 0.672
Iceland 0.721 0.810 0.879 Somalia 0.238 0.252 0.242
India 0.263 0.301 0.367 South Africa 0.299 0.318 0.693
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 4) for the details concerning the construction of the GEND variable
and the sources used. The GEND variable is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 0.000
(lowest possible value).
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APPENDIX M - Scaled % Non-Agricultural Employment (%NAgr) Rates*
All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country %NAgr %NAgr %NAgr Country %NAgr %NAgr %NAgr Country %NAgr %NAgr %NAgr
1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
Afghanistan 0.180 0.210 0.390 Indonesia 0.340 0.500 0.440 Spain 0.740 0.860 0.890
Albania 0.340 0.390 0.440 Iran 0.540 0.610 0.700 Sri Lanka 0.450 0.460 0.510
Algeria 0.500 0.750 0.820 Iraq 0.580 0.580 0.860 Sudan 0.180 0.280 0.280
Angola 0.360 0.410 0.270 Ireland 0.730 0.820 0.860 Sweden 0.920 0.950 0.970
Argentina 0.840 0.870 0.870 Israel 0.900 0.930 0.960 Switzerland 0.920 0.950 0.940
Australia 0.920 0.940 0.940 Italy 0.810 0.890 0.910 Syria 0.490 0.670 0.770
Austria 0.850 0.910 0.930 Ivory Coast 0.160 0.210 0.350 Tanzania 0.140 0.170 0.150
Bangladesh 0.140 0.260 0.410 Jamaica 0.700 0.790 0.740 Thailand 0.200 0.240 0.330
Barbados 0.790 0.920 0.930 Japan 0.800 0.880 0.930 Togo 0.270 0.330 0.350
Belgium 0.950 0.970 0.970 Jordan 0.660 0.800 0.900 Trinid. & T. 0.770 0.900 0.900
Benin 0.500 0.540 0.300 Kenya 0.180 0.220 0.190 Tunisia 0.500 0.650 0.740
Bolivia 0.450 0.500 0.530 Korea, S. 0.500 0.660 0.830 Turkey 0.330 0.460 0.530
Botswana 0.130 0.220 0.720 Kuwait 0.980 0.980 0.990 UAE 0.790 0.950 0.950
Brazil 0.540 0.700 0.750 Lesotho 0.100 0.130 0.770 Uganda 0.140 0.170 0.140
Bulgaria 0.530 0.630 0.830 Liberia 0.250 0.300 0.250 UK 0.970 0.980 0.980
Burkina Faso 0.130 0.180 0.130 Libya 0.720 0.820 0.800 Uruguay 0.850 0.890 0.950
Burundi 0.130 0.160 0.080 Luxembourg 0.920 0.960 0.970 USA 0.960 0.980 0.970
Cameroon 0.150 0.170 0.210 Madagascar 0.100 0.130 0.190 USSR 0.740 0.860 0.800
Canada 0.920 0.950 0.950 Malawi 0.110 0.140 0.130 Venezuela 0.740 0.820 0.870
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.090 0.120 0.190 Malaysia 0.440 0.500 0.740 Y ugoslavia 0.490 0.710 0.710
Chad 0.100 0.150 0.170 Mali 0.090 0.270 0.150 Zaire 0.210 0.250 0.290
Chile 0.770 0.810 0.810 Malta 0.930 0.950 0.970 Zambia 0.270 0.330 0.620
China 0.230 0.260 0.270 Mauritius 0.660 0.710 0.840 Zimbabwe 0.360 0.400 0.290
Colombia 0.620 0.740 0.900 Mexico 0.550 0.640 0.770
Congo 0.580 0.660 0.380 Morocco 0.430 0.480 0.540
Costa Rica 0.580 0.710 0.750 Mozambique 0.270 0.340 0.150
Cuba 0.670 0.760 0.760 Myanmar 0.300 0.330 0.300
Cyprus 0.610 0.700 0.850 Nepal 0.060 0.070 0.070
Czech. 0.830 0.890 0.890 Netherlands 0.920 0.940 0.950
Denmark 0.890 0.930 0.940 New Zealand 0.880 0.910 0.890
Domin. Rep. 0.390 0.510 0.540 Nicaragua 0.490 0.570 0.540
Ecuador 0.490 0.480 0.670 Niger 0.070 0.090 0.150
Egypt 0.460 0.500 0.580 Nigeria 0.380 0.460 0.520
El Salvador 0.440 0.490 0.890 Norway 0.880 0.930 0.940
Finland 0.790 0.890 0.910 Pakistan 0.410 0.430 0.530
France 0.860 0.920 0.940 Panama 0.580 0.730 0.730
Gabon 0.190 0.230 0.250 Papua NG. 0.140 0.180 0.240
Gambia 0.180 0.210 0.160 Paraguay 0.470 0.510 0.520
GDR 0.870 0.900 0.890 Peru 0.520 0.600 0.650
Germany, W. 0.920 0.960 0.970 Philippines 0.470 0.540 0.550
Ghana 0.420 0.470 0.410 Poland 0.610 0.690 0.730
Greece 0.540 0.630 0.770 Portugal 0.670 0.720 0.830
Guatemala 0.390 0.450 0.500 Romania 0.510 0.700 0.710
Guinea 0.150 0.180 0.220 Rwanda 0.070 0.090 0.100
Haiti 0.260 0.260 0.320 Saudi Arabia 0.340 0.390 0.520
Honduras 0.330 0.370 0.620 Senegal 0.190 0.230 0.190
Hong Kong 0.960 0.970 0.990 Sierra Leone 0.290 0.350 0.300
Hungary 0.750 0.790 0.850 Singapore 0.960 0.980 1.000
Iceland 0.820 0.870 0.890 Somalia 0.150 0.180 0.240
India 0.260 0.300 0.380 South Africa 0.690 0.700 0.870
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 4) for the details concerning the construction of the %NAgr variable
and the sources used. The %NAgr variable is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 0.000
(lowest possible value).
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APPENDIX N - Scaled Tertiary Enrolment (TERT) Rates*
All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country TERT TERT TERT Country TERT TERT TERT Country TERT TERT TERT
1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
Afghanistan 0.009 0.021 0.020 Indonesia 0.037 0.051 0.123 Spain 0.119 0.309 0.472
Albania 0.085 0.068 0.093 Iran 0.041 0.065 0.124 Sri Lanka 0.016 0.036 0.069
Algeria 0.025 0.079 0.145 Iraq 0.069 0.116 0.168 Sudan 0.016 0.023 0.037
Angola 0.005 0.005 0.009 Ireland 0.181 0.243 0.391 Sweden 0.285 0.411 0.420
Argentina 0.189 0.285 0.532 Israel 0.267 0.392 0.431 Switzerland 0.133 0.244 0.365
Australia 0.221 0.336 0.467 Italy 0.223 0.360 0.399 Syria 0.123 0.225 0.237
Austria 0.157 0.292 0.457 Ivory Coast 0.012 0.039 0.033 Tanzania 0.003 0.004 0.004
Bangladesh 0.028 0.043 0.045 Jamaica 0.073 0.089 0.079 Thailand 0.023 0.169 0.209
Barbados 0.053 0.193 0.227 Japan 0.227 0.407 0.383 Togo 0.007 0.028 0.033
Belgium 0.233 0.347 0.504 Jordan 0.029 0.355 0.289 Trinid. &T. 0.037 0.059 0.085
Benin 0.001 0.015 0.036 Kenya 0.011 0.012 0.020 Tunisia 0.039 0.065 0.112
Bolivia 0.124 0.213 0.275 Korea, S. 0.105 0.196 0.503 Turkey 0.080 0.072 0.172
Botswana 0.005 0.017 0.041 Kuwait 0.049 0.151 0.197 UAE 0.013 0.041 0.139
Brazil 0.068 0.148 0.151 Lesotho 0.007 0.023 0.049 Uganda 0.007 0.007 0.015
Bulgaria 0.192 0.216 0.401 Liberia 0.013 0.032 0.033 UK 0.188 0.255 0.384
Burkina Faso 0.001 0.004 0.009 Libya 0.041 0.104 0.219 Uruguay 0.151 0.223 0.401
Burundi 0.003 0.007 0.009 Luxembourg 0.021 0.035 0.032 USA 0.659 0.741 0.963
Cameroon 0.007 0.021 0.043 Madagascar 0.013 0.036 0.043 USSR 0.339 0.292 0.335
Canada 0.461 0.547 0.949 Malawi 0.004 0.008 0.009 Venezuela 0.145 0.276 0.355
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.001 0.012 0.019 Malaysia 0.021 0.055 0.063 Yugoslavia 0.212 0.293 0.240
Chad 0.000 0.003 0.011 Mali 0.003 0.011 0.011 Zaire 0.009 0.016 0.025
Chile 0.125 0.165 0.275 Malta 0.076 0.043 0.156 Zambia 0.005 0.019 0.025
China 0.001 0.016 0.023 Mauritius 0.039 0.011 0.029 Zimbabwe 0.004 0.017 0.060
Colombia 0.064 0.121 0.189 Mexico 0.079 0.188 0.187
Congo 0.024 0.068 0.071 Morocco 0.020 0.079 0.132
Costa Rica 0.141 0.280 0.351 Mozambique 0.004 0.001 0.003
Cuba 0.049 0.231 0.277 Myanmar 0.029 0.063 0.064
Cyprus 0.019 0.041 0.200 Nepal 0.031 0.036 0.067
Czech. 0.139 0.232 0.227 Netherlands 0.260 0.391 0.468
Denmark 0.245 0.377 0.448 New Zealand 0.232 0.360 0.593
Domin. Rep. 0.084 0.128 0.248 Nicaragua 0.076 0.172 0.124
Ecuador 0.105 0.453 0.255 Niger 0.001 0.004 0.009
Egypt 0.107 0.231 0.245 Nigeria 0.007 0.028 0.047
El Salvador 0.044 0.055 0.203 Norway 0.212 0.340 0.560
Finland 0.177 0.429 0.643 Pakistan 0.031 0.024 0.035
France 0.260 0.333 0.528 Panama 0.096 0.273 0.279
Gabon 0.005 0.033 0.049 Papua NG. 0.007 0.025 0.023
Gambia 0.001 0.009 0.009 Paraguay 0.057 0.111 0.108
GDR 0.437 0.399 0.464 Peru 0.147 0.231 0.441
Germany, W. 0.179 0.341 0.508 Philippines 0.264 0.323 0.325
Ghana 0.011 0.021 0.019 Poland 0.187 0.241 0.292
Greece 0.180 0.228 0.339 Portugal 0.107 0.143 0.301
Guatemala 0.045 0.108 0.115 Romania 0.135 0.161 0.115
Guinea 0.008 0.060 0.019 Rwanda 0.003 0.004 0.008
Haiti 0.009 0.012 0.016 Saudi Arabia 0.023 0.096 0.167
Honduras 0.031 0.101 0.111 Senegal 0.019 0.036 0.039
Hong Kong 0.099 0.139 0.235 Sierra Leone 0.007 0.011 0.019
Hungary 0.135 0.188 0.193 Singapore 0.091 0.104 0.107
Iceland 0.135 0.231 0.341 Somalia 0.005 0.007 0.031
India 0.083 0.069 0.089 South Africa 0.060 0.065 0.179
♦Notes. See Technical Note 3 (section 4) for the details concerning the construction of the TERT variable
and the sources used. The TERT variable is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 0.000
(lowest possible value).
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APPENDIX O - Integrated Human Development Index (I-HDI) Values*
Part 1. All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country I-HDI
1970
I-HDI
1980
I-HDI
1990
I-HDI
1970/80
I-HDI
1980/90
I-HDI
1970/90
Afghanistan 0.313 0.224 0.216 -0.089 -0.008 -0.097
Albania 0.556 0.627 0.698 0.071 0.072 0.142
Algeria 0.451 0.531 0.596 0.080 0.064 0.145
Angola 0.268 0.235 0.195 -0.033 -0.040 -0.073
Argentina 0.715 0.629 0.772 -0.085 0.142 0.057
Australia 0.884 0.885 0.921 0.001 0.036 0.037
Austria 0.873 0.888 0.923 0.015 0.034 0.050
Bangladesh 0.307 0.326 0.387 0.019 0.061 0.080
Barbados 0.841 0.862 0.902 0.021 0.040 0.062
Belgium 0.877 0.890 0.926 0.013 0.036 0.049
Benin 0.386 0.389 0.435 0.003 0.046 0.049
Bolivia 0.507 0.518 0.537 0.011 0.020 0.031
Botswana 0.468 0.548 0.712 0.080 0.164 0.244
Brazil 0.499 0.625 0.678 0.127 0.053 0.180
Bulgaria 0.683 0.758 0.772 0.075 0.014 0.089
Burkina Faso 0.358 0.365 0.390 0.008 0.025 0.032
Burundi 0.238 0.370 0.419 0.132 0.050 0.181
Cameroon 0.439 0.444 0.520 0.005 0.076 0.082
Canada 0.900 0.915 0.950 0.015 0.035 0.049
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.354 0.376 0.409 0.022 0.032 0.054
Chad 0.268 0.297 0.350 0.029 0.054 0.082
Chile 0.621 0.652 0.804 0.030 0.152 0.183
China 0.390 0.463 0.613 0.073 0.151 0.223
Colombia 0.646 0.641 0.724 -0.004 0.083 0.079
Congo 0.440 0.490 0.557 0.050 0.067 0.116
Costa Rica 0.742 0.786 0.825 0.044 0.039 0.083
Cuba 0.613 0.728 0.697 0.115 -0.031 0.084
Cyprus 0.731 0.821 0.880 0.090 0.059 0.149
Czech. 0.696 0.801 0.831 0.104 0.030 0.135
Denmark 0.885 0.897 0.921 0.011 0.025 0.036
Dominican Rep. 0.578 0.630 0.663 0.051 0.034 0.085
Ecuador 0.597 0.687 0.697 0.090 0.010 0 .100
Egypt 0.324 0.490 0.628 0.166 0.137 0.304
El Salvador 0.541 0.479 0.521 -0.063 0.042 -0.021
Finland 0.859 0.873 0.920 0.014 0.047 0.061
France 0.868 0.878 0.913 0.011 0.035 0.045
Gabon 0.467 0.499 0.581 0.031 0.083 0.114
Gambia 0.381 0.386 0.417 0.005 0.032 0.036
GDR 0.749 0.802 0.836 0.052 0.034 0.086
Germany, W. 0.879 0.882 0.919 0.003 0.036 0.040
Ghana 0.430 0.429 0.440 -0.001 0.010 0 .010
Greece 0.677 0.821 0.847 0.144 0.027 0.171
Guatemala 0.478 0.495 0.566 0.017 0.071 0.088
Guinea 0.305 0.328 0.341 0.023 0.013 0.036
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Appendix 
O, Part 1 (cont’d)
Appendix O, Part 1 (cont’d)
Country I-HDI
1970
I-HDI
1980
I-HDI
1990
I-HDI
1970/80
I-HDI
1980/90
I-HDI
1970/90
Poland 0.694 0.806 0.728 0.112 -0.079 0.034
Portugal 0.533 0.756 0.823 0.223 0.066 0.290
Romania 0.642 0.743 0.691 0.102 -0.053 0.049
Rwanda 0.362 0.375 0.390 0.013 0.015 0.028
Saudi Arabia 0.539 0.578 0.650 0.039 0.072 0.111
Senegal 0.370 0.426 0.490 0.056 0.064 0.120
Sierra Leone 0.355 0.357 0.305 0.002 -0.052 -0.050
Singapore 0.717 0.765 0.816 0.048 0.051 0.099
Somalia 0.271 0.247 0.183 -0.024 -0.064 -0.089
South Africa 0.606 0.593 0.619 -0.013 0.026 0.013
Spain 0.746 0.826 0.892 0.079 0.067 0.146
Sri Lanka 0.595 0.615 0.620 0.019 0.005 0.024
Sudan 0.264 0.288 0.267 0.025 -0.021 0.004
Sweden 0.896 0.903 0.924 0.007 0.021 0.028
Switzerland 0.876 0.902 0.926 0.027 0.024 0.051
Syria 0.405 0.545 0.643 0.140 0.098 0.238
Tanzania 0.388 0.380 0.403 -0.009 0.024 0.015
Thailand 0.541 0.607 0.764 0.067 0.157 0.223
Togo 0.395 0.412 0.455 0.018 0.043 0.060
Trinidad &T. 0.789 0.802 0.868 0.013 0.067 0.080
Tunisia 0.483 0.577 0.714 0.094 0.137 0.231
Turkey 0.516 0.531 0.615 0.014 0.084 0.099
UAE 0.578 0.704 0.765 0.126 0.061 0.186
Uganda 0.274 0.213 0.262 -0.061 0.049 -0.012
UK 0.864 0.858 0.897 -0.006 0.038 0.032
Uruguay 0.674 0.692 0.777 0.018 0.086 0.104
USA 0.811 0.900 0.896 0.089 -0.004 0.085
USSR 0.705 0.684 0.727 -0.021 0.043 0.021
Venezuela 0.773 0.789 0.786 0.017 -0.003 0.013
Yugoslavia 0.611 0.743 0.627 0.132 -0.115 0.017
Zaire 0.348 0.384 0.376 0.036 -0.008 0.028
Zambia 0.457 0.467 0.430 0.010 -0.037 -0.027
Zimbabwe 0.452 0.466 0.540 0.014 0.074 0.088
♦Notes. The construction of the Integrated Human Development Index (I-HDI) was explained in Chapter 3. 
The I-HDI is based on a scale from 1.000 (highest possible value) to 0.000 (lowest possible value).
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Appendix O (cont’d) Part 2. Country Ranks By I-HDI Values (1970,1980,1990)
Ra Country I-HDI
1970
Ra Country I-HDI
1980
Ra Country I-HDI
1990
1 Canada 0.900 1 Canada 0.915 1 Canada 0.950
2 Sweden 0.896 2 Japan 0.906 n Japan 0.934
3 Norway 0.889 3 Norway 0.904 3 Netherlands 0.933
4 Denmark 0.885 4 Sweden 0.903 4 Norway 0.931
5 Australia 0.884 5 Switzerland 0.902 5 Switzerland 0.926
6 Japan 0.884 6 USA 0.900 6 Belgium 0.926
7 Netherlands 0.880 7 Denmark 0.897 7 Sweden 0.924
8 New Zealand 0.879 8 Netherlands 0.896 8 Austria 0.923
9 Iceland 0.879 9 Belgium 0.890 9 Denmark 0.921
10 Germany, W. 0.879 10 Austria 0.888 10 Australia 0.921
11 Belgium 0.877 11 Australia 0.885 11 Finland 0.920
12 Switzerland 0.876 12 Germany, W. 0.882 12 Germany, W. 0.919
13 Austria 0.873 13 New Zealand 0.878 13 France 0.913
14 France 0.868 14 France 0.878 14 New Zealand 0.908
15 UK 0.864 15 Finland 0.873 15 Ireland 0.903
16 Finland 0.859 16 Luxembourg 0.872 16 Barbados 0.902
17 Luxembourg 0.854 17 Ireland 0.862 17 Luxembourg 0.898
18 Barbados 0.841 18 Barbados 0.862 18 UK 0.897
19 Italy 0.836 19 UK 0.858 19 USA 0.896
20 Ireland 0.836 20 Italy 0.841 20 Spain 0.892
21 USA 0.811 21 Iceland 0.837 21 Italy 0.892
22 Hong Kong 0.791 22 Hong Kong 0.836 22 Cyprus 0.880
23 Trinidad &T. 0.789 23 Spain 0.826 23 Hong Kong 0.869
24 Venezuela 0.773 24 Cyprus 0.821 24 Trinidad &T. 0 .868
25 GDR 0.749 25 Greece 0.821 25 Malta 0 .866
26 Spain 0.746 26 Malta 0.814 26 Iceland 0 .866
27 Costa Rica 0.742 27 Poland 0.806 27 Korea, S. 0.849
28 Jamaica 0.739 28 Trinidad &T. 0.802 28 Greece 0.847
29 Cyprus 0.731 29 GDR 0.802 29 GDR 0.836
30 Malta 0.729 30 Czech. 0.801 30 Hungary 0.836
31 Kuwait 0.728 31 Hungary 0.798 31 Czech. 0.831
32 Israel 0.720 32 Venezuela 0.789 32 Costa Rica 0.825
33 Singapore 0.717 33 Costa Rica 0.786 33 Portugal 0.823
34 Argentina 0.715 34 Kuwait 0.768 34 Singapore 0.816
35 Hungary 0.705 35 Israel 0.766 35 Chile 0.804
36 USSR 0.705 36 Singapore 0.765 36 Mauritius 0.797
37 Czech. 0.696 37 Bulgaria 0.758 37 Venezuela 0.786
38 Poland 0.694 38 Portugal 0.756 38 Uruguay 0.777
39 Mexico 0.687 39 Romania 0.743 39 Panama 0.774
40 Bulgaria 0.683 40 Yugoslavia 0.743 40 Bulgaria 0.772
41 Greece 0.677 41 Cuba 0.728 41 Argentina 0.772
42 Uruguay 0.674 42 Mexico 0.727 42 Israel 0.768
43 Mauritius 0.656 43 Panama 0.718 43 Jamaica 0.765
44 Colombia 0.646 44 UAE 0.704 44 UAE 0.765
45 Romania 0.642 45 Uruguay 0.692 45 Thailand 0.764
46 Panama 0.632 46 Ecuador 0.687 46 Malaysia 0.758
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Appendix O, Part 2. (cont’d)
Ra Country I-HDI
1970
Ra Country I-HDI
1980
Ra Country I-HDI
1990
47 Chile 0.621 47 Malaysia 0.684 47 Kuwait 0.740
48 Cuba 0.613 48 Jamaica 0.684 48 Poland 0.728
49 Yugoslavia 0.611 49 USSR 0.684 49 USSR 0.727
50 South Africa 0.606 50 Mauritius 0.668 50 Colombia 0.724
51 Ecuador 0.597 51 Korea, S. 0.657 51 Tunisia 0.714
52 Sri Lanka 0.595 52 Chile 0.652 52 Botswana 0.712
53 Malaysia 0.595 53 Colombia 0.641 53 Albania 0.698
54 Domin. Rep. 0.578 54 Domin. Rep. 0.630 54 Cuba 0.697
55 UAE 0.578 55 Argentina 0.629 55 Ecuador 0.697
56 Peru 0.576 56 Albania 0.627 56 Mexico 0.696
57 Paraguay 0.573 57 Paraguay 0.626 57 Romania 0.691
58 Korea, S. 0.563 58 Brazil 0.625 58 Jordan 0.689
59 Nicaragua 0.558 59 Jordan 0.620 59 Brazil 0.678
60 Albania 0.556 60 Libya 0.617 60 Domin. Rep. 0.663
61 El Salvador 0.541 61 Sri Lanka 0.615 61 Paraguay 0.659
62 Thailand 0.541 62 Thailand 0.607 62 Libya 0.657
63 Saudi Arabia 0.539 63 South Africa 0.593 63 Saudi Arabia 0.650
64 Portugal 0.533 64 Saudi Arabia 0.578 64 Syria 0.643
65 Turkev 0.516 65 Tunisia 0.577 65 Honduras 0.630
66 Papua New G. 0.516 66 Peru 0.575 66 Egypt 0.628
67 Bolivia 0.507 67 Honduras 0.565 67 Yugoslavia 0.627
68 Iran 0.507 68 Botswana 0.548 68 Philippines 0.621
69 Philippines 0.503 69 Syria 0.545 69 Sri Lanka 0.620
70 Brazil 0.499 70 Papua New G. 0.532 70 South Africa 0.619
71 Honduras 0.489 71 Algeria 0.531 71 Turkey 0.615
72 Tunisia 0.483 72 Turkey 0.531 72 China 0.613
73 Guatemala 0.478 73 Philippines 0.529 73 Indonesia 0.602
74 Lesotho 0.475 74 Bolivia 0.518 74 Algeria 0.596
75 Morocco 0.468 75 Lesotho 0.502 75 Morocco 0.582
76 Botswana 0.468 76 Gabon 0.499 76 Gabon 0.581
77 Gabon 0.467 77 Nicaragua 0.497 77 Papua New G. 0.573
78 Libya 0.467 78 Guatemala 0.495 78 Guatemala 0.566
79 Madagascar 0.462 79 Kenya 0.492 79 Iran 0.566
80 Zambia 0.457 80 Egypt 0.490 80 Peru 0.559
81 Kenya 0.456 81 Congo 0.490 81 Congo 0.557
82 Myanmar 0.455 82 Morocco 0.481 82 Lesotho 0.555
83 Zimbabwe 0.452 83 El Salvador 0.479 83 Zimbabwe 0.540
84 Algeria 0.451 84 Iraq 0.468 84 Bolivia 0.537
85 Congo 0.440 85 Zambia 0.467 85 El Salvador 0.521
86 Cameroon 0.439 86 Zimbabwe 0.466 86 Iraq 0.520
87 Ghana 0.430 87 China 0.463 87 Cameroon 0.520
88 Iraq 0.421 88 Ivory Coast 0.456 88 Nicaragua 0.516
89 Jordan 0.419 89 Myanmar 0.445 89 Pakistan 0.513
90 Syria 0.405 90 Cameroon 0.444 90 Kenya 0.512
91 Ivory Coast 0.405 91 Madagascar 0.441 91 Ivory Coast 0.505
92 Togo 0.395 92 Haiti 0.438 92 Haiti 0.498
396
Appendix O, Part 2. (cont’d)
Ra Country I-HDI Ra Country I-HDI Ra Country I-HDI
1970 1980 1990
93 Haiti 0.394 93 Iran 0.436 93 Madagascar 0.493
94 China 0.390 94 Nigeria 0.434 94 Senegal 0.490
95 Tanzania 0.388 95 Ghana 0.429 95 Nigeria 0.471
96 Benin 0.386 96 India 0.427 96 India 0.467
97 Liberia 0.382 97 Senegal 0.426 97 Togo 0.455
98 Gambia 0.381 98 Liberia 0.413 98 Nepal 0.447
99 Senegal 0.370 99 Togo 0.412 99 Myanmar 0.446
100 Rwanda 0.362 100 Nepal 0.406 100 Ghana 0.440
101 Nepal 0.360 101 Indonesia 0.401 101 Benin 0.435
102 Burkina Faso 0.358 102 Pakistan 0.398 102 Zambia 0.430
103 India 0.357 103 Benin 0.389 103 Burundi 0.419
104 Sierra Leone 0.355 104 Gambia 0.386 104 Gambia 0.417
105 Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.354 105 Zaire 0.384 105 Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.409
106 Zaire 0.348 106 Tanzania 0.380 106 Tanzania 0.403
107 Malawi 0.339 107 Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.376 107 Liberia 0.395
108 Niger 0.333 108 Rwanda 0.375 108 Niger 0.391
109 Nigeria 0.330 109 Burundi 0.370 109 Rwanda 0.390
110 Egypt 0.324 110 Burkina Faso 0.365 110 Burkina Faso 0.390
111 Pakistan 0.322 111 Sierra Leone 0357 111 Bangladesh 0387
112 Afghanistan 0.313 112 Malawi 0.344 112 Zaire 0.376
113 Bangladesh 0.307 113 Niger 0.340 113 Malawi 0.373
114 Guinea 0.305 114 Guinea 0.328 114 Mali 0.372
115 Mozambique 0.295 115 Bangladesh 0.326 115 Chad 0.350
116 Mali 0.293 116 Mali 0.319 116 Guinea 0.341
117 Uganda 0.274 117 Chad 0.297 117 Sierra Leone 0.305
118 Somalia 0.271 118 Sudan 0.288 118 Sudan 0.267
119 Indonesia 0.271 119 Mozambique 0.272 119 Uganda 0.262
120 Angola 0.268 120 Somalia 0.247 120 Afghanistan 0.216
121 Chad 0.268 121 Angola 0.235 121 Mozambique 0.211
122 Sudan 0.264 122 Afghanistan 0.224 122 Angola 0.195
123 Burundi 0.238 123 Uganda 0.213 123 Somalia 0.183
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APPENDIX P - Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDP/C, $US) Values
Part 1. All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country GDP/C GDP/C GDP/C Country GDP/C GDP/C GDP/C Country GDP/C GDP/C GDP/C
1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
Afghanistan 93 219 400 Indonesia 79 517 520 Spain 1110 5650 9602
Albania 389 881 1016 Iran 388 2488 2720 Sri Lanka 190 279 405
Algeria 376 2260 2024 Iraq 391 2848 3220 Sudan 167 209 240
Angola 137 363 665 Ireland 1316 5654 9200 Sweden 4164 15028 22538
Argentina 991 5462 1892 Israel 1921 5888 10168 Switzerland 3351 16083 26894
Australia 3133 10599 17516 Italy 1997 8021 15166 Syria 344 1484 884
Austria 1936 10183 16688 Ivory Coast 271 1242 849 Tanzania 101 279 107
Bangladesh 97 179 218 Jamaica 748 1250 1600 Thailand 198 688 1269
Barbados 553 3442 6656 Japan 1953 9068 23052 Togo 130 432 381
Belgium 2597 11979 15535 Jordan 258 1373 1147 Trinid &T. 847 5763 3209
Benin 93 336 355 Kenya 148 426 357 Tunisia 281 1370 1251
Bolivia 234 900 609 Korea, S. 279 1643 5030 Turkey 358 1281 1461
Botswana 134 990 1989 Kuwait 3856 20688 11672 UAE 2976 29159 17635
Brazil 454 1877 3270 Lesotho 66 274 234 Uganda 197 124 173
Bulgaria 735 2059 2878 Liberia 224 488 497 UK 2219 9487 14482
Burkina Faso 54 185 216 Libya 1873 11735 5094 Uruguay 856 3477 2736
Burundi 70 230 207 Luxembourg 3238 12454 18864 USA 4922 11804 20749
Cameroon 175 779 986 Madagascar 133 372 139 USSR 1592 3409 5053
Canada 3960 10947 20739 Malawi 71 201 195 Venezuela 1299 4644 2353
Cen. Afr. Rep. 97 343 374 Malaysia 319 1779 2149 Y ugoslavia 714 3136 3456
Chad 89 205 165 Mali 63 243 236 Zaire 95 234 102
Chile 858 2474 1958 Malta 698 3109 5479 Zambia 427 677 388
China 111 305 381 Mauritius 271 1170 1939 Zimbabwe 287 751 625
Colombia 337 1241 1219 Mexico 704 2766 2396
Congo 217 1022 1031 Morocco 258 971 916
Costa Rica 569 2114 1807 Mozambique 108 199 84
Cuba 701 1575 1884 Myanmar 104 165 303
Cyprus 1579 3419 6481 Nepal 75 131 164
Czech. 1378 2704 3322 Netherlands 2568 11975 15059
Denmark 3209 12943 20373 New Zealand 2233 7113 12113
Domin. Rep. 336 1164 953 Nicaragua 378 786 792
Ecuador 277 1444 1005 Niger 96 454 266
Egypt 255 526 652 Nigeria 175 1125 157
El Salvador 287 788 1121 Norway 2884 14124 21636
Finland 2364 10802 23258 Pakistan 162 333 386
France 2814 12335 17124 Panama 667 1818 1919
Gabon 664 5305 2978 Papua NG. 317 896 926
Gambia 116 425 334 Paraguay 253 1413 990
GDR 2010 7492 11811 Peru 529 1161 1356
Germany, W. 3042 13216 19406 Philippines 187 729 728
Ghana 257 1451 353 Poland 1870 1710 1865
Greece 1133 4163 5400 Portugal 684 2569 4414
Guatemala 363 1139 949 Romania 640 1530 2315
Guinea 518 385 432 Rwanda 58 225 310
Haiti 73 267 439 Saudi Arabia 673 12373 5538
Honduras 263 695 660 Senegal 208 536 690
Hong Kong 916 5467 10877 Sierra Leone 156 337 251
Hungary 537 2069 2733 Singapore 914 4852 10539
Iceland 2430 14105 20598 Somalia 93 515 173
India 104 250 317 South Africa 768 2740 2569
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Part 2. Country Ranks By GDP/C Values (1970,1980,1990)
Ra Country GDP/C
1970
Ra Country GDP/C
1980
Ra Country GDP/C
1990
1 USA 4922 1 UAE 29159 1 Switzerland 26894
2 Sweden 4164 2 Kuwait 20688 2 Finland 23258
3 Canada 3960 3 Switzerland 16083 3 Japan 23052
4 Kuwait 3856 4 Sweden 15028 4 Sweden 22538
5 Switzerland 3351 5 Norway 14124 5 Norway 21636
6 Luxembourg 3238 6 Iceland 14105 6 USA 20749
7 Denmark 3209 7 Germany, W. 13216 7 Canada 20739
8 Australia 3133 8 Denmark 12943 8 Iceland 20598
9 Germany, W. 3042 9 Luxembourg 12454 9 Denmark 20373
10 UAE 2976 10 Saudi Arabia 12373 10 Germany, W. 19406
11 Norway 2884 11 France 12335 11 Luxembourg 18864
12 France 2814 12 Belgium 11979 12 UAE 17635
13 Belgium 2597 13 Netherlands 11975 13 Australia 17516
14 Netherlands 2568 14 USA 11804 14 France 17124
15 Iceland 2430 15 Libya 11735 15 Austria 16688
16 Finland 2364 16 Canada 10947 16 Belgium 15535
17 New Zealand 2233 17 Finland 10802 17 Italy 15166
18 UK 2219 18 Australia 10599 18 Netherlands 15059
19 GDR 2010 19 Austria 10183 19 UK 14482
20 Italy 1997 20 UK 9487 20 New Zealand 12113
21 Japan 1953 21 Japan 9068 21 GDR 11811
22 Austria 1936 22 Italy 8021 22 Kuwait 11672
23 Israel 1921 23 GDR 7492 23 Hong Kong 10877
24 Libya 1873 24 New Zealand 7113 24 Singapore 10539
25 Poland 1870 25 Israel 5888 25 Israel 10168
26 USSR 1592 26 Trinidad &T. 5763 26 Spain 9602
27 Cyprus 1579 27 Ireland 5654 27 Ireland 9200
28 Czech. 1378 28 Spain 5650 28 Barbados 6656
29 Ireland 1316 29 Hong Kong 5467 29 Cyprus 6481
30 Venezuela 1299 30 Argentina 5462 30 Saudi Arabia 5538
31 Greece 1133 31 Gabon 5305 31 Malta 5479
32 Spain 1110 32 Singapore 4852 32 Greece 5400
33 Argentina 991 33 Venezuela 4644 33 Libya 5094
34 Hong Kong 916 34 Greece 4163 34 USSR 5053
35 Singapore 914 35 Uruguay 3477 35 Korea, S. 5030
36 Chile 858 36 Barbados 3442 36 Portugal 4414
37 Uruguay 856 37 Cyprus 3419 37 Yugoslavia 3456
38 Trinidad &T. 847 38 USSR 3409 38 Czech. 3322
39 South Africa 768 39 Yugoslavia 3136 39 Brazil 3270
40 Jamaica 748 40 Malta 3109 40 Iraq 3220
41 Bulgaria 735 41 Iraq 2848 41 Trinidad &T. 3209
42 Yugoslavia 714 42 Mexico 2766 42 Gabon 2978
43 Mexico 704 43 South Africa 2740 43 Bulgaria 2878
44 Cuba 701 44 Czech. 2704 44 Uruguay 2736
45 Malta 698 45 Portugal 2569 45 Hungary 2733
46 Portugal 684 46 Iran 2488 46 Iran 2720
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Appendix P, Part 2. (cont’d)
Ra Country GDP/C Ra Country GDP/C Ra Country GDP/C
1970 1980 1990
47 Saudi Arabia 673 47 Chile 2474 47 South Africa 2569
48 Panama 667 48 Algeria 2260 48 Mexico 2396
49 Gabon 664 49 Costa Rica 2114 49 Venezuela 2353
50 Romania 640 50 Hungary 2069 50 Romania 2315
51 Costa Rica 569 51 Bulgaria 2059 51 Malaysia 2149
52 Barbados 553 52 Brazil 1877 52 Algeria 2024
53 Hungary 537 53 Panama 1818 53 Botswana 1989
54 Peru 529 54 Malaysia 1779 54 Chile 1958
55 Guinea 518 55 Poland 1710 55 Mauritius 1939
56 Brazil 454 56 Korea, S. 1643 56 Panama 1919
57 Zambia 427 57 Cuba 1575 57 Argentina 1892
58 Iraq 391 58 Romania 1530 58 Cuba 1884
59 Albania 389 59 Syria 1484 59 Poland 1865
60 Iran 388 60 Ghana 1451 60 Costa Rica 1807
61 Nicaragua 378 61 Ecuador 1444 61 Jamaica 1600
62 Algeria 376 62 Paraguay 1413 62 Turkey 1461
63 Guatemala 363 63 Jordan 1373 63 Peru 1356
64 Turkey 358 64 Tunisia 1370 64 Thailand 1269
65 Syria 344 65 Turkey 1281 65 Tunisia 1251
66 Colombia 337 66 Jamaica 1250 66 Colombia 1219
67 Domin. Rep. 336 67 Ivory Coast 1242 67 Jordan 1147
68 Malaysia 319 68 Colombia 1241 68 El Salvador 1121
69 Papua New G. 317 69 Mauritius 1170 69 Congo 1031
70 El Salvador 287 70 Domin. Rep. 1164 70 Albania 1016
71 Zimbabwe 287 71 Peru 1161 71 Ecuador 1005
72 Tunisia 281 72 Guatemala 1139 72 Paraguay 990
73 Korea, S. 279 73 Nigeria 1125 73 Cameroon 986
74 Ecuador 277 74 Congo 1022 74 Domin. Rep. 953
75 Mauritius 271 75 Botswana 990 75 Guatemala 949
76 Ivory Coast 271 76 Morocco 971 76 Papua New G. 926
77 Honduras 263 77 Bolivia 900 77 Morocco 916
78 Jordan 258 78 Papua New G. 896 78 Syria 884
79 Morocco 258 79 Albania 881 79 Ivory Coast 849
80 Ghana 257 80 El Salvador 788 80 Nicaragua 792
81 Egypt 255 81 Nicaragua 786 81 Philippines 728
82 Paraguay 253 82 Cameroon 779 82 Senegal 690
83 Bolivia 234 83 Zimbabwe 751 83 Angola 665
84 Liberia 224 84 Philippines 729 84 Honduras 660
85 Congo 217 85 Honduras 695 85 Egypt 652
86 Senegal 208 86 Thailand 688 86 Zimbabwe 625
87 Thailand 198 87 Zambia 677 87 Bolivia 609
88 Uganda 197 88 Senegal 536 88 Indonesia 520
89 Sri Lanka 190 89 Egypt 526 89 Liberia 497
90 Philippines 187 90 Indonesia 517 90 Haiti 439
91 Cameroon 175 91 Somalia 515 91 Guinea 432
92 Nigeria 175 92 Liberia 488 92 Sri Lanka 405
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Appendix P, Part 2. (cont’d)
Ra Country GDP/C
1970
Ra Country GDP/C
1980
Ra Country GDP/C
1990
93 Sudan 167 93 Niger 454 93 Afghanistan 400
94 Pakistan 162 94 Togo 432 94 Zambia 388
95 Sierra Leone 156 95 Kenya 426 95 Pakistan 386
96 Kenya 148 96 Gambia 425 96 China 381
97 Angola 137 97 Guinea 385 97 Togo 381
98 Botswana 134 98 Madagascar 372 98 Cen. Afr. Rep. 374
99 Madagascar 133 99 Angola 363 99 Kenya 357
100 Togo 130 100 Cen. Afr. Rep. 343 100 Benin 355
101 Gambia 116 101 Sierra Leone 337 101 Ghana 353
102 China 111 102 Benin 336 102 Gambia 334
103 Mozambique 108 103 Pakistan 333 103 India 317
104 India 104 104 China 305 104 Rwanda 310
105 Myanmar 104 105 Sri Lanka 279 105 Myanmar 303
106 Tanzania 101 106 Tanzania 279 106 Niger 266
107 Bangladesh 97 107 Lesotho 274 107 Sierra Leone 251
108 Cen. Afr. Rep. 97 108 Haiti 267 108 Sudan 240
109 Niger 96 109 India 250 109 Mali 236
110 Zaire 95 110 Mali 243 110 Lesotho 234
111 Afghanistan 93 111 Zaire 234 111 Bangladesh 218
112 Benin 93 112 Burundi 230 112 Burkina Faso 216
113 Somalia 93 113 Rwanda 225 113 Burundi 207
114 Chad 89 114 Afghanistan 219 114 Malawi 195
115 Indonesia 79 115 Sudan 209 115 Somalia 173
116 Nepal 75 116 Chad 205 116 Uganda 173
117 Haiti 73 117 Malawi 201 117 Chad 165
118 Malawi 71 118 Mozambique 199 118 Nepal 164
119 Burundi 70 119 Burkina Faso 185 119 Nigeria 157
120 Lesotho 66 120 Bangladesh 179 120 Madagascar 139
121 Mali 63 121 Myanmar 165 121 Tanzania 107
122 Rwanda 58 122 Nepal 131 122 Zaire 102
123 Burkina Faso 54 123 Uganda 124 123 Mozambique 84
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APPENDIX Q - Gross National Product Per Capita (GNP/C, $US) Growth Rates
All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country . GNP/C GNP/C GNP/C Country GNP/C GNP/C GNP/C Country GNP/CGNP/C GNP/C
1965/ 1980/ 1965/ 1965/ 1980/ 1965/ 1965/ 1980/ 1965/
1980 1992 1990 1980 1992 1990 1980 1992 1990
Afghanistan 0.6 N/A N/A Indonesia 5.2 4.0 4.5 Spain 4.1 2.9 2.4
Albania N/A -3.2 N/A Iran 29 -1.4 0.1 Sri Lanka 28 2 6 29
Algeria 4.2 -0.5 21 Iraq 0.6 N/A N/A Sudan 0.8 -0.2 0.0
Angola 0.6 -0.9 N/A Ireland 28 3.4 3.0 Sweden 20 1.5 1.9
Argentina 1.7 -0.9 -0.3 Israel 3.7 1.9 26 Switzerland 1.5 1.4 1.4
Australia 22 1.6 1.9 Italy 3.2 22 3.0 Syria 5.1 -1.4 2 9
Austria 4.0 20 2 9 Ivory Coast 28 -4.7 0.5 Tanzania 0.8 0.0 -0.2
Bangladesh -0.3 1.8 0.7 Jamaica -0.1 0.2 -1.3 Thailand 4.4 6.0 4.4
Barbados 3.5 1.0 N/A Japan 5.1 3.6 4.1 Togo 1.7 -1.8 -0.1
Belgium 3.6 2.0 2 6 Jordan 5.8 -5.4 N/A Trinid &T. 3.1 -2.6 0.0
Benin -0.3 -0.7 -0.1 Kenya 3.1 0.2 1.9 Tunisia 4.7 1.3 3.2
Bolivia 1.7 -1.5 -0.7 Korea, S. 7.3 8.5 7.1 Turkey 3.6 2 9 2 6
Botswana 9.9 6.1 &4 Kuwait 0.6 -4.3 -4.0 UAE 0.6 -4.3 N/A
Brazil 6.3 0.4 3.3 Lesotho 6.8 -0.5 4.9 Uganda -2.2 2.0 -2.4
Bulgaria N/A 1.2 N/A Liberia 0.5 N/A N/A UK 20 2 4 20
Burkina Faso 1.7 1.0 1.3 Libya 0.6 N/A -3.0 Uruguay 25 -1.0 0.8
Burundi 24 1.3 3.4 Luxembourg 3.9 3.3 N/A USA 1.8 1.7 1.7
Cameroon 2 4 -1.5 3.0 Madagascar -0.4 -24 -1.9 USSR N/A 1.0 N/A
Canada 3.3 1.8 2 7 Malawi 3.2 -0.1 0.9 Venezuela 23 -0.8 -1.0
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.8 -1.5 -0.5 Malaysia 4.7 3.2 4.0 Y ugoslavia N/A N/A 2.9
Chad -1.9 3.4 -1.1 Mali 21 -2.7 1.7 Zaire -1.3 -1.8 -2.2
Chile -0.1 3.7 0.4 Malta 8.7 3.8 N/A Zambia -1.2 2 2 -1.9
China 4.1 7.6 5.8 Mauritius 3.7 5.6 3.2 Zimbabwe 1.7 -0.9 0.7
Colombia 3.7 1.4 23 Mexico 3.6 -0.2 28
Congo 27 -0.8 3.1 Morocco 27 1.4 23
Costa Rica 3.3 0.8 1.4 Mozambique 0.6 -3.6 N/A
Cuba 0.6 N/A N/A Myanmar 1.6 N/A N/A
Cyprus 5.5 5.0 N/A Nepal 0.1 20 0.5
Czech. N/A 0.5 N/A Netherlands 27 1.7 1.8
Denmark 22 21 21 New Zealand 1.7 0.6 1.1
Domin. Rep. 3.8 -0.5 23 Nicaragua -0.7 -5.3 -3.3
Ecuador 5.4 -0.3 2.8 Niger -2.5 -4.3 -2.4
Egypt 28 1.8 4.1 Nigeria 4.2 -0.4 0.1
El Salvador 1.5 0.0 -0.4 Norway 3.6 22 3.4
Finland 3.6 20 3.2 Pakistan 1.8 3.1 2 5
France 3.7 1.7 2.4 Panama 28 -1.2 1.4
Gabon 5.6 -3.7 0.9 Papua NG. 0.6 0.0 0.1
Gambia 23 -0.4 N/A Paraguay 4.1 -0.7 4.6
GDR N/A N/A N/A Peru 0.8 -2.8 -0.2
Germany, W. 3.0 2 4 2 4 Philippines 3.2 -1.0 1.3
Ghana -0.8 -0.1 -1.4 Poland 1.5 0.1 N/A
Greece 4.8 1.0 2 8 Portugal 4.6 3.1 3.0
Guatemala 3.0 -1.5 0.7 Romania N/A -1.1 N/A
Guinea 1.3 1.3 N/A Rwanda 1.6 -0.6 1.0
Haiti 0.9 -2.4 0.2 Saudi Arabia 0.6 -3.3 2 6
Honduras 1.1 -0.3 0.5 Senegal -0.5 0.1 -0.6
Hong Kong 6.2 5.5 6.2 Sierra Leone 0.7 -1.4 0.0
Hungary 5.1 0.2 5.1 Singapore 8.3 5.3 6.5
Iceland 26 1.5 N/A Somalia -0.1 -2.3 -0.1
India 1.5 3.1 1.9 South Africa 3.2 0.1 1.3
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APPENDIX R - Post-1990 Data (PRI, HDI and GDP)*
All Countries (Alphabetical Order)
Country PRI
1989/
1991
PRI
1998
PRI
1990/
1998
Avg.
HDI
1997
HDI
Shortf Red. 
Rate (%) 
1990-97
GDP 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
1990-98
Albania 7.0 4.0 5.5 0.699 -0.9 1.8
Algeria 5.3 6.0 5.7 0.665 7.5 1.2
Argentina 1.3 3.0 2.2 0.827 12.1 5.3
Australia 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.922 35.0 3.6
Austria 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.904 16.5 2.0
Bangladesh 4.3 2.0 3.2 0.440 6.8 4.8
Benin 6.7 2.0 4.4 0.421 7.2 4.6
Bolivia 2.0 1.0 1.5 0.652 10.6 4.2
Botswana 1.3 2.0 1.7 0.609 -18.5 4.8
Brazil 2.0 3.0 2.5 0.739 10.7 3.3
Bulgaria 5.7 2.0 3.9 0.758 -8.5 -3.3
Burkina Faso 6.3 5.0 5.7 0.304 2.1 3.5
Burundi 7.0 7.0 7.0 0.341 -3.0 -3.2
Cameroon 6.0 7.0 6.5 0.536 0.6 0 .6
Canada 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.932 10.4 2.2
Cen. Afr. Rep. 6.0 3.0 4.5 0.378 -1.0 1.5
Chad 6.7 6.0 6.4 0.393 4.4 4.6
China 6.7 7.0 6.9 0.701 20.7 11.1
Congo 6.7 7.0 6.9 0.533 0.3 1.0
Costa Rica 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.801 8.2 3.7
Denmark 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.905 17.0 2.8
Dominican Rep. 1.3 2.0 1.7 0.726 10.7 5.5
Ecuador 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.747 7.6 2.9
Egypt 5.0 6.0 5.5 0.616 10.2 4.2
Finland 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.913 18.1 2.0
France 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.918 20.5 1.5
Ghana 6.0 3.0 4.5 0.544 7.9 4.2
Greece 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.867 13.6 2.0
Guatemala 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.624 8.8 4.2
Guinea 6.7 6.0 6.4 0.398 7.0 5.0
Honduras 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.641 6.4 3.6
Hong Kong 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.888 15.2 4.4
Indonesia 5.3 6.0 5.7 0.681 13.8 5.8
Ireland 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.900 27.0 7.5
Italv 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.900 20.0 1.2
Ivory Coast 6.0 6.0 6.0 0.422 1.0 3.5
Japan 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.924 19.5 1.3
Kenya 6.0 6.0 6.0 0.519 -5.4 2.2
Korea, S. 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.852 24.6 6.2
Lesotho 6.0 4.0 5.0 0.582 2.9 7.2
Malawi 6.7 2.0 4.4 0.399 5.1 3.9
Malaysia 4.7 5.0 4.9 0.768 17.7 7.7
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Appendix R (cont’d)
Country PRI
1989/
1991
PRI
1998
PRI
1990/
1998
Avg.
HDI
1997
HDI
Shortf Red. 
Rate (%) 
1990-97
GDP 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
1990-98
Mali 6.0 3.0 4.5 0.375 8.3 3.7
Morocco 4.0 5.0 4.5 0.582 9.2 2.1
Mozambique 6.0 3.0 4.5 0.341 1.1 5.7
Nepal 3.7 3.0 3.3 0.463 8.8 4.8
Netherlands 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.921 23.7 2.6
New Zealand 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.901 22.7 3.2
Niger 6.7 7.0 6.9 0.298 2.1 1.9
Nigeria 5.3 6.0 5.7 0.456 6.3 2.6
Norway 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.927 33.1 3.9
Pakistan 3.3 4.0 3.7 0.508 9.6 4.1
Paraguay 4.7 4.0 4.4 0.730 8.0 2.8
Peru 2.3 5.0 3.7 0.739 12.2 5.9
Philippines 2.3 2.0 2.2 0.740 10.1 3.3
Poland 3.7 1.0 2.3 0.802 10.0 4.5
Portugal 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.858 23.3 2.3
Romania 6.7 2.0 4.4 0.752 2.8 -0.6
Rwanda 6.0 7.0 6.5 0.379 8.5 -3.3
Saudi Arabia 6.7 7.0 6.9 0.740 11.1 1.6
Senegal 3.7 4.0 3.8 0.426 5.6 3.0
Singapore 4.0 5.0 4.5 0.888 32.5 8.0
South Africa 5.3 1.0 3.2 0.695 -1.8 1.6
Spain 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.894 18.5 1.9
Sri Lanka 3.7 3.0 3.3 0.721 8.9 5.3
Sweden 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.923 7.1 1.2
Thailand 2.3 2.0 2.2 0.753 12.9 7.4
Togo 6.0 6.0 6.0 0.469 2.4 2.3
Tunisia 5.3 6.0 5.7 0.695 15.2 4.4
Uganda 5.7 4.0 4.9 0.404 6.4 7.4
UK 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.918 33.5 2.2
Uruguay 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.826 11.7 3.9
USA 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.927 17.9 2.9
USSR/Russia 5.7 4.0 4.9 0.757 -18.5 -7.0
Venezuela 1.0 2.0 1.5 0.792 5.2 2.0
Zambia 6.0 5.0 5.5 0.431 -5.4 1.0
Zimbabwe 6.0 5.0 5.5 0.560 -12.6 2.0
Notes. The sources for the data are given in Chapter 8 (section 8.2). PRI means Political Rights Index 
(Gastil).
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